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THE IMPACT OF THE PSYCHICAL RESEARCH  
MOVEMENT ON THE LITERARY THEORY AND LITERARY  
CRITICISM OF FREDERIC W. H. MYERS.

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THE IMPACT OF THE PSYCHICAL RESEARCH MOVEMENT ON THE  
LITERARY THEORY AND LITERARY CRITICISM OF  
FREDERIC W. H. MYERS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO  
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By  
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## PREFACE

Our purpose in this study is to evaluate the impact of the psychological research movement of the Victorian period on Victorian literary theory and criticism, particularly the literary theory and criticism of Frederic W. H. Myers.

Myers is at the center of our study for two significant reasons. Firstly, he played a key role in the establishment of the Society for Psychological Research (S.P.R.) and was that Society's most brilliant, productive and imaginative figure. Secondly, a fine classicist, a minor poet, an important literary critic and a significant literary theoretician, Myers was deeply involved in the literature and letters of the Victorian period. Moreover, more than any other comparable figure in the period, Myers' literary studies illuminate the impact of psychological research on Victorian literary culture. It is Myers who best illustrates the integration of literary criticism, literary theory and psychological research in the Victorian period.

Our study will be divided into six chapters. In our first chapter we shall demonstrate through example and illustration that the psychological research movement was a movement of significant proportion having its own unique and peculiar Victorian character. Beginning with Myers' "Introduction" to Phantasms of the Living (1886) we shall trace the antecedents of this work to an interest in

psychical research at Oxford and Cambridge, to the first principles and original purposes of the Metaphysical Society, and to nineteenth century developments in the fields of psychology and anthropology. We shall also demonstrate the impact of the psychical research movement on the Synthetic Society, the successor to the Metaphysical Society and the last great Victorian attempt to come to grips with the conflict of religion and science.

Our second chapter will be a study of Myers' earliest attitudes toward poetry. A classicist by education, Myers initially endeavored to rework the classical notion of literary imitation into a coherent theory of poetry roughly approximating a vindication of "pure poetry." At this stage of his development, Myers was untouched by the psychical research movement. Yet only through an understanding of his earliest critical assumptions can we adequately comprehend the new directions his criticism and theorizing was to take as a consequence of his involvement in the psychical research movement.

Our third chapter is almost wholly biographical. Our purpose here will be to trace Myers' development from aesthete to psychical researcher. In determining what initiated Myers' interest in psychical research we will, in effect, determine why the psychical research movement became the significant movement it did become in the Victorian period. Myers' biography is a distinctively Victorian biography.

Our fourth chapter will be a study of themes and problems in Myers' literary criticism and essays written in the years immedi-

ately prior to the founding of the S.P.R. in 1882. After isolating the general characteristics of Myers' essays of this period, we shall illustrate with specific examples how these themes and problems manifested themselves in particular essays. Myers' critical theories and critical assumptions at this stage of his development were significantly different from those of the previous decade. These differences, we shall demonstrate, were a consequence of his involvement with the psychical research movement.

Our fifth chapter is a detailed study of Myers' work as a psychical researcher. Taking a cue from Plato, Myers believed that the answer to the problem of man's relationship to the universe around him ultimately lay in a careful investigation of human personality and human faculties. Initially, the investigations of Myers in the areas of mesmerism, automatism and telepathy were carried out in comparative isolation from the trends of psychological experimentation then popular in England. Ultimately, however, the movement merged with new developments in psychology taking place in Germany, France and America. Myers' interests changed from the slow and painstaking collection of psychological data to the setting forth of a theory which would account for the existence of a wide variety of mental and physical phenomena, normal, abnormal and supernormal. This theory, the theory of the subliminal self, was called by William James the single most important psychological theory to emerge from the nineteenth century.

Myers' theory of the subliminal introduced a whole new set of responses with respect to his attitudes toward art and poetry.

Myers believed that "Psychical Research is the left wing of Experimental Psychology." Consequently, his new responses toward poetry and art were the responses of a psychologist with a distinctive psychological theory. In our sixth chapter, we shall briefly trace psychology's general attitude toward literature and art in the latter part of the nineteenth century. We shall then elucidate Myers' own ideas on the relationship of psychology and literature, drawing on his statements about creativity and invention in his later work on psychical research and supernormal phenomena.

In conclusion, I wish to thank the following libraries for giving me permission to examine their manuscripts and other materials relating to the subject matter of this thesis: the University Library, Cambridge; Trinity College Library, Cambridge; Bristol University Library; the Library of the Society for Psychical Research; the Brotherton Library of the University of Leeds; Yale University Library. I am especially indebted to Mrs. E. Q. Nicholson and the Bristol University Library for giving me permission to quote from materials in their possession. Mrs. Nicholson, Myers' granddaughter, was invaluable in her encouragement and her kindness.

## CHAPTER I

### PSYCHICAL RESEARCH IN THE VICTORIAN AGE

#### Introduction

One of the real difficulties attendant upon any discussion of psychical research in the Victorian age is the difficulty of defining terms. In The Nightside of Nature: Ghosts and Ghost Seers, published in the 1840's,<sup>1</sup> Catherine Crowe wrote that the aim of her work was to explore "all that class of phenomena which appears to throw light on our psychical nature and on the probable state of the soul after death."<sup>2</sup> Dreams, presentiments, trances, wraiths, doppelgangers, apparitions, troubled spirits, haunted houses, spectral lights, poltergeists, palingenesia, corpse-candles, second sight, stigmata, divining rods and amulets were among the "psychical" phenomena which her book discussed and illustrated. Her method was almost wholly anecdotal. In the 1850's the physician Herbert Mayo published the second edition of his widely read little book, On the Truths Contained in Popular Superstitions, with an Account of Mesmerism.<sup>3</sup> Mayo took up a variety of so-called "popular superstitions"—ecstatica, sorcery, seership, ghosts, oracles, possession, witchcraft and doubles. His purpose, he argued, was to find the bases of scientific fact upon which these superstitions rested. His method was to compare such superstitions with



well known physical, physiological and psychological facts to demonstrate by analogy the possibility of truth in such superstitions.

In 1874, Alfred Russell Wallace published two lengthy essays in the Fortnightly Review entitled "A Defense of Modern Spiritualism."<sup>4</sup> The primary materials with which Wallace's articles were concerned were mediumship and spirit photography. Wallace's purpose in his essays was to dispel existing prejudice which might prevent the acceptance of spiritualistic phenomena as spiritistic. His arguments and methods consisted of arguments from history and from authority. He concluded his defense with a lengthy discussion of the moral, educational, philosophical, scientific and religious consequences which a belief in the validity of spiritistic phenomena can lead to. When the British Society for Psychical Research was organized in 1882, its initial statement of purpose mapped out six areas for research and investigation, suggesting the Society's aims, methods and subject matters: an examination of the nature and extent of any influence which may be exerted by one mind upon another, apart from any generally recognized modes of perception; the study of hypnotism and the forms of so-called mesmeric trance, clairvoyance and other allied phenomena; a critical revision of Reichenbach's researches into certain organizations called "sensitive"; a careful investigation of any reports, resting on strong testimony, regarding apparitions at the moment of death or otherwise, or regarding disturbances in houses reputed to be haunted; an inquiry into various physical phenomena commonly called spiritualistic with an attempt to discover their causes and general laws; and the collec-

tion and collation of existing materials bearing on the history of these subjects.<sup>5</sup>

Each of these exemplary attempts to define psychical phenomena and the province of psychical research differed in its materials for investigation and its investigative procedures. Each was also limited by the historical moment in which it was written and by the thematic preconceptions of its author or authors. Crowe's thesis was to prove life after death. Mayo tried to account for a variety of popular superstitions by fitting them into generally accepted scientific theories. Wallace demonstrated the acceptability of spiritualism as a substitute for traditional religion. The S.P.R. initially was to collect evidences of a variety of phenomena, catalogue and classify them and ultimately, through objective means, to find out whether there was any truth in the phenomena or not. If there was, the society moved on to the statement of new laws to account for such phenomena. The Society for Psychical Research, not at first interested in witchcraft or vampyrism,<sup>6</sup> largely excluded such phenomena from its investigations. Neither Wallace, Mayo nor Crowe could speak of telepathy or psychical research, for neither of these terms had yet come into use. The original list of inquiries drawn up by the S.P.R. in 1882 did not and could not take into account new areas of investigation to which these initial investigations would lead before the close of the Victorian era—crystal gazing, automatic writing, the subliminal self and secondary conscious states, the mechanism of genius, multiple personality and posthypnotic suggestion.<sup>7</sup>

Clearly, the precise definition of such terms as psychical research or psychical phenomena is something of an impossibility. We can perhaps do no better than to say with Andrew Lang that when we use the term psychical research in this dissertation we are using a term "which may be defined, partially, as an examination into the amount of truth contained in world-wide superstitions" by whatever methods the researcher deems appropriate.<sup>8</sup>

One of the purposes of this study is to suggest that the psychical research movement was one of the more significant aspects of Victorian culture, a thesis which can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. The movement initiated many new words and terms which entered the English language during the Victorian period. Among them were such terms as "psychical research," "automatic writing," "telepathy," "subliminal self." A bibliography listing the large number of articles and reports which deal specifically with psychical research in general periodicals of the period, excluding those specifically connected with psychical research or spiritualism, would be extensive.<sup>9</sup> It would draw on such periodicals as the Century, the Review of Reviews,<sup>10</sup> the Contemporary Review, the Spectator, the Quarterly Review, the Edinburgh Review, the Nineteenth Century, Mind, Overland Monthly, the National Review, the Arena, and Popular Science. Autobiographies and chronicles of the age ranging from that of Henry Adams<sup>11</sup> to the spicier comments of Frank Harris<sup>12</sup> make frequent reference to the subject. Numerous books and periodicals appearing at the end of the century which were largely testimonials to the intellectual achieve-

ments of the nineteenth century frequently give psychical research a prominent chapter.<sup>13</sup> If one were to compare the 11th edition of the Britannica with the 9th edition for purposes of illustrating what took place in the development of knowledge and intellectual interests in the last twenty five years of the Victorian period, one would again find our thesis amply demonstrated.

From one point of view, of course, a Victorian interest in popular superstition was a consequence of the Victorian inheritance of the Romantic movement, for even though it is true, as Lang wrote, that "at various periods, and in proportion to the scientific methods of the ages, attempts have been made to examine these things scientifically,"<sup>14</sup> the Romantic Movement pointed to an intensified recrudescence of interest in things psychic, supernormal or supernatural. Scott published several books and essays on ghosts and demonology.<sup>15</sup> Byron and Shelley, as their earlier biographers tell us, took a keen interest in doppelgangers, doubles and phantasms.<sup>16</sup> Coleridge was intensely interested in a variety of psychical phenomena, particularly ghosts and mesmerism.<sup>17</sup> Wordsworth not only used the vocabulary of the occult to describe the creative act, the mental operations of the poet and the effects of metre, but he also took delight in recording in poetic form those superstitions of a psychic character which were a part of the locale of his beloved Lake Country.<sup>18</sup>

This "romantic" inheritance can account, perhaps, for George Eliot's continual reworking of the willow-wand episode of Adam Bede because she believed it so excellent a characterization of Adam's primitivistic thoughts and beliefs.<sup>19</sup> The same inheritance also

accounts for Hardy's remarks to William Archer that he would give ten years of his life to see a ghost, "an authentic indubitable spectre." "The material world is so uninteresting, human life is so miserably bounded, circumscribed, cabin'd, crabb'd, confined. I want another domain for the imagination to expatiate in. . . . A ghost story that should convince me would make me a happier man."<sup>20</sup>

What was true of the first Romantics was also true of those whom Graham Hough calls "the Last Romantics." Rossetti's poetry, prose and biography are filled with comments and allusions to crystal gazing, scrying, spiritualism, table turnings, doppelgangers, apparitions, hallucinations and phantasms.<sup>21</sup> Morris' Icelandic sagas and other translations demonstrate that he too had a knowledge of seership and crystal gazing. Under the tutelage of Lady Mount-Temple, Ruskin believed he successfully raised Rose La Touche from the dead.<sup>22</sup> His experiences suggested to him a new hope for a future life, and he was one of the original founders of the S.P.R. Almost all of Pater's strange souls were by his own description psychics, occultists, or supernaturalists.<sup>23</sup> Yeats' interest in these phenomena is too well-known to need comment here.

To argue that Victorians were interested in psychical phenomena and psychical research solely because of their romantic inheritance would, however, vastly oversimplify the complex historical and cultural causes which made an interest in the movement among a variety of Victorian intellectuals so widespread. Briefly, we might list here some of these causes which had a peculiarly Victorian character and

which we shall encounter from time to time in our text: the rhetoric of Victorian science, involving circumstantial, definitive, jurisdictional and qualitative issues;<sup>24</sup> the survival of the work of the early mesmerists and the revival of an interest in mesmerism and hypnosis as an effective anaesthesia and a therapeutic tool in the treatment of mental and physical abnormality;<sup>25</sup> the impetus which hypnosis gave to the mapping out of man's inner world, his subconscious and his latent mental faculties; the introduction of Spiritualism from America to England both as a parlor game among the rich and as a religion among those seeking a satisfactory substitute for the older orthodoxy;<sup>26</sup> new developments and discoveries in classical and primitive anthropology;<sup>27</sup> an increase in scientific dilettantism and scientific curiosity furthered by the still amateur status of Victorian science;<sup>28</sup> the endeavor to find a workable solution to the conflict of religion and science both by empiricists and idealists; a "revolt" from Victorian "rationalism" expressing itself in new fashions of orientalism, primitivism and mysticism.<sup>29</sup>

Whereas psychical research was at one time an individual activity, in the Victorian age it became the principal interest of a number of significant organizations ranging from the Theosophy Society and the London Spiritualist Alliance to the British Folklore Society. In England, F. W. H. Myers, W. F. Barrett, Edmund Gurney, and Henry Sidgwick helped to found the British Society for Psychical Research. A similar organization took root in America under the guidance of

William James, Walter and Morton Prince, Josiah Royce, and Richard Hodgson. In Germany, Max Dessoir and Schrenk-Notzing founded the Berlin Society for Psychical Research. In France, Charles Richet organized the Société de Psychologie Physiologique.<sup>30</sup>

To summarize briefly, then, the psychical research movement was a most significant Victorian intellectual development which had its own peculiar consequences and its own complex system of causes. As a result, almost anyone who had anything to say in the period had something to say about psychical research, whether he believed there was any truth in the psychic experience or not. Huxley, Tyndall and Clifford took note of the movement but were vocally unanimous in their disbelief of the genuineness of the experiences being investigated. "There was no room for ghosts," Clifford argued, "in this world of ether and atoms."<sup>31</sup> Other prominent scientists such as Crookes, Wallace, Rayleigh, and De Morgan disagreed. In their own characteristic ways, Shaw and Wilde made fun of the movement. Tennyson, Hutton, Ruskin, and Watts took the movement seriously. Psychologists such as Sully, Maudsley and Carpenter saw little if anything "psychic" about psychical phenomena. Yet Theodore Flournoy, William James and Henri Bergson contributed both their time and energy to the S.P.R., Bergson (1913) and James (1894-1895) at one time holding the Presidency of the Society. Anthropologists like Tylor, Frazer and Spencer saw only evidences of primitive mentality when recording psychic experiences and beliefs among the uncivilized. Andrew Lang and Leon Marillier were not so quick to dismiss such beliefs as untruths. Although the Con-

tinental clergy, primarily Catholic,<sup>32</sup> opposed psychical research, the English clergy were often of a different mind. Dean Church once told W.T. Stead that "the phenomena of apparitions belong at present to this category of waste whose secret we have not yet mastered, and that secret may be the key which we need to unlock the gate which now bars us from wide fields of knowledge."<sup>33</sup> The Archbishop of Canterbury (E.A. Benson), the Bishop of Carlisle (J. Estlin Carpenter) and the Bishop of Ripon (Harvey Goodwin) all agreed with Church. Goodwin published an important series of articles on the religious and psychological implications of apparitions in the Contemporary Review<sup>34</sup> and Carpenter undertook the Presidency of the S.P.R.

#### Phantasms of the Living

In 1886, the Society for Psychical Research published its first book-length study for public perusal, Phantasms of the Living. Essentially a study of spontaneous and experimental telepathy, Phantasms was an epoch-making work in the sense that it laid the foundation for a new subject and still remains a classic indispensable to all students in its own field.<sup>35</sup> The large and unwieldy two volumes were written by Edmund Gurney, psychologist, musicologist and aesthete, Frederic W.H. Myers, classical scholar, poet and essayist, and Frank Podmore, postal-service employee, social "revolutionary," and one of the original founders of the Fabian Society. If Phantasms is significant for the psychical researcher and for those interested in the history of experimental psychology and parapsychology, it is equally significant for anyone interested in the intellectual history of the late Victorian age.



Phantasms was published under the auspices of an interesting and diversified group of Victorian intellectuals who called themselves the Society for Psychical Research.<sup>36</sup> Officially organized in 1882<sup>37</sup> for purposes of studying paranormal experiences and their analysis by scientific methodology, the Society was one of the real moving forces in the late Victorian intellectual world. The "Preface" of the book lists the important members of the Society who were all directly or indirectly responsible for the publication of the volume through their endorsement of the aims of the Society and through their financial support of the activities which the Society carried on. Henry Sidgwick was President of the Society. Myers and Gurney were Secretaries. Vice-Presidents were Arthur Balfour, Richard Holt Hutton, Roden Noel, the Bishops of Ripon and Carlisle, W. F. Barrett, and Lord Rayleigh. A. F. Watts, Lord Tennyson and John Ruskin were among those listed as Honorary Members of the Society. The Council of the Society consisted of men like Oliver Lodge, Balfour Stewart, J. J. Thompson, Arthur Macalister, and J. G. Adams. Corresponding Members of the Society included William James and Stanley Hall from America, Eduard Von Hartmann from Germany, Professors Kovalesky, Wagner and Dobroslavin from Russia, Hippolyte Taine, Lucien Janet, Charles Richet, Jule Liégeois, Henri Bernheim and Theodore Ribot from France. This list suggests the broad character of the Society and the variety of intellectuals who considered the activities of the Society of some importance.

The reviews and comments on Phantasms suggest the various attitudes which the late Victorian community took toward the general

subject of telepathy.<sup>38</sup> Shaw, writing in the Pall Mall Gazette, spoofed the subject matter. "The existence of a liar is more probable than the existence of a ghost," he wrote.<sup>39</sup> Wilde complained in the Nineteenth Century that "ours is certainly the dullest and most prosaic century possible. Why even sleep has played us false, and has closed up the gates of ivory and opened the gates of horn. The dreams of the great middle classes of this country as recorded in Mr. Myers' two bulky volumes on the subject and in the Transactions of the Psychical Society [sic] are the most depressing things I have ever read."<sup>40</sup> The reviewer in the Spectator took the volumes seriously and suggested that telepathy was a newly-found fact in nature, one which had significant bearing on the problem of science and religion.<sup>41</sup> The reviewers in Mind,<sup>42</sup> the Revue Philosophique,<sup>43</sup> and the American Journal of Psychology<sup>44</sup> thought the work worthy of serious, detailed and considered criticism.

Most important, Phantasms is a significant document because of F. W. H. Myers' remarkable "Introduction" to the two volumes.<sup>45</sup> This "Introduction" goes far beyond a statement of the nature of the evidence for experimental telepathy and a summary of the results the study achieved. In a very real sense it is something of a manifesto, calling attention, loud and clear, to the significance of psychical research in the late Victorian age. The "Introduction" is one of the most important Victorian statements on the cultural, intellectual, religious and scientific significance of psychical research. To accomplish his purpose, Myers draws out the numerous relationships and

interconnections between what Phantasms undertook to do and what other valid scientific and philosophic inquiries were at that time doing. In particular, Myers argued that psychical research was specifically relevant to the work of the psychologist and psychophysicist, the historian,<sup>46</sup> the biographer, the student of comparative religions, the student of the history of religion and the man of letters, who today, Myers argued, is the most important "discourser on things spiritual." The Arnolds, Emersons, Renans, Tennysons and Carlyles point out how fundamental and profound is the divorce among educated men of the emotional and the scientific creed. By the extension of science into new but vaguer realms of thought, an extension which psychical research attempts to make, science may at least suggest a possible reality in "those subtle intercommunications between spirit and spirit, and even between visible and invisible things, of which art and literature are still as full as in any Age of Faith which preceded us."<sup>47</sup>

Significantly, Myers' exposition draws out at once the relationship between psychical research and experimental psychology, a relationship which he believed to be fundamental to his argument but which sounds strange to twentieth century ears. We must remember, however, that experimental psychology in the 1880's and 1890's was a very different science from what it is today. When, for example, the First International Congress for Experimental Psychology convened in Paris in 1889, the largest segment of its membership was composed of researchers in that area of psychology which we now call abnormal psychology. The remainder of its membership was divided among the psycho-

physicists, who were followers of Fechner, and the French, German, English and American psychologists who were interested in the super-normal. The divisions between the three groups were not entirely clear and there was much overlapping of interests.<sup>48</sup> The psychophysicists, for example, undertook to continue Gurney's attempts at a Census of Hallucinations. The Second International Congress, held in London in 1892, had as its presiding officer Henry Sidgwick, then President of the S.P.R., and F.W.H. Myers was one of its two Secretaries.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, the relationship between psychical research and experimental psychology was so close that in many circles, Joseph Jastrow relates in his autobiography, a psychologist meant "a spook hunter."<sup>50</sup> Under the circumstances, for example, one should not be at all surprised to find out that Myers was the first Englishman to acknowledge and review the early work of Sigmund Freud.<sup>51</sup>

In this context, therefore, Myers' "Introduction" to Phantasms is a massive statement on a series of significant intellectual problems which both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries have had to face, problems which, for the most part, involve the relationship of the science of psychology to other intellectual disciplines. Myers' "Introduction" looks forward to the work of James, Thouless and others in the psychology of religion,<sup>52</sup> to Andrew Lang's remarkable biography of Joan of Arc,<sup>53</sup> to E. R. Dodd's study of the Greeks and the irrational,<sup>54</sup> to the application of psychology to anthropological and literary study in much the same vein as E.M. Chadwick's little classic, Poetry and Prophecy,<sup>55</sup> and to the animistic psychology of McDougall

and the idealistic and dynamic psychologies of Bergson and Dreisch.<sup>56</sup> More important for our purposes, however, is Myers' suggestion that psychical research and experimental psychology were areas of inquiry which offered a methodology and a subject matter which might make possible the solving of some of the most important and basic problems of the Victorian age--the problem of the conflict of religion and science, the problem of the limitations of science and positivism, the problem of the relationship of idealism and materialism, the problem of the validity or existence of miracle, the problem of the relationship of man's conscious self to his subconscious self and the problem of the possibility of a life beyond the grave.

#### Psychical Research and the Universities

Significantly, the three co-authors of Phantasms were university men. Podmore was an M.A. from Oxford,<sup>57</sup> and Myers and Gurney were M.A.'s from Cambridge. This is not accidental, for the two great ancient universities played a role in the development of Victorian interest in those phenomena which Phantasms undertook to analyze.

In the nineteenth century, Oxford was somewhat late in her expression of an interest in the investigation of paranormal phenomena and psychical research. This is rather curious, for in the figure of Glanvil she had the true beginnings of a psychical research tradition. Furthermore, there was a strong undercurrent of supernaturalism at Oxford at this time, but only Dean Church seems to have taken an interest in such things within the Oxford Movement itself. Even more important, the prevailing psychological and philosophical school at

Oxford was in the great tradition of post-Kantian Idealism and Kant, Hegel, and their followers (Coleridge is an illustration), took psychical and spiritualistic phenomena seriously.<sup>58</sup> Among the older British Idealists who dominated the Oxford scene in the last half of the century, however, Green "sniffed" his nose at such investigations,<sup>59</sup> Bradley waged war against spiritualists like Wallace,<sup>60</sup> Bosanquet thought the whole subject unworthy of serious discussion<sup>61</sup> and Andrew Seth, although writing an essay on the "new psychology," was totally unable to acclimate himself to the experimental tradition. He disagreed with Munsterberg's materialism and physiological and psychological automatism but was unable to find convincing arguments to disprove him.<sup>62</sup>

All was not darkness at Oxford, however. In April of 1872, for example, Mark Pattison delivered a paper to the Metaphysical Society on "The Argument for a Future Life."<sup>63</sup> Pattison argued that "the history of opinion offers not a few instances in which a given opinion remains widely diffused and the belief in it unimpaired, though the grounds on which it is based, or the arguments which pass current as its guarantees, have been from time to time remodelled." Applying this thesis to nineteenth century attitudes toward immortality, Pattison looked to Germany for a proper way to handle this problem. England, he argued, can learn something from German attempts to ground the argument for a future life on evidence offered from experimental psychology.

In the last ten years, nearly a dozen treatises in the subject, some of them considerable books, and reaching second editions,

have appeared. Especially in the philosophy of the younger Fichte, which starts from the individual as its basis, the question of our future destiny re-assumes an importance which it had lost in the reign of the Idea. . . . In Fichte's argument the last century reasoning is entirely dropped. He draws his proofs of the immortality of man entirely from empirical psychology, from the psychical phenomena of dreams, somnambulism, clairvoyance, ecstasy, etc.

What was true of the older Oxford Idealists was not necessarily true for their younger followers. Royce came under the influence of William James and became very much involved in psychical research.<sup>64</sup> He contributed frequently to the American Society for Psychical Research and his review of Phantasms of the Living in the American Journal of Psychology was the most extensive, and perhaps flattering, review that the volumes had then received. J. H. Muirhead, greatly influenced by the older Oxford thinkers and their first comprehensive and authoritative historian, also reflects the impact of the psychical research movement on the younger Idealists. In a paper published in the Contemporary Review, Muirhead rejected the predominant religious interpretation of much psychical phenomena, but he also rejected Bradley's scepticism and Bosanquet's lack of interest.<sup>65</sup> He found a basis for such investigations in those philosophers who formed the background and the tradition of the Oxford school, among them Plato and Hegel, and ultimately concluded that "as part of a wider philosophy the results of Psychical Research seem to me to be of the greatest theoretic interest and may even turn out to be of the greatest practical importance."<sup>66</sup>

Another Oxford man who took up the cudgels for psychical research was the philosopher and logician, F. C. S. Schiller. Describing

his own early career as a researcher, he records that when he came up to Oxford in 1882, he had found there a small but active band of psychical researchers which had been in existence for several years.

They were mostly undergraduates, with some recent graduates, not a few of whom, like Sir Charles Oman, the Bishop of Gloucester, and Dr. F. E. Brightman have since attained academic distinction. They were organized into a club called the Phasmatological Society, and they hunted ghost stories, and, whenever they got the chance, also ghosts. . . . Our procedure, when we had run down a ghost story, in as complete and first-hand a shape as it could be got, was to read it out at a meeting of the Society, and to try to "explain" it, i.e., to account for it by natural causes. If no natural explanation could be suggested . . . we voted the story "unexplained." Our idea was that when a sufficiently large number of unexplained stories had accumulated, the Society would solemnly proceed to formulate a theory that would go beyond the bounds of acknowledged science and explain them. You will note that our procedure was inspired by the strictest canons of Baconian induction. Needless to say, the "Phas" as we called it for short, never lived to complete its self-imposed task; and when the SPR was founded in 1882 in London we became a subsidiary to it, and ultimately presented our collection of stories to its archives.<sup>67</sup>

The Oxford Phasmatological Society was organized in the fall of 1879. Although it took its name from the most commonly discussed psychical phenomenon--ghosts--, its purpose was to investigate and to test a wide variety of alleged manifestations of the supernatural or supernatural such as premonitions, coincidences, inexplicable sounds, and things occult in general. Sir Charles Oman well describes the situation out of which the Society grew:

On October 29, 1879, a small meeting of undergraduates interested in Psychical Research--a term (by the way) which had not then been invented--sat in University College to discuss the formation of a society for the investigation of the occult. They were a chance assembly of people who all happened to have some curious story current in their own family or neighborhood which had puzzled them and deserved (as they conceived) further investigation. Each had supposed that his own particular problem was a unique one, and was surprised when he found someone else with a similar or parallel story. It was the discovery that there were so many such tales



abroad, far more than anyone had expected, which induced the original founders of the society to form themselves into a club for the investigation and testing of alleged manifestations of the supernatural.

This mentality was not at all a common phenomenon of the time, for the large majority of my contemporaries of 1879 had been brought up in a stalwart Victorian disbelief in all things abnormal and to profess interest in hauntings, apparitions or premonitions was likely to provoke kindly contempt from the healthy and normal undergraduate. The spirit of Dickens and Mr. Gradgrind was still abroad, and facts repugnant to common experience or common sense were put down by a large majority as deliberate inventions or at best cases of malobservation and careless reporting. Stories like Bulwer Lytton's House in Berkeley Square were pure fiction.<sup>68</sup>

The successive presidents of the "Phas" were E. Ridley, Charles Oman, A. P. Keep and Dr. Headlam. The Society lasted for six years and dissolved in 1885 when the original membership scattered and the others joined the more serious endeavors of the S.P.R. begun in 1882. In 1885, the Phasmatological Society turned over a large number of papers to the S.P.R. The papers were only initialed, however, and no names are attached which would suggest the investigators who carried out these studies.<sup>69</sup>

It was F. C. S. Schiller's argument that the Oxford Phasmatological Society of 1879 was the first systematic attempt at scientific inquiry into psychical research and, even though the S.P.R. itself was primarily Cantabrigian in character, Oxford deserved the credit for initiating such an undertaking. Clearly, Schiller was wrong. Cambridge had preceded Oxford in this kind of endeavor by thirty years. If one counts Tennyson's paper on ghosts to the Cambridge Conversazione Society in the late 1820's, one can say fifty years.<sup>70</sup> Hallam Tennyson stated that Tennyson was too shy to finish his paper. Perhaps,

his Apostolic audience was hostile to his subject matter, sceptical of what Buckley wrongly calls Tennyson's "black magic."<sup>71</sup> Whether they were or not we have no way of knowing, but we do know that when the next generation of intellectual leaders came up to Cambridge in the late 1840's and early 1850's, their scepticism and disinterestedness, perhaps because the first wave of spiritualism then was sweeping England, were dissipated and considerably tempered. In the early 1850's, for example, we find in existence at Cambridge a Cambridge "Ghostlie Guild" or, as its opponents called it, the Boogie Club or the Cock and Bull Club.<sup>72</sup> Membership in the Guild at this time included such men as F. J. A. Hort, Henry Bradshaw, Brooke Westcott, Arthur Gordon, Gerald Blunt, C. B. Scott, Henry Lunard, A. Barry and E. W. Benson, later the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The Guild was established early in the 1850's for purposes of investigating all supernatural appearances and effects. A committee was soon organized to draw up a paper explaining and justifying the inquiries of the Guild and inviting the communication of any sort of knowledge of any experiences of a supernatural nature. Westcott was saddled with the responsibility of drawing up a circular for this purpose.<sup>73</sup> The following is the "Introduction" to the Ghostlie Guild circular as it was approved by the membership in its final form:

The interest and importance of a serious and earnest inquiry into the nature of the phenomena which are vaguely called "supernatural" will scarcely be questioned. Many persons believe that all such apparently mysterious occurrences are due either to purely natural causes and to delusions of the mind or senses or to wilful deception. But there are many others who believe it possible that the

beings of the unseen world may manifest themselves to us in extraordinary ways, and also are unable otherwise to explain many facts the evidence for which cannot be impeached. Both parties have obviously a common interest in wishing cases of supposed "supernatural" agency to be thoroughly sifted. If the belief of the latter class should be ultimately confirmed, the limits which human knowledge respecting the spirit world has hitherto reached may be ascertained with some degree of accuracy.

But in any case, even if it should appear that morbid or irregular workings of the minds or senses will satisfactorily account for every such marvel, still some progress would be made towards ascertaining the laws which regulate our being, and thus adding to our scanty knowledge of an obscure but important province of science. The main impediment to investigations of this kind is the difficulty of retaining a sufficient number of clear and well attested cases. Many of the stories current in tradition, or scattered up and down in books, may be exactly true; others must be purely fictitious; others again, probably the greater number, consist of a mixture of truth and falsehood. But it is idle to examine the significance of an alleged fact of this nature until the trustworthiness and also the extent of the evidence for it are ascertained.

Impressed with this conviction, some members of the University of Cambridge are anxious, if possible, to form an extensive collection of authenticated cases of supposed "supernatural" agency. When the inquiry is once commenced, it will evidently be needful to seek for information beyond the limits of their own immediate circle. From all those, then, who may be inclined to aid them they request written communications, with full details of persons, times, and places; but it will not be required that names should be inserted without special permission, unless they have already become public property; it is, however, indispensable that the persons making any communication should be acquainted with the names, and should pledge himself for the truth of the narrative from his own knowledge or conviction.

The first object, then, will be the accumulation of an available body of facts; the use to be made of them must be a subject for future consideration; but in any case, the mere collection of trustworthy information will be of value. And it is manifest that great help in the inquiry may be derived from accounts of circumstances which have been at any time considered "supernatural" and afterwards proved to be due to delusions of the minds or senses or to natural causes (such for instance, as the operation of those strange and subtle forces which have been discovered and imperfectly investigated in recent times); and, in fact, generally from any particulars which may throw light indirectly, by analogy or otherwise, on the subjects with which the present investigation is more expressly concerned.<sup>74</sup>

Ultimately, Westcott's biographer tells us, this circular on the matter of spiritual phenomena had been "unceremoniously set aside" for several reasons, not the least of which was that it contained a number of words and phrases which were both alarming and unintelligible to the general public. Nevertheless, in the context of our subject matter here, it is a valuable document, for it was the first public statement of an organization which was to have a great impact on Cambridge intellectual life.

As one of Hort's letters suggests,<sup>75</sup> the Ghostlie Guild came in for heavy criticism. Macaulay was horrified at the circular and stated that it was evident "how much Puseyism" is spreading at Cambridge. An Edinburgh reviewer thought it highly unphilosophical to assume the existence of angels. Others, too, were appalled to find such a spot of medieval darkness flecking the light serene of Cambridge University in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Aside from criticism and scoffing, however, the same letter suggests the immense popularity of the Guild. Hort, for example, wrote to Chambers that he was sending him two Ghostlie papers. He remarked that he could have more copies if he wanted them, "but I find they go very fast, and the 750 copies which we had printed go by no means far enough." If we take into consideration the relative size of Cambridge in the mid 1850's, the rapid circulation of approximately 750 copies of a Prospectus for the Ghostlie Guild is an extraordinary figure.

There is no record to suggest that this curious anticipation of the S.P.R. obtained very satisfactory results or accomplished many

of their stated aims. Perhaps, its originators never went beyond the preliminary inquiry. In Prothero's biography of Bradshaw, however, Prothero says that he was informed by Sir Arthur Gordon that the Guild came to a conclusion very similar to that "which the modern Psychological Society has arrived at--namely, that while for the ordinary run of ghost stories there is nothing in the nature of trustworthy evidence, an exception must be made in favor of phantasms of the living, or appearances of persons at the point of death."<sup>76</sup>

Brief though its flirtation with ghosts and other paranormal experience was, the original Ghostlie Guild was to have a significant impact on Cambridge through the remainder of the nineteenth century. The key to the extensive development of the movement at Cambridge goes back to one of the original members of the Guild, E.W. Benson. After leaving Cambridge, Benson went to Rugby as a teacher. It was at Rugby that his young cousin and later brother-in-law, Henry Sidgwick, fell under his tutelage. Benson's influence was so strong on Sidgwick at this early date that it is not at all surprising to find that Sidgwick, while later matriculating at Cambridge, participated in some of the same psychical research activities which had interested his older mentor and friend.<sup>77</sup> In the Sidgwick Memoir, for example, the authors write:

He had before his degree (1859) joined the Ghost Society, which Archbishop Benson when at Cambridge had helped to found. Dr. West-Gott, afterwards Bishop of Durham, while in residence at Cambridge, had apparently acted as secretary; and in 1860 when he left for Harrow, we find him sending Sidgwick a story "produced by the old 'ghostlie circular,'" and adding, "I trust I am right in believing you are still engaged in the pursuit of the question."<sup>78</sup>

During the sixties, Sidgwick underwent the experience of deep religious doubt, and he broke away from his older traditional religious roots. Of importance here is that his interest in the subject of ghosts and spiritualism became involved with his attempts at unravelling his own theological and philosophical difficulties. He believed that the possibility of adequate evidence and proof for continued existence after death "could not be neglected either from a theological or an ethical point of view."<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, he was convinced that the study of comparative thaumatology required the careful and systematic investigation of such paranormal phenomena. Writing to Dakyns in 1864, for example, Sidgwick argued that "the vein to work now is comparative history. A comparative history of the mythical, and a comparative history of ecstasy, the past, especially the remote past, being, after all, always subordinate to the present. But what is still more required is psychological experiments in ethics and inductive theism."<sup>80</sup> With these ends in mind, Sidgwick kept the old Ghostlie Guild alive at Cambridge through the sixties and early seventies. Two other Apostles at this time, Jermyn Cowell and Roden Noel, joined him in his inquiries.<sup>81</sup>

In the middle 1870's, Sidgwick's rather private involvement with the investigation of these phenomena blossomed into a real movement at Cambridge which culminated in the founding of the S.P.R. Psychical research became one of the dominant themes of Cambridge intellectual life. Although this is a subject for a later chapter, we might quote here a few remarks made by Jane Ellen Harrison reminiscing upon her undergraduate days at Cambridge. They give a brief but il-

luminating glimpse into the impact of psychical research and the Ghost-lie Guild of the 1850's on Cambridge in the 1870's and 1880's:

Then there was the actual Cambridge academic circle—a brilliant circle it seems to me looking back. Cambridge society was then small enough to be one, and there were endless small, but not informal, dinner parties, Henry Sidgwick was the center and with him his two most intimate friends, Frederic Myers and Edmund Gurney. Frederic Myers rang, perhaps, the most seriously of all, but to me he always rang a little false. Edmund Gurney was, I think, the most lovable and beautiful human being I ever met. This was the Psychical Research circle; their quest, scientific proof of immortality. To put it thus always seems grotesque now; then it was inspiring. About this group from a wider world rayed Balfour, Jebb, and later rose a younger generation—the three Darwin sons, the Verralls, husband and wife. . . . And in the midst of them Mrs. Henry Sidgwick.<sup>82</sup>

#### Psychical Research, Science and the British Association

Phantasms of the Living attempted to account for specific psychical phenomena through a voluminous collection and sifting of evidential materials and the deduction from these materials of a scientifically acceptable theory suggesting their cause. As such, the volume calls attention to the increasing interest that science was beginning to take in psychical phenomena during these years; it also suggests the failure of science to come to grips with these problems.<sup>83</sup> Phantasms of the Living, one must remember, was really the first large scale attempt to do anything worthwhile along this line. The 1850's saw the publication of Mayo's Popular Superstitions and Faraday's famous account of table rapping published in the Times.<sup>84</sup> In 1863, William de Morgan, one of England's most prominent mathematicians, contributed an anonymous "Preface" to the book From Matter to Spirit: The Result of Ten Years Experience in Spirit Manifestations.<sup>85</sup> In the "Preface," De Morgan

argued that he had seen and heard "things called spiritual" which could not be explained adequately by imposture, coincidence or mistake. Current physical explanations were totally insufficient. The spiritual hypothesis was more rewarding, but, he added, it was ponderously difficult. Serious philosophical and scientific interest in psychical phenomena during this period can perhaps be accurately gauged by the inclusion of a chapter on "Swedenborgianism and Spiritualism" in David Masson's Contemporary British Philosophy, published in 1865.<sup>86</sup>

Whereas attempts to treat psychic phenomena scientifically in the 50's and 60's were only sporadic, the 1870's witnessed an extensive increase in serious attempts to get a fair hearing for psychic and spiritualistic phenomena from the scientific community. Early in the decade, the London Dialectical Society undertook an investigation of spiritualism.<sup>87</sup> In 1871, the physicist, William Crookes, began his experiments with the prominent medium, D.D. Home. He published his Researches in the Phenomena of Spiritualism in 1874.<sup>88</sup> 1877 saw the publication of William Benjamin Carpenter's Mesmerism and Spiritualism. Carpenter's concept of "unconscious cerebration" emerged directly from his studies of mesmerism and psychical and spiritualistic phenomena.<sup>89</sup> During this decade also, Alfred Wallace was publishing extensively on the reality of spirit manifestations in the Fortnightly and elsewhere. We might note here also that Balfour Stewart and P.G. Tait's The Unseen Universe: Physical Speculations on a Future State was initially published in 1878.<sup>90</sup>

Nevertheless, the validity of the phenomena attested to by



spiritualists and the whole enterprise of examining such phenomena remained very much of an open question in the 70's. Huxley had announced publicly that he had absolutely no interest in such an undertaking. Lewes and Tyndall rejected all such phenomena as fraudulent, the latter publishing his account of spiritualism in his Fragments.<sup>91</sup> Yet a correspondent to the Times in December of 1872 could still comment on "the extraordinary vitality of spiritualism notwithstanding frequent exposures."

It is evident either that the subject is surrounded by unusual difficulties, or that in this matter scientific men have signally failed to do their duty by the public, which looks to such men for their facts. We believe the latter to be the case. It may be said by some, that Spiritualism was long ago investigated, and proved to be a mass of imposture and delusion; but, as a matter of fact, this is not so, for there has never been undertaken an inquiry of that impartial, authoritative, and thorough nature which alone can decide a prejudiced controversy. . . . However absurd the phenomena and paraphernalia of Spiritualism may be, the sifting and settling of the whole matter, once and for all, would be a practical benefit, for which the age would thank our savants at least as much as it thanks them for recondite theories and abstract speculations, half of which are only laid up in print for the next generation to ridicule.<sup>92</sup>

Ten years later, Henry Sidgwick, in his inaugural address to the first general meeting of the Society for Psychical Research, echoed the very same thoughts when he enunciated the raison d'être of the formation of the society.<sup>93</sup>

The single most important gathering of British scientists whom one might expect to take up the problem of the validity of these phenomena, physical or psychological, was the British Association. In 1874, for example, Huxley took up the problem of epiphenomenalism at a meeting of the Association at Belfast.<sup>94</sup> The crux of his paper was

an illustration taken from a French medical journal which discussed the peculiar activities of a soldier suffering brain damage incurred in battle. Huxley utilized the soldier's periodic attacks of unconscious activity and amnesia to demonstrate that consciousness was causally sterile in human activity, an unnecessary phenomenon having physiological causes. The case was highly suggestive with respect to the psychology or pathology of mediumship and other spiritistic activity, and twenty-five years later, French and English psychologists such as Myers, Binet and Janet were to use the same illustration to demonstrate the psychology of mediumship and the existence of a subconscious self.<sup>95</sup> In 1874, however, nobody saw the relationship. There were, however, two significant instances in which the British Association was directly confronted with the problem of psychical research. The occasions were important, not so much for what was said at each occasion, but for the reaction to what was said and the differences between these reactions.

At the Glasgow meeting in 1876, a prominent physicist and student of Faraday, William F. Barrett, delivered a short paper to the Anthropological Section of the Society on the general subject of "Some Phenomena Associated with Abnormal Conditions of Mind."<sup>96</sup> Roughly, the paper can be divided into two parts. Firstly, utilizing such scientifically acceptable psychological and physiological theories as Maudsley's theory of automatism, Carpenter's theory of unconscious cerebration, Braid's theory of ideo-motor forces, and Spencer's hypothesis of two parallel streams of consciousness, Barrett argued that

the mind's capacity to act upon suggestions and to confuse illusion with reality while in a hypnotic state may possibly serve as a solution to the extraordinary assertions made by credible witnesses as to the elongation and levitation of the human body, the handling of fire, and the transcription of certain spiritualist phenomena. "I do not wish it to be supposed that I dogmatically assert this must have been the explanation of the phenomena described by Lord Lindsay and others; all I assert is, in our present state of knowledge, it is an easier explanation than to assume the actual occurrence of the marvels."<sup>97</sup>

Secondly, drawing on some of his own experiments, Barrett argued that Carpenter's notion of increased attention of the subject in hypnotic trance could not account for some remarkable evidences of the community of sensation which occasionally manifested itself between hypnotic agent and hypnotic subject. Taking his argument one step further, he cites a number of experiments which suggest that "the existence of a distinct idea in my own mind gave rise to an image of the idea in the subject's mind; not always a clear image, but one that could not fail to be recognized as a more or less distorted reflection of my own thought."<sup>98</sup> Barrett's remarks on the touchy subject of thought transference, we should note, were couched in caution:

All I wish to urge is, that it is not wise to allow a natural feeling of incredulity on this matter to become a barrier to a possible extension of knowledge. . . . My main object in bringing this paper before this Section is to direct attention to the subject in the hope that those who have any evidence to offer in support of my view, or any good grounds for opposing it, may favor me with their experience.<sup>99</sup>

Although Alfred Russell Wallace supported Barrett in his at-

tempts to bring the attention of the Association to such matters, Barrett's brief remarks raised a terrible furor.<sup>100</sup> Charges of impropriety on the part of Barrett and Wallace for forcing this subject matter on the Association passed back and forth. Letters to The Times were nasty and biting. The issue of abnormal mental states and their possible causes which Barrett raised, essentially a psychological issue not far removed from that raised by Huxley two years before, became mixed up with discussions of extraordinary physical phenomena and the fraudulent activities of the American slate-writer, Henry Douglas Slade. Adverse reaction to Barrett's paper was such that the Association thought it best to write Barrett's paper out of the Association's proceedings altogether. In their published Proceedings for 1876, no mention was made of the paper in either the general index to the Association's meetings or in the section reserved for summaries of papers delivered to the Association. This omission occurred, of course, even though Barrett's paper was the most widely discussed and debated paper at the meeting. The Times' correspondent to the convention, however, commented in his report that Barrett had referred to "new and wonderful facts which must sooner or later compel the attention of thoughtful men."<sup>101</sup>

Twenty-two years later, the Association once again was confronted with the problem of psychical research. In this instance, however, the circumstances were very much different. The speaker was the physicist, Sir William Crookes. His capacity as speaker was as President of the British Association. The occasion was Crookes' presidential address at the opening of the general proceedings. No great

dismay attended his remarks, for Crookes had also just been elected President of the Society for Psychical Research.

Crookes' statements specifically directed to the problem of psychical research consisted of a history of the theory of telepathy over a period of thirty-five years. His main point was that new light has been thrown on the whole problem by psychological analysis of the subconscious workings of the human mind. The sources of his argument were the work of F.W.H. Myers in England, the observations of Richet, Janet and Binet in France, William James in America, and Breuer and Freud in Austria.<sup>102</sup>

No doubt, things psychic had now assumed dimensions very much different from what they were when Barrett presented his paper on thought transference and trance states more than twenty years before. Crookes' address was reprinted and indexed by the Association. Furthermore, it was not only reprinted by the Spiritualist press and the psychical research press, but it also found its way into such eminent scientific periodicals as the papers of the Smithsonian Institute.<sup>103</sup> As the correspondent of the Times to the Association's proceedings commented, "it is certainly a sign of the times that the President of the British Association for this year is also the President of the Society for Psychical Research, and as such, a declared believer in what he pronounces to be 'the fundamental law that thoughts may be transferred from one mind to another without the agency of the recognized organs of sense.'"<sup>104</sup>

### Psychical Research and Anthropology

That the first paper to the British Association on the subject of psychical research and experimental psychology was read to the Anthropology Section of that Society indicates symptomatically the growing interaction between the three disciplines in the last three decades of the century, reaching its fruition in the work of Leon Marillier in France and Andrew Lang in England. As early as the 1860's Sidgwick himself endeavored to bring together his interest in ghosts, psychology and anthropology as the basis of a study of religious origins substantiating contemporary theistic beliefs.<sup>105</sup> In his "Introduction" to Phantasms, Myers had also argued that "the connection of anthropology with psychical research will be evident to any reader who has acquainted himself with recent expositions of Primitive Man."<sup>106</sup>

Some anthropologists were, of course, hostile to this kind of endeavor. Herbert Spencer, for example, refused to participate in the Second Congress of Experimental Psychology at Sidgwick's invitation because telepathy and kindred subject matters were to be discussed and because Myers and Gurney were to participate in the Congress' activities.<sup>107</sup> Frazer also was antagonistic to the work of psychical research.<sup>108</sup> As the century wore on, however, there was a considerable softening of the anthropologists' hostility to these inquiries. Wallace records that sometime in the 1870's Tylor had urged him strongly to make a personal investigation of various spiritualistic phenomena,<sup>109</sup> and Lang mentions that Tylor foresaw the fact that there seemed a good

deal of value for the psychologist in his discussions of primitive mentality. "With his habitual caution and openmindedness, Mr. Tylor remarked that a careful and scientific scrutiny of some of the new or revived marvels would seem to throw light on some interesting psychological questions."<sup>110</sup> In a letter to Sidgwick very late in the century, Tylor mentions that he is familiar with the work of the S.P.R. on telepathy, particularly the work of Podmore, and was following the inquiries of the Society through its Journal.<sup>111</sup>

Late nineteenth century English anthropology lent itself very easily to the disciplines of psychology and psychical research. Primitive mentality, the origins of religion, the bases of belief--all these areas of inquiry concerned themselves in one way or another with such phenomena as dreams, visions, apparitions, wraiths, hallucinations, trance phenomena and divination.<sup>112</sup> Frazer, for example, argued at length that the savage's customs and moral code were so designed as to make allowance for telepathy and sympathetic magic. The savage hunter pursuing game forbade his children to draw on wood or sand "for fear that if they did so, the paths in the forest would become as perplexed as the lines in the drawings so that the hunter might lose his way in the forest."<sup>113</sup>

These same materials also suggested theories of the origins of religion which were relevant to psychical research. Tylor's theory of Animism and his concomitant ghost-theory of the origins of religion was one such.

Stated shortly, this theory is, in the first place, that a conception of the Human Soul is a crude but reasonable inference by primi-

tive man from obvious phenomena. Man had two things belonging to him, his phantom and his life. The human shapes which appear in dreams and visions seem to the savage to be real objects, connected with the bodies whose image they bear, but separable from them so as to be capable of presenting themselves to people at a distance. The life which seems to be present in the active, waking, healthy, living man, but absent or lessened in sleep, lethargy, disease, and death, is also something connected with the body, but separable from it. The outcome of these two sets of considerations is the primitive and savage doctrine of a ghost-soul, which accounts under one head for dreams, and for visions and for life and death . . .<sup>114</sup>

Tylor's theory of the ghost-soul, as one might expect, became a subject for heated and popular controversy. At the same time, and for the same reason, the ghost-theory added a significant dimension to Victorian speculation on paranormal experience and the psychology of belief.

Five years after Tylor published his Primitive Culture (1871) Herbert Spencer published his Principles of Sociology. Disregarding some of his earlier work in the same area, Spencer also put forth a ghost-theory of the origins of religion. Technically, the two theories differed, for Spencer's "ghost-theory" refers the origins of religion back to the cult of the dead and ancestor worship whereas Tylor's doctrine of Animism was considerably broader.<sup>115</sup> On the whole, however, both agreed that the ghost-theory, whatever its foundation, was the basic factor in the origins of religion and for primitive explanations of many different phenomena resulting in the belief in spiritual beings, including souls. Most important, both discussed in great detail a wide variety of phenomena from the contemplation of which primitive man was led to believe in ghosts, trances, dreams, apparitions, wraiths, and clairvoyance.

As provocative as the ghost-theory was, its impact on its age



was considerably stimulated by the debate between Spencer and Tylor as to who discovered the theory first. The debate became something of a cause célèbre which focused far more public attention on ghosts and ghost-theories than they would have otherwise received. In a belated review of Spencer's Principles in the April, 1877 issue of Mind, Tylor not only was harsh with Spencer because of his many errors in detail, but he also suggested that Spencer's theory was not arrived at independently.<sup>116</sup> Spencer printed a reply in the following issue, referring to an article he had written in the Fortnightly for 1870 which he believed antedated Tylor's work in the same area and obviated the charge of plagiarism. In turn, Tylor compared passages of two lectures he delivered on Animism to the Royal Institute in 1867 and 1868 with Spencer's article in the Fortnightly showing similarities in their arrangement of evidential materials. Claims and counter-claims bubbled over from the pages of Mind to the pages of the Academy until the controversy drew to a stuffy close and an uneasy stalemate in June, 1877.<sup>117</sup> The debate and the charges served one significant purpose, however. Ghosts, ghost-theories and the wide variety of psychical and abnormal mental phenomena, which served as evidential support for such theories, had become a popular subject for discussion.

The anthropologists could not resist drawing comparisons between primitive beliefs and modern beliefs. Throughout their work, in particular the work of Tylor and Frazer, they offered anthropological analyses of modern man's belief in ghosts, hallucinations, and the veridical character of dreams. Tylor, for example, argued that primi-

tive Animism and magic have never ceased to be latent propensities in the minds of civilized peoples. He described Spiritualism as "a direct revival from regions of savage philosophy and peasant folklore." The whole Spiritualist movement, he pointed out, was a survival of the world outlook of the prehistoric man. In the seance room "the world is again swarming with intelligent and powerful disembodied spiritual beings whose direct action on thought and matter is confidently asserted."<sup>118</sup> In his Golden Bough, Frazer wrote that "whatever doubts science may entertain as to the possibility of action at a distance, Magic has none; faith in telepathy is one of its first principles. A modern advocate of supernormal phenomena would have no difficulty in persuading a savage."<sup>119</sup> This statement, of course, was a "slap in the face" to the psychological research movement.<sup>120</sup>

The anthropologist argued that the belief in such phenomena as telepathy, clairvoyance, ghosts, phantasms of the dead, and the veridicality of dreams was a "survival" of the crude superstitions of ignorant savages which cannot assume any significance in a rationally ordered world.<sup>121</sup> Others, however, took up the same problem from another point of view. They took the paranormal and abnormal phenomena recorded by the anthropologist and used them for more careful and less prejudiced inquiries into an explanation for such phenomena. They were not only concerned with the ghost-theory, but they were equally concerned with the possible validity of the recorded experiences which supposedly demonstrated the ghost-theory. Writing in Phantasms, for example, Myers argued that "in the works of these and similar authors

(Tylor, Lubbock, Spencer) we are led to regard all these beliefs and tendencies as due solely to the childishness of savage man—or absurdities which real progress in civilization must render increasingly alien to the development of common sense, the rational experience of humanity. Yet it appears to me that as we trace the process of evolution from savage to civilized man, we come to a point at which the inadequacy of this explanation is strongly forced on our attention."<sup>122</sup>

In the Academy for 1872,<sup>123</sup> Alfred Russell Wallace reviewed Tylor's Primitive Culture and argued that there is a mass of supernatural facts or alleged facts ranging through every period of human history down to the nineteenth century which may very well have a substratum in reality and which are dismissed a priori by the anthropologist as imposture or delusion unworthy of discussion. Many of the so-called superstitions recorded by Tylor, he states, repose upon facts which have always been misunderstood and misinterpreted, both by the primitive and the modern savant. Man will never find a sound philosophy or any "true insight into the mysterious depths of our nature" until these facts are recognized as possible realities and studied with thoroughness and disinterestedness. Rather than attempt a rational explanation of the facts, anthropologists have classified them and grouped them in such a way that the grouping precludes the possibility that any truth may be found in them.<sup>124</sup>

Andrew Lang frequently argued from a similar position. Lang had a remarkably eclectic mind which always moved in the direction of the interdisciplinary character of whatever it was he was doing. A

prominent folklorist, for example, Lang argued persuasively that folklore and the psychical research movement should get together in a common enterprise. "He wanted the folklorist to see that the stories about ghosts, wraiths, and all their kind, were within his province to deal with. And he wanted the psychical researcher not to neglect the evidence furnished by savage and even civilized superstition and aught else that comes under the purview of folklore."<sup>125</sup> Similarly, Lang was also interested in establishing a working alliance between psychical research and anthropology. In April of 1885, he published an article in the Nineteenth Century entitled "Comparative Study of Ghost Stories."<sup>126</sup> Tylor and Spencer, he pointed out, established their own theory of the origin of a belief in ghosts without asking whether the actual appearance of apparitions may not have helped to start or confirm that belief. On the other hand, Myers, Gurney and other psychical researchers have collected a wide variety of modern instances of the actual appearance of apparitions without paying much attention to their parallels among the most backward races or to their medieval or classical variants. Lang himself called for a comparative science of ghost stories which, he believed, would not perhaps "prove or disprove any psychical or mythological theory" but would demonstrate that there is a "good deal of human nature in man," that we all share coincident beliefs or delusions. "What the value of coincidence of testimony may be, how far it attests facts, how far it merely indicates the survival of savage conceptions, Mr. Tylor and Mr. Gurney may be left to decide."

In his important work, The Making of Religion, Lang put into

practice what he had been preaching.<sup>127</sup> Drawing on his experience as a psychological researcher and his detailed knowledge of anthropology, he compared primitivistic beliefs about visions, hallucinations, apparitions, and trance phenomena with "well attested records of similar experiences among living and educated civilized men with the intention of proving that certain human faculties do exist that can cognize phenomena which pass unnoticed by ordinary power, but that lie at the root of religion."<sup>128</sup> Lang believed that his conclusions proved not only that primitives were not necessarily in error in their beliefs in the wandering soul, veridical hallucinations, and the reality of clairvoyance, but that the correspondence of their beliefs with well-attested contemporary evidence gives the origins of religion a foundation which materialistic arguments cannot destroy. The mass of evidence supporting the reality of these experiences demonstrates the existence of a spiritual world and, therefore, helps to maintain those traditional religious beliefs which materialists and anthropologists like Tylor and Huxley endeavored to undercut by dismissing the reality of such phenomena.<sup>129</sup> The origins of religion, Lang argued, arise out of well-attested matters of fact, not superstitious ignorance.<sup>130</sup>

#### Psychical Research and the Metaphysical Society

Two important organizations of the Victorian period aside from the S.P.R. itself indicate substantial Victorian interest in psychical research. The Metaphysical Society flowered in the early and middle seventies before the founding of the S.P.R. but looked forward in part to such an organization. The Synthetic Society was organized around the

turn of the century after the S.P.R. had accomplished some of its most important work and reflects some of the problems suggested by that work and some of its significant consequences on late Victorian thought.<sup>131</sup>

One important aspect of the Metaphysical Society was that its original name was to be the "Metaphysical and Psychological Society."<sup>132</sup> Moreover, one of its initial purposes was "to collect trustworthy observations upon such subjects as remarkable mental and moral phenomena, normal and abnormal, the relations of brain and mind and generally of physics and metaphysics."<sup>133</sup> Commenting on these initial principles Alan Willard Brown notes that they were "clearly related to the growing interest in hypnotism and spiritualism." Most of them, he adds, were "never again broached or undertaken as regular concerns of the society. It was not until the establishment of the periodical Mind in 1876 and the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882 that these subjects were adequately and professionally treated in England."<sup>134</sup>

In the context of our discussion here, two points about these initial purposes are significant. The Metaphysical and Psychological Society was not only going to concern itself with the psychology of clearly conscious phenomena, but also with the psychology of "remarkable" and "abnormal" mental phenomena. Furthermore, the original intent of the Society was not only to theorize about such phenomena and their significance, but "to collect trustworthy observations on such subjects." These initial purposes are identical in character with those of the S.P.R. They constitute a significant historical fact, especially when we realize that it was as far back as 1869 that a group of

significant British thinkers sought to come to terms, empirically and evidentially, with psychological issues and problems which were, on the whole, altogether neglected by the practicing and professional psychologists of that day.

The two prime movers behind the original conception of the Metaphysical and Psychological Society were James Knowles and Lord Tennyson, and both were profoundly interested in things "psychical."

About Knowles we know far too little. There is, however, one extant document which suggests the kind of thing Knowles was thinking about a few short months before the Society came into being. In the January 30, 1869 issue of the Spectator, Knowles published a lengthy letter entitled "Brain Waves - A Theory."<sup>135</sup> Briefly, Knowles' essay was concerned with the problem of the transference and communication of ideas from one mind to another without the use of recognized channels of sense. The essay may be divided into three parts. Firstly, Knowles calls for a collection or "concensus" of authenticated ghost stories which "might throw light on one of the darkest fields of science, a field indeed hardly yet claimed by science."<sup>136</sup> Such a collection of phenomena, he argues, may bring to light "a clear residue of fact" which will indicate "a common action of force" acting through them all and "bring out features suggestive of a law."<sup>137</sup> Secondly, to stimulate such a "concensus," Knowles contributes three authenticated stories of his own. One narrative involved Browning, the second involved Tennyson, and the third involved Thomas Woolner. Thirdly, Knowles constructs a hypothetical explanation for "telepathy." He assumes, first,

the physical hypothesis that any action which takes place in the brain is a chemical change resulting in an electric wave or undulation. Then, he assumes that there is diffused throughout all known space an universal, impalpable elastic ether, a material of unsurpassed tenuity. From these two assumptions he deduces that every brain action which takes place creates a wave or undulation, "electric or otherwise," in the ether. Certain sensitive individuals would be affected by this "brain wave" in much the same way as sensitized paper is sensitive to the undulations of light.

Richard Holt Hutton, one of the original members of the Society and Editor of the Spectator, thought Knowles' essay significant enough to contribute an editorial on it in the same issue.<sup>138</sup> Hutton found Knowles' theory inconclusive and suggested two other possibilities for understanding such phenomena, to neither of which is he himself wholly committed. Firstly, he argued that the materialistic and mechanical basis of Knowles' solution to the problem complicates and does not simplify the facts. It overlooks, he suggests, the possibility of intellectual links for intellectual phenomena, a theory just as probable as the materialistic links for such phenomena postulated by Knowles.<sup>139</sup> Secondly, he refers his readers to the work of W.B. Carpenter (a third member of the Metaphysical), particularly Carpenter's work on "The Unconscious Activity of the Brain" and his theory of "unconscious cerebration," which offers a third solution to the problem--an idea in the mind of a receiver which he thought was transferred from the mind of another was really his own thought once entertained but forgotten.<sup>140</sup>



Although he disagreed with Knowles' theory, Hutton agreed that "there is every good reason to look for much new light on the laws of mind from a careful collection of really well-authenticated and accurately recorded facts of this nature."<sup>141</sup> He willingly allowed the pages of his journal to be open to specimen cases and collaborated with Knowles on his "concensus" of such ghost stories. Stories ran in the Spectator for the next few months. It was a continuation of such a concensus, clearly, that the Metaphysical and Psychological Society proposed.

Unlike Knowles and Hutton, Tennyson's lifelong interest in "remarkable" mental phenomena, normal or abnormal, is and was a matter of common knowledge. It was, for example, one of the most frequently commented upon aspects of his life and art in the many essays which immediately followed his death.<sup>142</sup> We might briefly review here some of Tennyson's interests along this line.

Although Buckley does not take seriously Tennyson's paper on ghosts delivered to the Apostles, evidence suggests that ghosts were a lifelong preoccupation of Tennyson. One year after the publication of Phantasms of the Living, for example, Tennyson described the following phantasm in "Demeter and Persephone":

...As the likeness of a dying man,  
Without his knowledge, from him flits to warn  
A far off friendship that he comes no more....

Tennyson was a member of the S.P.R. and frequently gave its other members spiritual encouragement.<sup>143</sup> We know, too, that Tennyson frequently collected ghost stories. Some of them, of course, were only legends.

His poem, "The Ring," for example, was based on a ghost story told to him by James Lowell. Henry James used the same story for one of his early tales.<sup>144</sup> However, while the ghost for James was simply a jeu d'esprit, critical comment on Tennyson's use of ghosts in "The Ring" takes on a much more serious character. The poem, Buckley remarks, virtually exists for this soliloquy in which Tennyson examines the claims of the spirit.<sup>145</sup> Charles Tennyson suggests that the soliloquy was finished in 1888, soon after Tennyson visited his brother Frederick, and illustrates that Frederick's involvement with spiritualism had done something to restore Alfred's faith.<sup>146</sup> Hallam Tennyson quotes the lines twice in his Memoir of Tennyson. In one instance, he states that his father would often quote them to indicate his belief that "the afterlife is one of progress." In another, Hallam quotes the same lines to illustrate Tennyson's conviction that "there might be a more intimate communion than we could dream of between the living and the dead, at all events for a time."<sup>147</sup> We know, too, that Tennyson collected well-authenticated ghost stories. In a paper to the S.P.R. in July of 1889 on the subject of "Recognized Apparitions Occurring More than a Year After Death," F. W. H. Myers cited a crucial evidential case involving a Mrs. Renée of Quebec. Mrs. Renée was a sister of A. R. Ward and William Ward, one of the initiators of the Metaphysical Society. The case was submitted to the S.P.R. by Wilfred Ward and Lord Tennyson, "for whom," Myers wrote, "it was first committed to writing some years ago." The letter was dated "1884, Freshwater, Isle of Wight," but the events

which the letter describes occurred in the 50's.<sup>148</sup>

Tennyson was also interested in Spiritualism. This interest was particularly prominent in the months immediately prior to the founding of the Metaphysical. In 1867, Charles Tennyson remarks, "he had been giving more and more time to the study of metaphysics and Spiritualism" in order to "get some real insight into the prospects of the human race."<sup>149</sup> Hallam records that in July of 1868, Longfellow visited Tennyson and the two poets "talked much of Spiritualism, for he was greatly interested in the subject."<sup>150</sup> Spiritualism, like ghosts, was not a passing interest for Tennyson. In 1886, for example, Tennyson visited with Alfred Russell Wallace. After lunch, Wallace records, the conversation got around to the subject of Spiritualism, "which was evidently what he wanted to see me about."<sup>151</sup>

Tennyson was also greatly interested in hypnosis and trance phenomena. He himself, we know, was frequently subject to trance states.<sup>152</sup> In the early 50's, he practiced hypnosis on the wife of his friend Dr. Marsden. He was still talking about this in 1865.<sup>153</sup> Knowles recorded one of the stories about a telepathic experience which was a consequence of the Marsden-Tennyson rapport in his essay in the Spectator in 1869. Aside from Marsden, Tennyson had a number of friends and associates whose interest in hypnosis and mesmerism was notable. Among them were the Bristol physician, J.A. Symonds,<sup>154</sup> and Tennyson's life long friend, Monokton Milnes (Lord Houghton).<sup>155</sup> Like Tennyson, Houghton participated in the activities of the S.P.R. He had one of the most valuable libraries on mystic lore, the occult, and

mesmerism in England. Houghton took a great interest in the work of John Elliotson, the founder of the London Mesmeric Hospital. Elliotson's Zoist reprints a number of talks by Houghton to the Hospital's committees. The year in which Tennyson included the weird seizures of the prince in "The Princess" (1851), was also the year of the "Mesmeric Mania of 1851," and there is some indication that Tennyson was familiar with the literature on mesmerism then being published by physician and fraud alike.<sup>156</sup>

Tennyson's interest in psychic and spiritualistic phenomena in general and his deep personal involvement with trance phenomena in particular raised a number of serious interpretative issues for him. In "The Princess," for example, the trance state is indicative of self-deception, or self-preoccupation, of loss of control and judgment and the inability to distinguish the real from the unreal. In a letter to Benjamin Paul Blood twenty-three years later, however, Tennyson gives a very different appraisal and interpretation of the significance of his own trance states.<sup>157</sup> Knowles' essay in the Spectator suggested another significant interpretative problem. We noted that Hutton disagreed with Knowles' materialistic and mechanical explanation of telepathic phenomena. Tennyson, it is clear, disagreed with Knowles also. For example, Knowles argued that his explanation for thought transference was also applicable to the mystic experience, the inspirational experience and the creative experience.<sup>158</sup> He explains the "mystical hint" of the poet, the ghost-seer and the mediums of all ages from the same mechanical

and materialist point of view. Furthermore, he very frequently refers to Tennyson and to Tennyson's poems for purposes of example and illustration. In a footnote to his essay, however, he carefully explains that his explanation for these phenomena is his responsibility alone. Tennyson, from whom he was quoting, no doubt disagreed with Knowles' interpretations and their philosophical implications.<sup>159</sup> In his reminiscences of Tennyson published after the Laureate's death, Knowles returned once again to some of the ideas expressed in his essay of 1869 and further developed their relevance to the experiences of Tennyson. In this instance, however, he related Tennyson's attitude toward these experiences rather than his own.<sup>160</sup>

Taking all this material together, we can, perhaps, indicate the kinds of questions and issues upon which Tennyson and Knowles thought the collection and evaluation of materials relating to such phenomena would shed light. Were trance experiences indicative of some undefined oracular or supernormal power which gave the mind a unique insight into the realities of a spiritual universe, or were they mental aberrations indicative of monomania, hereditary madness and the degeneration of the intellectual powers? Were they evidential support for a distinctly psychical and spiritualistic psychology or did they merely illustrate further support for the physiological and materialistic conception of mind upheld by Huxley and Knowles? Did the revelations of trance indicate the possible survival of the soul after death or were such revelations self-induced illusions, the consequence of the suspension of powers of judgment and reason?

Was the creative state of mind indicative of true mystical and prophetic power or was it, too, "the mystic gleam," only a mechanical abnormality caused by monomaniacal preoccupations with the self?

These questions, and others like them, were, I believe, behind Tennyson's desire to have the Metaphysical and Psychological Society collect and evaluate evidence having to do with unusual and extraordinary states of mind, whether normal or abnormal.

Psychical research, we might say, was never a principal pre-occupation of the Metaphysical Society for two reasons. In January of 1869, the London Dialectical Society, founded in 1867 for purposes of treating philosophically "all questions which lie at the root of the differences of opinion which divide mankind,"<sup>161</sup> pre-empted the Metaphysical Society and undertook an investigation of spiritualistic and psychical phenomena over a period of eighteen months. The Dialectical carried out in fact what Tennyson, Knowles and Hutton proposed in principle during the same year--an accumulation and collection of a group of well-attested cases concerning unusual, normal and abnormal psychical and physical phenomena. Sir John Lubbock was appointed chairman of the Dialectical Society in the same year (1869) he was appointed discussion chairman of the Metaphysical.<sup>162</sup> Furthermore, a number of members of the Metaphysical opposed any discussion of these phenomena. Tyndall had earlier examined Spiritualism and found the phenomena incredible and those who believed it "only worthy of the scorn or pity of all intelligent persons."<sup>163</sup> When the Dialectical invited Huxley's cooperation in their investigations, he declined on the grounds that "supposing the phenomena to be genuine

they do not interest me. If anybody would endow me with the faculty of listening to the chatter of old women and curates in the nearest cathedral town, I should decline the privilege, having better things to do."<sup>164</sup> This is not to imply, however, that the problem of psychological research was never touched upon by the Metaphysical. Among other papers, Mark Pattison's on "The Argument for a Future Life" and W.B. Carpenter's paper on "The Fallacies of Testimony in Relation to the Supernatural" touched directly on the original first principles of the Metaphysical.<sup>165</sup>

#### Psychical Research and the Synthetic Society

What the Metaphysical Society was to the 1870's the Synthetic Society was to the 1890's.<sup>166</sup> Organized for purposes of finding a working and practical solution to the problems of a philosophy of Theism, its membership was restricted to those who believed a working philosophy of Theism was possible. Among those who belonged were Hutton, Wilfred Ward, Arthur Balfour, Bishop Talbot, Canon Gore, Gerald Balfour, Richard Haldane, A.V. Dicey, James Bryce, Lord Rayleigh, James Martineau, George Wyndham, C.C. Webb, Father Tyrrell, and Baron Von Hugel. Unlike the Metaphysical, the Synthetic Society included no agnostic temperaments such as that of Huxley. Nevertheless, the membership of the organization almost necessitated that at least part of its discussions would turn upon the conflict and the solution of the problem of science and religion, for this problem was one of the principal intellectual preoccupations of a large number of the members of the organization, particularly those whose interests

were in psychical research--Myers, Lodge, Sidgwick, Balfour, Hutton, Rayleigh. Thus, although the original purposes of the Synthetic were to be significantly different from those of the Metaphysical, it was in part the last great Victorian attempt to resolve the conflict of religion and science. Wilfred Ward's opening address to the Society suggests that Ward was well aware of this.<sup>167</sup>

The first meeting of the Synthetic was in March of 1896. The members, however, did not have to wait long before a series of papers by Oliver Lodge (May 2, 1896 and June, 1896) took up a position pertinent and relevant to the whole purport of psychical research. In May,<sup>168</sup> Lodge argued against the supposition that the older scholastic methods of philosophical analysis, "the traditions and dust of centuries," can offer any solution to the problem of religion and Theism at the end of the nineteenth century. "Science," Lodge argued, "has based itself on constantly fresh experience," and constantly has progressed. Philosophy, on the other hand, has starved herself for lack of nutriment "attainable by genuine experimental inquiry." At this late epoch, he argued, we cannot hope to solve any of the great questions by appealing to facts essentially within the knowledge of the ancients. We must demand and utilize new facts from experimental psychology and other cognate regions of inquiry. In June,<sup>169</sup> Lodge took up the cudgels against metaphysics once again and in this instance broadened his attack extensively. "Instead of trying to construct a universe or to evolve the nature of its ruling principle by operations of reason or cogitation we should aim at a wider acquaintance with important facts."



In January of 1897, Canon Gore read a paper to the society which attacked Lodge's position and argued that the basic intellectual substratum of religion was ultimately valid by reason of "praejudicia," not scientific fact.<sup>170</sup> Lodge answered Gore by arguing that regardless of disposition, the substrata of religion are either true or false and are open to proof or disproof.<sup>171</sup> There is a distinction to be drawn between what is valid and what is true. Religious doctrines, Lodge held, can be established in only two ways, by direct revelation to an individual or by scientific scrutiny of the facts, the discovery of fresh facts, and the consequent enlargement of general knowledge. "Hence if I had to answer the question, what sort of proof can be given of religious doctrine, I should be inclined to say, only a subjective proof at present; but that in the future a scientific proof of some of these doctrines, in perhaps a modified form, may possibly (I should say probably) be built up with probably a disproof of some others."

The conflict between the principles of Gore and Lodge was taken up at the next meeting of the Society by Thomas Strong.<sup>172</sup> Strong argued that the positions of Lodge and Gore are not incompatible. Gore's notion of praejudicia involved in the full acceptance of the proof of religious facts and Lodge's scientism which should compel the mind irrespective of presuppositions are both necessary for a real proof of the validity of an intellectual substratum for religious belief.

Lodge's papers to the Synthetic from its inception in 1896 through 1897, papers which quantitatively if not qualitatively domi-

nated the discussions of the Society, were in effect preparing the way for a more direct discussion of the role of psychical research in the Synthetic's attempts to find a practical and workable philosophy of Theism. For example, in a short paper of September, 1897, Lodge chose for his subject matter one of the real bugbears of Victorian controversy, the validity of the religious miracle.<sup>173</sup> Theologians, Lodge argued, at one time placed great stress on miracles while belief in them was widespread. Now that miracles have lost their hold upon popular beliefs, however, theologians have sought to minimise their importance. As long, however, as the Incarnation and the Resurrection are essential dogmas of the Christian church, so long will the miraculous element be inseparable from the Christian faith. "At these points theology touches upon science and science rightly claims to be heard. But it should be Science with a big S which speaks, and not the science in fashion at the decade." Lodge then added that to his mind the most outspoken representative of Science with a big S is "our common friend Myers, and I hope that before long he will be called upon for a Paper."

Never at a loss for words, Myers rose to the occasion that following spring, April 29th, 1898, and delivered the first of his three papers upon the relationship of psychical research to the ends and goals of the Synthetic.<sup>174</sup> The principal argument of Myers' paper was that a general metaphysical and theoretical approach to Theism raises far more problems and questions than it answers. Myers in turn suggests that there are approaches to religion which, if they hit a lower mark, are at least more definite, specifically, "the possibility

of a scientific approach to certain problems generally classed as religious." No scientific induction from general facts can offer man his only or his deepest insight into the meaning of the Universe or of Life, but science does utilize, within its limitations, a language and a method common to all mankind. Intuition and tradition cannot bring together the Buddhist, the Parsee and the Jew; nor can it unite the Christian and the agnostic. Only Science, by endeavoring to prove or disprove the preamble of all religions--the existence of a spiritual world--can unite all men and provide a practical and workable theistic and religious system. After assuring his audience that the S.P.R. was making an honest endeavor to prove the preamble of all theistic belief, Myers goes on to suggest that the work of the S.P.R. should interest the Synthetic in a number of ways. "First, there is the inquirer's attitude; secondly, there are the phenomena observed; thirdly, there are such religious corollaries as the evidence may as yet suggest." In this last, for example, he makes specific reference to the religious implications of the telepathic hypothesis.

Myers' paper raised considerable comment and a discussion of the paper carried over into the succeeding months. An anonymous critic at the same meeting contributed one reply. If one assumes the reality of telepathy, multiplex personality or the hypnotic state, one may be assuming only the reality of pathological conditions. On the other hand, if one were to suppose that a particular medium was not pathological and was really a vehicle of communications from a departed spirit, one would have an epoch making discovery but not necessarily a religious discovery, for a belief in l'homme posthume is not neces-

sarily a belief in the immortality of the soul.<sup>175</sup> Sidgwick and Balfour offered their own criticisms of Myers' paper. Sidgwick, for example, argued that a belief in Theism does not necessarily imply a belief in the immortality of the soul, although such a belief does have an important bearing on the problem of the evidences of Christianity; thus, Sidgwick argued, Myers' paper has no bearing on the initial purposes of the Synthetic Society.<sup>176</sup> Balfour's argument was somewhat different.<sup>177</sup> He agreed with Myers that the ideal of l'homme posthume is not contrary to the religious belief in personal immortality, but he further argued that "the investigations of the Psychological Society are directed purely toward scientific problems having in themselves nothing to do with religion, except for this one important exception."

Wilfred Ward gave a very long and very illuminating paper on the subject of Myers' remarks.<sup>178</sup> He contests Myers' arguments on three grounds. Firstly, although he agrees that the collection, scrutiny and testing of facts is of the utmost importance, he argues also that those facts most relevant to religion are too personal and too intimate to be amenable to scientific experiment. Secondly, again agreeing with Myers and Lodge that scientific evidence and investigation may suggest facts which would give a persuasiveness to religious beliefs, he believes that such evidence would be only confirmatory in nature and severely circumscribed by obvious limitations. Thirdly, Ward carries the argument to Myers on a wholly different basis; he contests Myers' argument that Theism was an enormous and obscure generalization which could not be a sound starting point for any sound

inquiry. Science itself, Ward argued, especially in its speculative habit, is open to the same criticism and objection. Choosing the evolutionary hypothesis as an example, Ward demonstrates that the evolutionary hypothesis and the generalizations of Theism may still be valid starting points for inquiry even though their details constantly have to be amended to square with some facts. Both hypotheses, he argues, are consistently confirmed by the multiplication of other facts.

Discussion of Myers' paper culminated in a brief but pointed attack by C. Bigg at the June, 1897 meeting of the Synthetic.<sup>179</sup> Bigg argued that no attempt at speculation as to the existence of a spiritual world has ever attained universal acceptance, nor will any ever do so. The methods of experiment and observation that Myers refers to have only raised ethical difficulties in that the "modern clairvoyant derives his vision not from moral fitness but from nervous aptitude."

Myers, Lodge<sup>180</sup> and Sidgwick,<sup>181</sup> each from his own perspective, responded to Bigg's challenge. Myers' paper, however, was the most forceful and well-developed.<sup>182</sup> Taking up each of Bigg's points in order, he argued that new developments in nineteenth-century science and certain habits of mind fostered by contemporary conditions suggest the present is better prepared and equipped to gain universal acceptance for its appraisal of the metetherial world than the past. Furthermore, he adds, Bigg cannot prove any ethical distinction between an act of contemporary clairvoyance and the "same gaze into an unseen world" by an apostle or a saint. He concludes his paper by

suggesting that evidence does not show that the other world is very much like our own, one of Bigg's secondary points. In an effort to illustrate this, Myers goes much further out on the spiritualistic limb than he had done before. If the apparitions, messages, and intimations of another world do, in actuality, proceed from the sources from which they claim to proceed, he argued, one might assume, for example, the reality of such "uninteresting" facts as the fact that survival is a structural law of the universe, that an avenue of communication exists between the spiritual and the material worlds, that the surviving spirit retains at least some measure of the memories and loves of earth, and that "every element of individual wisdom, virtue, love, develops in infinite evolution towards an even higher hope."

It is clear that in the first few years of its existence, the subject of psychical research played an important role in the discussions of the Synthetic principally because of the attempts of Myers and Lodge to appeal to the discussants to take further cognizance of the significance of the methodology of science as it related to the principal endeavor of the Society.<sup>183</sup> In his review of Bigg's paper, however, Myers opened up a new area of speculation. It was no longer the methodology of science which interested him and which was of utmost importance to his argument; he now turned to the results which he believed such a methodology had revealed and the upshot of those results in the context of a workable and practical philosophy of Theism. As a consequence of this new mode of argumentation, Myers' last paper to the Synthetic, delivered in March of 1899 and reprinted in the "Epilogue" of his posthumously published Human Personality, was

a rather magnificent prose poem enunciating the doctrine of a future life and the reality of the unseen and describing in purple passages what the future life holds for human kind.<sup>184</sup> What began, then, as a restatement of the necessity of the principles and the methodology of science in solving the religious crisis of the nineteenth century concluded on a note of Plotinian mysticism and faint hints of Virgilian spiritualism. We can conclude, however, that the Synthetic Society had, before the turn of the century, experienced both the consequences of, and the personalities involved in, the psychical research movement.

Postscript--Some Unpublished Notes from Myers'  
Autobiography

In the early summer of 1891, F.W.H. Myers interrupted his work on his autobiography to trace in a few very rough notes the impact of the S.P.R.'s researches on his friends and his contemporaries. Although the notes were hastily written and never published, they remain as a valuable testament to the interest and debate which the subject of psychical research occasioned in the late Victorian age.<sup>185</sup>

It is not my object in these pages (Myers wrote) to either dwell on my own private friendships, or to describe the well-known personages with whom society brought me into contact. My business is with the search for immortality alone. But in dealing with that topic, it may be well to give some account of the various ways in which the new ideas were received by different minds. I shall speak only of those I knew personally; and naturally I know more of the favorable critics than their actual proportion would justify. I will divide the persons with whom I have discussed these matters into four groups--apart from the small group of active workers mentioned elsewhere.

Myers then proceeded to catalogue his acquaintances, not in four groups, but in five. In the first, there were those who were definitely sympathetic to his labors--Tennyson, Ruskin, Watts,

A.J. Balfour, Gladstone and Sully-Prudhomme. In the second group were those who opposed his inquiries and their results--Huxley, Renan, Sir W. Thompson, Clifford, Mrs. Humphry Ward, George Eliot, Lewes, Spencer, Frederic Harrison and John Morley. In a third group he discussed his "scientific allies," men such as William James, Richet, Rayleigh, Macalister, and Liébeault. In the fourth, he listed those predisposed to belief in an unseen world either through their outright espousal of Spiritualism or through their holding to the traditional dogmas of Christianity. In the first class were Crookes, Wallace, Stainton Moses, C.C. Massey and Lord Crawford. In the second class were Balfour Stewart, Lady Mount-Temple and Richard Holt Hutton. In the fifth group, Myers listed the names of friends and acquaintances who, although sometimes taking an interest in his researches, were nevertheless indifferent to his results. Here were Robert Browning, G.O. Trevelyan, Sir Alfred Lyall, J.A. Symonds, Dilke, Lord Leighton, Alfred Lyttleton and Sir James Bryce.

Myers' notes consist of little thumb nail sketches of his friends wherein he comments briefly on their indifference, their sympathy or their opposition to his endeavors toward proving experimentally the survival of the personality after bodily death and the existence of a metetherial universe. Although the sketches were obviously not meant for publication, they serve as valuable little cameos summing up Myers' life-time preoccupation with personality and observation and indicate from his point of view the impact of psychological research on his contemporaries.



First I will take the men of eminence whose comprehension of the work and sympathy with it was of the completest kind. And first among these I must place Lord Tennyson. I had need to show elsewhere how profound was his comprehension of the spiritual needs of the age. To Edmund Gurney and myself personally he repeatedly gave deeply valued encouragement. Tennyson appears to me the highest mind with which I have ever been brought into contact: — nay the highest mind of our epoch.

John Ruskin, also, gave much of personal sympathy. He, more than Tennyson, suffered from the uncertainty of man's future. He, like Tennyson, felt that here, and here alone, was hope. But there was about Ruskin in his later years something of impatience and waywardness which prevented him from thoroughly studying the subject.

Arthur Balfour's intelligence, at once piercing and delicate, was one of the very first to perceive the importance of the scientific investigations. Already in 1878 he actively cooperated with our experiments with mediums. He could give little time to this investigation; but his remarks and inquiries always went straight to the point. Next to Tennyson's encouragement, I place his in its stimulating quality.

Mr. Gladstone became an Honorary Member (of the S.P.R.) on my invitation before his lamentable adoption of a Home Rule policy. To this subject, as to how many others, he brought his rapid intensity, his piercing earnestness of intellectual gaze. He told me—I think as early as 1885—that he regarded ours as the most important work going on in the world. Mr. Gladstone's interest was based, no doubt, on his belief in Christianity, and his perception that spiritual truths must in this age be confirmed from the scientific side . . .

This leads me to a second group of sympathizers,—less convinced, perhaps, of the necessity of our work, but thoroughly believing in its likelihood of positive truth. I speak of those who had already reached assurance of a future life through Christian or through Spiritualistic evidences.

From the Christian camp we had the Bishops of Carlisle and Ripon (Goodwin and Boyd Carpenter), Lady Mount-Temple, Hutton, editor of the "Spectator," and Balfour Stewart, the physicist, who was President of the S.P.R. at the time of his death. From the Spiritualist side we had Crookes and Wallace, Lord Crawford and Hensleigh Wedgwood.

There was little of help—much of hindrance—from the Spiritualist. Crookes was sulking in his tent like Achilles, disgusted at the reception which his first essay at S.P.R. had received. Wallace, the best and kindest of men, was too credulous to be of real service. His is almost the only case where I have seen a man nearly lose his critical faculty when dealing with these special problems. Disgust at the obstinate incredulity which prompted the world of science to reject the well-evidenced phenomena led him to apply the same vigorous assertion to those ill-attested phenomena also.

One might have hoped that, considering all the work recently done in hypnotism and the connection of hypnotism with many of our phenomena, there would have been a good deal of friendly interest from this quarter. But except in the single and very important case of Richet, there was hardly any help of this kind. The veteran Liébeault, indeed, whom we went to see at Nancy was at once warmly sympathetic, and Beaunis and Liégeois of the Nancy school were cautiously friendly. In the Paris school, Charcot was hostile. Féré, Binet, etc. though not hostile, were uninterested.

This lukewarmness was due in part to the suspicious weakness of those few enthusiasts who had, since the disappearance of Elliottson and his group, upheld what was to be regarded as the higher phenomena of mesmerism. There was, and probably long will be, a host of sub-scientific journals, alleging mesmeric marvels on the slenderest evidence, and combining phrenology, homeopathy, astrology, etc. with unproved assertions of very much the phenomena which we desired not only to assert, but to prove. No one can wonder that there was a reluctance even to enter so dubious a domain.

But the main opposition rested upon something deeper than mere prejudice or intellectual suspicion. Our line of work lay in direct antagonism—not indeed to the best scientific work of our time—but to certain conclusions which that scientific work had long tended to encourage. Telepathy represented the end of the Aufklärung. The long attempt at the simplification of all phenomena in a materialistic sense received here a fatal check. And thereinto a door was assuredly opened for the revival of mysticism,—for the appeal to fictitious sanctions of duty and all the confused superstitious credulity which Science had been hoping to exterminate.

George Eliot, John Morley, Frederic Harrison, Huxley, Clifford, Pollock, Fitzjames and Leslie Stephen, Swinburne—these felt in their different ways that the moral object of their lives would in some sense be upset if the new views prevailed. They had been endeavoring to erect a moral system upon a purely agnostic basis;—to teach mankind that the mere fact of human fellowship was a sufficient foundation for morality, for contented labour, or even for impersonal hope. "Do you understand," said George Eliot to me one day, "that the triumph of what you believe would mean the worthlessness of all that my life has been spent in teaching?" This indeed is an exaggerated view. All valid appeals to moral sentiment must remain valid, however widely our knowledge of the laws of the universe may extend. But from the point of view of the agnostic moralists themselves there is much truth in the saying. It was in their opposition to "supernatural ethics" that this group mainly dwelt. They had led the race, they thought, out of its ancient bondage, and here were men striving to put chains on it again. John Morley was one of those who felt this the most keenly. I remember staying along with him at Broadlands

once, when another guest was to recount certain psychical experiences. John Morley refused to form one of the group who listened, saying that, whatever the facts as to a future life might be, they could not modify the present and manifest duties of man. With Renan I had one curious conversation. He was at one time an object of my admiration and I took pains to see him. I mentioned hypnotism; and I found--this was as late as 1887--that he was, so to say, the last man who denounced the whole thing as fraud.

Other men whom I knew well, or whom Sidgwick knew well, and who cared about our opinion on other matters, remained indifferent to these.

Such was Sir George Trevelyn, a man of alert and sympathetic intelligence, an old college friend of H.S. and myself. He used to read some of our papers out of literary curiosity; neither believed or disbelieved their contents, but simply took no interest in the matter. He cared for his boys, for his career, for his place, Wallington, and for belles-lettres and history; but he could project forward no glance into a future beyond this earth.

Such was Frank Darwin, who cared to know all that in this life could be learnt of the structure of vegetable life; but beyond that he had no longing to extend his insight into the Universe.

Such was J. A. Symonds, one of my most intimate friends, a man whose deeply interesting character is not adequately represented in his books. With him, indeed, the indifference had a different ground. It was not that he was unmindful of possible expansions of human fate. But his sadness, his weariness, his inward scepticism as to the Cosmos' meaning, were such that he felt satiated in advance with all existences, and desired an endless rest.

Sir Alfred Lyall again, the most philosophical of our Eastern scholars, might have been expected to take an interest in our researches so closely touching the inner meaning of ancient faiths. But his mind had a different bent; and although after staying at my house, and brought into contact with these inquiries, he had no curiosity whatever about them. . . .

Myers' notations suggest that, except for a very few instances, the Victorians were not greatly impressed by the S.P.R.'s research and endeavors. No doubt, at the time of this writing in 1891, Myers sadly felt this to be true.<sup>186</sup> Nevertheless, from the perspective of almost seventy-five years, the situation around 1891 looks very much different. Myers was perhaps correct in his estimate of the small number of reliable persons and thinkers who believed as he did that the results of the scientific investigation of spiritualistic

and mediumistic phenomena, clairvoyance, telepathy, trance phenomena, multiple personality, veridical dreams, posthypnotic suggestion and other abnormal and paranormal mental and physical phenomena gave sufficient evidence for demonstrating the survival of the human personality after bodily death. Yet he was overly hasty in arguing that all who inquired into these phenomena and did not progress to his own ultimate spiritualistic hypothesis were necessarily untouched by the psychical research movement. The existence of a strong opposition undermines his assertions. So does the evidence we have been gathering in this first section. The same holds true for the frequent references made to Myers in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, and the extensive reviews of his posthumously published Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death. Indeed, two anonymous comments in two very different sources come much closer to the truth. In an article in the Times for September 7th, 1898, a reporter can say, "It is certainly a sign of the times that the President of the British Association for this year is also the President of the S.P.R., and as such a declared believer in what he pronounced to be the fundamental law that thoughts and images may be transferred."<sup>187</sup> And in an 1886 issue of Light, a Spiritualist periodical, an anonymous editorialist can reflect that "the S.P.R. has done much to make the present generation talk of things psychical. It is a note of modern culture to at least know what the word 'psychical' means."<sup>188</sup>

## CHAPTER II

### THE EDUCATION OF AN AESTHETE

#### A Plagiarism and Its Defense

In 1863, F.W.H. Myers, then an undergraduate at Trinity College, Cambridge, found himself at the center of one of the more interesting university scandals in the Victorian period. Particularly adept at winning poetic prizes,<sup>1</sup> Myers had won in 1863 the Camden Medal Prize for a Latin poem on the subject of "India Pacificata" and the Chancellor's Medal Prize for an English poem on the subject of "The Distress in Lancashire." The young poet read his two prize poems in the Senate House late in the spring. They were published in the appropriate volumes.<sup>2</sup> The following summer, however, a series of letters in the local newspapers disclosed that the Camden Medal poem had "borrowed" numerous lines from classical sources and previously published Oxford prize poems.<sup>3</sup> Ultimately, it became clear that approximately one quarter of Myers' poem was taken from other sources.

Although the plagiarism has been frequently commented upon,<sup>4</sup> no one has made any attempt to understand Myers' motivations for handling his materials as he did. Considering that two years later Myers was elected a Fellow and Lecturer in Classics at Trinity College, Cambridge, we might consider his defense of his actions worth looking at. That defense, as we shall note, reveals most intimately Myers' whole

notion of the nature of poetry and art at the commencement of his long career as a man of letters. Furthermore, that defense demonstrates and illuminates a significant aspect of Victorian critical theory,<sup>5</sup> an aspect all too infrequently commented upon. Several pieces of evidence, taken together, can help us reconstruct the outlines of that defense.

Firstly, in September of 1863 Myers sent the following unpublished letter to his uncle, Arthur Marshall, then residing at Hallsteads:<sup>6</sup>

My dear Uncle,

My mother tells me that you say you would be glad that I write to you about the affair of my Camden. I am very glad to do so, as I wished to do so before, but did not know whether it would be fitting. It seems to me that there are two questions which anyone might actually ask. Firstly, how could you steal the lines without feel that you were doing wrong? Secondly, how could you fail to see that others would think that you were doing wrong? . . .

. . . I had thought a good deal on the theory of poetry, and had come to the conclusion, of course very probably erroneous, but at any rate sincerely held, that the essence and value of a poem consist entirely in the impression which it makes as a whole, and that the special parts have no separate function, as it were, but are only valuable as building up and subserving the symmetry of the whole. For example, any criticism which was content to compare two poems by comparing the beauties of their special portions, as for example Mr. Gladstone's criticism on Homer and Virgil, appeared to me unsatisfactory. I looked wholly to the indefinable nobility of the general style and manner of thought, and most of all to the rhythm which appeared to me the highest manner of implying poetic thought, and the true test of the poet. Thus no one poet could be materially assisted by plagiarizing from another; if he did not possess that breath of thought and power over rhythm to which I refer no theft could enable him to assume: if he did possess those powers I considered that the works of others might fairly be useful to him where through some casual fitness they were capable of amalgamation with his own peculiar and essential style. (Thus, though of course the cases are not precisely parallel, a philosopher may be great not by inventing new views only, but by assimilating the views of others and perhaps giving them a depth and significance which they did not before possess.)<sup>7</sup> I fancied that I discovered traces of a similar view in several of the poets whom I most admired: most of all in Virgil of whom after Mr. Conington's edition it is surely hardly too much to say that almost every line in his work

is a translation, an adaptation, or an actual theft. At any rate the number of such thefts in him is enormous, but it seemed to me that this did not in the least detract from the merit or real originality of the work, which I considered to lie in the masterly rhythmical and poetical judgment which enable him to select and arrange his booty. I will go no further into this theory: I only wish to say enough to show in what manner I conceived of plagiarism. While writing my poem, and with such theories in my head, I chanced to notice an old book of Oxford Prize Poems, which I possessed by chance and had hardly ever opened, as I am not in the habit of reading such compositions. It is natural to me to be desirous of immediately reducing to practice any theory which I might have formed and I seized on the opportunity of doing so then . . .

Secondly, in commenting on the plagiarism incident in his autobiographical fragment written many years later, Myers wrote that

Having won a Latin prize poem, I was fond of alluding to myself as a kind of Virgil among my young companions. Writing again a similar poem, I saw in my bookshelves a collection of Oxford prize poems, which I had picked up somewhere in order to gloat over their inferiority to my own. I laid this out on my table, and forced into my new poem such lines as I deemed worthy of preservation.<sup>8</sup> When my friends came in, I would point to this book and say, "Aurum colligo e stercore Ennii"—"I am collecting gold from Ennius' dung heap,"—a remark which Virgil used to make with more valid pretensions. My acquaintances laughed; but when my poem was adjudged the best, a disappointed competitor ferreted out these insertions; and the Master of Trinity, although he roundly asserted that I had done nothing illegitimate, advised me to resign the prize.<sup>9</sup>

Thirdly, among the letters published weekly in the Cambridge papers during the summer when the plagiarisms were disclosed, one letter, published August 15, and signed "Codrus," made some attempt to defend Myers' practices.<sup>10</sup> The letter was apparently written by Myers or one of his friends and constitutes a not very bold attempt to give a rough approximation of Myers' motives, methods and sources. Thus, the letter refers to John Conington's recently published edition of Virgil,<sup>11</sup> draws attention to Virgil's famous remarks about collecting gold from Ennius' dung heap, and quotes verbatim from Conington's

comments on the significance of Virgil's remarks on the Latin poet's theory of poetry and art. In a satirical tone, the letter goes on to say that if the disappointed competitors would wish to win competitive prizes, they would do well to follow Virgil's example. In effect, the letter defends poetic imitation as an acceptable and traditional literary mode.

Brief as these statements are, we can bring them together into a kind of summary of the poetic theory Myers' prize poem supposedly was illustrating.<sup>12</sup> A poem is a product made out of a mosaic of parts amalgamated and fitted together into a symmetrical whole. The proper end of poetry is its "impression" and the controlling principle of the poem, that which makes it a whole which does impress, is the poem's manner, style and underlying rhythmical structure. The parts out of which the whole is constructed may be tropes, phrases, thoughts, adaptations, paraphrases or translations from the tradition of art itself. Independent fabrication is not to be encouraged and imitation, not of action but of tradition, is not to be discouraged. The originality of poetry is not the originality of content or idea, but the originality of the poet's use of, and power over, rhythm, metre and style. Furthermore, the poet--and Virgil is the model here--is to be judged by his success at reinterpreting the tradition and giving it a depth and significance which it did not have before by properly fitting his imitations into a new context and new rhythmical structure. The depth and significance given to tradition through imitation suggests that the tradition's function is, as one modern critic has put it, "a resource equivalent to symbolic metaphor and elaborate



imagery" in that the imitative allusion enables the poet to get "his purchase of larger meanings and to evolve the finer resonances of poetry."<sup>13</sup> Because the poet employs models for his own purposes, his choice of models becomes a touchstone of judgment. The poet must exercise his faculties as critic as well as his abilities to make an object of impressive style, manner and rhythm. Imitation carries with it the notion of poet as critic and critic as poet.<sup>14</sup> Myers also suggests in his defense that poetry and the making of a poem is a form of competition. The poet competes with his own contemporaries for poetic honors. He also competes with the tradition he uses in order to surpass it or do it better.<sup>15</sup>

#### Gladstone on Homer and Virgil

In his letter to his uncle defending his plagiarism, Myers refers both to Gladstone and Conington and their discussions of Virgil. These discussions, I believe, were the primary sources of Myers' theory. To see the implications of that theory, we must turn to the sources of Myers' argument. Both sources were published within the few years immediately prior to Myers' defense of his imitations.

Gladstone's study of Virgil and Homer was initially published in the Quarterly Review for January and July, 1857. It was subsequently republished with additions and augmentation in the third volume of his Homer and the Homeric Age (1858).<sup>16</sup> Gladstone's rhetorical purpose in his essays on Homer was to raise the esteem of Homer and encourage a rediscovery of Homer. The means by which he effectuated his purpose and discovered arguments to support his thesis was to com-

pare Homer and Virgil. The function of the comparative method in this instance was to raise the esteem of one ancient by lowering the esteem of the other. In order to accomplish this end, Gladstone developed a series of critical commonplaces from which to demonstrate differences and distinctions between the two poets. At the same time, the commonplaces served as tools of critical and qualitative judgment. Ultimately, they presuppose a critical theory and a critical methodology which reflects Gladstone's notions of what poetry is.

Gladstone differentiates the two poets by announcing at the outset of his argument that the poet of the Aeneid and the poet of the Iliad and Odyssey are "discordant" upon "everything that relates to the truth of our nature, to the laws of thought and action and to veracity in the management of higher subjects such as history, morality, polity and religion."<sup>17</sup> In so arguing, Gladstone implies that no distinction is to be made between poetry, history, ethics, religious and theological speculation and political philosophy. One evaluates a poem in the same context and with the same set of tools that one employs to evaluate and analyze these other disciplines.<sup>18</sup> The upshot of these criteria of judgment is too obvious to need further example or illustration. Gladstone awards Homer the palm because (a) he is a better historian than Virgil, (b) he is more acceptable as a moralist, (c) he is a better theologian, (d) he is a better psychologist, (e) he is a more profound political theorist. In each instance, Gladstone evaluates and judges an historian, a moralist, a psychologist and a theologian. Consequently, he does not discriminate between poems, but discriminates between kinds of history, kinds of

metaphysical and religious speculation, kinds of ethical systems and kinds of political theory.

Gladstone finds it necessary to confront and reverse what Arnold referred to as the "historical fallacy"--the assumption that poets and poems assume significance and importance because they were causes or antecedents productive of more important and significant consequence and effects.<sup>19</sup> In the context of the historical fallacy, Homer assumes importance because he was the predecessor of Virgil. Gladstone reverses the assumption. He argues that the antecedent is more important than the consequence, the cause than the effect, the original than its imitation.<sup>20</sup> In so doing, he severely depreciates and criticizes poetic imitation. The critical commonplace with which he works may be summarily stated as follows: That which precedes is necessarily better than that which follows. Consequently, poetry and poems are evaluated and judged not only as history, but as historical documents. The philologist, grammarian and linguist have proved the imitation of Homer by Virgil.<sup>21</sup> Homer, hence, is the greater poet of the two for he is the original, Virgil the imitation, and the original is a priori more significant than the imitation, the source than the tradition.<sup>22</sup>

Concomitant with Gladstone's argument that the original is preferable to the imitation is his notion that poetry is a reflection of the poet and the poet, in turn, a reflection of the moment and milieu of which he is a product.<sup>23</sup> Great art is the product of great men and great men are products of great ages. Here Gladstone utilizes tools and assumptions which Arnold, Ruskin and Morris were

to develop further and to popularize more fully. One begins not with facts or with definitions but with the isolation of qualities which one believes to have inherent value, moral or otherwise, in themselves. One then deduces from these qualities the character of men or historical epochs. Epochs of intellectual mediocrity or moral deficiency are inferior to epochs of intellectual acumen and moral uprightness. Epochs of a certain political character are inferior to epochs of another political character.<sup>24</sup> By a very careful sleight of hand, the critic then redistributes his adjectives and formulates a kind of analogical proportion--A is to B as B is to C as C is to D. The age of Augustus was a degenerate age and, consequently and proportionally, a degenerate age implies degenerate men (Virgil) and degenerate men necessarily and proportionally imply degenerate literature (the Aeneid). Art, therefore, reflects the moral, political and social character of the age that produced it. One evaluates and estimates an artistic product by judging the age in which it was made.

Gladstone's arguments have another important implication. How does one talk about a work of art as a reflection of its age, as historically valid, as morally uplifting or philosophically acceptable? Gladstone's answer to this question is built into his argument and into the kinds of proof and testimony by which he develops the assumptions of his argument. He extracts several lines from Virgil and several from Homer and then shows how Virgil either translates or paraphrases Homer, or how Virgil's lines express a geographical or historical inaccuracy which Homer's do not, or how the

moral or philosophical sentiment of Virgil's lines is inferior and less acceptable than the sentiments expressed by Homer. Gladstone talks about poems and poetry in terms of the parts of poems, not in terms of the poem as a whole.

In summary, Gladstone's criticism of Virgil assumes that the art of poetry is no different from the art of history, political philosophy, or moral theory. Poems are not evaluated as wholes but are discussed in terms of their parts. Poems and poetry reflect the moral and political qualities of the age in which they were written. Poems are vehicles for moral, social, religious, historical and philosophical truth.

Gladstone's criticism of Virgil was not such as to find favor with young Myers. On the one hand, Myers disagreed with his estimate of Virgil in general. On the other, he disagreed with Gladstone's whole approach to poetry, his implied definition of what poetry was and the qualitative judgments by which Gladstone estimates the value or worth of a poem. He disagreed with Gladstone as to the importance of a poet's historical inaccuracies, ethical position, political attitudes or philosophical assumptions as means by which one judges and evaluates a poet or a poem. He disagreed with Gladstone's confusion of poetry with history, philosophy, ethics and politics. He took offense at Gladstone's depreciation of imitation in poetry and his attitude toward tradition and originality. He disliked Gladstone's neglect of the poem as a whole and his substitution of bits and pieces for wholes. For Myers, the parts were only effective and significant as they subserved a whole.

Conington on Virgil

Myers' reaction to Gladstone was negative. His reaction to Conington was positive, and to understand Myers' defense of his plagiarism and his prize poem one has to turn to Conington's essays on Virgil.<sup>25</sup> They provided Myers with the theoretical and practical suppositions of his own notions of poetry and art.

If he had wished, Conington could have countered Gladstone's depreciation of Virgil by employing similar or identical assumptions,<sup>26</sup> i.e., Virgil's value as a poet resides in his philosophical ideas, his historical accuracy, his ethics, his understanding of human nature.<sup>27</sup> Because he did not accept the validity of Gladstone's commonplaces, however, Conington constructed his defense of Virgil on very different grounds. Consequently, there is little in Conington's essays which suggests that poetry is comparable to history, philosophy, morality or religion. Nor does he argue that the proper estimate of poetry is to be a moral, philosophical or historical estimate.<sup>28</sup> On the contrary, Conington took up the defense of Virgil from the point of view of a defense of the notion of poetry as "imitation."<sup>29</sup>

Virgil, Conington stated, was no doubt guilty of "conscious and overt imitation which would stamp the modern author with the charge of plagiarism."<sup>30</sup> At the same time, however, there can be no doubt that Virgil ranked as an original poet in his own judgment no less than in the judgement of his contemporaries.<sup>31</sup> Conington's problem is to work out the consequences of this paradox in critical

and historical terms. Clearly, now that all Virgil's borrowings have been pointed out, he argues, one cannot say that Virgil's appeal to his own generation or to ours is a consequence of the originality of his subject matter or his observations of the natural world. To the contrary, Conington remarks, Virgil was one of those men who are more impressed by the inexhaustibleness of Art rather than the infinity of Nature. "They see with the eye of others, not with their own."<sup>32</sup> Over such minds, the recollection of a word in a book has the same power which others find in the natural world or in a remembered sight or sound.<sup>33</sup>

If Virgil's appeal is not a consequence of his originality of subject matter nor a consequence of the relationship of his material to the world of nature or reality, his appeal must reside in other qualities, qualities of language, artifice and finished excellence--distinctively "artistic" qualities. Thus, for example, one might define pastoral poetry as a truthful dramatic representation of one of the simplest forms of life. By this standard the Eclogues, with their systematic confusion of time, place and circumstance, cannot stand and are a corruption of the pastoral tradition. Conington, however, argues persuasively that this does not necessarily vitiate the character of the Eclogues "as pure poetry, irrespective of the class to which they profess to belong."<sup>34</sup> He sums up his critical position in a single, weighty paragraph:

It is as an artist that Virgil appears chiefly to challenge our admiration, as in other works, so also in the Bucolics. The language, indeed, which he puts into the mouths of his pastoral personages is for the most part as undramatic as the thoughts which

that language expresses are conventional and unreal. . . . Yet a more poetical people than the Romans might be pardoned if they forgot their sense of dramatic propriety in the delight with which they welcomed such specimens of language and versification as those which the Eclogues everywhere exhibit. The tedious labor of the file, the absence of which is deplored by Horace as fatal to the excellence of Roman poetry, had at last found an artist who would submit to it without complaining. The finished excellence of his workmanship is a fact which will not be readily impeached or overlooked, though its importance may easily be underrated. We are apt, perhaps, not sufficiently to consider what is involved in the style or diction of poetry. We distinguish sharply between the general conception and the language, as if the power which strikes out the one were something quite different from the skill which elaborates the other. No doubt, there is a difference between the two operations, and one which must place a poet like Virgil at a disadvantage as compared with the writers whom he followed; but it would be a mistake to suppose that imagination may not be shown in the words which embody a thought as well as in the thought which they embody.<sup>35</sup> To express a thought in language is in truth to express a larger conception by the help of a number of smaller ones; and the same poetical faculty which originates the one may well be employed in producing the other. It is not merely that the adaptation of the words to the thought itself requires a poet's sense, though this is much; but that the words themselves are images, each possessing, or capable of possessing, a beauty of its own, which need not be impaired, but may be illustrated and set off, by its relative position, as contributing to the development of another and more complex beauty. It is not necessary that these words, in order to be poetical, should be picturesque in the strict sense of the term; on the contrary, it may suit the poet's object to make a physical image retire into the shade, not advance into prominent light: but the imagination will still be appealed to, whatever may be the avenue of approach--by the effect of perspective, by artful juxtaposition, by musical sound, or perhaps, as we have already seen, by remote intellectual association.<sup>36</sup> The central thought may be borrowed or unreal, yet the subordinate conceptions may be true and beautiful, whether the subordination be that of a paragraph to an entire poem, a sentence to a paragraph, or a phrase or word to a sentence. It is, I conceive, to a perception of this fact, and not to a deference to any popular or mechanical notion of composition that the praise of style and execution in poetry is to be referred. . . .<sup>37</sup>

Conington's introductions to the Georgics, the Eclogues and the Aeneid are variations on this one basic critical thesis. Poems are to be judged and evaluated by their language, by their qualities as



artistic products, by the finished excellence and perfection of their workmanship, by their artful juxtaposition of parts, by their illustration of the poet's command of musical sound, rhythm and perspective and by their use of intellectual associations and allusions. Thus, Conington repudiates Gladstone's thesis that Homer was a greater poet than Virgil because he was more original and more profound as a thinker. He also repudiates Keble's thesis that the most distinguishing quality of Virgil is his single-minded enthusiasm for nature. Virgil is, Conington says, "the many-sided cultivator of art."<sup>38</sup> Thus he compares Virgil's Georgics with Lucretius' De Rerum Natura and argues that the reason one poem is uniformly popular while the other is comparatively neglected has nothing to do with the differences in their subject matters. "It is the artistic part of poetry which has the most enduring charm for the generality of readers; and there it is that Lucretius falls short and Virgil succeeds."<sup>39</sup>

Conington also suggests that the poet as imitator is identical with the notion of the poet as critic:

A minute analysis of the language of the Eclogues is in truth a school of poetic criticism; and though the subtlety and complexity of the images involved may induce a practice of overrefining on the part of the inquirer, yet experience, I think, will show that the danger of giving Virgil credit for more than he had in his mind is far less than would be supposed by an ordinary reader. . . . In possessing Theocritus, Hesiod and Homer, we may feel that we possess, as it were, the exciting cause of the Eclogues, the Georgics, and the Aeneid. They do not indeed represent all the literary influences which must have told upon Virgil's genius or disclose to us the origin of the peculiar manner in which he has conducted his work of imitation; but they show us what it was that in each successive case first stimulated his general conception of his subject--what it was that he admired in the literature of Greece, and sought to reproduce among his countrymen: they enable us to judge of him not only as a poet, but as a critic of the poetry of others.<sup>40</sup>

For Arnold, poetry was a criticism of life. For Conington and Virgil, poetry was a criticism of art and the tradition through imitation and adaptation.

In summarizing Conington's introductory essays to Virgil, we can say that Conington believed Virgil does not appeal to our imagination and taste by the originality of material, the reality of his matter, his historical accuracy or moral or philosophic position, but through the originality of his artistic personality which is stamped upon his adaptations, appropriations, imitations, plagiarisms, allusions and translations by his own unique employment of the artistic devices of rhythm, harmony, versification, color, composition and sound. Virgil's artistry entitles his poetry to be classed as "pure poetry" and original poetry, whose workmanship alone is the standard by which it should be judged. This thesis is no different from the thesis by which Myers endeavored to defend his own poetry in 1863.

Conington was a Professor of Latin whose criticism of poetry was carefully controlled by his scholarly pursuits. His argument, for example, that Virgil's poems are capable of withstanding any criticism which points to his plagiarisms, translations and wholesale borrowings was set in a scholarly framework. Myers, on the other hand, was an aspiring young poet, in reality an aesthete, interested in constructing a theory of poetry which would not only account for the practices of Virgil but which would also be useful to the contemporary poet. He believed that Conington's criticism of Virgil offered such a theory and, as a consequence, he was willing to extend Conington's critical precepts to their ultimate practical conclusions.

This was, in effect, what Myers tried to do with his Camden Medal poem of 1863. He had found in Conington's essays a critical theory of poetry which appeared to abandon all claims for originality of matter and, in some instances, of form and threw the burden of aesthetic judgment on the ability of the poet to handle what he considered the essential elements of poetry itself, that which "proved the true test of the poet"—the rhythm, metre, prosody, the use of color and the artist's sense of harmony, organization and careful craftsmanship.

As some of Conington's letters to Myers during the summer and fall of 1863 illustrate, Myers' extension of Conington's scholarly appraisal of Virgil into the realm of practice no doubt embarrassed the older man. Writing to Myers in the fall of 1863, for example, Conington slapped Myers on the hand:

Your view of poetry, as you explain it, is very interesting, certainly. If I hesitate to accept it, it is because it seems to prove too much. . . . You say it would have no detraction from a poem if not a word of it were by the author and the thefts were so thick together as to involve numberless contradictions: I can only ask, why then we have no such poems? Why have poets so systematically condescended to human weakness as they have done? On my theory, so-called originality is something, though I admit a writer would be a great poet in spite of much apparent disregard of it.<sup>41</sup> But the degree seems to me to make all the difference, and I see a great difference between translation and plagiarism proper. . . . I don't doubt that great poets can only be fully appreciated by their equals. But they are not for all that a fraternity of illuminants intelligible only to each other. Their inferiors understand them in a thousand different degrees, and within those degrees may even judge them, the poets themselves having furnished them with the means to do so. Were this not the case, poets would be a very different race from what they are—wandering voices which would soon die out and cease to be heard at all.<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless, there was far more agreement than disagreement between

the impulsive young poet and the more conservative and worldly scholar. Their differences were, as Conington had stated, differences in degree and not differences in kind.

#### Cheltenham and Trinity

Myers came by his early notions of poetry naturally, and Conington's criticism of Virgil was but a catalyst which, through a slight shift of emphasis, brought the older techniques of classicism and imitation into a coherent literary theory which a young man like Myers was only too willing to extend into what he thought was perhaps a wholly new theory of poetry. Myers' preparation for the role of poet and critic, a preparation ultimately leading toward aestheticism, was little more than the preparation of an exceptionally bright school-boy who took to classical studies and classical literature with a relish and whose own poetry, much of it in the vein of translative and imitative verse, brought him honors and prizes.<sup>43</sup>

At Cheltenham,<sup>44</sup> where Myers matriculated from 1856 through 1860, almost the whole of the school curriculum was given over to the translation of Latin and Greek verse into English, Greek verse into Latin, Latin into Greek and English into Latin and Greek. The Principal of Cheltenham at the time of Myers' attendance was the Reverend William Dobson, who had come up from Cambridge with the prestige of a Fellow of Trinity and a third classic in the same year that Shilleto was second.<sup>45</sup> Unlike other noteworthy schoolmasters of the mid-Victorian period, Dobson never preached or ministered in the chapel nor did he devote any of his time to his students' religious or moral

educations. He concentrated wholly upon running his classes for University scholarships in the classics and, as one cynical student noted, his candidates seldom missed. Among those who succeeded were Myers, "the most brilliant of Cambridge scholars for a whole generation,"<sup>46</sup> R.W. Raper, Professor of Latin and later Vice-President of Trinity College, Oxford, and Henry Jackson, Professor of Greek and later Principal of Trinity College, Cambridge. To assist in his educative endeavors, Dobson chose for his Vice-Principal the Reverend Hubert Ashton Holden, a senior classic and former Fellow of Trinity. Holden's reputation is still infamous today, for he was the compiler of the Foliorum Silvulae, a collection of choice passages of English poetry for rendering into Latin verse.<sup>47</sup>

Myers had been very well prepared for such a scholarly venture. He was an extremely precocious youngster and at the age of six had already begun work on Latin. By the age of eleven, he had committed the whole of the Aeneid to memory, a feat unusual enough to be frequently recorded. Before going to Cheltenham, he was instructed by the Reverend Cowley Powles. Writing to Myers after Myers had already had children of his own, Powles gives us a revealing insight into the nature of Myers' preparation for Cheltenham. "How I should like to see your boys, and you with them. If they learn as readily as their father did, teaching them must be a real pleasure. I never shall forget your first introduction to Greek iambs. I can see now your quick eager look as you followed the rendering of the Shakespeare line by line into almost literal Greek."<sup>48</sup> Douglas Sladen, also a graduate of Cheltenham, has recorded Myers' extraordinary abilities as a

student of classical literature in his autobiography:

One cannot think of Lang without thinking also of F.W.H. Myers, whom I met far earlier. As a child he was remarkable; at thirteen, on entering Cheltenham College (where I was educated long afterwards) so precocious was his scholarship that he was placed with boys of seventeen and eighteen. I doubt if there ever has lived another English boy who learned the whole of Virgil by heart for his own pure delight, before he passed the school age. He won the senior classical scholarship in his first year at thirteen; besides gaining first prize for Latin lyrics, he sent in two English poems in different metres, and both were the best and came out top.

At the University few men have won more honours. Myers was to Cambridge as Lang was to Oxford--and more so. He was greater in pure scholarship, and far greater as a poet, for he wrote "St. Paul," almost the finest quatrain poem in the English language.  
 . . .49

It is, of course, only a very short step from the translation of classical verse into English and English into Greek and Latin to the imitation of a poet writing in one's own language, and here also Myers excelled. Writing of Myers, for example, at Cheltenham, one of his classmates, R.C. Francillon, states in his autobiography:

The second seat was no less permanently occupied by Frederic William Henry Myers, of psychical research celebrity. He had taken the place he held at seventeen when he first entered the school at the age of thirteen: an instance of precocious scholarship rare enough to be worth recording. Nor was he merely a scholar. He was our poet; and while still a boy was a Tennysonian enthusiast who could show reason for his faith at the time when quite intelligent men and women scoffed at "Maud" and found "In Memoriam" obscure. On the practical value of his excursions into the occult world, opinions may and do so legitimately differ that I am entitled to express my own, founded as it is by the likeness of the boy to the man--namely, that he was gifted with real imaginative genius misapplied to subjects only befogged by his speculative subtlety and literary charm.<sup>50</sup>

The precise nature of Myers' Tennysonian interests which, together with his classical gifts, gave him the title of Cheltenham's poet can best be illustrated by the following letter from the poet

Aubrey de Vere to Myers' mother. The letter is dated November 22, 1857.

My dear Mrs. Myers,

I cannot help writing to you just a line to tell you how very much struck I have been with some poems written by your boy Freddy, which your sister, Lady Monteaagle, has shown me. I do not exaggerate when I assure you that they seem to me far superior to any poetry written at so early an age that I have ever seen. I allude especially to the "In Memoriam" poems and the additional pictures for the "Palace of Art." In imagination, vigour of diction and a certain artistic instinct about them, they are very remarkable things indeed. The likeness to Tennyson, which is in manner rather than in thought, is not unnatural and in no way derogates from the merit of the poems, as youthful genius always develops itself at first through a process of sympathetic admiration. . .<sup>51</sup>

Myers' undergraduate years at Trinity College repeated in large measure his experience at Cheltenham. Here too he won fame as a classical scholar and his training encouraged him to concentrate his verse writing along strictly classical and formal lines, to compete for poetic prizes, to translate, to imitate and to write to Conington at Oxford that his verses must be judged on standards other than the matter of his verse. His education taught him that the standard of poetic judgment and poetic originality lay in the poet's abilities to implement formal qualities. The matter itself, the subject and frequently the theme, were givens. As he wrote to Conington, a Cambridge prize poet was not as responsible for the sentiments of his poem as he was for the mechanical part.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, he had acquired such an impressive record of artistic achievements and awards that his own successes dictated his choice of critical and poetic theories.<sup>53</sup>

#### Subsequent Variations

The classical and imitative theory of poetry which Myers used

to defend his plagiarism in 1863 was altered and gradually tempered in the late 60's and early 70's; in the 80's and 90's, it was no longer the dominant strain in his critical thought. Yet it is important to note that Myers' classicism, his interest in language, rhythm, technique, imitation, conscious artistry, allusion, tradition, style and mannerism, whether a dominant theme or a minor theme, always remained a part of his general attitude toward poetry.<sup>54</sup> The ideas expressed in his defense of his Latin Prize Poem were not the hasty excuses of a schoolboy caught in the act of cheating. Many of the same ideas, with substantial variation no doubt, were repeated again by Myers in the next forty years. Three examples should make this clear.

In 1879, Myers published an essay on Virgil in the Fortnightly Review.<sup>55</sup> Significantly enough, Myers begins his essay with a defense of poetry which is imitative, allusive, and "traditional." In this instance, he again rebuffs the critical assumption that poetry must be original and once more reworks the paradox that a poem can be both imitative and original, allusive and inventive. The specific occasion of this defense, however, was not any attack on his own verse, but the attack made upon Virgil by German literary historiographers who, like Gladstone, continually superimposed the historical faculty on the critical or poetic faculty. Like Gladstone, German critics like Wagner, Teufel and Ribbeck argued that every work of art is essentially an historical product and must be evaluated from the perspective of the national life from which it sprang.<sup>56</sup> They, too, indicated an explicit preference for early naïveté and ori-



ginality over against the self-consciously excellent, imitative or formal.<sup>57</sup> Commenting on this essay, R. P. Cowl in his Theory of Poetry in England cites passages from it which, he rightly comments, illustrate the notions that poetry is both "an imitative and an imaginative art" and that poetry is "a system of rhythmical and melodious effects."<sup>58</sup> All of these ideas are explicitly stated in Myers' defense of his plagiarism in 1863.

In 1881, Myers published one of his masterpieces, a study of Wordsworth for the English Men of Letters Series.<sup>59</sup> Quite clearly, his sympathy with Wordsworth lay not with the so-called Romantic revolution which Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads and their prefaces initiated, for his portrait of Wordsworth reaches its climax with Myers' criticisms of Wordsworth's theory of poetic diction and with his description of the way in which "classical models" became "more and more dominant in Wordworth's mind, till the poet of Poor Susan and The Cuckoo spends months over the attempt to translate the Aeneid--to win the secret of that style which he placed at the head of all poetic styles."<sup>60</sup> In his comments on Wordworth's theory of poetic diction Myers states that the pleasures of poetry are extremely complex. They cannot be reduced to moral or intellectual sources.<sup>61</sup> Poetry's significant elements--its richness of sound, melody and rhythm--are inexplicable, non-moral and non-intellectual. In both doctrine and practice, "Wordsworth exhibits a progressive reaction from the extreme views with which he starts towards that common vein of good sense and sound judgment, which may be traced back to Horace, Longinus and Aristotle."<sup>62</sup> Later in the same chapter, Myers devotes consider-

able space to a discussion of Wordsworth's "Laodamia" and other poems which represent and suggest the influence of Virgil on Wordsworth. He points to a number of passages in which "whether from mere similarity of feeling or from more or less conscious recollection, there are frequent passages in English which recall the Roman poet."<sup>63</sup> Some lines, he points out, "are almost a translation of Palinuris' remonstrances with the treachery of a tranquil heaven."<sup>64</sup> Others suggest significant allusions and imitative echoes which enlarge the context and significance of Wordsworth's meaning. "He who wrote them has entered--where no commentator could conduct him--into the solemn pathos of Virgil's Musaeum ante omnis, where the singer whose very existence upon earth has become a legend and a mythic name is seen keeping in the underworld his old pre-eminence, and towering above the blessed dead."<sup>65</sup> It is in Wordsworth's classical poems, Virgilian, imitative and allusive, that Myers finds Wordsworth achieving some of his greatest poetic successes. They represent "the Indian Summer of his genius."<sup>66</sup>

In 1897, Myers wrote a letter to Hallam Tennyson on the latter's request for an essay on his father "approached not from the side of Plotinus but from the side of Virgil." The letter, reprinted in Tennyson, A Memoir,<sup>67</sup> states that Tennyson's veneration for Virgil is "no chance preference or literary idiosyncrasy." Rather, it implies "the acceptance of a certain ideal of poetic art." Bothered by the critical strategy of drawing up poets into two camps, the classic and the romantic, Myers nevertheless believes the two words do express a real distinction, especially with respect to Tennyson:

It would be absurd, indeed, to draw up poets in two opposite camps; especially absurd in treating of a poet whom those who best appreciated Romanticism held as romantic, while those who best appreciated Classicism felt him as classic to the core. Yet the words thus express a real distinction; and it is well to draw out their meaning and to realize how we regard their leading exemplars. In each art, then, we tend to call the type romantic when the artist strives above all things to make his work fresh, vivid, interesting; infusing into it individual emotion, interweaving with it the attractiveness of other forms of art; filling it, as one may say, with the pulse and breath of life. The aim of him whom we call the classical artist is at first sight a narrower one. For his absorbing and primary desire is to carry to its utmost height that innate and inexplicable charm in the relations of sound and line or rhythm or colour which makes the essential principle of his art. When he fails, he degenerates into a virtuoso. When he succeeds, he enters in some sort into the hidden heritage of emotion which maintains the life of art itself; and although his public may sometimes be small, he gives to cognoscenti a joy at least as penetrating and vital as any which the romanticist can bestow. Each type, I say, has its dangers, but there is need of both; not only of Wagner, but of Beethoven; not only of Shakespeare, but of Virgil.<sup>68</sup>

Myers goes on to argue that poetry, like music and painting, is a trained skill requiring special and technical preparation, not only before a man can create, but before he can understand or appreciate.<sup>69</sup> As a consequence, a classical education is essential for those cognoscenti who "desire to judge the highest poetry aright." It is only through a study of classical poetry, employing the new tools of philology and history, that we can catch "the vital spirit of antiquity . . . the flower of the past."<sup>70</sup> This is the spirit which Tennyson exemplifies, for through practice and preparation, he has understood from within the "inmost structure and prepotent energy" of the classical spirit. "He has recognized the true tradition and lived again the ancient song."<sup>71</sup>

Myers' illustrations of the derivative and imitative nature of much of Tennyson's poetry, together with his emphasis on Tennyson's

own artistic sensibility, his consummate artistry and skill in rhythm and sound, his knowledge of the technicalities of his art, his ability to weave into his own verse the allusive and imitative qualities of line and phrase from art's own great tradition are, in effect, similar to, if not identical with, his defense of classicism and imitation thirty-four years earlier.

### Classicism and Aestheticism

One of the real problems of a scholarly appraisal of the poetry and poetic theory of the last thirty years of the Victorian age is the problem of defining terms. Art for art's sake, decadence, aestheticism—all such phrases and terms, according to some who have occupied themselves with the problem, have been much overused and misunderstood.<sup>72</sup> In a recent discussion of this problem, however, one revealing and significant question has been asked which is relevant to our chapter and discussion here. "Is aestheticism closer in kind to what now seems to be understood by the term classicism and by contrast, is decadence then closer to what now seems to be understood by romanticism?"<sup>73</sup> In the context of our discussion, we would, I believe, have to answer in the affirmative to at least one half of this modest proposal, for Myers' classicism appears to be part of a larger "aesthetic" context. Indeed, as the reader no doubt has observed, one could easily substitute the word "aestheticism" for almost every instance we have used the words "classicism" or "imitation" and feel little discomfort at the substitution. In effect, the ramifications of Myers' classicism coalesce quite nicely with late Victorian notions of aestheticism.

The relationship between the presuppositions of aestheticism<sup>74</sup> and those of Myers' classical education and training are self-evident. Such a training emphasized correctness of style and form. It placed great emphasis on language. On one hand it opened a division between the formal properties of verse and the matter of verse. On the other, it emphasized the appropriateness of form to content rather than the content itself. The rhythm, prosody, color and harmonies of verse were given primary consideration in the making of a critical judgment. The traditional and artificial were given preference to the real and the natural, training and education to genius and originality.

Buried too within the classical context of Conington's defense of Virgil's imitations and Myers' defense of his plagiarism is a theory of poetry which looked forward to, if it was not part of, the aesthetic movement. Both Myers and Conington place much value on the impression which a poem makes as a whole rather than on its individual parts or on its logical and intellectual development. Both insist that this impression is a consequence of a highly developed and cultivated artistic sensitivity, not a consequence of the poet's normal or ethical sensibility. Both Conington and Myers intimate that certain types of poetry, particularly poetry written in an age of superior aesthetic and artistic awareness, may stand as "pure poetry" which cannot be judged by standards which are not ultimately "artistic." Both thus emphasize artificiality, careful technique, and conscious artistry. In so doing, they repudiate the romantic dogmas of Wordsworth which emphasized poetic realism, naturalism and sincerity and those of Shelley which emphasized "genius," originality, the notion of the poet as a legis-

lator of the world. At the same time, they also repudiated the traditional Victorian conception that poetry is a vehicle for moral truth, religious inspiration and political and social problem-solving.

Myers was particularly interested in the relationship of the poet to his audience. Like the aesthetes near the end of the century, his theory of poetry, particularly his notions of literary allusion and the function of imitation as a form of aesthetic criticism, emphasized the artistic exclusiveness and aesthetic cultism of the cognoscenti. Since his emphasis was on the peculiar sensitivity of the artist and his audience, his theory necessarily precluded the democratization of literary audiences as implied by Wordsworth or those mid-Victorian critics who emphasized the moral and ethical rather than the aesthetic function of the poet's art. Myers' emphasis on poetry as an art whose greatness depended upon indefinable qualities of style and manner of thought rather than upon the thought itself, together with his conviction that the true test of the poet lay in his sense of rhythm, harmony and language, presupposed an audience capable of sharing the poet's aesthetic sensibilities.

The relationship between classicism and aestheticism in Myers' thought can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. His classical interests in translation, for example, encouraged him to take an interest in translating from the French. Thus, his notebooks show translations from Baudelaire and De Musset. Similarly, his interest in classical metres and English metres and prosody bubbled over into studies of French versification. In an essay on Victor Hugo published in the late 70's, for instance, Myers wrote what is possibly the finest in-

troductory analysis in English in the Victorian period of the principal aspects of French prosody and metrics and the principal differences between French and English prosody.<sup>75</sup>

More important, however, Myers' appreciation and critical acceptance of much so-called aesthetic poetry seems to have grown out of his interests in classical literature, imitation, adaptation, allusion and translation. His delight in Swinburne and Morris, for example, were in essence a delight in the metrical, prosodical and allusive qualities of their verse, its classical and imitative texture.<sup>76</sup> In a lecture on "The Poetry of Swinburne and Morris" given at Newnham College in January of 1896, for instance, Myers argued similarly to his arguments of 1863:

Mr. Frederic Myers began the present series on Saturday last by an enthusiastic appreciation of Swinburne with about ten minutes devoted to William Morris; and created in his audience a strong desire to ask for more. . . . There is little good poetry in this world but for what there is no measure of thankfulness can be too great. Our standard must be high, and for true criticism, a classical education is necessary. Only once and again, among the many who leap in numbers does a matter arise. Such are Swinburne and Morris. In studying them we must remember that poetry is not a method of preaching or of expressing our thoughts. It is an art of managing the symbolism of language, as music is an art of managing the symbolism of notes. In a poem, every word should have a musical and emotional relation to every other word, and each should be applied to its noblest significance, surrounded by its most glorious associations.<sup>77</sup>

Of particular importance in this lecture is the fusion in Myers' thought of the necessity of a classical education, a strong admiration for the verse of Swinburne and Morris and a suggestion as to the similarity of poetry and music as symbolic arts. Furthermore, Myers once again extols the allusive quality of poetry and repudiates the notion that poetry is a method of preaching or of expressing thoughts. A

year later, Myers gave a second lecture at Newnham on the subject of "Rhythm and Metrics in English Poetry."<sup>78</sup> Here, too, working with Swinburne, Morris, Tennyson and Gilbert he emphasized the distinctively aesthetic qualities of verse from a classical and academic perspective.

A similar classical context provided the grounds for his appreciation of such a luminary among aesthetes as Edgar Allen Poe.<sup>79</sup> Myers problem in this essay was the following: How does one evaluate poems which are "barren" of any serious message, "unequal to any criticism of life," or narrow in range of thought, experience or emotion? "To analyse 'Ulalums', for instance, would be like breaking a death's head moth on the wheel. But nevertheless a dozen solid British poets of the Southey type would to my mind be well bartered for those few lines of Poe's which after the sternest sifting must needs remain."<sup>80</sup>

The lines which Myers comments on are of two types. Firstly, there are those in which Poe through the allusive quality of his line and mood echoes the "bitter fragrance" and the "cosmic terror" which is part of the great tradition of poetry. Secondly, there are those lines, stanzas and poems of Poe which are of a "virtuoso" type (the virtuoso for Myers being the classicist and formalist whose lines and poems lack the allusive quality suggestive of the very tradition of poetry and its echoes, but who nevertheless employs all the apparent resources of classicism--rhythm, harmony, color and sound) which Myers endeavors to justify by a "virtuoso" standard.<sup>81</sup>



There does exist a very real aspect of all verse-makers as a vast band of persons playing a game something like Patience in excelsis--a game in which words are dealt round as counters, and you have to arrange your counters in such a pattern that rivals and spectators alike shall vote you a prize: one prize only being awarded for about ten thousand competitors in the game. Poe has won a prize with a few small patterns which no one in his generation could exactly beat.<sup>82</sup>

Myers' emphasis here on formulae (the counters and the game are suggestive of a kind of Gradus ad Parnassum), pattern, rhythm, metric, competition and rivalry are all aspects of the classical context we have previously discussed, and the justification of the virtuoso comes very close to Myers' justification of his plagiarism in August of 1863.

#### Myers' Theory of Translation

Myers' early theory of translation<sup>83</sup> adequately demonstrates the relationship between his classicism and his aestheticism and holds a significant middle ground between his classical education and interests and his aesthetic propensities. In the next few pages I shall indicate the principles and assumptions with which Myers evaluated translation, suggest how these principles are identical with the poetic principles we have already noted, point out the similarities of Myers' notions of translation with those of such academicians as Conington and Herbert Warren, and suggest through illustration and example how Myers' theory of translation approximates several principles of literary criticism and judgment enunciated by such aesthetes as Pater and Wilde.

Our notes and text have already touched upon Myers' attitude toward translation. Translation, for example, was part of the whole complex of associations surrounding his classical notions of imitation.

Virgil both paraphrased and translated Homer, but this did not vitiate his claim as a true poet. Myers thought the same of Morris. Myers argued that the distinctions between plagiarism, translation and imitation are, when rightly conceived, distinctions of degree and not distinctions of kind. His defense of his own plagiarism, his essay on Virgil and his study of Wordsworth all touched upon the problem of translation.<sup>84</sup> An essay which Myers contributed to the Fortnightly Review for 1873 on Jebb's translations,<sup>85</sup> however, is his most extended and coherent theory of translation.

Jebb's small volume of poetry, Translations into Greek and Latin Verse,<sup>86</sup> combined both the arts of translation and imitation. He transposed or "rendered," for example, Browning into the metres of the Fourth Pythian, Byron into an Aeschylean fragment, Tennyson into Horatian and Sophoclean metres, Arnold into Latin elegiacs and Wordsworth into Greek hexameters. Because it was something of an academic curiosity, Myers found it necessary to defend his serious treatment of Jebb's work. He did so by exalting the art of translation to a level almost commensurate with the highest creative arts and the translator to a level commensurate with the highest kind of creator.<sup>87</sup>

The art of Latin and Greek versification bears to poetry something of the same relation as the art of execution on organ, pianoforte, or violin bears to music. Eminent success in either of these subsidiary arts implies nearly all poetical or musical capacities short of absolute genius; and in poetical as well as in musical "rendering," the perfection of skill may approach so near to genius as to be scarcely distinguishable from it.<sup>88</sup>

In effect, Myers argues that Jebb's work, unlike translations which are nothing more than the "plaything of an idle hour," is worthy of serious detailed criticism because they are great artistic achieve-

ments capable of sustaining criticism. They fulfill the art of successful translation which is the creation of successful poems "fashioned according to the genius of the language adapted" and winning applause on their own merits. On one occasion, Myers states that Jebb's style is "sometimes in danger of becoming a law to itself, and of laying an offering of some strange new iridescent metal among the golden possessions of the gods."<sup>89</sup> On the whole, however, he stresses the independence of the translator's work as a poetic creation able to stand on its own as an imaginative work of art.

In arguing that successful translation is successful poetry and the successful translator is the successful poet, Myers in effect defines once again how he conceives of the poet and poetry. The translator as poet suggests that the end of poetry is its manner and style rather than its thought or its matter. The translator as poet has as his source of inspiration the world of art and artifice. His peculiar "joy" is to "feel and educe the touches of nature which make the whole world kin; to prove, as it were that the germ of all our thought and passion was alive and beating beneath the Athenian's mantle, and beneath the mail of Rome."

There is nothing trifling in such an aim and hope as this; for it is to live among the greatest thoughts, to enter into the heart of the mightiest men; to feel, as with a derivative inspiration, the very fountains of their majestic numbers upspringing in the soul; to be conscious that our vital force is doubled beneath the celestial armour's strain. This joy Mr. Jebb has known; and the first and the last thought which his book brings us is of that glorious page where it is told how "great Achilles made trial of himself in the immortal arms, if so be that they fitted him and therein his fair limbs were free; but lo! they were as wings unto him, and upbore the shepherd of the people."<sup>90</sup>

The "derivative" imagination by which the translator-poet enters into the hidden emotion which is the life of art itself is, for Myers, the highest kind of inspiration, for only through such imaginative projection can the artist achieve the freedom necessary to create vital, meaningful and significant works of art. The translator as poet suffuses the heritage of art and tradition with something of his own distinctive artistic sensibility, marrying the past and the present. Characteristic of the translator as poet are the qualities of refinement, judgment, cultivation and training; appreciation and interpretation are essentials of his art. "To marry the noblest thoughts and melodies of the ancient and modern world" is one of the highest aims "which a refined and cultivated intellect can set itself to accomplish."<sup>91</sup>

In this theory of translation Myers also allows that the poet-translator may play upon the allusive possibilities of the tradition of art with which he works. In commenting on Jebb's translation of Wordsworth's "Intimations Ode" Myers argues, for example, that the result is "a gorgeous and imposing poem, not Homeric, not Hesiodic, but reminding us partly of Empedocles, partly of Theocritus, and most of all,--of Mr. Jebb."<sup>92</sup> In this particular instance, the translation is praised for recalling for the "cognescenti" a host of literary allusions which add a panache and significant "allusive" dimension to Wordsworth's original thoughts.

The notion of translator as poet also suggested to Myers the notion of poetry as a form of rivalry and competition for poetic honors. For example, after pointing out that modern poetry is often

amateurish and clumsy in comparison with the professional work of the classical poets, Myers goes on to argue that Jebb's translation of Byron's "Darkness" is a greater poetical achievement than the original composition. Jebb's poem, he states, demonstrates a greater command over the rhythmical, structural and stylistic capacities inherent in the language in which it was written.

It is clear from the very framework of Myers' discussion of translation that his principles and assumptions were a consequence of the classical and academic tradition in which he was educated. Jebb's translations themselves were the ultimate expression of that tradition. Only a classical scholar of Jebb's quality and learning could have produced them and only a thorough familiarity with ancient and modern verse could have produced the sensitivity to the nuances of rhythm, language, style and form which Jebb's work exhibited. Furthermore, if we compare Myers' principles of translation with those of other scholarly academics such as Warren somewhat later and Conington somewhat earlier we find so many significant similarities that we can rightly argue that Myers' opinions on translation were no different from numerous other scholarly and academic attitudes toward the same subject.<sup>93</sup>

Myers, Conington and Warren state explicitly, for example, that good translation is good poetry and a successful translator is in effect a successful poet.<sup>94</sup> Implied in each instance is a definition of poetry and judgments and assumptions about what qualities are necessary for good poetry. Each writer agrees that a good translation is not a servile copy of the original but reinterprets, remakes and

refashions the original into a new mode imprinted upon the original by the artistic personality of the translator. Each agrees that originality, personality and individuality are given expression through language, form, rhythm, color, melody, arrangement and construction. These are the qualities by which one evaluates all poetry and hence all translation. The originality of the subject matter or thought is unimportant. The translator as poet draws his inspiration and models not from the world of nature or the "real" experience around him, but from the world of art and artifice and the masterpieces of tradition.

Each agrees also that the idea of translator as poet is also synonymous with the notion of the translator as critic,<sup>95</sup> for in his refashioning of the original according to the laws of his own aesthetic sensibility and the possibilities inherent in his own language, the translator emphasizes those qualities of the original which he believes are most important and which he most wishes to preserve. In some instances, the translator even improves upon the original and in others adds a significant dimension to it by discovering new qualities inherent within it. In such instances, the translator discovers something about his model as well as communicating something of himself.

Clearly, Myers' ideal translator is identical with his "classical" attitude toward the ideal poet. Imitation and translation are both species of the same genre and represent what Myers called the "classical" tradition in poetry. In each instance, Virgil serves as a kind of authoritative model for purposes of emulation and illustration, for he was a poet for whom the end of his art was not the originality or validity of his thought, but the conscious artistic tech-

nique by which he manipulated the tradition of art and the resources of his own language to express his own aesthetic sensibilities and to create new and original aesthetic effects.

### Myers, Pater, Wilde and Valery

Even though Myers' principles and assumptions about translation in particular and his principles and assumptions about poetry in general reflect a classical, scholarly and educative bias, they are similar to, if not identical with, critical principles and assumptions of the most significant and noteworthy aesthetes.

In his essay on Du Bellay, for example, Walter Pater interpolates his own comments and opinions about translation with those of Du Bellay:

It was an age of translations. Du Bellay himself translated two books of the Aeneid, and other poetry, old and new, and there were some who thought that the translation of the classical literature was the true means of ennobling the French language:—strangers are ever favourites with us—nous favorisons toujours les étrangers. Du Bellay moderates their expectations. "I do not believe that one can learn the right use of them"—he is speaking of figures and ornament in language—"from translations, because it is impossible to reproduce them with the same grace with which the original author used them. For each language has I know not what peculiarities of its own; and if you force yourself to express the naturalness (le naïf) of this in another language, observing the law of translation,—not to expatiate beyond the limits of the author himself, your words will be constrained, cold and ungraceful." Then he fixes the test of all good translation:—"To prove this, read me Demosthenes and Homer in Latin, Cicero and Virgil in French, and see whether they produce in you the same affections which you experience in reading those authors in the original."<sup>96</sup>

For Pater, who obviously takes Du Bellay's sentiments as his own, all good translation presupposes the translator's own poetical skills which emerge from the poet-translator's intimate understanding of the

grace, number, perfection, movement, passion and charm which are potential in his own language.<sup>97</sup> Good translation must produce the same "affections" in the reader which the reader would experience if he were reading an original.

Du Bellay's Deffense, the volume from which Pater quotes, is a classic study of the role of imitation in poetry. Its main thesis is that if French verse is to achieve a higher and better form than that with which it has been long contented, which form must be sought in the old Greek and Latin poets, the poet must learn to reinterpret, not merely to copy servilely, to graft foreign branches skillfully on the native tree so that they no longer appear adapted, but the product of natural growth, to devour the authors imitated, digest them, and convert them into blood and nourishment for the works written in their imitation.<sup>98</sup>

This thesis, which is identical in kind with Myers' notions of poet as imitator and poet as translator, is used by Pater to justify Du Bellay's own poetry. For example, echoing Conington, Pater writes that if Du Bellay's poetry is to be judged aright, it must be judged on the basis of its aesthetic value, not its historical value. Poetry must do more than satisfy curiosity. Although Du Bellay's poetry is characteristic of the poetical taste of its age, it is necessary, if his work is to have the highest sort of interest, that there should be perceptible in his work "something individual, inventive, unique, the impress there of the writer's own temper and personality."<sup>99</sup> Pater then applies these commonplaces, which are, of course, Du Bellay's own, to "D'Un Vanneur De Ble Aux Vents," the poem which he considers



to be Du Bellay's best. The poem is both an imitation and a partial translation—"an Italian product transplanted into that green country of Anjou; out of the Latin verses of Andrea Navagero into French."<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, it is a poem in which the matter is almost nothing. What Pater does is to evaluate the poem in terms of its affective qualities, those formal qualities by which Du Bellay reinterprets the tradition and reworks it into something of his own with his personal note of style, language, rhythm and taste. Du Bellay serves Pater as a kind of model which is similar in kind to Virgil's function as model for Myers and Conington. In essence, Pater's justification for the value of his model, a model which is virtually an imitation and a creative translation, is identical with the justification of poet as imitator and translator which Myers and Conington developed. Indeed, the critical assumptions, qualitative and definitive, of the aesthete and the academics are identical.<sup>101</sup>

In his "Preface" to The Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde defined a critic as "one who can translate into another matter or a new material his impression of beautiful things." In the same "Preface" he defined an artist as one who "is the creator of beautiful things."<sup>102</sup> Wilde was a writer who chose his words and phrases carefully, and when in 1890 he published his essay "The Critic as Artist" he developed his revealing epigrams into a coherent theory of art and criticism. If the critic is a translator, and if he is also an artist, one who is the creator of beautiful things, in what context does Wilde place translation? The following passages from "The Critic as Artist" will give us our answer:

Criticism works with materials, and puts them into a form that is at once new and delightful. What more can one say of poetry? Indeed, I would call Criticism a creation within a creation. For just as the great artists, from Homer and Aeschylus down to Shakespeare and Keats, did not go directly to life for their subject matter, but sought for it in myth, legend, and ancient tale, so the critic deals with materials others have, as it were, purified for him, and to which imaginative form and color have already been added. Nay, more, I would say that the highest Criticism, being the purest form of personal impression, is in its way more creative than creation, as it has least reference to any standard external to itself, and is, in fact, its own reason for existing, and, as the Greeks would put it, in itself, and to itself, an end. Certainly, it is never trammelled by any shackles of verisimilitude.<sup>103</sup>

It seems to me that, while the literary critic stands of course first, as having the wider range, and larger vision, and nobler material, each of the arts has a critic, as it were, assigned to it. The actor is a critic of drama . . . the singer or the player on lute and viol is the critic of music. The etcher of a picture robs the painting of its fair colours, but shows us by the use of a new material its true colour—quality, its tone and values, and the relations of its masses, and so is, in his way, a critic of it, for the critic is he who exhibits to us a work of art in a form different from that of the work itself, and the employment of a new material is a critical as well as a creative element. . . . And in the case of all these creative critics of art, it is evident that personality is an absolute essential for any real interpretation. When Rubinstein plays to us the Sonata Appassionata of Beethoven, he gives us not merely Beethoven, but also himself, and so gives us Beethoven absolutely—Beethoven re-interpreted through a rich artistic nature, and made vivid and wonderful to us by a new and intense personality.<sup>104</sup>

And you see now, Ernest, that the critic has at his disposal as many objective forms of expression as the artist has. Ruskin put his criticism into imaginative prose, and is superb in his changes and contradictions; and Browning put his into blank verse and made painter and poet yield us their secret; and M. Renan uses dialogue, and Mr. Pater fiction, and Rossetti translated into sonnet-music the colour of Giorgione and the design of Ingres, and his own design and colour also, feeling, with the instinct of one who had many modes of utterance, that the ultimate art is literature, and the finest and fullest medium that of words.<sup>105</sup>

From time to time the world cries out against some charming artistic poet, because, to use its hackneyed and silly phrase, he has "nothing to say." But if he had something to say, he would probably say it, and the result would be tedious. It is just because he had no new message that he can do beautiful work. He gains his inspiration from form, and from form purely, as an artist should.<sup>106</sup>

Although Wilde's way of saying things charges his material with an air of originality and individual perception, he really is saying nothing more about the function of translation and imitation than did Conington, Myers or Warren when they argued that the translator is poet and the translator is critic. Both Wilde and Myers, for example, talk about the translator as one who is a kind of performing artist. Wilde draws his illustration from Rubinstein and Myers from Lizst, both, perhaps significantly, from romantic interpreters richly indebted to the cult of personality. In each instance, of course, the implication is that the translator as artist refashions and reworks the materials of another so as to stamp his materials with his own aesthetic sensitivity and sensibility which he expresses through his sense of form, line, color and composition. This is exactly the function that Conington claimed for Virgil and that Warren claimed for Myers' translations of Virgil. Verisimilitude is neither the function of the critic as translator nor the translator as poet. Wilde, Myers, Conington and Warren also all agree that the translator as critic and as artist draws his inspiration from the finished world of art and not the world of nature. As Conington said of Virgil, "he was the many-sided cultivator of art." All agree also that one of the characteristics of the translator as artist is not only his initial sensitivity, but his refined education and cultivation, his sense for form and word and line. The translator, the poet, the critic, the classicist, the aesthete all are cognescenti, eminently sensitive to the inherent beauty of form and language. There are several other

parallels here, but all in all, we can conclude that the academic notion of creative translation was little different from Wilde's aesthetic notion of critic as artist or "creative criticism."

Paul Valéry, perhaps better than any other poet working in the field of translation, ties all these approaches to creative translation together,<sup>107</sup> for his essays on translation make it clear that he, like Myers, believed that translation was nothing other than a mode of "pure poetry." Like others before him, Valéry recognized that linguistic and personal distinctions make poems literally untranslatable. He carried this thesis one step further, however, and suggested that although poems are untranslatable, the art of translation itself is an act of pure poetry. "I use the word pure," he wrote in an often quoted passage, "in the sense in which the physicist speaks of pure water. I mean that the question arises of knowing whether one can manage to construct one of those works which may be pure of all non-poetic elements. I still hold, that this aim is impossible to reach and that poetry is always a striving after this purely ideal state."<sup>108</sup> Valéry considered the translator as an original artist working within severer limits than other artists, and for this reason the translator, he believed, composed in a purer medium than an original poet.<sup>109</sup> Appropriately enough, in an essay on his own translations of Virgil's Eclogues, he even stated that the art of translation is the model of all writing:

Writing anything at all, as soon as the art of writing requires a certain amount of thought and is not a mechanical unbroken inscribing of spontaneous inner speech, is a work of translation exactly comparable to that of transmuting a text from one language

to another. . . . The poet is a peculiar type of translator who translates ordinary speech, modified by emotion, into "language of the Gods," and his inner labor consists less of seeking words for his ideas than of seeking ideas for his words and paramount rhythms.<sup>110</sup>

Here the notion of translator as poet and poet as translator is pushed to its furthest extreme, but, again, the distinctions between what Valery is saying and what Myers and Conington and Warren were implying were distinctions of degree, not of kind.

### Conclusion

We are now in a position, I believe, to comprehend the qualities of Myers' early interest in literature which I have described, somewhat loosely, as the education of an aesthete. This education was, in the older sense of the term, a traditional classical education. Myers' early awareness of the beauty to be found in poetry and literature, particularly the poetry of the ancients, was a consequence of his training in translation, imitation and adaptation. Such an education sharpened his awareness of the formal qualities of poetry, its metre, prosody, rhythms, color, harmonies--the perfection and charm of its language and form. Furthermore, his training as a poet as well as a critic was in the older classical tradition of emulation, rivalry, and competition. It was in this tradition, of course, that Plautus and Terence "translated" and imitated Menander and Greek New Comedy, that Virgil imitated Homer and Dante Virgil. Translation, imitation, adaptation and even plagiarism were effective pedagogical tools and part of the educational system. The successful within the system were placed on equal terms with the original poet. Few within the system

drew invidious distinctions between translation, imitation and originality. Both the translator and the original poet were thought of as doing the same thing--turning aesthetic experience into art. The student competitor and the original poet were both expected to triumph over their material, whether that material be drawn from the world of nature or from the world of art.

Myers was not simply an antiquarian or academician, however. He was a young scholar with great poetic ambitions of his own. His interest in Horace and Virgil, for example, taught him that it is the poet's right to translate, adapt and imitate the work of others, to re-use situations, themes and even phrases and lines from the tradition of poetry itself. Milton drew from Virgil and the Bible, Pope from Horace and Homer, Horace from Sappho and Pindar, and Virgil from Theocritus, Hesiod, Homer and Euripides. Each of these poets, however, adapted their material to new purposes and stamped their appropriations with their own artistic and poetic sensibility, worked it, if you will, in the crucible of their own minds and in the context of their own art.

Myers was not willing to allow such scholarly and academic information to lie fallow. He believed that he had found in Conington and the ancients a theory of poetry which could be utilized by the contemporary poet and critic, a theory which suggested an historical justification for "pure poetry," which saw the role of the translator and imitator as poet and the poet as translator, imitator and critic, on one hand, and on the other stressed the poet's artistic sensibility and sensitivity, his sense for language, form, rhythm, and

color. The one notion served as a justification for Myers' interest in such modernists as Baudelaire, Poe, Morris, Rossetti and Swinburne. The other served as justification for Myers' appreciation of traditionalists like Virgil and Tennyson. In both instances, appreciation and practice were a direct result of Myers' classical education which, when imprinted upon his own exuberant and artistic personality, became, in essence, an aesthetic education.

## CHAPTER III

### YEARS OF CHANGE

#### Hellenism

In a lecture at Newnham College in January of 1896, Myers argued that England was the inheritor of two proud traditions from Rome, her laws and her gift for song.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, as our last chapter demonstrated, Myers' classical aestheticism, especially his early emulation of Virgil, always a model for Myers, was decidedly Latinate in character. When we turn from his poetical and critical principles to his life and biography, we find the same classical aestheticism during these early years, but in this instance, however, the source of that mode and attitude was Greece and not Rome. From the age of sixteen to twenty-three, Myers wrote in his autobiography, there was no influence on his life comparable to the influence of Hellenism "in the fullest sense of that word."<sup>2</sup>

His enthusiasm for Greece and Greek literature (he travelled to Greece in 1864) was encouraged by his friendship with two young students of Conington, both Oxonians, Arthur Sidgwick and John Addington Symonds. As a group, the three young men exhibited a variety of characteristics common to young aesthetes of their day and age. In an age dominated by science, politics, fragmentation, shifting social



conditions and a dying religion, they turned to what they believed to have been a lost world of beauty and charm in ancient Greece.<sup>3</sup> They were particularly fond of the lyric poets of Lesbos, Sappho and Praxilla. Many years later, Myers in his autobiography and Symonds in his Studies of Greek Poets, summed up their youthful response to these poets, reliving once again their earlier enthusiasms.

Then it was that Praxilla's cry rang out across the narrow seas, that call to fellowship, reckless and lovely with stirring joy. "Drink with me," she cried, "be young with me! Love with me! wear with me the garland crown! Mad be thou with my madness; be wise when I am wise. . . ." There rose the heathery promontories, and waves lapped . . . upon those rocks where Sappho's feet had trodden; broke beneath the heather on which had sat that girl unknown, nearness to whom made a man the equal of the gods....For gazing thence on Delos and on the Cyclades, and on those straits and channels of purple sea, I felt that nowise could I come closer still; never more intimately than thus could embrace that vanished beauty.<sup>4</sup>

Symonds commentary on the same theme emphasizes more strongly than does Myers' the conditions and circumstances which were productive of such great beauty and lyricism:

Several circumstances contributed to aid the development of lyric poetry in Lesbos. The customs of the Aeolians permitted more social and domestic freedom than was common in Greece. Aeolian women were not confined to the harem like Ionians, or subjected to the rigorous discipline of the Spartans. While mixing freely with male society, they were highly educated, and accustomed to express their sentiments to an extent unknown elsewhere in history. . . . The Lesbian ladies applied themselves successfully to literature. They formed clubs for the cultivation of poetry and music. They studied the arts of beauty, and sought to refine metrical forms and diction. Nor did they confine themselves to the scientific side of art. Unrestrained by public opinion, and passionate for the beautiful, they cultivated their senses and emotions, and indulged their wildest passions. All the luxuries and elegances of life which the climate and rich valleys of Lesbos could afford were at their disposal; exquisite gardens where the roses and hyacinths spread perfume; river beds ablaze with the oleander and wild pomegrante; olive groves and fountains, where cyclamen and violet flowered with feathery maiden-hair. . . .

In such scenes as these the Lesbian poets lived, and thought of love. When we read their poems, we seem to have the perfumes, colours, sounds, and lights of that luxurious land distilled in verse. . . . The voluptuousness of Aeolian poetry is not like that of Persian or Arabian art. It is Greek in its self-restraint, proportion, tact. We find nothing burdensome in its sweetness. All is so rhythmical and sublimely ordered in the poems of Sappho that supreme art lends sublimity and grandeur to the expression of unmitigated passion. . . .<sup>5</sup>

Clearly, what they had found in the Lesbian poets was stimulatingly sensual and intoxicating, intensifying those qualities of mind and heart so lacking in the straitened ethic and aesthetic of mid-Victorianism. "The classics," Myers wrote, "were intensifications of my own being. They drew from me and fostered evil as well as good; they might aid in imaginative impulse and detachment from sordid interests, but they had no check for lust or pride."<sup>6</sup> In an earlier draft of the same chapter, he defined this state of mind even more explicitly. "Nay, they encouraged that indifference to ordinary persons and excessive interest in physical beauty which have greatly impaired my efficiency in life."<sup>7</sup>

Their intoxication with the physical and sensual also manifested itself in their concern for erotica. In 1865, for example, Myers and Symonds discovered Whitman.<sup>8</sup> In 1866, Symonds wrote to his good friend Dakyns:

. . . Whereas I have always held that, admitting the sensuality of the coarser natures, and quite independently of it, the most sensitive, delicate and nervous organizations are exposed to corruption less offensive in itself but more awful in its consequences. You know what I mean. You know that I consider the tone of F. Myers to be radically wrong in matters of passion and I regret the peculiar colour of A.S.'s erotics, not to speak of the misery which I have myself suffered. There, *salva modestia*, are at once three of not the least intellectually constituted members of our Universities assailed by the same disease. . . .

A man who regards Swinburne as a clear case of lunacy because he treats of Sappho cannot readily understand how there is much danger of the best and purest of his pupils idealizing the passion of the Phaedrus.<sup>9</sup>

This letter does not demonstrate, as some have argued, that at this time the three young aesthetes were practicing paederastia.<sup>10</sup> Symonds, who was at this time in the throes of revulsion from the sexuality and eroticism of his contemporaries, only refers to their "tone," clearly not their actions or practices. Moreover, they "idealized the passion of the Phaedrus" without realizing, Symonds states, its seductive tendency upon young, sensitive and impressionable minds.

In summary, during the early and middle sixties Myers was passing through an important phase of intellectual and emotional development common among sensitive university men of the fifties, sixties and seventies. He was, in effect, rebelling against the philistinism and narrow ethic of mid-Victorian morality and aesthetics. Swinburne, of course, was the prototype of this rebellious spirit, but it also seduced temporarily more temperate natures such as that of Arnold in his "A Modern Sappho," "The Strayed Reveller" and the "New Sirens." These too are illustrations of the same movement of mind, albeit somewhat earlier. "Hellenism" in the fullest sense of that word meant embracing a morality which was essentially aesthetic, a sensitivity to every form of loveliness and beauty unrestrained by moral or religious prohibitions.

#### Evangelism

Myers' fling with Sappho was short-lived. Early in 1866, for example, R.C. Jebb described a very different Myers from the

youthful undergraduate aesthete and Hellene we have been examining.

Myers is a man for whom I am beginning to have admiration. He has great self-command and earnestness of purpose. Having come to the conclusion that the life he has been leading is not the thing, he has devoted himself to self-discipline, such as he believes suited to his own temperament. He never goes anywhere. He gets up at 6:30 and goes to bed at ten. His days are spent in reading *Ecce Homo*, and thinking. All this may seem morbid, and many people would laugh at it, but for my part I respect and congratulate a man who can do it.<sup>11</sup>

What had happened to Myers was that he had turned inward upon himself and had rebelled against his own sensual and sensuous instincts and the lack of moral and religious purpose which he now had decided Hellenism represented. He was becoming increasingly preoccupied with Christianity.

This preoccupation is something of a paradox in Victorian biography, for Myers' "pattern of conversion" did not commence from an orthodox Christian background. True, his father had been a clergyman who had a significant impact on the Broad Church movement. His lengthy two-volume study, *Catholic Thoughts*,<sup>12</sup> found favor with his contemporaries of the eighteen-forties and later, in the seventies, it was reprinted under the auspices of Jowett.<sup>13</sup> Yet the elder Myers' death in 1851 seems to have been the end of his son's Christian education. In his autobiographical fragment, Myers speaks of his mother's profound religious convictions, his horror at her suggestion that a dead mole had no soul and his inability at an early age to bring Virgil's suggested mysteries into the context of his childish Christianity.<sup>14</sup> The general impression which one gathers from his autobiography is a surprising lack of interest in any aspect of the Christian faith other than immortality. His earliest manuscripts are not

filled with pious anecdotes, Sunday school aphorisms or religious instructions as one might expect of the son of a clergyman and a deeply religious mother. Rather, they consist of translations from the Greek and Latin poets and imitations of Tennyson's most luxurious mannerisms. It was not until 1865 that one can find Christianity becoming an active influence upon his life and his thought.

In 1865, he renewed his friendship with Jebb, writing to his mother that Jebb had "the unusual advantage of believing in Christianity."<sup>15</sup> In the spring of that year, he went up to Rugby to visit his friend Arthur Sidgwick. Myers, Symonds and Sidgwick had frequently lectured at Rugby on various literary and historical subjects. In this instance, however, Myers' activity at Rugby took a new turn. He suddenly entered into a series of lengthy religious debates, defending the values and virtues of Christianity against Sidgwick's arguments for the values and virtues of aestheticism and Hellenism. In an exchange of letters with Sidgwick following Myers' visit, Myers frequently comments on his recoiling from an earlier emotional and intellectual experience, his aestheticism, and his search for a means to supplement the sensuality and pride fostered by his earlier preoccupations.<sup>16</sup> He constantly makes reference to himself in these letters as a "beginner" in the Christian faith.

Browning, Seeley and Josephine Butler--these were the three figures who stimulated Myers' newly found faith. In March of 1865, he suddenly discovered Browning as a religious poet. Writing to his mother about Browning's "Easter Day," he stated that he had never "read anything which came home to me so much; it gave me quite a new

sense of companionship and help afforded me by the writer."<sup>17</sup> What Myers found of value in Browning<sup>18</sup> was the poet's denial of the sensuous and emotional attachments of the earth and his promulgation of a faith founded upon personal revelation which offered the "sinner" the possibility of a "Better Land" through hope and striving. Furthermore, whereas Browning's Aeschylus "offered blind hopes" to spice the meal of life, his Paul struggled to "effect" his warfare, rejecting the "ghastly smooth life, dead at Heart/Tame in earth's paddock as her prize." In Browning's poem, the Hellenic world of Symonds and Sidgwick was the world of sense, "earth's exquisite treasures of wonder and delight," the enjoyment of earth "unrestrained," a "summer's opulence." Browning rejected the world of earthly joys for the "spirit's fugitive brief gleams." Browning's speaker also rejected, as means of spiritual advancement, the world of nature and natural things symbolized by the fern and the statuary of the Greeks and the paintings of Italy—"What are displays of power and beauty intermixed,/ Which now thy soul is chained betwixt."<sup>19</sup>

Finding himself at Rugby ignorant both of sufficient justification for faith and intelligent arguments to support his position, Myers took it upon himself to read widely in nineteenth century religious and theological literature, Strauss, Feuerbach, Renan, Stanley, and Trench, among others.<sup>20</sup> As Jebb's letter of February, 1866, shows, however, Myers was particularly impressed by Seeley's anonymously published Ecce Homo.<sup>21</sup> Henry Sidgwick in a letter commented on the impact of the book on some of the younger men at Cambridge, stating that "Myers in particular was tremendously stirred by it."<sup>22</sup> Many years

later, Myers was to reject Seeley's work as a "new eirenicon."<sup>23</sup> It is not difficult to see, however, why he found the work appealing to him in 1866.

Seeley's analysis of Christ's purpose and ethic emphasized the emotional and non-intellectual characteristics of Christ's teaching. Love, enthusiasm and faith, Seeley believed, all lay in the region where intellectual ideas are fertilized by emotion, the most actively motive-producing region of the mind.<sup>24</sup> His Christ was not the Christ of a cloistered virtue, for Seeley emphasized the philanthropic aspects of Christ's teaching, his "enthusiasm for humanity."<sup>25</sup> Christ added to the older morality of not doing the duty of doing good. Philanthropy was not the amusement of man's leisure, but the chief occupation of life.<sup>26</sup> Christianity was a universal religion, for the Church offered itself to saint and sinner alike, to the sensualist as well as to the idealist.<sup>27</sup> What Myers therefore found rewarding in Seeley was an image of Christianity which was unencumbered by dogma, form or obscure scholasticism and which developed and fostered man's emotional temperament.

The qualities of mind and heart emphasized by Seeley found a deeper and more personal embodiment for Myers in the teaching and character of Josephine Butler.<sup>28</sup> A genteel Evangelist (her husband was the Principal of Liverpool College, and later Vice-Principal of Cheltenham College) Josephine Butler was a living manifestation of Seeley's perfect Christian. She was a leader in the struggle against the slave trade, the Contagious Diseases Act and unjust treatment of prostitutes. She vigorously supported higher education for women and

greater political freedom for women. The spiritual equality of the sexes and humane attitudes toward the poor and afflicted were axioms of her religious faith and she was persuaded that in the final verities of life all men are equally children of a Divine Father.

Although Myers had known the Butlers some years before, it was not until 1865 that he fell under Mrs. Butler's influence and began to take an active interest in both her work and her message. At that time he was, so to speak, ripe for the plucking. His travels to Greece the year before, intoxicating though they were, left him with the impression that the vanished beauty of Delos and Cyclades was an ideal which rooted itself in the past and offered little hope for the future.<sup>29</sup> One year later, he sailed for North America and the New World where, in an act of bravura, on the night of August 28th, he swam from the Canadian side of Niagara Falls to the American side, his only onlooker a foolhardy boatman following behind with Myers' clothing. Looking back on this experience some twenty-five years later, Myers saw his action as symbolic of his own centre of indifference, his Rue de L'Enfer. "I seemed immersed in thundering chaos, alone amid the roar of doom. I emerged on the American side, and looked back on the tossing gulf. May death, I dimly thought, be such a transit, terrifying but easy, and leading to nothing new? Caelum non animus mutant may be true of that change as well."<sup>30</sup>

In 1865, as Phyllis Grosskurth records, Mrs. Butler's "call was not [yet] directed toward fallen women but to reviving the flagging faith of sceptical young men."<sup>31</sup> And, in large measure, this she accomplished. Full of the fervor of the ecstatic, reminding Symonds



of St. Catherine,<sup>32</sup> she gathered around her Symonds, James Stuart, Cotter Morrison, Myers, and, with considerable difficulty, Arthur Sidgwick. Her impact upon Myers was immediate. She caused him, he says, and his letters bear this out, to realize the Christian faith in its emotional fullness. "She introduced me to Christianity," he wrote, "by an inner door; not to its encumbering forms and dogmas, but to its heart of fire. I had been 'converted' by the Phaedo, and not by the Gospel. Christian conversion now came to me in a potent form--through the agency of an ardent and beautiful woman, much older than myself."<sup>33</sup>

#### Saint Paul

It was at this time in his life that Myers published his well-known Saint Paul, originally written in competition for the Seatonian Prize as Saint Paul and Felix in 1867.<sup>34</sup> Published by Macmillan in 1867, Saint Paul, Sir Edward Cook relates, "vied with Fitzgerald's Omar in popularity."<sup>35</sup> Between its initial appearance and the turn of the century, the poem went through sixteen editions and a variety of textual changes.<sup>36</sup> Meredith reviewed it favorably in the Fortnightly.<sup>37</sup> Swinburne copied its peculiar metrical effects for his "Mater Triumphalis," one of his signal metrical successes.<sup>38</sup> Gosse records that when he came down to London on his famous pilgrimage from the bondage of his father's household the two literary events which most impressed him were the death of the poet-priest Milman and the popularity of Saint Paul. "These features," he records, "seemed like the end of an old age and the beginning of a new one."<sup>39</sup>

How many years ago it seems since I read George Meredith's review of Saint Paul in the Fortnightly and bought it with one of the half-crowns that then were scarce with me; and read it aloud in season and out of season until a dreadful fate befell me, for Saint Paul was snatched from me by an old Evangelical aunt, and returned without a cover, which had been immolated because of the Popish cross that was thereon. I bought another, years later, but I have always kept the mutilated specimen which had given me so much pleasure and pain.<sup>40</sup>

The criticism on Myers' poem suggests that its great appeal was two-fold. Many were aroused, favorably or unfavorably, by its religious address and religious subject matter. Gosse's father strongly disagreed with its expressed theology and therefore intensely disliked the poem.<sup>41</sup> Ruskin, somewhat more temperately, disagreed with its theological position but, he added, "I am glad to have my thought changed."<sup>42</sup> Others, however, found its message deeply religious in thought and tone. As Oliver Smeaton wrote of the poem,

Few poems of modern times have engraven themselves so deeply on the moral and spiritual consciousness of the age. Its deep devotional tone, its haunting and bewitching metrical melody, the nobility of its teaching and the claimant character of its call to lofty self-sacrifice, have all combined to make it one of the most aspiring as well as one of the most comforting of latter-day religious poems. . . . One quality of Myers should not be omitted of mention, the extraordinary influence it exercises over those in moral or spiritual distress. To such it comes like a healing balm, and many have ascribed their just interest in religious matters from the consolation they had received from the poem.<sup>43</sup>

There were also those who found the poem's appeal to be wholly aesthetic. They enjoyed the wealth of rich imagery and metaphor, the wide variety of rhetorical and alliterative techniques, and the curious rhythms and movements of its prosody. The fact is, serious comment upon Myers' rhythmical scheme far outweighs in quality and quantity commentary upon Myers' message. Herbert Warren believed the

metrical scheme a variation on schemes found in some of the older devotional hymnals.<sup>44</sup> Gosse considered the metre ambidextrous. Each line could be treated as one of four feet or five feet, at the choice of the reader.<sup>45</sup> Meredith found the line to be rhymed fours with an alternating eleven and ten syllable line.<sup>46</sup> A.C. Benson thought the poem's form, metre, and rhythmical structure a perfectly novel experiment. In a tantalizing passage, he records that "I venture to say that no technical metricist would ever dream of assigning to the poem the scheme of rhythm which Myers maintained underlay it. But the poem, with all its rush of feeling and gorgeous word music, remains."<sup>47</sup> Even Saintsbury consented to make a statement about the poem in his Manual of English Prosody.<sup>48</sup>

If we take Myers' conversion to Evangelicalism through the agency of Josephine Butler together with the critical reception Saint Paul received, I believe we can construct the motives which underlay the poem's creation. Unlike one of Browning's monologues, Saint Paul's florid and intoxicating monologue lacks dramatic objectivity. In effect, Myers' Saint Paul is really Myers' himself, a pagan converted to evangelical Christianity. Myers' intention was not to write a treatise on Pauline theology or an historical account of Paul's life; he was, as E.T. Cook writes, pouring out on a given subject the emotions and imagination of a poet. It is clear, however, that the sensuous emotion of the Greek poets, the ravishing beauty of the scenery of Greece, in effect, the Pagan ecstaticism which Myers supposedly abandoned in 1865 because of his inability, under its influence, to check both lust and pride, was subsumed but not destroyed by an

overtly emotional evangelicalism. Myers' Saint Paul is essentially a Christian ecstatic who fuses together Christianity and pagan aestheticism.

Saint Paul is a revealing document in the context of Myers' life. For one thing, it represents another illustration of his intensive emotional enthusiasms, whether their object be Virgil, Swinburne, Morris, Evangelicalism or psychical research.<sup>49</sup> For another, it represents the paradoxical character of his evangelical conversion, for it seems to suggest a turning away from the classical aestheticism and hedonism of his undergraduate years while in reality it illustrates that for Myers, Sappho and Paul had an emotional fervency and ecstaticism in common. The poem's strong physical and emotional sense of color, rhythm, and image suggests not a cloistered Paul but a fervent enthusiast who is very much a part of the sensuous beauty of his Greek and Mediterranean surroundings. Myers' Paul and Myers himself were pagan-Christians whose emotions tied the new world to the old. Myers' hedonism and intoxication with Hellenism had its source in the same emotional roots as did his evangelicalism and his intoxication with the spiritual fervency of Josephine Butler.

#### Disillusionment

Myers' involvement with Evangelicalism, however, was to be as short-lived as his involvement with classical hedonism. The causes for his change of heart were a consequence of his epoch and his personality. As he writes in his autobiography,

There is no need to retrace the steps of gradual disillusion.

This came to me, as to many others, from increased knowledge of history and of science, from a wider outlook on the world. Sad it was, and slow; a recognition of insufficiency of evidence, fraught with growing pain. Insensibly the celestial vision faded, and left me to

pale despair and cold tranquility,  
Nature's vast frame, the web of human things,  
Birth and the grave, that are not as they were.<sup>50</sup>

In the beginning of 1869, Mrs. Butler's hold upon him slipped away completely. He had contracted pneumonia while lecturing for the North of England Council, and the dangerous and protracted illness brought matters to a serious crisis. Near to death, he felt neither fear nor helplessness but, as he says, "an absence of all certainty in the Christian hope. I recovered, but the world gradually grew less bright."<sup>51</sup> In another unpublished note in his manuscripts, Myers wrote that the entry in his diary, "Martineau and Manning," dated Sunday, October 29, 1871, represented "perhaps the last time when I attended chapel, cathedral, or church with any faintest hope of learning of the chief concerns of man."<sup>52</sup>

In part, of course, Myers' difficulty was that his Christian experience was entirely emotional. In the passage above, he remarks that he attended chapel to learn the chief concerns of man. Another passage in his autobiographical fragments, however, suggests more completely his aesthetic and emotive responses to Christianity, those responses which are recorded in his Saint Paul:

I used constantly to go alone to the week-day afternoon services at King's College Chapel,—services then attended by scarcely anyone, and dimly lit by a few candles for the use of the choir. There in the gloom and vastness the soaring trebles sang. "When God heard this He was wroth,"—the boys' clear passionless cry mounted through the dusky air. . . . Swift came the antiphonal clauses, winged with the worship of a hundred generations; and

with nothing left in them of individual or of purposive,—a hieratic cry; but for that very reason carrying the continuity of man's long complaint, the age-long sense of nearness and removal, of dealings with a God afar. Like odours which touch early memories the phrases sank and rose, till heaven darkened behind the towering windows and night descended on the song. And last of all the organ quivered with thunderous sound; the echo of appeals immeasurably vaster than human voice or wail; as it were the murmuring of a World soul up-pent in caverns of the earth.<sup>53</sup>

Indeed, after reading a passage such as this, one sees how little prepared were Myers and his evangelical high-church aestheticism to combat the historical and intellectual developments of the late sixties and early seventies.

Many of Myers' poems at this time represent the various phases of hope and doubt he was now undergoing and mirror the philosophical and emotional stages of his experience around 1870. Among the best of these poems are his "Ammergau," "Implicit Promise of Immortality," and "The Translation of Faith."<sup>54</sup> In "Ammergau,"<sup>55</sup> for example, the poet traces his mental history backward from his full acceptance of the most sophisticated kind of Christian faith to his childhood experiences in the Cumberland country. In each successive phase of the poem, the source of the poet's musings is some work of art or artist. The passion play initiates his reflections on Christianity and the disappearance of Christ in the modern world. Recognizing that hope for Christ's return is only a shadow, he next thinks on Virgil and the Latin poet's mythological world of enchantment, a peaceful harborage from the temporal passions of reality. Art, he concludes here, can capture a "fragment of passion's tenderness" but this fragment belies the real isolation of souls in this world. The poet is thrown back on his early memories of Wordsworth "in that enchanting home where I was

born." Through recollection of man and verse, he briefly sustains a visionary insight into the natural world around him and into the cosmic sweep of the universe. The vision faded, the poet still finds nature enough to sustain a somewhat unexpected belief in the "Fatherhood of God."

"The Translation of Faith"<sup>56</sup> was published soon after Myers visited the great Oecumenical Council of 1870. In the winter of 1869, Myers left for Europe and a warmer climate, fearing a second attack of pneumonia. In the first week of the new year, he reached Rome and then recorded in this poem and a series of letters to his mother,<sup>57</sup> all his impressions of the Council's activities. Although the poem is not entirely successful (Sidgwick thought it lacked clarity) it apparently occasioned some serious comment. R.H. Hutton, for example, commented on it in the Spectator and later reprinted his comments in his Aspects of Religious and Scientific Thought.<sup>58</sup> Hutton believed that the poem was a fresh illustration of "one of the most curiously marked and constantly recurring features of the unbroken succession of English poems between Shelley's day and our own--the always bitter and sometimes almost tragic cry of desolation with which one after the other, as they gaze eagerly into the spiritual world, they nerve themselves to confess what they have not found and cannot find there." Hutton's main thesis was that what distinguishes Victorian poetry from the earlier verse of Shelley is the thread of feeling to be found in Tennyson, Clough and Arnold which was in reality an undercurrent of faith. Such a faith, he argued, enabled the modern poet to express his doubt. Myers' poem, he commented lengthily, was of this temper.

The period of despair and intellectual and religious difficulties which began in 1869 culminated, in 1872, in an agnosticism void of the underlying hope present in so much of Myers' earlier religious poetry. His poem, "Ode to Nature,"<sup>59</sup> which his publishing diary tells us was written on August 14, 1872, summarizes Myers' loss of faith during this crucial year. The poem concludes on a suicidal gesture which is reminiscent of Arnold's Empedocles in both thought, diction and stanzaic structure. The poet asks that all should end in darkness as "darkly all began":

Hence, hence I too had birth,  
 One soul with the ancient Earth,  
 Beyond this human ancestry of pain;-  
     My soul was even as ye;  
     She was, - and she would be;-  
 O Earth, and Night, and Nought, enfold her once again!

These years of religious and intellectual disillusionment and the inward passage of various moods of philosophical and emotional hope and despair were also reflected in the troubled outward circumstances of Myers' life. In 1867, he resigned his Fellowship at Trinity and cast his lot with the movement for the higher education of women (a movement which resulted in the establishment of Newnham College at Cambridge). He also went on extensive lecture tours promoted by the North of England Council.<sup>60</sup> In the winter of 1869-1870, he travelled widely on the Continent, but on his return found that he had no vocation or profession, not an unusual thing for those who, unlike Sidgwick, Clifford, Jebb, Butcher, and Jackson, did not remain active in university life or teaching.<sup>61</sup> In 1870, after his return from the Continent, he thought of travelling for a long stay in Australia with



the son of Henry Taylor, one of Myers' oldest friends, whose son was apparently an incurable asthmatic.<sup>62</sup> This falling through, he then thought of the profession of medicine, but was dissuaded from such an enterprise by Henry Sidgwick's gentle and fatherly chiding.<sup>63</sup> His unpublished letters point out that he even was thinking of politics. His friend Henry Fawcett suggested to him that he might find it possible to run for M.P. (Liberal) from Birmingham.<sup>64</sup>

Myers had not, of course, lost all hope for a purely literary career. It was at this time that John Addington Symonds asked him to work on his History of the Renaissance with him, but Myers refused.<sup>65</sup> Henry Sidgwick was an active reviewer for Hutton's Spectator, and although Sidgwick endeavored to enlist Myers on their reviewing staff, he discouraged Myers from trying to find full time employment on a magazine for which the editor generally handled most of the reviewing himself and only occasionally permitted others to do it for him.<sup>66</sup> In 1870, the year that he wrote "Art as an Aim in Life,"<sup>67</sup> Myers also wrote to friends and family that he was going to go down to London, take up residence, and try his hand at the Muse as a profession.<sup>68</sup> Again Sidgwick dissuaded him, arguing that Myers' poetic genius was primarily lyrical rather than dramatic or epic and, as a consequence, his professional future was too dim to take seriously.<sup>69</sup> He even tried his hand at fiction, but was apparently totally unsuccessful. John Addington Symonds has recorded the fate of one of his stories in his letters:

One funny incident happened at Murren. Myers talked to me before Norman about his story of Rollo and then gave me the Manuscript. After I went to bed I read the manuscript out loud and made free comments on it. Half-way through, a stentorian voice was heard--

"I say, you fellows, shut up! I want to sleep." It was Myers who had heard the whole proceeding. Early next morning I went to him and said he had heard the worst of my criticisms, and that all I could do was to tell him on what I founded them, which I did, entering into a very severe analysis. He was angelical and we were good friends. But I felt foolish. I have never so put my foot in it.<sup>70</sup>

It was not until 1871 that Myers finally began to find himself professionally. In that year he took over the temporary post of Inspector of Returns for the Education Department. A year later, he became an Inspector of Schools and after inspecting in several London and country districts, he was permanently appointed to the Cambridge District in 1875. He held this post to his death in 1901 and apparently labored with distinction. For example, at a world conference of educators in Chicago at the turn of the century, he received an award for his work.<sup>71</sup> Myers' professional occupation, however, never became a part of his larger literary and intellectual interests. Comparing Matthew Arnold to Myers, for example, Herbert Warren mentions that

The career of a school-inspector was perhaps not necessarily so laborious as might appear. Some years later another distinguished poet, critic and thinker, Frederic W.H. Myers, deliberately chose it as giving the maximum of free time for private research and writing. Myers undoubtedly justified his choice by his contributions to literature and to psychical inquiry. Possibly things were more difficult in the earlier days. As Arnold lived it, it was a hard life, and he was assuredly Pegasus in harness.<sup>72</sup>

#### Psychical Research in the Seventies

It was during these years of professional, intellectual and religious confusion that Myers began to interest himself in activities roughly approximating psychical research. We cannot date specifically Myers' introduction to spiritualism and the investigation of abnormal

physical and psychical phenomena, but there is enough evidence to reconstruct the pattern of his new experience. Henry Jackson, for example, suggests that Myers' interests in these phenomena began while he still was a Lecturer at Trinity. In the middle sixties, Myers, Jackson and Sidgwick were all lecturers in classics. Commenting on the attitude of the lecturers at this time (1867) Jackson remarks that lecturing in those days was perfunctory. "Sidgwick prepared his lectures at breakfast and gave most of the rest of the day to his studies in Arabic. Myers prepared more thoroughly, but when his lectures were done he gave himself to the study of mesmerism."<sup>73</sup> In an essay on Sidgwick published in 1900, Myers recalled that he came up to Cambridge in 1869 to examine for the Moral Science Tripos. At that time he resumed his friendship with Sidgwick, his former tutor.

I felt drawn to Henry Sidgwick as somehow my only hope. In a starlight walk which I shall not forget (December 3, 1869), I asked him, almost with trembling, whether he thought that when Tradition, Intuition, Metaphysic had failed to solve the riddle of the Universe, there was still a chance that from any actual observable phenomena--ghosts, spirits, whatsoever there might be--some valid knowledge might be drawn as to a World Unseen. Already, it seemed, he thought this was possible . . .<sup>74</sup>

In his autobiography, Myers mentions another date. The diary entry of November, 1871, "H.S. on ghosts," indicated "the first turning of my spirit towards the possible attainment, with Henry Sidgwick's aid, of a scientific assurance of unseen things."<sup>75</sup>

Although there are three possible choices here, we might suppose the later date, 1871, really indicates Myers' turning to psychical research as a serious intellectual endeavor. 1871, for example, was a crucial year in the history of psychical research, for it was at this

time that the physicist William Crookes completed his extensive investigation of the famous American medium, Daniel Douglas Home. In two critical articles in the Quarterly Journal of Science, Crookes had argued that he had not only succeeded in demonstrating experimentally the existence of a hitherto unknown force, but that he was actually able to measure it.<sup>76</sup> The first wave of spiritualistic activity to hit England in the 1850's had dissipated because of the exposure of several well-known mediums. The second wave was initiated by Crookes' researches. Its fascination was no longer as a novelty, however, but as an area of serious scientific investigation carried on by a number of men of responsible scientific reputations--Crookes, Wallace, and Barrett. Crookes' character and reputation in particular had an influence on the movement. Commenting on Lord Rayleigh and the physicist's first introduction to psychical phenomena, Rayleigh's biographer states "his interest had been primarily aroused by the investigations of Crookes, whose scientific work in other fields he knew and appreciated."<sup>77</sup>

What Crookes and his investigations were to the whole of the second wave of spiritualistic investigation of the 70's, Sidgwick was to the interesting group of young men who surrounded him at Cambridge--Myers, Leaf, Noel, Rayleigh, Balfour and Gurney. Rayleigh's biographer again makes this clear. "He was also in communication with Henry Sidgwick, Edmund Gurney and F.W.H. Myers, all of whom were Fellows of his old college, Trinity. Sidgwick in particular, who originated the movement for investigation, was senior to Rayleigh, and they were well acquainted when my father was in residence after his degree at Cambridge,

if not earlier."<sup>78</sup> Leaf's Memoir also helps to characterize the impact of the psychical research movement on Cambridge, particularly Trinity, at this time. Speaking first of Sidgwick, Leaf remarks that it was he "who mainly induced me to throw much energy for many years in the cause of psychical research."

My first interest in the subject dates from my last year at Cambridge when public attention, for some years distracted from spiritualism . . . had been recovered by some startling articles of phenomena obtained by various witnesses in the presence of the famous medium D.D. Home. The most important of these, and that which produced the most startling effect, was by the eminent man of science and philosopher, William Crookes. Without taking any side in the question of the origin of the startling phenomena which he recorded as an eye-witness . . . he brought forward a record that produced a startling impression. . . . There was a feeling widespread among all of us at Cambridge, that here was a call to each of us to do something to resolve the amazing problem which had been set us. So impressed was I that I proposed a motion in the Union to the effect that the question demanded further investigation. It was the only set speech I ever made in that historical debating society, and I do not recollect what the result was. But it is certain that a number of us set about an attempt at experimental inquiry.<sup>79</sup>

Initially, the Sidgwick circle at Cambridge set out at experimental inquiry to see if they could find among themselves any trace of mediumistic powers. They had no difficulty in getting tables to tilt, but they soon realized they could find none among them who possessed any true mediumistic abilities. As a consequence, their investigations took a new turn in 1874 when they began the investigation of professional mediums.<sup>80</sup> As early as May of 1874, Myers, for example, "seems to have proposed something more systematic, in fact a sort of informal association for the purpose with a common fund."<sup>81</sup>

Although having all the characteristics of a general cultural and intellectual phenomenon, psychical research was such that each

of the men who became interested in the movement--whether within the university or without--became interested for his own especial reasons. We noted this previously in our discussion of Tennyson, Sidgwick and Knowles. It was true also in the seventies.

Richard Holt Hutton, for example, turned to psychical research and the study of the paranormal to bolster his orthodox theological position. Here he differed greatly from Sidgwick or from Tennyson. Hutton saw the materialism which was built upon the foundations of science as the true menace to his age and faith. Materialism, he argued, undermined man's faith in miracles and in his own free will.<sup>82</sup> In numerous instances, Hutton used psychical research as part of his context in which he discussed such problems.<sup>83</sup> It was not so much to science that he objected but to the failure of science to recognize that at the borderland of its inquiries--telepathy, somnambulism, hypnosis--there existed support for traditional religious thought suggestive of a spiritual world.<sup>84</sup> It was to investigate more thoroughly this borderland that Hutton took an active interest in psychical research and supported the inquiries of the movement in the pages of the Spectator and on the Council of the S.P.R.

Roden Noel approached the subject of psychical research from a position outside established philosophical and religious orthodoxy.<sup>85</sup> In his "Preliminary" to A Philosophy of Immortality, Noel commented on his initial interest in the movement.

Now in a very momentous crisis of my own life I happened to be thinking much and deeply on some very important questions in philosophy, when the evidence in favor of these occurrences was presented to me with a gradually accumulating force; and curiously

enough, the philosophical conclusion that had appeared to throw light upon our relations with the external world, and to harmonize the teachings of physiology and science as to the connection between our bodily organization and the phenomena of inner consciousness with the more fundamental intuitions, demands, and aspirations of our moral, emotional, and intellectual nature—that philosophical conclusion seemed also to throw light upon these abnormal experiences themselves. Hence I was led to give the more attention to these: they fitted into the scheme of thought, which had independently commended itself to me on other accounts, and in their turn threw light upon the general system of belief to which I had gradually been impelled by the combined influence of reason, feeling and external circumstance.<sup>86</sup>

The system of thought to which Noel refers was that of James Hinton. A product of the German Idealistic tradition, Hinton taught that nature has no absolute existence outside of human consciousness. At the same time, he argued, man and nature are part of a larger spiritual world, participating in the harmonious solidarity of the Universal Thought System.<sup>87</sup> For Noel, spiritualistic phenomena supported the mystical and idealistic contentions of Hinton and demonstrated scientifically the existence of a spiritual world.

Walter Leaf's interest in psychical research and the investigation of spiritualism had still another starting point. Commenting on his early religious upbringing, he mentions that his moderate Evangelicalism simply dropped away the moment he came to think about and talk about religion. Yet he did not become irreligious. "I was at best a theoretical Agnostic, but with a strong natural bent to Theism of a rather intimate sort."<sup>88</sup>

I took the purely provisional attitude that I had an instinct, which I could not justify, but which told me that true reality was to be found not in Matter but in Mind; that Universal Mind, which we called God, was immanent in all of us, and that the voice of conscience which we call Duty was the voice of God. . . . In fact I had arrived pretty much at Kant's Categorical Imperative

but had not gone further. Psychological research, with the evidence it seemed to afford of the "subliminal self" as a channel of communication between the conscious self and the Universal Mind came in aptly to extend this rudimentary faith into a sort of Pragmatism. . . . I was, in short, logically an Agnostic, in my inmost heart a convinced Pantheist. I was patiently awaiting light on the manner in which the two were to be reconciled.<sup>89</sup>

Psychical research, Leaf believed, held out the possibility for such a reconciliation.

Balfour's interests in spiritualism and psychical research in the 1870's also had its own particular characteristics. For one thing, he had lost his paramour, May Lyttleton, in March of 1875 and this stimulated his interest in mediumship.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest Balfour had some psychic gifts of his own. But psychical research had important philosophical consequences for Balfour too. If the existence of a world beyond death could be demonstrated, it would bridge the gap between the intuitionist and empiricist positions and provide the sole empirical proof of religion.<sup>91</sup> Balfour's thesis of "philosophical doubt" was an attempt to bridge the gap between these two positions, and his interest in psychical research reflects his whole philosophy--his arguments that observation and experiment were not guides merely to be followed but witnesses which need to be broken down and cross-examined, that sense experience is limited and not the only source of rational conviction, that if Britain was to maintain her dominant position in the world her scientists must keep an open mind about facts and theory, that science at its core was irrational and inexplicable by ordinary logical processes, and that "the full complexity of any true belief about reality will necessarily transcend the comprehension of any finite intelligence."<sup>92</sup>



We know only in part, Balfour always argued, and therefore we know wrongly.

### The Anne Marshall Affair

What was true of Sidgwick, Tennyson, Hutton, Noel, Balfour, and Leaf was also true of Myers. To understand his interest in spiritualistic investigation and psychical research is to understand something of the intellectual milieu of the seventies and something of Myers' own personal character and experience.

Perhaps the best approach to understanding this interest is through a lately discovered chapter in Myers' life--his affair with Anne Marshall. Since I have little to add except some details to what has already been written on this subject, we might briefly summarize what this chapter in Myers' life was all about.<sup>93</sup> Anne Hill, daughter of the Rector of Thornton-le-Dale, married Myers' very close friend and cousin, Walter Marshall. Myers' friendship with his cousins was such that they frequently spent much time together, visiting in London, in Cambridge and at Hallsteads in the Lake Country, the home of Myers' mother's family and then in the possession of her brother, Arthur Marshall.

Some five years after their marriage, there is reason to suspect that Walter and Anne were not altogether happy, even though they had had several children together. No doubt, their difficulties increased as a consequence of Walter's ill health. In May of 1874, for example, Myers cancelled plans to go to America with Gurney because of Walter's poor condition.<sup>94</sup> And in June of the same year, Myers wrote

Sidgwick to come to Hallsteads and to stay with him at Old Church, a small home on the grounds of the estate. In this particular letter, Myers suggests that it was not only ill health that was the cause of the Marshalls' unhappiness--"Worse again and many troubles of various kinds hang over that unhappy household."<sup>95</sup> Apparently, Walter's problems were as much psychological as they were physical. In 1875, he made a slight recovery and Myers saw a great deal of him at Walter and Anne's home in Thurloe Square, London. In May of 1875, the Marshalls came up to Cambridge to visit with Myers and Sidgwick.<sup>96</sup> In the spring of the next year, however, Walter took a turn for the worse. In May he was committed to an asylum in Ticehurst, very much against his will.<sup>97</sup> In June, two psychiatric examinations resulted in pessimistic diagnoses. One psychiatrist told Anne's father that Walter's illness was incurable and he would never be able to leave Ticehurst.<sup>98</sup> Anne Marshall spent the following summer at her father's home in Sussex and at the residence of Walter's uncle at Derwent Island. Walter complained violently of plots. On August 28th, 1876, Anne Marshall returned to Hallsteads, moved into Old Church, and early on the 29th of August, committed suicide by drowning in the waters of Ullswater.

The real chestnuts in this story, of course, are Myers' relationship to Mrs. Marshall and his responsibility for the disintegration of her marriage, for Walter's breakdown and for her suicide. As a number of recent articles demonstrate, there is plenty of room here for speculation. The problem has been further complicated by Myers himself.<sup>99</sup> In his autobiographical fragment he intentionally avoided "actual names and facts of any personal importance" for "reasons which

discredit neither her nor me." He scorned any reader "who would try to discover what is here held in reserve" as "a prying intruder upon joys and sorrows such as he can never share." Anne is given the mythological name Phyllis, perhaps a reference to the pastoral Phyllis of Virgil's Eclogues but more likely a reference to the tragic Phyllis of Ovid's Heroides II.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, almost all reference to his relationship with Phyllis is recorded in poems in the text which make up more than half of the autobiography. The function of the poems, Myers wrote, was to give their story "its inner meaning."

One thing is certain, however. Myers did fall deeply and passionately in love with his Phyllis. Furthermore, he tells us when. "In 1873 there dawned upon me a new knowledge of what divineness can lodge in a woman's soul."<sup>101</sup> Our primary concern here, however, is not so much with what the relationship was, but how Myers thought about it and what its consequences were. The upshot of the relationship was that it was a most pervasive crisis in Myers' life and brought to a head concretely and immediately a number of significant aspects of Victorian thought in the 1870's and conditioned Myers' attitudes and thought for the next three decades. Anne's death and Myers' apparent guilt over her death spurred his interest in psychological research and spiritualistic activity.

The problems associated with Anne were seemingly largely ethical. What sanctions, moral, ethical and religious, were to prevent Anne and Myers from committing adultery? This ethical problem was further complicated by two aspects of Myers' character. Firstly, as we have noted, he suffered from intense sexual and sensual preoccupa-

tions. Secondly, Myers' temperament was such that he needed some hint of certainty before he could act "earnestly." His essay on Marcus Aurelius, written many years later, aptly sums up his own particular situation: "Many a living memory records some crisis when one who had rejected as unproved the traditional sanctions was forced to face the questions whether his virtue had any sanction which could still stand; some night when the foundations of the soul's deep were broke up, and she asked herself why she still should cleave to the law of other men rather than to some kindlier monitor of her own."<sup>102</sup>

In this instance, his good friend Henry Sidgwick was of little help. Sidgwick found it so difficult to make up his mind about things important that John Maynard Keynes summed up his religious position by saying "He never did anything but wonder whether Christianity was true and prove it wasn't and hope it was."<sup>103</sup> His Methods of Ethics (1874) (Myers, oddly enough, patiently awaited to see if it offered any solution to his own problems) characteristically failed to reconcile the relationship between Egoistic and Universal Hedonism. As C.D. Broad has commented, Sidgwick was "ultimately left in the unfortunate position that there are two principles, each of which separately seems to be self-evident, but which when taken together seem to be mutually inconsistent."<sup>104</sup> In a letter to Myers dated April, 1872, and marked with a note in Myers' hand reading "I think this is the most interesting letter I ever received from him," Sidgwick delineated Myers' own personality and, by contrast, his own:

I find it very difficult to answer your letter as I feel that you expect from me not so much sympathy and certainly not Hortation

(which grows on every moral bush) but strictest science and such adumbrated Principles of Conduct as may spring from strictest science. And my difficulty is that I cannot give to Principles of Conduct either the formal certainty that comes from exact science or the practical certainty that comes from a real consensus of Experts. And I feel that your peculiar phase of the "Maladie" is due to the fact that you demand certainty with special peremptoriness--certainty established either emotionally or intellectually. I sometimes feel with somewhat of a profound hope and enthusiasm that the function of the English mind with its uncompromising matter of factness will be to put the final question to the Universe with a solid passionate determination to be answered which must come to something. However in the meantime we have to live on less than certainty, which for you is peculiarly difficult.<sup>105</sup>

The series of "Modern Symposia" which James Knowles ran in his Nineteenth Century on the subject of the influence of the decline of religious belief upon morality well illustrates the confusion and diversity of opinion with which Myers was confronted.<sup>106</sup> The participants in these discussions--men like Stephen, Selbourne, Martineau, Harrison, Clifford, Ward, Church, the Duke of Argyll, Huxley and Hutton--represented almost all the important intellectual resources of the seventies, but they were unable to reconcile their fundamental differences. The theists among them argued that Christianity was not only a force that contributed to the development of ethical conduct, but a force which would, no doubt, sustain it. The anti-theists were equally vocal in their faith that morality was capable of support on grounds other than those of theistic dogma and a supernatural faith.

Myers found that such debates could have little or no influence upon his attempts to solve his own predicament and indecision. He observed and listened to all the discussions of the chosen illuminati, but he found all such deliberations bore a very strong resemblance to the talk of those diplomats who concoct protocols which consist of

empty phrases to which all the parties can agree because they do not touch any of the points on which the co-signatories would be likely to differ:

It must be remembered that this was the very flood-tide of materialism, agnosticism--the mechanical theory of the Universe, the reduction of all spiritual facts to physiological phenomena. It was a time when not the intellect only but the moral ideals of men seemed to have passed into the camp of negation. We were all in the first flush of triumphant Darwinism, when terrene evolution had explained so much that men hardly cared to look beyond. Among my own group, W.K. Clifford was putting forth his series of triumphant proclamations of the nothingness of God, the divinity of man. Swinburne, too, in The Pilgrims had given passionate voice to the same conception. Frederic Harrison, whom I knew well, was still glorifying Humanity as the only Divine. And behind these exultant pioneers was a rearguard of steadier and sadder thought. George Eliot--on whose deep moral impressiveness I have dwelt elsewhere--strenuously rejected all prospect save in the mere terrene performance of duty to our human kin. And others--all, it seemed, to whom I could look for wisdom,--maintained a significant silence, or fed with vague philosophisings an uncertain hope.<sup>107</sup>

Indeed during the late sixties and early seventies, Myers was becoming more and more aware of the existential demands of his own nature, individuality and temperament, an aspect of his character which often impressed his contemporaries. Edmund Gosse, for example, commented that "Throughout his life, it seems to me, whether in company or not, Myers was always alone. He staked his faith on Plato's Phaedo and was a solitary Pagan ecstatic." At times, Gosse said, Myers seemed to live in a "Leyden Jar." "There was something disembodied, something that evaded reality and repelled sympathy in his intellectual aloofness,"<sup>108</sup> an estimate of Myers which was supported in part by two other friends of his, Jebb and A.C. Benson.<sup>109</sup>

It was this emphasis on the predicament of the individual and the uniqueness of the individual temperament which Myers described in

an essay on Arthur Penryn Stanley when commenting upon the possibilities for a true National Church for England:

There remains, however, the question whether religious unity is really strongly desired by many men; whether the different sections of the English Church or the English nation are disposed to make much effort to preserve the idea of a National Church. And the answer commonly given is that such union is not strongly desired, that, on the other hand, men tend to hold views more divergent, and to express them with more distinctness, than ever before. It might, perhaps, have been expected that as the conclusions of science become more definite, as it grows easier to make men understand the same demonstrations and obey the same laws, it would also grow easier to unite them in the same religion. But this is not so; for religion is a matter of tastes and emotions, as well as of reason. Along with what is deepest and most universal its sphere includes points on which classes of men at different mental levels—nay, even different individuals on the same level—cannot possibly be expected to agree. On the one hand, as fresh bodies of men wake up to religion they inevitably pass through stages of thought and feeling which many of their contemporaries have already outgrown. And, on the other hand, learning and intellect, so far from securing uniformity, will, when combined with certain temperaments, only serve to make the cases of reversion to an older type, or of divergence into an individual type, more marked and impressive.<sup>110</sup>

And it was this same concern which caused Myers to sympathize so profoundly with Symonds and his difficulties and to feel that Sidgwick could say all that he had to say on the subject of ethics, but his words and thoughts were circumscribed by his own experience and the philosophical tradition in which he worked. Huxley and Harrison could speak about Humanity at large, but neither was capable of bridging the gap between "the constitution of man" and the temperament and character of the individual.

James Martineau, a figure much admired by Myers, once wrote that the power of religion lay in the sanctity it gave to the claims of duty and the play of character rather than to the direct sanctions

of hope and fear. If this belief in the religious sanction is cancelled, morality will be left reasonable still, but paralysed: "possible to temperaments comparatively passionless, but with no grasp on vehement and poetic natures and gravitating toward the simply prudential wherever it maintains its ground."<sup>111</sup> "A vehement and poetic nature"—this, Myers had realized, was a description of his own complex emotional problem, but intellectually he could no longer accept alone the sanctions of traditional religious faith. In essence, his relationship with Anne Marshall concretized and made immediate his own peculiar individuality. For himself, and possibly for others like him, he felt that what was needed was a reconciliation of his own intense emotional drives, in part sensual and sensuous, in part religious (the qualities of Myers' Saint Paul), and his own intellectual demands for demonstrative certainty and ethical absolutes. One possible solution to this problem was the solution offered by the application of the only conceivable method of demonstrative certainty in the modern world, science, to that area of human experience which had hitherto been neglected by science but which offered the possibilities of spiritual and ethical sanctions by its supposed evidence for the existence of a world outside the limitations imposed upon the universe by the materialist, the agnostic and the physiologist.<sup>112</sup>

Thus, the Anne Marshall affair brought into focus many of the ideas and thoughts which the young poet had brooded upon for the greater part of five years.

In the fall of 1873, Myers' investigations of spiritualistic phenomena with Sidgwick and others began to bear fruit, for at that



time Myers believed he had amassed enough evidence to suggest the possibility that amidst the fraud and imposture there were real spiritual forces operating which were still unknown to science.<sup>113</sup> His autobiography does not reveal the particular phenomena which impressed him, but it does suggest the profound effects which they had upon his own inward character. With Anne Marshall, Myers had labored under "the painful effort of self-restraint." The question of "how one should act" was always uppermost in his mind.<sup>114</sup> He singles out the poem "Honour,"<sup>115</sup> written in 1873, to illustrate his feelings and attitudes during this particular stage of his development. In many respects a paean to George Eliot, the best gloss on the poem, perhaps, is Myers' famous description of his evening walk with George Eliot in the Fellows' Garden of Trinity. "Taking as her text the three words which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-calls of men,—the words God, Immortality, Duty,—[she] pronounced, with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable was the first, how unbelievable was the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third. Never, perhaps, have sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of impersonal and unrecompensing law."<sup>116</sup> Nevertheless, as absolute and peremptory as Duty was, it had very nearly failed. As it was, the affair had tragic consequences.

To understand the consequences of the new "facts" and possibilities which he believed his spiritualistic investigations were unfolding, we must realize that they meant no absolute break with those modes of thought common to most young intellectuals of the seventies, Myers among them. Rather, they presented the possibilities of a

wider extension of these modes. If a spiritual world did exist, for example, and if it could be proved scientifically, Darwin's evidence for terrestrial evolution could be extended to the possibility of spiritual evolution enunciated by such poets as Browning and Tennyson. W. K. Clifford's concept of "cosmic emotion," the worship of a universe of ether and atoms, could be equally extended to the worship of a spiritual universe.<sup>117</sup> The emotion of love, in part sensual and physical, could be demonstrated to have spiritual as well as biological and physiological causes. But most important, the possibilities of the existence of a world beyond that known to our terrestrial sensibilities meant the possibility of a moral victory for Myers with both an emotional and an intellectual sanction, for here was an opportunity to say with all probability that nothing in this world should be sacrificed to that chance of happiness to be, an opportunity "to reconcile the moral sense to the fact that so many innocent creatures were born to unmerited and unrequited pain."<sup>118</sup> In summary, it was no longer necessary to experience the sadness of a passion accepting moral barriers without celestial hope as he had described in the poem "Honour."

#### New Friends and a New Commitment

To many of his contemporaries of the seventies, Myers was perhaps still the young aesthete and author of the florid Saint Paul.<sup>119</sup> His life, however, had undergone a series of vital and significant changes. In an essay on Virgil,<sup>120</sup> Myers details the development of Virgil's life and thought. Clearly, Myers had found in Virgil a

parable of his own intellectual and emotional development in the seventies. Myers was raised in the Cumberland country of Wordsworth. Virgil "was reared among the woods and thickets, an Italian country child, the counterpart of Wordsworth in the union of spiritual aspiration with rustic simplicity."<sup>121</sup> Whereas Myers in the late sixties and early seventies was strongly influenced by the flood-tide of scientific speculation reflected in the work of Tyndall, Clifford, Huxley and Darwin, Virgil as a young man fell under the influence of Lucretius who "proclaimed the nothingness of momentary man" and convincingly "thundered in our ears the appalling Gospel of Death."<sup>122</sup> For Virgil, as for Myers, the Lucretian notion that man's only hope lay in the annihilation of his unsated longings and his deep despair became part of the natural religion of his youth. In the Georgics, Virgil paused between two hypotheses, each incapable of proof. The first assumed that because man feels within himself a living spirit, the universe too "breathes with the divine." The second assumed that nature's order is an impersonal order consisting of nothing but its material attributes.<sup>123</sup> Like Virgil, Myers acted on the first hypothesis as a consequence of both his character and temperament. Virgil's choice, Myers recognized, was his own.

The decade from 1870 to 1880 also saw Myers seeking out new friends and new teachers in an effort to find new solutions to those personal problems we have just detailed. Among those friends and teachers outside of Cambridge who most influenced him at this time, for example, were John Ruskin and George Eliot.

Ruskin had a profound impact both on Myers' attitudes toward literature and spiritualistic investigation.<sup>124</sup> Ruskin encouraged him to fuse his interests together, to bring his convictions of a spiritual world to bear upon his literary endeavors. In a conversation with Collins in 1884, Ruskin mentioned that Myers was "the truest poet of the present day, for he always coordinated his intellectual gifts with his aesthetic instincts and wrote only when impelled to do so."<sup>125</sup> Ruskin's high sense of moral purpose was a contributing factor in Myers' growing belief that literature was something more significant than an aesthetic or academic exercise. Literature was a form of self-expression which bore fruit only when the writer wrote from his own personal experience and from the point of view of his own personal convictions. Ruskin's own mediumistic investigations under the tutelage of the Mount-Temples, and his conviction in 1876 that a spiritual world does exist and that "there is personal life independent of the body" also had a profound effect upon Myers.<sup>126</sup> Ruskin's "conversion"<sup>127</sup> at this time symbolized for Myers the great changes in human attitudes toward life and death, the miraculous and the unseen, which could come about if men would only endeavor to re-examine those experiences to which ancient and modern tradition has testified but to which modern man had turned a deaf ear.<sup>128</sup>

Unlike his relationship with Ruskin, Myers' friendship with George Eliot<sup>129</sup> never centered itself around a mutual acceptance of the validity of spiritualistic and mediumistic phenomena. Nevertheless, she too had a profound influence on Myers in the 1870's. She symbolized for him the role par excellence of writer as philosopher

and thinker. Just as religious and moral ponderings made the basis of her life, so also for Myers they made the basis for her art. She wrote from the point of view of personal emotion and experience, and the lessons of her books derived their moral weight not from her abstractions or pure thought but from her sincerity.<sup>130</sup> Her art, like everything else in her aspect and experience, was "the more impressive because it seemed to proceed so entirely from within."<sup>131</sup> Thus, although Myers could write that her poems often lacked "that instinctive melody which is the indispensable birth-gift of poets," they still "lift us into the region where Art melts into virtue; where they are discerned as twin aspects of the spirit's unselfish earnestness, which would fain lose itself in a larger joy."<sup>132</sup>

In an exchange of letters between Myers and George Eliot late in the seventies, we have preserved an extraordinary summary statement of both George Eliot's influence upon Myers and his disagreement with her final ethical position.<sup>133</sup> To compare the sentiments of these letters with Myers' description of George Eliot's influence upon him in 1872 is to understand the long road which Myers had travelled in just four years in his assurance that psychical research held profound hopes for the solution to the moral and philosophical dilemma of modern man.

Most important, however, the great change in Myers' life was a passionate commitment to the investigation of abnormal and paranormal experience which paralleled his earlier commitments to aestheticism and evangelicalism. For Sidgwick, Leaf, Balfour, and Hutton, psychical research played only one part in their intellectual en-

deavors. For Myers, however, it conditioned all that he did and all that he wrote, his poetry, his essays and criticism, his autobiography, his dialogue and interaction with friend and foe, his rhetoric, his research and his preoccupation with ancient thought and contemporary thought. To understand this quality of Myers is to understand his experience and his significance as a late Victorian figure.

In a letter to Sidgwick in 1879, Myers wrote that he never had been more deeply moved than he was when he had read Mrs. Oliphant's The Beleagured City. "You will see that the whole thing seems as if it had been written for me,—and one character, Lecamus, represents more of my own inward self than I ever expected to see on paper."<sup>135</sup> Convinced of the existence of the unseen world, Lecamus committed himself to carrying his message to the faithless and sceptical. "But I, who am I, a poor man without credit among my neighbors, a dreamer, one whom many despise, that I should come to their aid? Yet I could not listen and take no part. I cried out: 'Send me. I will tell them in words they understand.'"

The overriding impulse and sense of mission characterizing the life's work of Frederic Harrison was the dogma of positivism. For Huxley, it was Darwinism and evolution. But for Myers, that overriding intellectual and emotional impulse was psychical research. A letter to Symonds in 1874 clearly brings this decade of Myers' life full circle, for Myers had earlier written similar letters to Symonds about Hellenism, aestheticism and evangelicalism. The letter is a perfect illustration of Myers' passionate fervor to investigate borderland phenomena which held out the possibilities for a life beyond

the grave and the existence of a spiritual world.

. . . Our previous lives,—different tho' they have been—seem to me both of them to have led up to some such destiny. In both there has been an incessant beating against the bars of humanity, dying down into a hopeless satiety and a ruinous repose. And I believe that this new revelation was the only thing which could again awake either of us to our true life, could give an enduring object, and a profound and persistent joy.

I cannot help hoping, too, that you may find in those endless vistas of mysterious and unimaginable glory which are just beginning to open on us an inspiration to poetry still more impassioned and glowing than that which you have consecrated to irrecoverable emotions and phantasmal hopes.<sup>132</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### ESSAYS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN

#### Introduction

Myers' experiences as aesthete, evangelist and agnostic, his tragic affair with Anne Marshall, his friendships with Sidgwick, Edmund Gurney, Ruskin, George Eliot and, above all, his groping for a new formulation, in the context of psychical research, by which the totality of his intuitions and temperament could be tested and guaranteed by experiment and experience, had a profound impact on his attitude toward literature and letters in the late 70's and early 80's. It will be our purpose in this section to examine, with perhaps more detail than would be necessary if Myers' essays of this period were better known than they are, what specifically was the impact of these experiences on his approach to literature and letters on the eve, so to speak, of the founding of the Society for Psychical Research.

The bulk of Myers' critical work of this period was collected and published in two volumes,<sup>1</sup> and these volumes, along with his biography of Wordsworth,<sup>2</sup> will serve as the texts from which we will work. In effect, what we shall do in this section is to ask ourselves what kinds of critical problems and subject matters was Myers now concerned with, why did these subject matters interest him, given the problems



he raises, what kinds of solutions did Myers propose to offer for them and why did he conceive of these problems as problems in the first place. Finally, and most important, we will ask how these problems, subject matters and possible solutions reflect Myers' growing involvement with psychical research in the period immediately prior to the founding of the Society for Psychical Research.

### The Arnoldian Mode

Commenting on Arnold's importance in nineteenth century criticism, T.S. Eliot places Myers' critical work squarely in the Arnoldian tradition. "The critical method of Arnold," he stated, "the assumptions of Arnold, remained valid for the rest of his century. In quite diverse developments, it is the criticism of Arnold that sets the tone: Walter Pater, Arthur Symons, Leslie Stephen, F.W.H. Myers, George Saintsbury--all the more eminent critical names of the time bear witness to it."<sup>3</sup>

A comparison of Arnold and Myers more than adequately serves as a proper beginning for a discussion of Myers as critic of men, ideas and literature in the seven years prior to the founding of the Society for Psychical Research.

In his lecture on "The Modern Element in Literature," Arnold argued that the peculiar demand of modernity is the demand for an intellectual and emotional deliverance from the impatient irritation of mind which modern man feels in the presence of "an immense, moving, confused spectacle which, while it perpetually excites our curiosity, perpetually baffles our comprehension." "All intellectual pursuits,"

he goes on to add, "our age judges according to their power of helping to satisfy this demand; of all studies it asks, above all, the question, how far they can contribute to this deliverance."<sup>4</sup>

A modern man, Myers too felt this demand of modernity, and like Arnold, his criticism of this period was directed toward judgment or evaluation from the perspective of such a deliverance. Because they agreed on the proper function of criticism, and because each was in his own distinctive way a rhetorician as well as a critic, Myers and Arnold both employ a similar methodology in their criticism.<sup>5</sup> Broadly speaking, their critical essays follow the same basic pattern. They both begin by isolating a pressing problem which demands immediate attention. They then inquire into a variety of doctrines, methods, attitudes and works evolved by men in the past or present in order to discover and invent possible solutions for that problem. In asking what can be learned, emulated, or avoided from what others have done, each critic establishes a series of commonplaces and proper places for purposes of judgment and evaluation. Finally, after finding a possible solution through discovery and judgment for the problem isolated for discussion, each then exhorts his contemporaries to undertake a specific activity or action or adopt a specific attitude or set of attitudes. In effect, one might argue that the characteristic movement of their essays is the raising of the question, discovery and invention, judgment and exhortation.

Aside from basic similarities in the rhetorical development of their essays, Myers and Arnold also agree on a number of commonplaces by which one evaluates those solutions for present problems

which one has discovered and invented. For instance, each agrees that whatever solution be adopted or proposed, that solution must be applicable to all men. Its characteristics must be universal. Furthermore, both agree that if any intellectual deliverance was to be initiated, the initiator must be a man of wide experience and broad perspective. Both Arnold and Myers inveigh vociferously against parochiality of attitude and narrowness of purview. Therefore, both critics argue that an understanding of history, other cultures, other national attitudes and a variety of different disciplines is necessary for understanding and delivering the present.

These fundamental general similarities between the criticism of Arnold and the criticism of Myers also dictate their particular and distinguishing differences. Although they did not necessarily disagree on what the real problem of the modern age was, they did disagree on the particular means and methods by which that problem can be solved and the necessary conditions for universality and catholicity. Furthermore, the objects of their charges of parochiality were very dissimilar. So, too, was their understanding of what the consequences of an understanding of history, culture, ethnology, and other disciplines both embodied and entailed. An essay on Arnold which Myers contributed to the Fortnightly Review after Arnold's death enables us to clarify these distinctions and similarities.<sup>6</sup>

For Myers, Arnold's most significant line of work was his treatment of religion. No wanton divergence, Arnold's concern with the religious problem, his moral earnestness, was a consequence of his heredity, character, temperament and experience. So, too, was

the position he adopted toward solving that problem. Like many others, Myers argues, Arnold adopted "the simple resolve to live up to the best light that conscience gives, without hope of any save this terrene life, of any other reign or continuance of virtue." Thus, Myers asserts, Arnold was of that party which accepted as basic premises the probability of truth and the necessity for disinterested virtue. If this is the broad genus in which Myers categorizes Arnold, his species involved a number of distinguishing characteristics. Unlike others of the same genus, Arnold was "linked by insuperable attachment to the ancient faiths. Living the life, too, not of an isolated philosopher, but of the companion and friend of all conditions of men, he perceived the absolute moral need that their religion should be transformed and not destroyed; that it should retain authority and loveliness; that it should not shrink into the Stoic's bare exhortation to heroic virtue." Therefore, Myers argues, Arnold endeavored to pour Christian wine into Stoic bottles, to identify the party of hope with the party of resignation. Arnold was no "flippant and and illusory Christian." He was, in effect, "a specially devout and conservative Agnostic."<sup>7</sup>

We can learn much about how Myers usually handles his critical material from this particular essay on Arnold. For instance, he apparently agrees with Arnold that the fundamental issue of modern life is the religious issue. Clearly, Myers interprets Arnold's life and work in such a way that the religious problem is central for Arnold. In reality, the problem is central for Myers. Arnold is held up as an illustration of how one might go about solving the religious prob-

lem. True to his rhetorical heritage, Myers throughout his essay continually invents arguments which divide materials into basic differences. Thus he asserts that there are two broad categories into which men divide when confronting the religious problem, those who belong to the party of hope and those who are of the party of resignation. Similarly, he defines distinctions and differences within this latter category. In each instance, he refers Arnold's choices to fundamental aspects of Arnold's character, temperament, and experience. His thought is a consequence of his own individuality. Arnold's choices, therefore, are both broadly categorized and narrowly particularized. Apparently, Myers believes both considerations are necessary if one is to learn from another how one might solve the religious problem. Of particular note is Myers' judgment of Arnold's solution to that problem. The materials which Myers chooses to discuss are so individualized, for example, that Arnold's position can have no claims to universality. The solution Arnold offers has no relevance to the party of hope and is distinguished from other positions within the party of resignation. Myers also emphasizes how Arnold endeavors to collapse significant distinctions. For Myers, clearly, these fundamental distinctions must be preserved. Arnold "minimized" significant distinctions and points of difference which divide the Stoic from the Christian. In so doing, Arnold "led his followers dryshod across Jordan."

In one way or another, Myers' treatment of Arnold dictates his treatment of each of the other figures or movements of mind he undertook to discuss in those years immediately prior to the founding

of the S.P.R. In each of the essays the religious problem is central. In each instance, a figure is held up as an example of how one might go about solving that problem. Throughout, Myers concentrates heavily on the particular character and experience of the figure whose choice he is delineating. In each essay, also, he discriminates and defines positions in terms of their fundamental differences. All the essays together illustrate that these fundamental differences do exist, and they exist as a consequence of basic distinctions of human character, temperament and experience. Myers' essays, therefore, emphasize biography when he treats individual figures, and emphasize moments and milieu when he treats movements of ideas or systems of thought and belief.

Clearly, what Myers is working towards is a solution to the religious problem which will commence from the awareness of fundamental distinctions among men and which will not collapse and minimize those attitudes which are basically dissimilar. Psychological research is ultimately Myers' answer to that religious problem and all the essays of this period, whether their particular context be history, philosophy, literature, aesthetics, Biblical criticism or religion, are apologies for psychological research. The essays reflect Myers' growing interest in psychological research; they illustrate why he thought such a preoccupation was necessary; and they ultimately exhort his contemporaries, through thinly veiled strategies, to undertake such research.

#### Crucial Distinctions

Myers' essay on Arnold illustrates clearly one such strategy,

for his critique of Arnold demonstrates that Arnold's solution to the religious problem failed to achieve that universality and consensus which Arnold himself deemed so necessary for an intellectual deliverance for the age. Furthermore, Myers argues, Arnold's failure is a failure of the means by which he endeavored to effectuate such a solution. Arnold's methods were wholly rhetorical and artistic, and for Myers, rhetoric, "juggleries of language," "unction" and an "optimist temper" were simply not enough. Rhetoric implies the use of strategies by which one endeavors to get the speaker and his audience together. Myers argues that the distinctions between speaker and audience in this instance are so fundamental that rhetoric simply cannot function as a successful tertium quid bringing together two parties so different. Myers does not assert that Arnold is a poor rhetorician. He argues, however, that rhetoric alone simply cannot do the job.<sup>8</sup>

As we have noted, Myers always distinguished and defined positions and attitudes toward significant issues in terms of fundamental differences. In his essay on Aurelius, he describes a fundamental distinction between the "creeds and philosophies by aid of which men have ordered their life on earth." There are those who believe life is to be ordered by "rules drawn from its own experience alone" and those who seek "indications which may justly modify our conduct or expectations by some influx of inspiration, or some phenomenon testifying to the existence of an unseen world, as to our continued life after the body's decay."<sup>9</sup> In his essay on Mazzini, Myers is more specific. Here he argues that "in this age of profound modification of received beliefs" man's duty toward religion is of three kinds.

There are those "to whom a certain view of the universe appears axiomatic; who seem to themselves to be speaking that which they do know, testifying to that which they have seen, when they describe the character and counsels of the Eternal. Such men the world tests by a rough standard of its own." There are those who are at the furthest dialectical pole from the first. "There are some who, though almost hopeless of arriving at any convictions as to an unseen world, seem strong enough to dispense with hope; who can labor for their own progress, though they believe it ended in the tomb." And "there are others, again, who while they do not assert that religious tradition suffices to meet the wider view and keener scrutiny of the advancing time, consider, nevertheless, that there is something premature, something almost impatient, in already abandoning as insoluble, problems of such import to mankind."<sup>10</sup>

In his criticism of Arnold, Myers carefully organizes Arnold's opinions so that he is aligned with the second party. Myers himself assumes the position of the third. In effect, his whole criticism of Arnold demonstrates the criticism of the party of resignation by the party of hope. These two positions dictate the fundamental distinction between Myers and Arnold. The distinction is such that Arnold and Myers, although having a number of subject matters in common, frequently find their examples among different figures, or when they find an example for imitation or emulation in the same figure or system of ideas, they interpret or judge that figure or system differently.

Both agreed, for example, that "it is distinctively as a force, an influence, a promulgation of real or supposed truth, rather



than as a repertory of graceful amusement" that George Sand's thoughts and books claim consideration.<sup>11</sup> As such, George Sand illustrated what each thought modern man's response to the dilemma of the modern world might be and what instructive attitude was necessary for a possible intellectual and emotional deliverance from that dilemma. Arnold, however, interprets George Sand's significance and importance as if she were one of the followers of Aurelius or an English George Eliot. For Arnold she represented "all the best thoughts and the best actions of life, suffering endured, duty achieved, whatever purifies our existence, whatever vivifies our love."<sup>12</sup> Myers interpreted her significance quite differently. He argued that her conception of man's fate and duty was far more inward and spiritual than Arnold would have us believe. She was of the party of hope. Her most important message was her "continual longing" and her "continual voice" for the things of God and the spirit. Her significance lay in a spiritual faith based upon a profound spiritual experience which one could uphold without Christianity, but not without an essential belief in the spirituality of man and the universe. "We know that the true controversy is no longer between those within and those without the walls of any given church, but on a wider scale and involving profounder issues. It is a controversy between Spiritualism and Materialism, between those who base their life upon God and immortality and those who deny or are indifferent to both."<sup>13</sup> For Arnold, George Sand was of the second party. For Myers she was of the first.

More significant, perhaps, than their different interpretations of George Sand was their totally different judgment of Virgil. Even

though he believed Virgil was "the most beautiful and the most attractive figure in literary history," Arnold argued that he absolutely failed to satisfy the modern demand for an intellectual and emotional deliverance. Virgil lacked the mastery of the problem of human life. He was an inadequate interpreter of his own age. The only passage of the Aeneid which Arnold singles out for special comment is the Dido episode, which, he thought, was the most interesting part of the poem because it was here that Virgil developed his best dramatic effects-- "that portion where locality and manners are nothing--where persons and characters are everything."<sup>14</sup>

Because he disagreed with Arnold as to what the actual problem of human life was and what an intellectual deliverance should be, Myers was decidedly in disagreement with Arnold's judgment of Virgil.<sup>15</sup> For Myers, it was precisely just Virgil's sense of an infinite desire, a melancholic homesickness, and a longing for a greater understanding of a world unknown which made Virgil worthy of serious attention. Myers sees in Virgil's Weltanschauung hope for, and intimations of, an intellectual and emotional deliverance. It is not the Dido episode which he finds most interesting about the Aeneid, but book vi, in particular the speech of the shade of Anchises. This passage, Myers asserts, lies at the watershed of all religions. Virgil is the harbinger of new convictions. He had experienced the need for something other than the old dogmas which had hardened into superstition or the materialism of a Lucretius. Consequently, he shifted his creed from the material to the spiritual world. Thus, Myers argued, although Virgil's prophetic vision of a spiritual world concludes on

a note of doubt and melancholic withdrawal, and although his imaginative and prophetic experience is only one of elevation and not of ecstasy, it, nevertheless, shows the way to a possible deliverance for the nineteenth century, for it points to a deliverance in terms of a greater understanding of these aspects of the cosmos which man has yet to comprehend.

### The Personal Equation

Myers firmly believed that the distinction between those who were willing to act on the basis of conscience and experience alone and those who could not act meaningfully without specific sanctions for the consequences of their actions was itself a consequence of character, temperament and experience. Just as he had argued some years before that style and mannerism in art were a consequence of the temperament of the artist, he now argued that ideas and attitudes toward the larger things in life were a consequence of one's individuality. One significant aspect of his criticism of this period, therefore, is a heavy emphasis on biography for his criticisms of individual figures and on history for his criticisms of movements of ideas or systems of thought and belief. In his essay on Renan, he uses the term "a personal equation" to denote this relationship of attitudes and ideas to character, experience, environment, national origin and historical epoch. To understand Renan correctly, he argued, one must also understand the "sum of powers and tendencies which M. Renan brings to bear on the complex problems of man's life and destiny"—his Celtic background, his parentage, his conservatism, his

experiences as educator and political figure, his exclusively contemplative life and the gentle irony which was the result of such a life, and the peculiarities of his emotional and philosophic temperament. What was true of Renan was true of Myers' treatment of all the other figures he examines in these essays. In his essay on Aurelius, for example, Myers argued that "character and circumstances rather than talent or originality give to the thoughts of Aurelius their special value and charm."<sup>17</sup> Myers then gives his reader a series of delightful word pictures of events in Aurelius' life which both reflected the individuality of his character and which helped to mold his temperament.

Myers' notion of a "personal equation" suggested to him the real difficulty of finding an intellectual, emotional and moral deliverance for his contemporaries which would dissolve crucial distinctions and create universal agreement on universal principles. He had discovered from his own experience and from his inquiries into the past that one cannot, so to speak, make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. What was acceptable to one man of one kind of temperament would be frequently unacceptable to another. What Myers does in his essay on George Eliot is a case in point. Firstly, he uses his notion of a "personal equation" to construct a history of the development of George Eliot's thought. The essay is highly biographical in character. Rather than just an explication of what she thought, Myers emphasizes as well the why of what she thought in the context of her age, her upbringing, her friendships, her experiences. Secondly, Myers undertakes to evaluate George Eliot's final creed. In so doing,

one man's personal equation serves as the means of judgment of the intellectual consequences of another's:

Yet in this realm of high speculation to admire is not necessarily to feel complete agreement. There were some to whom these consolations seemed all too shadowy, this resignation premature; some whose impulsion to a personal life beyond the grave was so pre-occupying and dominant that they could not readily acquiesce in her negations, nor range themselves unreservedly as the fellow-workers of her brave despair. Those, especially, to whom life's most impressive experience has been the spectacle of some tragedy without an issue, of some unmerited anguish driven in storms upon an innocent soul,—such men might well have scarcely heart enough to work for the future, with thoughts for ever turning to an irredeemable injustice in the past. Rather they would still recur to the ancient hopes of men; they would urge that great discoveries follow on great needs; that problems which have resisted a hundred keys may yield to yet one key more; that in some field of knowledge there may yet be that to know which shall not, indeed, diminish life's effort, but shall establish its felicity,—shall not relax duty but add hope.<sup>18</sup>

What Myers is clearly indicating here is that unless man can find a solution to the religious problem which transcends those individual judgments which are a consequence of differing personal equations, man is left with a series of provisional solutions which individually are applicable only to some men of certain qualities and not applicable to all men of all qualities. We have here again another demonstration of the necessity for psychical research, an objective inquiry into those phenomena and experiences which can prove or disprove beyond a doubt the existence of a spiritual world.

The principle of the "personal equation" dictates Myers' critical responses to most of the important intellectual movements and developments in the nineteenth century,—stoicism, positivism, agnosticism, the miracle controversy, Higher Criticism, the dialogue of nineteenth century science. If the nineteenth century is to achieve her

deliverance, Myers argues, she must examine all experience and not just a part of experience in order to discover just what the deliverance must entail and what possible solutions might be offered to bring it about. One must not limit the materials for discovery to one's personal equation. Yet one must also recognize that different proposed solutions are frequently relative and provisional in character since they too frequently proceed from a personal equation. Practicing what he preached, Myers, for example, turned to an analysis of the exhibition of irrationalism and spiritualism in Greek culture,<sup>19</sup> an aspect of that culture which, he argued, nineteenth century humanism had too frequently neglected. What he implies throughout his essay on "Greek Oracles" is that if the recovery of the Greek experience is to serve modern man as a means of discovering his own intellectual deliverance, modern man must examine the whole of that experience and see the object as it really was. The cultured Greek's trust in the validity and meaningfulness of the oracle may very well demonstrate in its own way that "the highest hope of the future is not far removed from the truest interpretation of the past."<sup>20</sup>

As this last sentence indicates, Myers was very fond of using history in his essays. His comments on history and the discipline and value of history are worth looking at. In his essay on Wordsworth, for instance, Myers argued persuasively that the feelings and beliefs of each individual successive century would probably be, on the whole, superior to those of the preceding century. Nevertheless, he asserted, this was not always universally true.<sup>21</sup> In his essay on Aurelius he pointed out that "the path of enlightenment is not a royal road but a

labyrinth; and those who have marched too unhesitatingly in one direction have frequently generally been obliged to retrace their steps to unravel some forgotten clue, to explore some turning which they had already passed by."<sup>22</sup> In the Mazzini essay he in part defines the party of hope in the context of its notions about history and its historical assumptions. "So variously may history be read that, while to some minds we may seem the empty-handed heirs of all the ages, who have asked every question and found every answer vain, to others it appears that those ages have been but the infancy of man; that he has hardly as yet formulated the question which he would ask of the Unseen; that as yet he can neither estimate the value of such answers as have been given nor anticipate those which are to come."<sup>23</sup>

As these comments exemplify, the kind of history which Myers wrote was almost wholly operational or rhetorical in character.<sup>24</sup> Frequently, history served the same function in his discussion of larger issues as did his use of biography in his discussion and criticism of individual figures. Myers is not so much interested in what happened in the past as he is in using history as a means to furthering his own non-historical ends. In some instances, for example, history is used directly to call his readers' attentions to the necessity and significance of psychical research. He also uses history in other instances to demonstrate to his contemporaries that their own prejudices prevent them from seeing things as they are and hence prevent them from discovering possible intimations of truth which can initiate an intellectual deliverance for the age as a whole. Two essays of this period deserve special consideration from this perspective, the

essay "Greek Oracles" and the essay "Marcus Aurelius Antoninus."

### The Uses of History

The enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Myers points out in his essay, "Greek Oracles," witnessed a marked rise in standards of historical accuracy and evidence and new developments in the treatment of the errors and superstitions of the past. Eighteenth century historiographers, however, placed so much faith in human reason that they considered all things explicable. Consequently, whatever they could not reduce to ordinary rules they simply brushed aside. Today, Myers argued, philosophical enlightenment has given way to science, physical and historical, with similar consequences. "Science is the power to which we make our first and undoubting appeal, and we run a corresponding risk of assuming that she can already solve problems wholly, which as yet she can solve only in part--of adopting under her supposed guidance explanations which may hereafter be seen to have the crudity and one-sidedness of Voltaire's treatment of Biblical history."<sup>25</sup>

In rebutting "the spirit of enlightenment," and in equating contemporary historical analysis with contemporary science, Myers argues that the time is not yet ripe to pass final judgment on the forms which religion has assumed in the past. "We have traversed too small a part of the curve of human progress to determine its true character."<sup>26</sup> We cannot wholly explain away the beliefs of the world's past by suggesting that they were the consequence of a deliberate fraud on the part of a ruling priesthood or that they were beliefs indicative of a primitive and inferior mentality. To illustrate his argument



here, Myers comments that Greek civilization offers an insight into a primitive culture which, while closely approximating other primitive cultures, reached a remarkably high degree of civilization. Yet scholars have neglected the surprisingly large substratum of irrationalism and anti-intellectualism in Greek culture and the importance of the oracle in the religious, political, and social life of Greece.

The raison d'être of Myers' essay on Greek oracles goes beyond the limited historical thesis that the Greeks believed in the oracle, however.<sup>27</sup> As in his essays on Virgil and Aurelius, the subject matter of the essay was, in part, simply a rhetorical strategy, a tour de force, to enable Myers to comment on the attitudes of his own age. The essay is, therefore, a thinly veiled criticism of that smugness and self-assurance which assumed that the nineteenth century had found the key to unlock all doors. Although Myers had condemned philosophical disinterestedness in the Aurelius essay, he now puts it forth as an important corrective to readjusting the narrow prejudices of contemporary science and history. We should not endeavor to dismiss on the basis of our own philosophical and scientific predilections, what we have not carefully evaluated.<sup>28</sup> Rather, we should employ the tools the nineteenth century has evolved to understand more fully our intellectual and emotional heritage. Science and history have dismissed without inquiry and experiment any remnant of truth in Greek irrationalism in much the same way that they have dismissed all irrationalism in the nineteenth century, specifically the large substratum of interest in spiritualism and psychical phenomena.<sup>29</sup>

In the Victorian age, Aurelius served as a figure who illu-

minated the principal religious, philosophical and ethical position of those men who discussed him. For Frederick Pollock, for example, Aurelius illustrated the pantheist, materialist and determinist who could still present a worthwhile ethical ideal.<sup>30</sup> For Renan, Aurelius illustrated the disinterested philosopher who, because he subscribed to no particular dogma or supernatural speculation, but rested truth upon reason and nature, was a model representative of a moral consciousness valuable for all races, all creeds, and all time.<sup>31</sup> For Arnold, Aurelius' ethical system represented the closest approximation of paganism to Christianity in the ancient world, a Christianity bare of its Aberglaube and metaphysical and supernatural trimmings. He lacked Christ's love, Arnold argued, but he would readily have accepted Christ's ethic and therefore looks forward to Christ's coming.<sup>32</sup>

Although they differ in some essential detail, Arnold, Renan and Pollock all agree that Aurelius' value for the contemporary world is a consequence of his representation of the highest type of religious and ethical thought without any necessary ascription to the sanctions of dogmatism, speculation or supernaturalism. He is the exemplary prototype of an ethical and moral temperament that orders life and thought by rules and precepts drawn from its own experience without concern as to "whether there are indications which may justly modify our conduct or expectations by some influx of inspiration, or some phenomena testifying to the existence of an unseen world, as to our continued life after the body's decay."<sup>33</sup> Thus, for Renan, Pollock and Arnold, he is an intellectual hero worthy of serious imitation and emulation, for they all believe that only an ethic or a morality

of this kind and based upon these assumptions could be universally valid for the modern world.

Myers, of course, disagreed with this point of view. Commenting upon this aspect of Aurelius and his commentators, he writes:

An increased interest, indeed, may be felt at the present time in considering the relations which the philosophy of Marcus Aurelius bears either to ancient or to modern religious thought. For he has been made, as it were, the saint and exemplar of Agnosticism, the type of all such virtue and wisdom as modern criticism can allow to be sound or permanent. It will be the object of the following essay to suggest some reflections on this position assigned to him, dwelling only incidentally, and as briefly as may be consistent with clearness, on the more familiar aspects of his opinions and his career.<sup>34</sup>

If Myers is to refute successfully the arguments of Renan, Arnold and Pollock, he must demonstrate that Aurelius' thought and ethic were only provisional, relative and conditional, a product of a particular time and particular circumstances and of value not universally, but only for certain kinds of temperaments and certain individuals.

To accomplish this end, Myers first adopts the strategy and methodology of historical criticism and the Higher Criticism of the Bible, a kind of strategy that became more and more common with him as his interest in promoting the cause of psychical research increased. The strategy was, in effect, to use the methodology of one's opponent to suggest conclusions different from those which the same methodology had suggested to the other party. In psychical research, for example, Myers' employed the demonstrative and empirical methods of materialism and agnosticism in order to prove the spirituality of the cosmos and the survival of human personality after bodily death.

In the Aurelius essay, he employs the historical methods of Renan, Arnold and Pollock in order to refute the notions of universality which their conclusions suggest.

Characteristically, then, Myers begins his essay with an analysis of those significant factors in Aurelius' life and experience which were responsible for his "personal equation." He then demonstrates the relationship between Aurelius' brand of Stoicism and the larger Stoical tradition of which he was a part in terms of similarity and difference. As a consequence of Aurelius' own peculiar character and temperament, Myers argues, Aurelius differed in important ways from other Stoics. He was both more emotional and agnostic than his traditional forebears. The ancient Stoic self-sufficiency loses its exclusiveness in Aurelius and is represented "only by the resolute recurrence to conscience as the one support against the buffets of the world." Furthermore, Myers states, Aurelius questioned the fundamental Stoic belief in God and Providence. Aurelius was fond of repeating the antithesis "either God or atoms" without, as other Stoics had done, resolving the conjunction.

The next step in Myers' argument is a significant one. If Aurelius differs from his predecessors as a consequence of his personal equation, he differs also from his adherents and disciples in the modern world as a consequence of their personal equations:

There have been many who, with no more belief than Marcus in a personal immortality, have striven, like him, to accept willingly the world in which they found themselves placed. But sometimes they have marred the dignity of their position by attempting too eagerly to find a reason for gladness; they have dwelt with exultation upon a terrene future for our race from which Marcus

would still have turned and asked, "Where, then, is the glory?" It would have seemed to him that a triumphant tone like this can only come from the soilure of philosophy with something of the modern spirit of industrial materialism and facile enjoyment; he would have preferred that his own sereness should be less near to complacency than to resignation; he would still have chosen the temper of that saintly Stoic, whose rude, strong verses break in with so stern a piety among the fragments of philosophic Greece. . . . These, however, are differences only of tone and temper overlying what forms in reality a vast body of practical agreement. For the scheme of thought and belief which has thus been briefly sketched is not only in itself a noble and a just one. It is a kind of common creed of wise men, from which all other views may well seem mere deflections on the side of an unwarranted credulity or of an exaggerated despair. Here, it may be not unreasonably urged, is the moral backbone of all universal religions; and as civilization has advanced, the practical creed of all parties, whatever their speculative pretensions, has approximated ever more nearly to these plain principles and uncertain hopes.<sup>35</sup>

The second half of this paragraph, in which Myers imitates the attitudes of Renan, Pollock and Arnold, suggests the crux of Myers' second argument denigrating the universality of Aurelius' creed. Renan and Pollock, for example, drew analogies between nineteenth century Europe and second century Rome and, in so doing, chose Aurelius as an exemplary figure of the past capable of affording perhaps the only real intellectual deliverance for the present. With the advance of civilization and religious progress, they maintained, Aurelius' creed was the only creed which is compatible with contemporary rationalism and incredulity. Myers did not disagree with the drawing of such historical parallels. Rather, he endeavored to extend them and to modify them from the perspective of a more complete and disinterested historical analysis.

What follows in his essay is a refutation of the main positions of Renan, Pollock and Arnold organized around a dialectical

history of the interaction of the religious and ethical heritage of Western man. Characteristically, the history concludes with an exhortation to his contemporaries to undertake psychical research.

Beginning with the Roman Empire, Myers traces the variety of ethical and religious systems which the personal equation of Rome molded into a provisional synthesis. One consequence of the dogma and official routine of the religion of the Empire which solidified yet sterilized the traditions of which it was a composite, however, was the need among men to find expression for their religious and ethical temperaments. The ethical thought of Aurelius grew out of this historical and psychological condition. Given a state religion which is decaying, unilluminated and sterile and given an age both tolerant and enlightened, history demonstrates that one choice open to men of varying character and temperament was the rejection of dogma and a superannuated supernaturalism and the promulgation of an ethical system dependent only upon unassisted virtue.

History also demonstrates, however, that intelligent and enlightened men could and did make another choice, for the decline of Rome exhibits also "a gradual recrudescence among the cultivated as well as the ignorant of the belief in a perceptible interaction of the seen and the unseen world."<sup>36</sup> Like Stoicism, this movement, too, had its roots in the first beginnings of Rome. And like Aurelian Stoicism, it was also cast into new forms peculiar to the Roman experience. Thus, in a critical period of human history, when the national religion of Rome lost its validity and solidified into sterility, two streams of higher tendency rushed into the spiritual vacuum--the

main ethical tradition taking the form of a generalized and simplified Stoicism and the main religious tradition whose origins were in the remote East, the speculations of Pythagoras, the prophetic mysticism of Virgil and the spiritualistic investigations of Varro, Claudius, Figulus and Niggarius. Each stream of tendency took forms dependent upon the personal or historical equation of the age and the inherent psychological dissociation of ethical and religious sensibility among men.

Christianity, however, acted as a catalyst drawing the two streams of tendency in the Roman world into a provisional synthesis once again. "It was the only formulated and intelligible creed which united the two elements most necessary for a widely received religion, namely a lofty moral code, and the attestation of some actual intercourse between the visible and the invisible worlds."<sup>37</sup> By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the two streams of tendency had broken apart once again. New historical conditions augur, however, the possibility for a new synthesis which will perhaps dialectically complete the processes of the two streams of tendency initiated by the fall of the Roman Empire.

Looking to the future, Myers now poses the question: "How might the ethical tendency and the religious tendency in the modern world formalize into a universal and lasting synthesis?" He turns to psychological research as a possible answer, for in his conclusion Myers expresses his belief that a new era in human ethics and religion could be formed through the application of the methodology of the agnostic and the party of resignation to the phenomena which traditionally have

upheld the faith of the party of hope, who believe in the interaction of the seen and the unseen worlds. Such a synthesis, Myers argues, holds out the possibility for evidence of spiritual laws which will demonstrate to the satisfaction of all men an external reward for virtue and thus resolve the crisis of faith and character as rife in the nineteenth century as it was in the age of the Antonines.

Myers' dialectical interpretation of history enabled him to refute effectively several of the basic assumptions of such nineteenth century religious and ethical commentators as Arnold, Pollock and Renan. Firstly, whereas they had judged the significance of Aurelius on grounds of his offering the nineteenth century the only possible religious and ethical solution to men of an enlightened and tolerant age, Myers demonstrates that history itself proves otherwise. Enlightened and tolerant ages of the past show that two streams of tendency and not one are likely to exhibit themselves under such circumstances. Drawing an analogy between the past and the present, Myers argues that the enlightened and disinterested agnosticism and the spiritualism and supernaturalism of the present are different phases of the main ethical and religious tendencies which at different times have taken different forms contingent upon the historical equation of a given age.

Secondly, Myers' dialectical reading of history refutes Arnold's contention that it was the morality of Paul and his gospel which alone was the cause of Christianity's immense success and appeal in the late Empire. The significant raison d'être of Christianity was the apparition of Jesus after his death. Furthermore, "possession, inspiration,



faith healing, luminous appearance and the modification and movement of natural objects formed, not as some later apologists would have it, a mere accidental mixture, but an essential and loudly asserted element in the new religion."<sup>38</sup> Arnold had misconstrued the historical significance of Christianity and its meaning to its adherents in the early modern world.

Thirdly, by suggesting that the dialectic which history demonstrates will possibly complete itself in the future, Myers argues that the present is only one stage or phase in a history of process. In so doing, he is arguing the transitional and provisional character of the present, "an incident in the moral life of man." His essay is ultimately an exhortation to the present to initiate a new form of the process which will complete itself in the future when "saints are necessarily philosophers and philosophers saints."<sup>39</sup> Against the background of such a spectacle of tendency and process whose end is in the distant future, the satisfaction of a Renan or a Pollock in the finality of the present and the systems of the present pales in its prematurity.

#### The Failures of Science

Arnold had argued that an intellectual and moral deliverance for the nineteenth century could be initiated by getting to know the best that has been thought and said in the world and shedding a stream of fresh ideas on our stock notions and attitudes. Myers agreed. But Arnold went one step further. Culture was not just a means to an end but the end itself. Here Myers disagreed. He thought Culture, as

Arnold conceived of it, lacked universality and catholicity. The nineteenth century was still left with the same two distinctive groups it began with. Arnold finds his solutions not through reconciliation of fundamental differences but through the neglect of one party altogether. The Stoic and the believer in an unseen world are incompatible unless one can find a tertium quid or a principle or methodology which would transcend apparent incompatibilities. Psychical research, Myers believed, offered such a principle and method. Here again we can isolate a fundamental distinction between Myers and Arnold. Arnold put his trust in humanism and the past. Myers, however, put his trust in contemporary science and in the future. Myers was more than just of the party of hope, for he argued throughout his essays that that hope may become a certainty as a consequence of the tools, procedures and methods of nineteenth century science and empiricism. This attitude is a general characteristic of Myers' essays of this period and needs further comment.

Jerome Buckley regards the psychical research movement as antagonistic to the trend of Victorian rationalism and empiricism in the 1870's and 1880's.<sup>40</sup> There is a partial truth in Buckley's statement if one looks hastily at Myers' essays of this period, for Myers frequently demonstrates his antagonism to contemporary science. Yet this does not necessitate the assumption that Myers rejected science, the analytic method, the microscope or the telescope. A closer examination of his essays will reveal, rather, that the psychical research movement was part of the greater rhetoric of Victorian rationalism and empiricism which is all too frequently overlooked by those<sup>41</sup>

who endeavor to make a consistent movement out of what essentially was a highly complex dialogue.<sup>42</sup>

Without suggesting that the following forms of Victorian rationalism and empiricism are all inclusive, we might note the following distinctions. Firstly, there were those like Tyndall<sup>43</sup> who used the tools and methods of empiricism and observation to seek final causes suggesting a materialistic explanation of man and the cosmos. Secondly, there were those like Alfred Russell Wallace<sup>44</sup> who used the tools and methods of empiricism and observation but believed observable phenomena suggested final causes and ultimate beginnings and ends which were essentially spiritualistic and vital, not mechanical and materialistic. Thirdly, there were those who used the tools of empiricism and science, but, like Huxley or Leslie Stephen,<sup>45</sup> stopped short of the search for final causes and ultimate ends, believed in man's experiential limitations, and adapted stoical and agnostic attitudes void of emotionalism. And fourthly, there were those like W. K. Clifford<sup>46</sup> or Frederic Harrison<sup>47</sup> who used the methods and procedures of empiricism and rationalism and who recognized man's experiential limitations but who, nevertheless, refused to see these limitations as necessary cause for stoical, unemotional, "colorless" agnosticism.

In the context of this plurality of rationalistic and empirical conceptions,<sup>48</sup> Myers in the late 70's can best be understood as "rationally" eclectic and not of one school, even though he ultimately wound up in that school which used the tools and methods of empiricism to seek final causes and ultimate beginnings which are spiritualistic in character. For example, although his essays of this

period suggest strong moral convictions by way of qualitative judgments, they also suggest that Myers was of the party of rationalist and free thinking liberals like Mill or Morley who stressed the peril of suppressing "new ideas" and "new facts" which might, if reasonably and empirically considered, prove vital to the progress of man and to society.

Contemporary science, Myers thought, had the potentiality for bringing about a new Aufklarung or enlightenment. But believing that it had found the royal road, it turned its back upon the past and looked only to the present or to the future circumscribed by the present. Myers was more hesitant. Without rejecting science, he recognized the transitional character of the seventies<sup>49</sup> and was far more willing than most of his "free thinking" or "dogmatic" contemporaries to accept the labyrinth and to turn backward as well as forward to find a meaning and value in man's traditional and present responses to the world around him.<sup>50</sup> In this sense, he was far more disinterested than Renan. Although he challenged stoicism and agnosticism, he nevertheless was sympathetic with these attitudes within their context and accepted them as relevant approaches to nineteenth century problems. But he also realized that stoicism and agnosticism were products of their time and history, were meaningful and valuable only for certain individuals of certain temperaments and personalities, that they were, consequently, relative and not universal responses to man and the universe.<sup>51</sup> Like Tyndall, he also was aware that science was perhaps the only method by which to solve the problems of man and the universe. Unlike Tyndall, however, he was not certain that the accumu-

lated facts of experience would necessarily prove that the final cause in the universe was material. Myers was also sympathetic to Clifford's "religion" of cosmic emotion, but he challenged Clifford's definition of that cosmos. Before we can adjust our emotional lives to the cosmos around us, he argued, we must first better understand what that cosmos is. Clifford's cosmos of ether and atoms was one hypothesis which may or may not be true, but it was only an hypothesis, not a fact.<sup>52</sup>

What Myers was saying, as well as exemplifying, in these essays, therefore, was that nineteenth century man must widen his purview, must enlarge the scope of his experience and understanding, must seek new facts and new hypotheses to account for them and not rest satisfied with those he has already found. In none of the essays did he necessarily give any positive solutions to the problems he tried to raise. His purpose in these essays was primarily to raise questions, suggest problems, and examine the potentialities of old modes and methods of approach to problems and theses and to tentatively suggest new ones--to raise, we might say, the ancient questions and issues of Cicero, issues of fact and circumstance, issues of definition, issues of quality and issues of procedure.

What Myers does in the Aurelius essay in the context of Stoicism and the history of religious and ethical thought he also does in the Renan essay in the context of a discussion of the Higher Criticism and the miracle controversy. Both essays have a number of distinct parallels. For example, Myers begins the Renan essay with an analysis of those elements which constitute Renan's personal equation. He then

turns to a study of Renan's religious thought, criticizing its virtues and limitations as consequences of Renan's personal equation. One significant aspect of Renan's thought was his attitude toward miracles. Taking this attitude for a new beginning, Myers launches into the various possibilities of solving the miracle problem and ultimately finds a means to synthesize science and religion in the undertaking of psychical research. Like the Aurelius essay, Myers here, too, is seeking for a means of reconciling contradictory tendencies. In so doing, his work is highly rhetorical in character, functioning as an apology for psychical research and an exhortation to his contemporaries to undertake such a study. Most important in this essay, however, is the last part of Myers' argument, for it suggests how and why Myers laid the charge of parochiality at the feet of modern science.

Myers' apology for psychical research in the Aurelius essay was argued from the position of a history of the interaction of religion and ethical theory from Rome to the present day. His argument and apology in the Renan essay was somewhat different. Here he was concerned with finding a via media between science and religion. Taking a cue from Aristotle, he seeks a golden mean between the excesses of both parties. Thus, Myers begins his attempted reconciliation by first dismissing all unproved assumptions, question begging terms, and polemical antitheses of both parties.<sup>53</sup> The Christian "reasonably" points to certain happenings which suggest a beneficent ruler of the universe. Such a ruler may at times reveal himself with the accompaniment of unusual phenomena. The savant, on the other hand, "reasonably" assumes that certain unusual events alleged to have occurred in un-

critical times and no longer observed in more critical epochs are unworthy of credence. Religion becomes "unreasonable" when it confines such revelations to certain specific churches, groups of men or the Bible, arguing all other soi-disant revelations are untrustworthy. Science is "unreasonable" when it affirms that "alleged phenomena, which cannot be repeated at will, nor explained by known laws of nature, must be referred to illusion or imposture." Taking the possible fraction of truth from each antagonist, Myers postulates that we can "reasonably" assume that Christ's life may have been accompanied by some abnormal phenomena, but the uncritical temper of the times wherein they occurred necessitates a suspension of judgment until some confirmatory evidence can be adduced from later times. Contemporary religious opinion, Myers argues, is willing to accept this hypothesis, but the modern savant is not. It is at this point in his argument that Myers launches an attack on the prejudices of contemporary science.

Myers argues his case against science and her reluctance to examine borderland phenomena which may help man to understand the nature of the recorded Biblical miracles on three grounds. Firstly, he argues that science is guilty of false definition and false classification, for it classifies all abnormal events, whether Biblical or otherwise, "in the same category of error." His argument here serves two functions. On one hand, he issues a challenge to science by suggesting her failure to follow the pioneering spirit that previously had led to success in difficulties overcome. On the other, he implies by analogy that psychical research is within the province of scientific discourse and investigation, for its problems closely approximate those

of the science of ethnology, anthropology, and behavioral and abnormal psychology.<sup>54</sup>

Secondly, Myers argues that science's unwillingness to investigate the borderland phenomena of spiritualism and psychical research is a consequence of her historical position and her own "personal equation." Long persecuted by theology, science has now come into its own and "like all strong forces which have been too long suppressed and are now asserting themselves in triumph must necessarily be at first intolerant of the power which persecuted her." Once able to personify nineteenth-century science, Myers is able to criticize it on distinctly human grounds, in this instance attacking its motivations for inactivity on grounds of childish pride and revengefulness of character. At the same time, he demonstrates that modern science is only a neophyte as an intellectual tradition and lacking maturity of motive, design, and conception.<sup>55</sup>

Thirdly, Myers argues that science's reluctance to examine these alleged abnormalities has in one respect done mankind a service. It has popularized the notion of unvarying law and encouraged the critical temperament. Yet by refusing to examine these phenomena, she cannot know whether they are in truth violations of natural law. History and science have both demonstrated that some abnormalities are better supported by evidence than others and come closer to known analogies. This should suggest the possibility that some of these abnormalities may contain a residue of fact highly important to both science and religion and that not all of these phenomena should be equally ignored. But science fears the introduction of an "uncalcul-



able element which would interfere with the certainty of all experiments." The scientific answer to this, Myers argues, is to assume that "whatever worlds, whatever phenomena exist, are governed by rigid law, and that all elements in all problems are incalculable only till they are calculated. The true discipline of science should desire to bring all regions, however remote and strange, under her sway."<sup>56</sup>

In summary, Myers argues that science's circumscription of its own subject matter has limited its own finality, for it provides only provisional responses to questions concerning the nature of man and the universe, provisional in the context of its limitations. Renan's Life of Jesus, for example, which well illustrates the contemporary scientific temperament, can only be a provisional life of Christ. It is clear and it is consistent, but its experiential limitations indicate its impermanency. Paradoxically, Renan assumes that the New Testament miracles never occurred whereas he should have assumed that the New Testament presents a series of marvels which have as yet neither been explained nor explained away. Science's concern for clarity and consistency has, in other words, violated its own canons of evidence. By refusing to widen its purview of inquiry, science, like orthodoxy, is guilty of relying on tradition and intuition rather than on the patient accumulation and observation of fact. The one thing needful to both science and religion is facts, and facts can only be obtained by careful and minute observation, not through "lofty ideas generated within our own minds."<sup>57</sup> Religion postulates a spiritual world in terms of aspiration, intuition and tradition. Science supposedly postulates a methodology and mode of in-

quiry. Myers wishes to see the two brought together. Science, if it is to be science, should endeavor to acquire facts and data relating to the possible interaction between the seen and the unseen worlds, which might possibly give certainty to man's religious intuitions and traditions. In so doing, science will also enlarge the paradigm from which it operates.

### New Directions in Literary Criticism

If these previous remarks suggest the general character of Myers' essays of this period, the kinds of themes he was concerned with and the means and methods by which he supported his position, we might now focus our attention more closely on the new directions of his literary criticism, particularly his criticism of poets and poetry.

In our second chapter, we noted in some detail the dialogue between W. E. Gladstone and John Conington on the proper assumptions for evaluating poetry in general and Virgil's poetry in particular. We observed that Myers' sympathies at that time lay strongly with his friend Conington and not at all with the theories of Gladstone. In the essays written at this period we are now looking at, a period dating roughly from 1877 to 1882, Myers has moved considerably closer to the camp of Gladstone, although not entirely abandoning the suppositions of Conington or his aesthetic-classical criteria of judgment.

In his essay on George Sand, for example, Myers insisted that "Art, like everything else which is worth having or worth doing, is the result and outcome of a certain inward and spiritual state; that

to good Art moral qualities are as necessary as intellectual; that those who fail in Art fail oftenest through egoism and ambition, through license and vanity; while those who succeed succeed through delight in their work and devotion to an impersonal and lofty aim."<sup>58</sup> In the same essay he quotes with approval Ruskin's "great maxim" that "in order to represent anything well we must love to look at it, in order to do anything well we must love to do it, quite apart from all thought of rivalry, or profit, or fame."<sup>59</sup>

In considering the poetry of George Eliot, Myers argues that her poems fail in that instinctive melody which is the "indispensable birth-gift of poets." Nevertheless, he goes on to argue that the poems are "yet the most concentrated expression of herself which she has left behind her." They teach that "as the mounting spirit becomes more conscious of its own being, it becomes more conscious also of the bonds which unite it to its kin; that thus the higher a man is, the closer he is drawn to the lowest, and greatness is not an exemption, but a debt the more."<sup>60</sup> Thus, Myers implies, although George Eliot's poems are distinctively inartistic by his standards of 1863, they nevertheless are good poems because the thoughts they express are noble and worthy thoughts and because the character they represent and express is a noble and worthy character.

Myers' essay on the poetry of Archbishop Trench is somewhat more complex, for it mingles his new conceptions with his old. Thus, for example, Myers praises the rhythmical and metrical qualities of Trench's poems. "Surely there can be no question as to the profound charm of these lines, the charm of the slowly-falling syllables, the

strong and lingering rhythm, which paint the gradual eclipse of the last faint joy in light and form and colour, and the whole soul's abeyance in an unstirred and unawakening gloom."<sup>61</sup> He also praises Trench for the traditional, imitative and allusive qualities of his verse. Trench's identification with the world of art and poetry in all its forms and traditions is one of the most powerful stimulants to his verse making and one of his richest virtues. "In his 'Orpheus and the Sirens,' Dr. Trench gives us the peculiar pleasure which is afforded by a poem which is not a translation but a transmutation of some great remembered song: melted afresh in the crucible of an understanding heart and poured into a new shape which recalls without imitating the old."<sup>62</sup>

A close reading of Myers' remarks on Trench, however, indicates some significant new changes in his attitudes toward poetry. For one thing, even though he praises Trench for his imitations, allusions and uses of tradition, almost always Myers speaks of the significance of allusion not as a significant poetic end in itself but as a means of identifying Trench with a tradition larger than that of literature. Trench's characteristic message becomes the message of the party of hope in its religious context. The tradition which Trench represents and manifests in his poems is the tradition which Myers himself upheld in each and every one of the essays we have been looking at. "It is a noticeable fact that Dr. Trench, himself the very type and norm of Christian and Anglican orthodoxy, has yet by the intensity of his pondering on the things unseen been led to feel the profound affinity which has existed between the hopes and creeds of such men

in all times and countries as have set themselves to seek after God, and has thus been upheld in one of his highest moments by the Vision of the Pindaric Apocalypse."<sup>63</sup>

In commenting on the function of tradition, imitation and allusion in his earlier poetics, Myers had asserted that the poet's use of tradition and allusion demonstrated the poet's abilities to compete with that tradition and to refashion it into an amalgamation and a composition of his own making. That amalgamation in no way depended on the quality or character of thought imitated or alluded to, but on the imaginative power which enabled the poet to force the thoughts and lines of another into a rhythmical and compositional structure of his very own doing. In his essay on Trench, the uses of tradition and allusion are very different. The emphasis now is on the quality and character of thoughts imitated, the distinctive creed of others. Allusion and imitation function not as aesthetic ends but as means of identifying religious traditions. Moreover, Myers goes on to add that it is the function of poetry to teach and instruct. The peculiar aesthetic qualities of poems are, therefore, only means to larger ends. They better enable the poet to effect his particular rhetorical ends, to enlarge his reader's moral and ethical sensibilities, to teach the lesson of "elevation through sorrow" and to bring consolation in moments of acute bereavement. Clearly, Myers' classical aestheticism has also been tempered by his reading and study of Wordsworth.

Myers' essay on Victor Hugo<sup>64</sup> also demonstrates Myers' bringing together old ideas and newer ideas. At the very beginning of the

essay, for example, Myers states that Swinburne's estimate of Hugo is excellent of its kind, but "it leaves room for a soberer estimate, which shall refer the works in question as much to a moral as to an artistic standard."<sup>65</sup> On what grounds then does Myers criticize the poetry of Hugo? To begin with the artistic judgment first, we find Myers at the outset of his essay arguing that Hugo's central distinction lies in his unique power over the French language, "greatly resembling Mr. Swinburne's power over the English language, and manifesting itself in beauty and inventiveness of poetic form and melody." In particular, Myers discusses Hugo's advancements in the techniques of "increased richness" of rhythm and "increased richness" of rhyme, his greatest artistic achievements. What follows is a lengthy discussion of rhyme, metrics and rhythms, an analysis of the principal distinctions between French versification and rhyme and English versification and rhyme, a history of metrics, and a study of the ambiguities of iambic and anapaestic rhythms, the problems of accentuation and enjambment, and the "virtuoso" qualities of Hugo and Swinburne. Throughout, Myers demonstrates Hugo's greatness as an artist in metre, rhythm and rhyme.<sup>66</sup>

As Myers stated at the beginning of his essay, however, poetry must be judged by moral standards as well as artistic standards. On what moral grounds, then, does Myers criticize the poetry of Hugo? Myers argues that one of the single greatest failures of Hugo's poetry is the excessive egoism and autotheism of the character of the poet as that character is expressed in the content of his poetry. The poet's claim to represent his fellow men (note that he no longer

speaks to the cognoscenti) is a consequence of his more exquisite sensibilities, loftier idealism, his truer moral sense. But the poet's emotions are to be overheard, not adjusted, as are Hugo's, to his admiring public.<sup>67</sup> One great failure of Hugo's poetry, then, is that the poet suffers from amour propre and his poetry from an improper rhetorical stance.

Myers also evaluates Hugo on the verisimilitude of his historical portrayals, on "the truth to history" and "truth to nature" of his dramatic poems,<sup>68</sup> two cardinal tenets of Gladstone's evaluation of Virgil and Homer. It is the "moral" defect of Hugo's reckless indifference and inaccuracy of assertion, his want of knowledge and want of truth, that suggest to Myers Hugo's inferiority to George Eliot, for example. Hugo, Myers argued, "might have been a real savant if he had given to other subjects the same kind of attention he has given to versification and grammar, if he had cared as much for what he said as for the style in which he said it."<sup>69</sup>

More important, however, and more characteristic of the position which Myers was to take throughout his essays of this period, was his argument that a poet must be judged by the way in which he meets the philosophical and religious problems of the "terrible possibility that after all there is no hope--that there are no gods who prefer the just man to the unjust--that our loves and aspirations do but mock us with an ever unattainable desire."

The poets who have been the voices of humanity have given utterance to this dark fear in many a passage which has sunk deeply into human hearts--from the stern realism of Achilles among the shades down to the visionary despair of the end of Alaster--from the bit-

terness of that Hebrew preacher down to the melodious complaints of "the idle singer of an empty day." Often, indeed, we measure the elevation of the poet or of the race to which he sings by noting the nature of the region on which he chiefly dwells-- whether it be, as often with the Greeks, mainly for the loss of our own joy in life and sunlight, or, as in the sadder Psalms resentment at the outrage of Death against Justice, or the still nobler agony of the thought that the claim of Love to its own continuance shall be made in vain. . . . By what indeed are we to judge a man if not by the way in which he meets this problem? Be his speculative conclusions what they may, if there is any unselfishness in him, if any heroism, if any holiness, he will show them in the face of these extreme possibilities, this one hope worth hoping, this only formidable fear.<sup>70</sup>

In the 1860's, Myers approached poetry "problematically," that is to say, he asked himself the questions what is the peculiar character of poetry as an art form, what distinguishes poetry from other literary and verbal kinds, and what distinguishes the poet from other kinds of men of different kinds of abilities. He then evolved answers which we have already examined. In the essays we are looking at now, however, Myers has considerably altered both his method and his evaluative criteria. He is no longer interested only in the particular problematic character of poetry, but he is equally interested in the poet's character, his ethos and his rhetoric, the poet as historian and naturalist, and the poet as philosopher, moralist and commentator on the essential problems of man and his relationship to the universe and cosmos.

There are three very distinctive points which Myers makes in this essay which suggest his new interest in psychical research. Firstly, we might note the unique character of the problem which Myers asserts that each man, poet or otherwise, must endeavor to solve, the problem of how man is to deliver himself from the fear that the universe and



cosmos is not moral or just and that man's sufferings in this world cannot be relieved in a next. The problem which he isolates as being most important for the poet to solve is, of course, the same problem which grew out of Myers' difficulties in the early and middle seventies and which initiated his investigation of spiritualistic and psychical phenomena in order to find a solution for them.<sup>71</sup>

Secondly, Myers' somewhat confused emphasis on the character and ethos of the poet and the poet's sincerity also reflects his psychical research preoccupations. If one considers the poet a source of wisdom, and if men are to respond to his emotions, intuitions and speculations seriously, one must rely on the sincerity and character of the poet alone, barring any other experimental or scientific evidence as to the validity of his assertions. Myers discusses this problem on two levels—the ethos of the poet, a biographical problem, and the ethos which the poet's verse manifests, a rhetorical and poetical problem.<sup>72</sup> This problem was not peculiar to Myers. Nevertheless, the crises of character which were a consequence of Myers' relationship with Anne Marshall, his friendships with Ruskin and George Eliot, and above all, his intensive investigation of spiritualism and psychical phenomena brought this point home more severely to Myers than perhaps to others. His essay on Wordsworth discusses this problem of poetry and sincerity even more directly:

He who claims to give a message must satisfy us that he has himself received it; and inasmuch as transcendent things are in themselves inexpressible, he must convey to us in hints and figures the conviction which we need. . . . And so also with Wordsworth. Unless the words which describe the intense and sympathetic gaze with which he contemplates Nature convince us of the reality of "the light that never was on sea or land" . . . unless his tone awakes

a responsive conviction in ourselves, there is no argument by which he can prove to us that he is offering a new insight to mankind.<sup>73</sup>

Myers is commenting here on a problem which he was increasingly thinking about. In an area of inquiry and investigation so fraught with deceit, deception and fraud as Spiritualism and mediumship, the analysis of the sincerity of messages and the sincerity of the medium or deliverer of those messages was particularly important. The tone of the message, its "hints," its "figures," its language itself, as well as the ethos which characterizes it, must be weighed and evaluated thoroughly and carefully. Similar sentiments, somewhat differently phrased, for example, surround most of the citings of specific evidential cases in Phantasms. The analysis of messages in terms of character and ethos was as important to the literary criticism of the sort Myers was practicing as to the investigation of mediums and spirit seers.

Thirdly, the significance Myers gives to the function of poetry as a means of sustaining religion in a world in which the traditional paradigmatic structure of organized religion had crumbled also reflects his interest in psychical research in a somewhat more explicit way. In 1880, for example, Arnold had argued that the peculiar character of the present age dictates the significance of the future of poetry. "More and more," Arnold asserts, "mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, and to sustain us."<sup>74</sup> For Arnold, poetry is the universal synthesizing element in the triad of Art, Science and Morality. Culture, poetically realized, is Arnold's final solution to the religious dilemma of the

modern world. John Seeley in his Natural Religion argued similarly to Arnold. For Seeley, also, Culture, in the form of the synthesis of art, science and morality, was a satisfactory solution to the religious crisis.<sup>75</sup> From Myers' remarks on Seeley<sup>76</sup> we can adequately gauge his judgment and evaluation of Culture and poetry as a wholly adequate solution to that crisis.

In effect, Myers' review of Seeley endeavors to ascertain whether Culture alone can sustain those requisites necessary for universality in solving the religious crisis. Much of the essay is refutative in character. Seeley's conception of Culture and religion offers "nothing of personal, of spiritual intercourse, between the soul and God."<sup>77</sup> Consequently, it cannot therefore fully satisfy the Christian. Moreover, it cannot satisfactorily satisfy those who have an impulse to a spiritual union with something that is above and within them but who are not Christians. "For while it may be the fact that the belief in any definite superhuman personality becomes harder to maintain as men's minds become subtler and scrutiny of evidence more exacting; yet, on the other hand, we see the craving for divine communion, divine forgiveness and blessing, satisfying itself with a spiritual answer which it shrinks from defining, and growing (as in Plotinus) the more absorbing as its object grows more incognisable to man. Not science alone, but mysticism, has shown itself ready to become the heir of all religions; and the churches of Christendom may be destined to dissolve away, not into civilisation only, but into ecstasy."<sup>78</sup>

Myers' extraordinarily prophetic critique of Seeley should not

blind us, however, to his willingness to accept the argument of Culture as a provisional "religious" synthesis. In his conclusion to "Preface to Poems" (1853) Arnold had argued for the provisional acceptance of his theory of poetry. "Let us not bewilder our successors: let us transmit to them the practice of poetry with its boundaries and wholesome regulative laws, under which excellent works may again, perhaps, at some future time, be produced, not yet fallen into oblivion through our neglect, not yet condemned and cancelled by the influence of their eternal enemy, caprice."<sup>79</sup> Myers advanced a similar argument with respect to Culture as an adequate means of solving the religious crisis. Given the changing character of the times, given the age in which we live, given the destruction of the older religious paradigm and our failure as yet to construct one anew, Culture may preserve those aspects of human endeavor, mind and heart which are vitally worth preserving:

The lights that rule the night may bestow no warmth with their illumination. Art, perhaps, may seem to us but a moonlight halo; Science and Stoicism--the resolve to learn and to endure--may be but as noctis signa severa--night's austere constellations, enthroned in a frozen heaven. And yet that nocturnal outlook is the prerequisite of almost all we know; not without the sun's withdrawal and obscuration could men truly have conceived the sun. If the belief in a life to come should ever regain as firm possession of men's minds as of old, that belief will surely be held in a nobler fashion. That life will be conceived not as a devotional exercise nor as a passive felicity, but as the prolongation of all generous energies, and the unison of all high desires. It may be that till we can thus apprehend it its glory must be hid from our eyes. Only, perhaps, when men have learnt that virtue is its own reward may they safely learn also that that reward is eternal.<sup>80</sup>

In a later essay on "Tennyson as Prophet" Myers described his attitudes toward the function of poetry in the present day more ex-

plicitly. In this instance, he argued that the final answer to the religious problem must depend on the discoveries of science herself. "But meantime we more than ever need our prophets; and the true poet comes nearer to inspiration than any prophet to whom we can hope to listen now. Let his intuitions come to us dissolved in that fusion of thought and melody which makes the highest art we know."<sup>81</sup> What he is in essence endeavoring to argue in the Hugo essay is that if poetry is going to serve as an adequate provisional solution to the religious crisis of the present time, it must be poetry of a certain kind and a special quality. It must be "true poetry" and Myers' notions of "true poetry" in 1877 differed considerably from those notions about "true poetry" he had expressed more than ten years before.

Myers' essay on Rossetti also exhibits his growing interests in psychological research and his preoccupation with those ethical and moral problems which were both a stimulus to this interest and a consequence of it. The essay consists of two parts. Firstly, Myers argues that the aesthetic movement is a movement to be taken seriously, for it represents one of the significant cultural and social changes Britain was then undergoing. Secondly, and more important, however, Myers confronts his contemporaries with the significance and value of Rossetti's criticism of life.<sup>82</sup> It is this last which interests us here. For Myers, what are the grounds for Rossetti's significance to the modern world?

Myers begins his analysis of this problem with a statement on the tradition initiated by Plato and nurtured by Dante which Rossetti brought forth into the Victorian world.<sup>83</sup> He does not stop here, how-

ever; rather, he goes on to demonstrate that that tradition and Rossetti have something relevant and important to say to the modern world. What Rossetti demonstrates to us, Myers argues, is that there are still men whose characters and temperaments are such that they react against the aridity and materialism of nineteenth century science and culture and therefore seek a meaning for life in the possible existence of an unseen world. Rossetti, like Plato, Virgil and Dante before him, is one of those whose character and temperament place him on the side of the party of hope.<sup>84</sup>

For Myers, the significance of Rossetti's message to the modern world is, therefore, twofold. Firstly, his experience of love was clearly more than just a physiological and neurological reaction. It was in effect a source of insight into a world beyond the world of ether and atoms and thus evidential proof that human experience is not as limited and circumscribed as modern science suggests it is. Secondly, because he is of the party of hope, Rossetti demonstrates that the nineteenth century has not yet found those universals which can account for the variety and plurality of human experience.<sup>85</sup>

In the following letter to Symonds, dated August 28, 1883, Myers explains what he thought the rhetorical intent and the thesis of the essay on Rossetti was to be.

Thank you for your deeply interesting letter. I will speak first of what you say about Rossetti. I know that I have represented him as he desired to be rather than as he was; the soaring spirit in him being grossly cumbered with clay. But I cannot altogether refuse to believe Theodore Watts, who assures me so earnestly that the essay--written before I had heard Watts say a work on the subject--does in reality depict Rossetti's inmost man;<sup>86</sup> and I cannot think that the sacredness which breathes for me round "The One Hope" is an illusion reflected from mere vacancy in the

sinner's soul. As to the undesirability of dwelling on the so-called religion of beauty there may fairly I think be two opinions. For one person who is in danger of feeling Beauty too much there are surely ten who feel it too little; and tho' my language is very likely too florid or mystical I have not meant to suggest anything at variance with the most delicate moral sense of our times.

I think that the fact is that, with no great difference of moral aim, you and I feel ourselves, as it were, to be placed in front of different antagonists. Your foes, if I may say so, are of your own kindred; that is, you do battle against the lower instincts, the haunting temptations of men who, after all, are of the salt of the earth. But the kind of adversary present to my mind is a man like Dr. Maudsley;--a man for whose private character I can well believe that I should feel much respect, but who represents a school of thought which, if it prevails, will bring the world to the Nihilism of the brutes of the field. I want to snatch our young Ray Lankesters as brands from the burning--to save the men whose minds associate religion and the mad house, psychology and the vivisection table,--Love and the Strand.<sup>87</sup>

What this letter suggests is that Myers conceived of his essay on Rossetti as clearly intending to serve a rhetorical function beyond the obvious; it was not so much Rossetti that Myers was interested in as it was his explanation of the value of the tradition which Rossetti was made to reflect and exemplify, a tradition which did not confuse religion and insanity, psychology with neurology, or love with commercial and physical pursuits. The significance of this tradition was that it served as an antidote to the smug materialism of Maudsley and other physiological psychologists of the 1870's by asserting the essential spirituality of man and the universe. It was to provide a similar antidote and to prove the validity and truthfulness of the intuitions of Plato, Dante and Rossetti that Myers turned to psychical research.

#### A New Poetics

Myers' experiences in the 70's and his interest in psychical

research are also reflected in his poetics of this period as well as in his general criticism. In his great essay on Virgil, for example, Myers takes German literary criticism to task for relying wholly upon an objective standard of critical judgment; such objectivity, Myers argued, failed to explain the subtleties of poetry in general and poetic language in particular:

It is impossible to criticize any form of art without the introduction of subjective impressions of some kind. It would be vain to attempt to give any such general exposition of poetical excellence as should carry conviction to all minds. Some obvious shortcomings may be pointed out, some obvious merits insisted upon; but when a higher region is reached we find that a susceptibility to the specific power of poetry is no more communicable than an ear for music. To most readers the subtle, the unexpressed, the infinite element in poetry such as Virgil's will remain forever unacknowledged and unknown. Like the Golden Bough which unlocked the secrets of the underworld.<sup>88</sup>

Myers then undertakes to explain why such subtleties do exist in poetry.

They are a consequence, he argues, of the fact that the quantity and quality of human thoughts and emotions far transcend the number and quality of words and signs which man has evolved to express them.<sup>89</sup> Consequently, the artist, if he is to express those limitless thoughts and emotions, must take the finite system of signs which is available to him and maximize its finite potential to achieve infinite effects. To do so poetically, Myers goes on to argue, the poet must use his signs or language in a double way. Language, for example, may be used for the direct representation and expression of thought and feeling. In this way, language is imitative in quality. But words are also made up of sounds and collocations of sounds which may be combined and organized imaginatively so as to suggest, like music perhaps, what there is no means of expressing directly. Here Myers



argues, experience "shows that it is possible to arrange forms, colours, and sounds to stimulate the imagination in a new and inexplicable way." Language, therefore, can be used both expressively and suggestively, imitatively or originally.<sup>90</sup>

Poetry, then, a product of language, may be both imitative and imaginative. It possesses the reality which depends on its directly recalling our previous thoughts and feelings. In this instance, it is both expressive, representative, and imitative. "But as a system of rhythmical and melodious effects--not indebted for their potency to their associated ideas alone--it appeals also to that mysterious power from which mere arrangement of sound can convey an emotion which no one could have predicted before hand, and which no known laws can explain."<sup>91</sup> Here language is both suggestive, presentative and imaginative. It was Myers' contention that poetry as a vehicle for emotions and an intelligible linguistic statement fuses together the expressed and the suggested emotion and the expressed and suggested thought. Each word, therefore, "is raised to a higher power," for although each word continues to be an articulate sound and a logical step in the poetic argument, each word also becomes a musical sound and a center of emotional force.

It becomes a musical sound;--that is to say, its consonants and vowels are arranged to bear a relation to the consonants and vowels near it,--a relation of which accent, quantity, rhyme, assonance, and alliteration are specialised forms, but which may be of a character more subtle than any of these. And it becomes a centre of emotional force; that is to say, the complex associations evoked by other words in the same passage in a way quite distinct from grammatical or logical connection. The poet, therefore, must avoid two opposite dangers. If he thinks too exclusively of the music and the colouring of his verse--of the imaginative means of suggesting thought and feeling--what he writes

will lack reality and sense. But if he cares only to communicate definite thought and feeling according to the ordinary laws of eloquent speech, his verse is likely to be deficient in magical and suggestive power.<sup>92</sup>

Myers' theory of poetry as I have briefly summarized it here is a highly suggestive one. It looks back, in part, for example, to his defense of his Cambridge Prize poem of 1863. He then intimated that poetry should be a fusion of tradition and individual talent. The Oxford book of prize poems from which he drew so many of his lines served him then, in a rather rough, crude, approximate, and immature way, as the embodiment of tradition in much the same way as Homer, Theocritus, and other Greek models served Virgil. What justified the borrowings and the imitations from the originals, he then argued, was the use the poet made of them, his ability to stamp them with his own artistic personality and to make them his own through his own sense of form and rhythm. At that time, of course, the esoteric and out of the way nature of his sources prevented his reader from realizing the impact of allusion and the intellectual and emotional delight thereof which such practice is capable of sustaining, but he was clearly working toward such a concept as this, as we know now.

Yet Myers' poetic theory<sup>93</sup> in 1879 differed importantly from his aesthetics of 1863. In 1863, we noted, his whole emphasis was on the rhythmical and formal qualities of verse, and he was fast moving toward a theory of "pure poetry" and Pater's notion that the delight of the eye and ear is more important than the thoughts of the brain. One cannot, however, draw similar conclusions from his statement of 1879. Matter of factly, Myers' remarks on poetry in the Virgil essay were

cited and quoted by contemporary critics as an antidote to Pater. For example, John Addington Symonds<sup>94</sup> argued in his Essays, Speculative and Suggestive that critics had the right to conclude from Pater that in their consummate moments the fine arts all aspire to vagueness of intellectual intention. Quoting, for example, Pater's famous remark on art and music in his essay on "The School of Giorgione," Symonds cites Myers as a witness to Pater's error.

At the same time, Myers' remarks on poetry in 1879 differed in their complexity and suggestiveness from his remarks in the essay on Victor Hugo written two years before. In the Hugo essay, he drew distinctions between the formal and intellectual qualities of poetry which he does not draw in 1879. In 1879, he was primarily interested in the fusion of form and content into a higher synthesis and a higher power. In 1877, he was still perfectly willing to discuss form and content separately. Furthermore, in evaluating the formal characteristics of Hugo's verse, Myers was primarily interested in those technical qualities of Hugo's poems which could be reducible to the known laws and rules of French versification. There is little or nothing said about the rules of versification in the Virgil essay, however. The peculiar and distinctive qualities of all great poetry, he argued in 1879, are the consequences of the poet's innate ability to fuse the expressed and the suggested emotion and thought which, because innate, are inexplicable. Myers' Wordsworth, written at the same time as the Virgil essay, states this assumption perhaps more explicitly. In one instance, for example, Myers takes a half dozen lines from Wordsworth's "The Affliction of Margaret" and analyzes

them in terms of what can rationally be said about their qualities as beautiful poetry—their accent, their vowels, alliterations, consonance, diction, and their allusions to certain well-known lines of Moschus. He then goes on to argue the incompleteness of such an analysis to account for what Wordsworth has accomplished:

We must not, of course, suppose that Wordsworth consciously sought these alliterations, arranged these accents, resolved to introduce an unusual word in the last line, or hunted for a classical allusion. But what the poet's brain does not do consciously it does unconsciously; a selective action is going on in its recesses, simultaneously with the overt train of thought, and on the degree of this unconscious suggestiveness the richness and melody of the poetry will depend. No rules can secure the attainment of these effects; and the very same artifices which are delightful when used by one man seem mechanical and offensive when used by another. . . . Humiliating as such reflections may seem, they are in accordance with actual experience in all branches of art. The fact is that the pleasures which art gives us are complex in the extreme. We are always disposing to dwell on such of their elements as are explicable, and can in some way be traced to moral or intellectual sources. But they contain also other elements which are inexplicable, non-moral and non-intellectual, and which render most of our attempted explanations of artistic merit so incomplete as to be practically misleading. Among such incomplete explanations Wordsworth's essays must certainly be ranked.<sup>96</sup>

Myers' poetics in his Virgil essay involves a number of significant aesthetic theories also found in the work of his good friend and fellow psychical researcher, Edmund Gurney.<sup>97</sup> During the years 1875 to 1880, both men, one a poet and critic, the other a musicologist and aesthete, exchanged thoughts and ideas not only about phantasms and mediums but about art and poetry, each bringing his own special fund of knowledge to bear on a common set of problems. On certain points their ideas and attitudes so interlock that one cannot adequately distinguish what contributions belonged to whom. Nevertheless, it is this relationship with Gurney that suggests how Myers'

poetics in his Virgil essay reflected his interest in psychical research.

We might enumerate here a number of theses which they held in common. Both, for example, argued that art and aesthetic experience cannot be wholly reduced to any objective criteria, for both believed in a subjective factor in artistic creativity, artistic products and aesthetic experience which gave works of art their individuality.<sup>98</sup> Gurney and Myers also devoted considerable energy to drawing the distinction between various kinds of artistic products. Gurney developed critical tools by which to distinguish art products from other human products. The same set of tools enabled him to distinguish painting from poetry and music and music from poetry.<sup>99</sup> Myers and Gurney agreed that music is like poetry in that its formal and sensory appeal was auditory. Both agreed also that poetry differs from music in that the latter was capable only of impressive and presentative qualities whereas poetry was capable also of expressive and representative qualities.<sup>100</sup> Myers and Gurney agreed on the significance and importance of the rhythmical quality of verse. Gurney maintained with Myers that meter and the relations of sounds were the most important aspects of poetry, for meter and rhythm were form and only through form does beauty become art.<sup>101</sup> Myers and Gurney also agreed that it is "the business of Art to use its symbols in a double way."<sup>102</sup> What made Virgil an unequalled stylist for Myers was the poet's ability to fuse the suggested emotion (the rhythmical and metrical qualities of his verse) with the expressed emotion (the statement and meaning of his words). For Gurney and Myers, this fusion resulted not only in "an

added panache," as Saintsbury suggests, but in a genuine symbol.

For our purposes here, the most significant common thesis in the work of Myers and Gurney is their notion that language symbols which function both impressively as well as expressively when arranged in formal, sensory and rhythmical patterns are inherently irrational, inscrutable and incapable of reduction to the simple formulae of the intellect or the understanding. This is the quality of Gurney's aesthetics which was most commented upon by his reviewers.<sup>103</sup> James Sully, for example, pointed out that Gurney differs from the majority of nineteenth century musicologists in his belief that the essential pleasure giving quality of music was not capable of reduction to nameable laws and conditions. For Gurney, aesthetic impression, whether it be visual or audible, constitutes an indeterminable unanalysable factor in aesthetic criticism and experience. "It would seem," Sully wrote, "that after all our efforts to define aesthetic qualities and enumerate corresponding ideal requirements we are left with an unexplained remainder."<sup>104</sup> Sully could just as easily have made the same statement about Myers. He too stressed "the hidden music of poetry," the ineffable nature of the complex symbology of sound which constitutes an emotional force beyond "the comprehension of a Lady Why."<sup>105</sup>

It is at this point that I believe one can see the relationship of Gurney and Myers' poetics and aesthetics to their early work in psychical research, for their attempts to differentiate their theories from those of their contemporaries go beyond their limited aesthetic and poetic intentions in a very real sense. Gurney's principle of an inscrutable, unknown special musical faculty and Myers' corres-

ponding principle of the ineffable and inexplicable quality of the rhythmic and audible symbology of poetry reflect their growing awareness that no matter how contemporary science has attempted to explain certain phenomena, there still remains a residue and remainder found in nature and in art which appears to be prima facie inexplicable by known scientific laws. Gurney's arguments, for example, were frequently directed against the physiological aestheticians who were then dominating aesthetic theory in the late seventies. Grant Allen, for instance, reduced aesthetic experience to simple physiological and quantitative conditions, arguing that the aesthetically pleasurable consisted of the "maximum of sense and physiological stimulation with the minimum of physiological fatigue."<sup>106</sup> Gurney considered his subject matter from the perspective of quality as well as quantity. All musical compositions, he argued, may comply with the principle of unity in variety, a principle which suggests the maximum of physiological stimulation with the minimum of physiological fatigue, but not all such compositions are beautiful. The ability to perceive the beautiful is a consequence of a qualitative intuition which defies analysis in quantifiable, measurable, physiological terms.<sup>107</sup> Myers develops a similar argument when he writes that "between an exquisite and a worthless line there is no difference of sound in any way noticeable to an unintelligent ear. For the mere volume (quantity) of sound--the actual sonority of the passage--is quite a subordinate element in the effect, which is produced mainly by relations and sequences of vowels and consonants, too varying and delicate to be reproduced by rule."<sup>108</sup> Thus, like Gurney, Myers draws a significant distinction between quantitative

judgments and qualitative judgments in aesthetic experience, between that which is reducible to known laws and rules and that which is not, and between the physiologically and physically measurable and the residue or remainder which is inexplicable and unknown.

In their investigations of spiritualistic and psychical phenomena at this time, Myers and Gurney had found that there was evidence to suggest an unexplained remainder or residue which could be observed or experienced but which the known laws of physiology, psychology or other quantitative sciences could not explain or account for. This unexplained remainder and residue in man's psychical experience corresponds to the unexplained residue and remainder found in the aesthetic experience. In aesthetic experience, as well as in other life experiences, Myers and Gurney imply, there is more to be taken into account than is provided for in the established paradigms of physiology or other life sciences. Thus, a physiological psychology and a physiological aesthetic both fail to account for the qualitative distinctions which are far more significant than the simple, measurable, quantitative distinctions which lie on the surface. The mind and its activities and faculties, as well as the beautiful in a work of art, are equally "unknowns" to contemporary science.



## CHAPTER V

### MYERS' WORK AS A PSYCHICAL RESEARCHER

#### Introduction

To comment fully and adequately on the whole of Myers' work in psychical research would be an effort beyond the limitations of this study. If we are to construct the bridge between his Essays, Classical and his Essays, Modern and his most mature statement on literature and literary problems, it is necessary, however, to discuss the significant aspects of Myers' work in psychical research, to say something about the kinds of problems he was concerned with, the subject matters in which he was most interested, and the solutions and theories those problems and inquiries generated. To accomplish this end, the following section will be divided into five parts. Firstly, through example and illustration we shall identify some of the more general and significant characteristics of his published essays on psychical research. Secondly, we will then look briefly at the early work of Edmund Gurney, Myers' most important collaborator in his psychical investigations. Although Gurney died in 1888, his work in psychical research had a lasting influence on Myers, and it is primarily from Gurney's position that we can observe where Myers began and in what direction he was moving. Thirdly, we shall examine in some detail Myers' most important work in psychical research during the eighties, noting

as we go along where he followed Gurney and where he began to move off in directions of his own. Fourthly, we shall observe the connections and relationships between the psychical research movement in the middle eighties and new developments in abnormal psychology sprouting on the Continent and in France at the same time. And fifthly, we will move on to a discussion of Myers' major work in the 1890's and discuss his theory of the subliminal self and some of its implications.

The bulk of Myers' essays on psychical research published in the 1880's fall into four general categories, each indicating a fundamental purpose for any given essay's having been written. The first category consists of those essays in which the researcher endeavors to define, categorizes and systematize phenomena under investigation by the S.P.R. Such essays were classificatory in intent. In 1883, for example, Myers and Gurney published an essay on apparent telepathic phenomena in which they classified recorded instances in terms of the conscious, unconscious, normal or abnormal states of the agent of the telepathic message or its percipient.<sup>1</sup>

A second kind of article to which Myers frequently affixed his name was articles which suggested possible causes for error in traditional or contemporary explanations for certain specified phenomena. These essays were primarily critical in intent and rarely ventured into an adequate explanation to take the place of the explanation then current. In 1882, for example, Barrett, Gurney and Myers published an essay presenting evidence casting serious doubt on the traditional "muscle-reading explanation" for a successful find in the playing of the "willing game." Having designed experiments demonstrating that

physical contact was not necessary for a successful find, they propose that obscurer causes may be at work--causes which may necessitate a modification of the general view of the relationship between mind and matter to which "modern science has long been gravitating." The researchers, however, venture to justify no single explanation of their own.<sup>2</sup>

A third group of essays consisted of those which suggested, at first with hesitancy, a reasonable explanation for phenomena under investigation by the S.P.R. in order to place these phenomena into a workable, scientific, conceptual framework. Such were the many articles, for example, in which Myers and Gurney argued that telepathy was a cause for a wide variety of mental phenomena. Such, too, were those essays which argued the existence of a subliminal or subconscious self to account for the existence of telepathy. In an essay on mesmerism published in 1883, for example, Myers and Gurney reviewed all the more significant theories accounting for hypnotic phenomena. On the basis of their own specific experiments and observations outlined in detail in the text, they conclude that the older theory of mesmeric influence and an actual mental or physical rapport between agent and subject satisfactorily explains a variety of hypnotic phenomena for which the more recent "suggestion" theory fails to account.<sup>3</sup>

A fourth kind of article which was prominent in the early work of Myers and Gurney was the article which called into question the procedures and jurisdiction of nineteenth century science. The end of such articles was to justify psychical research as a valid scientific endeavor. The means by which such an end was realized usually took the form of a hypothetical dialogue between the psychical researcher and

those scientists who defined such inquiries outside the legitimate sphere of scientific investigation. In April of 1883, for example, Myers and Gurney contributed an essay to the Fortnightly on telepathic impressions and their classification. The article does not so much demonstrate a classification, however, as it does defend the whole subject of psychical research and the inquiry into the "supernormal." In arguing their case for psychical research in this instance, Myers and Gurney call into question three basic attitudes of Victorian science. Firstly, they combat the practical notion that a necessary connection exists between scientific inquiry, progress and general advancement with a splendid vindication of pure science. The end of science is not the progress of human happiness but the progress of human knowledge. Secondly, they dispute the distinction which the "high priests" of contemporary science make between the natural and the supernatural. They argue that if telepathy is a fact in nature it must have as its basis not the miraculous but natural law. And thirdly, Myers and Gurney challenge the distinction which science frequently makes between legitimate and illegitimate lines of inquiry. The distinction between inquiries should not be legitimacy or illegitimacy, they argue, but between inquiries which are more advanced or less advanced in their progress. The distinction should be a distinction of stage and degree.<sup>4</sup>

Although we have looked at these essays only from the point of view of their rhetorical intent, the content of these illustrations demonstrates that Myers' and Gurney's psychical inquiries in the early and middle eighties had turned radically away from the

physical phenomena of table turning, spirit-rapping, materializations and the movements of physical objects which had so taken the interest of the Sidgwick circle in the seventies. Gurney and Myers turned inward to the study of the human mind and obscure human faculties rather than outward to physical or external objects acted upon in an occult or supernatural fashion. Writing of Gurney's early work, Myers describes both his and Gurney's preoccupations at this time.

We perceived that the seances with paid mediums, which formed the ordinary method of Spiritualism, were ill-calculated to lead us to any solid results; nay, that, in the beginning our inquiry with the so-called Spiritualistic phenomena at all, we were somehow beginning at the wrong end. I will not here repeat the account given in the Introduction to "Phantasms of the Living" of the gropings and the tâtonnements, the disappointments and the successes, which ultimately taught us, in 1882, to discern a less hazardous line of approach to the cloud-capt citadel. The Society for Psychical Research was founded, with the establishment of thought-transference—already arising within measurable distance of proof—as its primary aim, with hypnotism as its second study, and with many another problem ranged along its dimmer horizon. Here at length there was sea-way for a definite adventure; with wide possibilities, indeed, of failure—with the bones, so to say, of shipwrecked precursors bleaching along all the shore,—but yet with chances also of an achievement which, though in our lifetime it might remain obscure and inchoate, should grow and broaden to unguessed issues in generations yet to be.<sup>5</sup>

This important change, as we shall see, brought the psychical research movement in England into the mainstream of late nineteenth century developments in experimental and abnormal psychology. Moreover, as a consequence of their new inquiries, Myers and Gurney became the most important disseminators of new and important developments in nineteenth century psychology in England.

#### Gurney's Work in Psychical Research

Gurney's principal areas of psychological and psychical in-

quiry were hypnosis and hallucinations. From the years 1883 until his death in 1888 he contributed numerous articles on hypnotic phenomena to the journals of the S.P.R., Mind, the Nineteenth Century and the National Review. His work on hallucinations formed the backbone of his studies of apparitions and phantasms which culminated in the writing of Phantasms of the Living, almost wholly his own book. Gurney was primarily responsible for one of the largest scientific undertakings of the nineteenth century, the Census of Hallucinations initiated by the International Congress of Experimental Psychology one year after his death.<sup>7</sup>

Gurney's work in hypnotism can be divided into two parts. On one hand, his interests centered around the problem of stages of hypnotic trance and hypnotic memory. This interest culminated in Gurney's reputation as a significant psychologist.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, his interest in hypnotism was closely tied to his interest in the higher phenomena of human faculty such as thought transference and telepathy.<sup>9</sup> Here he made his reputation as a psychical researcher. All taken together, however, his work demonstrates that he conceived of the two lines of inquiry as interdependent rather than independent.

Gurney began his investigations into hypnotic phenomena by countering the contemporary argument that the two stages of hypnotic trance--the alert stage and the deep stage--were merely two degrees of a single condition. Gurney argued that they are in reality two stages which differ in kind. To prove his thesis, he analyzed the function of memory in each of the two stages. What he found through experimentation was that the subject in his waking state does not

remember what took place in the hypnotic state. In both hypnotic states, the subject can recall facts of general knowledge which relate to the subject in his waking state. Moreover, in each state of hypnotic trance, the deeper stage will recall the alert stage but the alert stage cannot recall the deeper stage. Gurney concluded that each stage of the hypnotic state has an independent set of memory impressions and experiences. Furthermore, he argued, the phenomenon of alternating memories under experimental conditions corresponds to the same phenomenon under such normal spontaneous conditions as sleep and dreams and in such abnormal conditions as instances of double personality.

Our limited interest in these experiments is that from them Gurney began to develop a notion of secondary conscious states which conflicted with current psychological dogma, in particular, the doctrine of epiphenomenalism and the doctrine of unconscious cerebration.<sup>10</sup> Each stage of the hypnotic trance, Gurney argued, has its own independent memory and seems to form an independent stream of consciousness. Much of Gurney's work in hypnotism then proceeded to characterize through experimentation what that independent stream of consciousness and memory really was.<sup>11</sup> The result of his multiple experiments on hypnotic memory and post-hypnotic states was his belief that there did exist a possible secondary self which not only remembered, but was capable of conscious, active, and intelligent behavior and mentation.<sup>12</sup> The limited nature of his own inquiries only demonstrated that such a self was a mere rudiment of personality, a short connected train of intelligence of whose activities and products the

normal waking self was unaware.<sup>13</sup> Yet he was willing to speculate on the more far-reaching consequences of these rudimentary beginnings of an active and intelligent secondary state.<sup>14</sup>

As early as 1877,<sup>15</sup> Gurney began to collect the material on hallucinations and phantasms which culminated in the publication of Phantasms of the Living. In processing, evaluating and organizing this material, however, he found that some instances of hallucinations and phantasms of a veridical character could not be accounted for by any ordinary theses. By 1882, he and Myers, among others, believed that such cases could only be account<sup>ed</sup> for telepathically. Certain sensitive minds were apparently able to acquire information from other minds without the use of the recognized channels of sense. Such a theory contradicted the supernaturalist and occult interpretations and opened the possibility for experimentation which would demonstrate that telepathy was a psychological fact, a natural law of the human mind. For convenience, we can organize Gurney's thinking on telepathy into three stages. He first encountered the possibility of telepathy while working with the seeing of hallucinations and phantasms by persons in relatively abnormal states of mind and in times of great crisis.<sup>16</sup> Later, under the tutelage of W. F. Barrett, he became convinced of the existence of thought transference between persons in a normal state and under normal conditions.<sup>17</sup> If thought transference was a distinct possibility in both spontaneous and abnormal conditions but not really concretely demonstrable in either instance, it might certainly be possible to reproduce the phenomenon under more stringent experimental conditions and to verify its existence more



satisfactorily. Hypnotism offered such a possibility, and from 1883 through 1884, Gurney initiated a series of experiments which involved the sending of messages by an agent to a hypnotized subject without the use of the recognized channels of sense.<sup>18</sup> Convinced that his experiments under controlled conditions demonstrated the real existence of a psychical rapport between agent and subject and thus the real possibility of thought transference, Gurney launched a series of articles in Mind, the Proceedings of the S.P.R. and the Nineteenth Century in which he challenged the suggestion theory of hypnotic phenomena and promulgated thought transference as an experimentally valid and reproducible phenomenon.

The assumption from which Gurney approached the problems of hypnotism also dictated the framework of his work on hallucinations.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, we can confine ourselves to a few brief remarks on this aspect of Gurney's endeavors. Firstly, Gurney used the telepathic hypothesis to explain the great bulk of hallucinations which seemed to be veridical or truth-bearing in character, that is to say, hallucinations which corresponded to some objective fact in the real world.

Secondly, Gurney linked his studies of telepathy and hallucinations to his notions of conscious activity existing below the normal conscious state. One of the major criticisms of the application of telepathic theory to the mass of apparitions and veridical hallucinations collected in Phantasms, for example, was the rarity of telepathic communication between friends and relatives. Gurney replied to this criticism by arguing that it was the absence of response and not the absence of stimulus that most readily and reasonably account for that rarity:

Now if, as analogy would indicate, the marked cases of telepathic phantasms are only the "ostensive instances" of a class of events which may occur with all degrees of diminishing intensity, we may fairly suppose some of the degrees to be subliminal; and if so, numbers of spontaneous transferences might naturally take place, conditioned by the normal bonds of affection or acquaintance, which fail to produce any recognizable effect--fail, that is, to make their way into normal consciousness as clear ideas or sensory hallucinations--through a lack of some necessary condition in the recipient's mind.<sup>20</sup>

Such cases of "unconscious" telepathic stimuli, he argued, "take effect in some secondary plane of the "subject's mind--a plane segregated off from the conscious self as ordinarily understood."<sup>21</sup>

In summarizing Gurney's work in psychical research and psychology, we might note the following remarks published by Myers and Gurney in an article on "Apparitions" which appeared in the Nineteenth Century for May, 1884. Commenting on the broadening current of interest in science and scientific investigation in the nineteenth century, they wrote:

It is natural that the tone and the claims of science should change with this gradual popularisation of the scientific instinct. She can now demand, without fear, to subject, as it were, to her police regulations the Broad Sanctuary which was once governed by tradition and sentiment alone. Everything which claims to be known is expected to show its credentials; and views about the seen and the unseen worlds are alike conceived as amenable to objective tests. This process has been applied, as we all know, to every element in ancient creeds and institutions. It would be absurd to say that any kind of general agreement has been in this way obtained. But if we had to submit two resolutions as a kind of compromise, to be voted on by the readers of the innumerable tractates, "symposiums," etc., which have dealt with these high matters, we should select the following as prudent generalities, likely to gain more assent and provoke less strenuous opposition than any others which we could think of:

1. The thesis that the universe is governed by unchanging laws, as opposed to arbitrary interferences has gained in probability.
2. The crudely materialistic account of things, which refuses to allow us to seek the key of any phenomena of life and

mind outside the admitted scope of physiological and psychological laws, has failed to commend itself as a complete or ultimate solution of the problems without and within us. Now if we wish to see what real guidance lies in these two somewhat vague resolutions, taken together, our practical corollary, as it would seem, must be something of this kind:--that while accepting as perfectly valid every law which recognized science can establish, we may fairly suppose that further laws, of a different kind it may be, but perhaps none the less susceptible of rigorous investigation, are actually in operation in the domain of human life; and certainly no reason exists for contentedly ignoring any hint of such laws which experience may offer.<sup>22</sup>

This statement summarizes the complex set of assumptions from which Gurney undertook the investigation of such psychological problems as apparitions, phantasms, hallucinations and hypnotism. He believed, quite sincerely, that he had helped to uncover, or rediscover, as it were, a remarkable new set of facts which suggested that certain basic physiological and psychological assumptions had to be challenged. Furthermore, he believed the problems he encountered and endeavored to solve were all decidedly within the framework of so-called natural law--telepathy, the alterations of personality, the coexistence of different conscious states within a single personality, and the existence of some sort of physical and psychical rapport between the agent and the hypnotised subject. None of the accounts of the phenomena with which he experimented indicated to him any occult, supernatural or arbitrary interference with natural law. He did tend toward a spiritualistic interpretation of man and the universe, but his notions were not "spiritistic."

#### Myers' Early Work in Psychical Research

Whereas Gurney's initial and original work in psychology and psychical research centered around his studies of hypnotism and hallu-

ination, Myers' original contributions to psychical research and psychology revolved around his investigations of sensory and motor automatisms. His single greatest contribution to psychology and psychical research in the middle eighties, for example, was four long articles which he contributed to the Proceedings on motor automatisms and automatic writing.<sup>23</sup>

The apparent similarity between the work of Gurney and Myers is to be found in a variety of details. At the outset of his first essay on automatic writing, for example, Myers draws heavily on Gurney's experiments with apparitions and hallucinations to argue that telepathy is now a verified cause of numerous unexplained phenomena. As such, he goes on to argue, the telepathic hypothesis must be pushed, even though pressed too far, to cover phenomena other than apparitions and certain hypnotic phenomena. He proposes then to take up the subject of automatic writing in the light of the telepathic hypothesis.<sup>24</sup> Myers, too, was interested at the outset in the problems of secondary consciousness that automatic writing frequently suggested. In his first essay on automatic writing, for example, Myers surveys the general theoretical relationship between telepathy and consciousness.<sup>25</sup> In most telepathic experiments with percipients in a normal state, the percipient is necessarily conscious of the impact. It is otherwise, however, in experiments in which the percipient is either hypnotized, in a somnambulistic condition, or in a state of hysteria. In these states, Myers asserts, consciousness leaves no trace in the subject's normal memory. Thus, if one finds telepathy occurring in these conditions one can assume it is not inseparably linked with the ordinary

stream of normal consciousness. "If it appears as an element of the conscious or quasi-consciousness of abnormal states, which are lacunae in the main life-memory, it may exist beneath the threshold of consciousness in normal states also."<sup>26</sup> Automatic writing, he argues, provides clues for direct evidence to demonstrate these hypotheses.

As Myers' first original contributions to psychical research and psychology demonstrate, however, his work was moving in a number of directions which were not so clearly evident in Gurney's explanations of mesmerism, hallucinations and telepathy. Firstly, his earliest work exhibited a greater interest in subconscious states and secondary personality than did Gurney's work. Secondly, Myers' work was more "evolutive" in character. At the outset, he was deeply interested in the relationship between the evolutionary hypothesis and the results of his psychological experiments. As a consequence, his assumptions and conclusions were more deeply imbedded in the thick crust of cosmic speculation than were Gurney's. It is the evolutionary quality of his ideas that gives Myers' work its special character. And, thirdly, Myers was more willing than Gurney to admit that the telepathic hypothesis did not account for all veridical hallucinations. At this point, his notions of telepathy touched tangentially on the supernormal and the supernatural.

The essays which Myers contributed on automatic writing exhibit each of these qualities of his thought, explicitly or in embryo. Taken all together, for example, the four essays demonstrate Myers' growing interest in a spiritualistic interpretation of facts which goes beyond the telepathic hypothesis. The first of the essays

describes the nature of automatic writing and illustrates the factor of "unconscious cerebration" in the operation of automatic writing and its messages.<sup>27</sup> The second essay demonstrates that some automatic writing suggests an intelligence conveyed through the script unknown to the writer. Telepathy and the existence of secondary conscious states, Myers argues, can probably account for most such information. The third article was a more general statement on how the problem of automatism suggests the idea of a secondary consciousness and the alterations of the threshold of consciousness.<sup>28</sup> The fourth article in this series, however, moved toward an explanation of those sensory and motor messages which cannot be accounted for by unconscious cerebration or telepathy. It is here that Myers moves close to a spiritistic interpretation of such messages, suggesting that "some strain of intelligence, whether without us or within, which is not our conscious waking intelligence of the moment, is in some fashion impressing or informing the conscious self."<sup>29</sup>

These early essays also clearly exhibit Myers' interests in subconscious mental activity and secondary conscious states. In his first essay on automatic writing, for example, Myers proposes to take up the subject of automatic writing in the light of the telepathic hypothesis, but, and this is of primary importance, he seeks to do so because the problem of automatic writing and telepathy bears heavily upon the problem of human personality and conscious, unconscious and subconscious mental activity:

Throughout all these investigations we must keep unconscious cerebration steadily in view, and we shall, I think, find ourselves

confronted with many of its results, and be induced continually to regard this term less and less as expressing a subsidiary more and more as expressing a substantive and primary operation of our intelligence; and we shall come, perhaps, to find superconscious as necessary a term as sub-conscious, if we would indicate the true relation to each other of the processes in which our being consists.<sup>30</sup>

In the second essay on automatic writings, Myers continued his discussion of telepathy and automata from the point of view of what they illuminate and illustrate about consciousness and subconsciousness. Carpenter's theory of unconscious cerebration, he points out, suggests that the unconscious was distinct from, but subsidiary to, the normal conscious state. Rather than two separate streams of consciousness, Carpenter postulates a "subaqueous agitation which only stirs the conscious surface."<sup>31</sup> Myers, through a series of examples and illustrations, however, argues that the unconscious is clearly liable to become a co-conscious action and assume co-ordinate control over the body with the normal consciousness. Certain experiments with automatic writing demonstrated to him that there is an active duality of mentation and a colloquy between the two levels of consciousness. He himself, therefore, postulates a possible secondary self which certain segments of humanity are able to develop and manifest in the form of cerebral energy "neither fugitive nor accidental." This secondary self, he maintains, may have a continuous individuality and act purposfully on its own.<sup>32</sup> Myers then states three hypotheses based on his evidence in automatic writing which he believes need further examination. Firstly, coincidentally with our normal primary self there is within us a potential secondary self, or second focus of cerebration or mentation, which is not a mere metaphysical abstraction

but a manifestation of occasional supernormal, physiological or psychological activity. Secondly, telepathy is among the supernormal activities in which science has reason to suspect the operation of the secondary self. Thirdly, it may be expected that this secondary self capable of supernormal activity will manifest itself as far as possible through the same channels through which morbid or abnormal subconscious activity will manifest themselves.<sup>33</sup>

Whereas up to this point Myers' discussions of subconscious mental activity were part of his larger discussions of automatism, in 1886 he published two essays whose focus was wholly on these subconscious states and their philosophical, moral and scientific consequences. In the first of these essays,<sup>34</sup> for example, Myers argued that all the phenomena relating to these secondary states suggest the inadequacy of a number of traditional notions about human personality. New evidence, he argues, purports to demonstrate that human personality is neither definite, permanent nor stationary. Man may consist of one or more I's or Self's. The sensation of free will in the context of post-hypnotic suggestion is shifting and illusory. Memories are frequently discontinuous and multiplex. Character, the function of the two variables, free will and memory, is directly modifiable by artificial means. In his conclusion, Myers returns to his initial statement on the importance of psychical research and experimental psychology and argues that even though these conclusions considerably diminish man's sense of dignity and destiny, the continuation of such personality analysis may ultimately disclose that man's personality consists of qualities and faculties which may transcend his known powers.<sup>35</sup>



In the second essay<sup>36</sup> on these problems published in 1886, Myers undertakes to defend the moral and practical value consequent to modern man's ability to modify character and personality experimentally and artificially. Not all illustrations of multiple personality, Myers argues, consist of morbid, hysterical or pathological disintegration or retrogression. It is possible to artificially induce and regulate some central nervous changes which effect both physical and moral good. The notion of multiple personality, therefore, has both scientific and philanthropic possibilities. To illustrate his point, he cites a series of cases drawn from French psycho-analytic literature. In some of these famous cases, he points out, personality changes were retrogressive and degenerative in character. In others, however, the changes which took place brought about greater coordination among the elements of the personality indicating a change for the better. "We may be fused and crystallized into greater clarity" wherein "the shifting sand heap of our being will sometimes settle itself into a new attitude of more assured equilibrium."<sup>37</sup>

In his conclusion, Myers responds to the argument that tampering with personality and character is morally wrong because it denigrates human dignity. Myers argues, in turn, that "all living things strive for maximum pleasure."<sup>38</sup> And for the human being, the maximum sense of pleasure is a consequence of the loss of personal preoccupation. Man's lusts, fears, anxieties, habits and appetites are the "cloak which our forefathers wove against the cosmic storm. We can, perhaps, shift and refashion it (our character and personality) as our gentler weather needs, and if perchance it slip from us in the sunshine, then

something more ancient and more glorious is for a moment guessed within."<sup>39</sup>

We are now in a position to turn to the evolutionary characteristics<sup>40</sup> of Myers' psychology which, as we noted, grew out of his interest in human personality, hypnosis, telepathy, automatic writing, and subconscious and secondary states of the personality.

In his discussions of multiple personality, shifting psychical states, abnormality and subconscious states, Myers demonstrated the instability of the psychic diaphragm separating subconscious from conscious states. Traditionally, this instability of the personality had been taken to mean a retrogressive or degenerative stage of the personality. These secondary states were interpreted as states inferior to the everyday conscious self. Myers argued differently. Instability, he asserted, does not necessarily imply retrogression. "We are hardly warranted in speaking of our waking state as if that alone represented our true selves, and every deviation from it at best a mere interruption." In reality, our everyday conscious self is but one of two coordinated phases of our personality, which we have acquired or differentiated from each other during the stages of our long evolution. "And just as these two states may come to co-exist for us in advantageous alteration, so also other states may come to co-exist with these, in response to new needs of the still evolving organism."<sup>41</sup>

To further prove his point that instability is not necessarily degenerative in character,<sup>42</sup> Myers demonstrates that telepathy is a characteristic of the subconscious stratum of the personality. The subconscious frequently manifests itself through ordinary physiological

and psychical channels. In most instances, what is manifested is indicative of abnormality and a diseased morbidity. In some instances, however, what are manifested are "messages" indicative of faculties such as telepathy which go beyond common human experience and ability. Any faculty indicative of an increased extension of human powers, Myers argued, is evolutive in character. Telepathy, he believed he had demonstrated, involved a vast extension of powers which opened a new door to the reception and acquisition of objective truth. Telepathy, therefore, a characteristic of the subconscious, is indicative of a higher evolutionary state.<sup>43</sup> Thus, the instability of the psychic diaphragm is not necessarily indicative of dissolution. It may, in fact, be indicative of evolution, or, as Myers prefers to phrase it, "an evolutionary nisus"—"something which we may represent as an effort towards self-development, self-adaptation, self-renewal."<sup>44</sup>

Each of the various experimental means by which the normal personality may be displaced and the secondary levels of the personality may be tapped exhibit this curious duality.<sup>45</sup> In hypnotism, for example, we have indications of both evolution and retrogression. On the one hand, we have a state of lethargic sleep which is dissolutive in character. On the other hand, however, hypnotism exhibits a great increase in our sensory, physical and imaginative prowess which is evolutive in character. In automatic writing, the uncoordinated motor skills of the writer resemble the uncoordinated movements of hysteria and aphasia. But even though, he argues, the automatic writer may write words which are reversed or mirrored we do not have to assume, as most psychologists do, that automatic writing is sympto-

matic of mental and physical aberration. An examination of some of the messages produced by automatic writing, for example, particularly those which convey information which cannot be accounted for by any normal mode of perception or through unconscious cerebration, indicates telepathic and, hence, evolutive activity. In working with hypnosis and motor and sensory automatism, therefore, the psychologist's problem is to distinguish whether such phenomena are merely degenerate in character or whether they are symptomatic of higher states of evolutionary being, the actual possession of powers as yet unrecognized or unknown.<sup>46</sup>

There are three primary sources for Myers' evolutionary scheme,<sup>47</sup> Herbert Spencer, John Hughlings-Jackson, Britain's foremost nineteenth century neurologist, and Alfred Russell Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the law of natural selection.

The general influence of Spencer on Myers is that in his Principles of Psychology, Spencer led the way in applying evolutionary concepts to psychological materials.<sup>48</sup> More particularly, both to Spencer and Hughlings-Jackson Myers owed some of his most characteristic evolutionary and psychological vocabulary—stability, instability, coordination of nervous centers, dissolution of nervous centers, integration, differentiation, degeneration and retrogression.<sup>49</sup> Two key terms he borrowed and used frequently were "highest level nervous centers" referring to those nervous centers which are least stable but more complex in their functions and "lowest level nervous centers," those which are most stable, most basic and least likely to suffer disease and dissolution.<sup>50</sup>

One of the principal theses of Spencer's psychology was that environment and evolution give rise to the differentiation and integration of nervous centers both in the individual and in the race. The distinguishable levels of this development begin with reflex action and then progress to instinct, memory and the highest nervous centers responsible, for example, for reason, speech, and complex motor and sensory skills. For Spencer, the most primary nervous centers were the most stable centers and the more complex centers the least stable. In the evolutionary process, each stage of development coordinated more unstable centers with the more stable centers in such a way that each regulated the other so that all the centers functioned harmoniously.<sup>51</sup> Houghlings-Jackson took Spencer's main argument and suggested that instances of the dissolution and disintegration of the nervous system due to diseases such as epilepsy and aphasia first affected the least stable and highest level motor and sensory centers. Instability here, he argued, indicated the beginnings of such a dissolution.<sup>52</sup> Myers, however, took Jackson's thesis and advanced it one step further. As we have noted, he argued that if the instability of the highest nervous centres may lead to dissolution, the same instability of the same centers may also lead to evolutionary development. Using the examples of the moth, cocoon and the adolescent, Myers argued that new stages of physiological or psychical evolution frequently are masked by inhibition or perturbation. Thus, even though the manifestation of the secondary consciousness may approximate morbid activity indicative of instability, a particular manifestation may indicate an "evolutionary nisus." Instability of the higher nervous centers may indicate the

initiation of new and higher faculties or the dissolution of previously evolved nervous centers and motor and sensory skills.

In arguing that telepathy and other higher faculties emerging from the subconscious were evolutive in character, Myers ran into a real difficulty. The theory of natural selection and the survival of the fittest meant that man could only evolve when certain characteristics acquired by chance would enable their possessor to better adapt to his environment. Development was proscribed by environment and utility. Clearly, however, veridical hallucinations, clairvoyance, and telepathy were neither useful faculties nor faculties which would better enable their possessor to meet the exigencies of his terrestrial environment.

It was Wallace<sup>53</sup> who provided Myers with the scientific support he needed to argue his own thesis and to counteract the arguments of the "utilitarian" evolutionists.<sup>54</sup> Wallace had disagreed with Darwin on two significant points of his evolutionary doctrine. Firstly, Wallace argued that the doctrines of utility and limited perfectibility which were consequences of Darwin's theory did not satisfactorily account for many capacities of the human brain. As an instrument, the human brain had been developed far in advance of the needs of its possessor. Man's latent intellectual powers, even in a savage state, were far in excess of what he might have achieved by natural selection alone. Wallace in effect believed that some higher intelligence may have directed the process by which the human race was developed in much the same way that man had directed the process of development in the animal kingdom.<sup>55</sup>

Secondly, Wallace, unlike Darwin, did not believe human evolution was a single continuous process. It was, he argued, a two stage process. The earlier phase of human development achieved bipedal posture, the freeing of the hands to carry on the dictates of the brain, and other such physical changes. This earlier phase of evolution was in reality an evolution of parts. The second phase of evolution involved the role of the human brain as a wholly new factor in the history of human life. Man became a creature whose mind was of vastly greater importance than his bodily structure. With the development of the brain, bodily specialization became unnecessary. The body could assume a timeless aspect, for the development of the brain and mind removed it from the necessity of constant modification by the influence of external conditions and the cumulative action of natural selection.<sup>56</sup>

Here was fuel for Myers' fire, for Wallace provided a theory and substantial evidence which helped to free such "higher faculties" as telepathy from the trammels of terrestrial evolution and natural selection. Furthermore, it opened the way to a whole new concept for Myers of the relationship between the cosmos surrounding man and the terrestrial evolution of his existence here on earth. Commenting on Wallace (in 1893), for example, Myers indicates the direction in which this evolutionary schematicism was ultimately to take him:

He considers that these sudden increments of faculty—mathematical, musical, and the like—which occur without apparent hereditary cause, indicate some access of energy outside the order of purely terrene evolution. Somewhat similarly, I would suggest that telepathy and cognate faculties now beginning to be recognised as inherent in the sub-conscious strata of the human intelligence, may

be the results of an evolution other than that terrene or physical evolution whose successive steps and slowly-growing capacities we can in some rough way retrace.<sup>57</sup>

The evolution to which Myers was referring was cosmic evolution. His excursions into the development and significance of obscure human faculties inherently latent within man and which may emerge artificially through hypnotism, automatic writing and crystal gazing suggested to him that man is a result not only of terrene evolution but cosmic evolution. "Here and there," he wrote, "in humanity we discern powers which terrene evolution as we could conceive it could in no way have produced."<sup>58</sup>

Thus, Myers' work in psychology and psychical research took on all the characteristics of a cosmology, but it is significant that his cosmology was based upon his studies of the human mind and the human personality. This fact constitutes a significant dimension in Victorian thought. Darwin began as a biologist and then moved from biology to the study of man, approaching man from the context of his larger evolutionary and terrestrial premises. Tyndall was a physicist who first studied the laws of physical nature and moving bodies and then from these studies deduced the nature of man. Huxley, in much the same way, undertook the study of man only after he had made a thorough study of man's environment. Myers, however, approached the problem differently, for he began his work with a study of man, the human mind, the human personality, and human faculty. He then deduced the nature of the universe from this starting point. Man, he implied, can interpret the universe through an understanding of himself. For Myers, therefore, man was still the center of things, and to the careful reader of



his early work in psychical research it is no surprise to learn that he eventually returned to a paleolithic and anthropocentric view of man's relationship to "the whirl-gig of the spheres."<sup>59</sup>

### Psychical Research and Abnormal Psychology

When Gurney and Myers began their inquiries into hypnotism and automatism and the concomitant phenomena of hallucinations, telepathy, multiple personality and subconscious mental states they were, in effect, working wholly within their own limitations as experimentalists and psychological theorists. True, the psychical research movement did have its roots deep in the Victorian age--for example, in the debates and first principles of the Metaphysical Society, in the work of anthropologists such as Tylor, Spencer, and Lang, in the Oxford Phasmatological Society and the Cambridge Ghostlie Guild, and in the investigations of spiritualistic phenomena by Wallace, Crookes, and Carpenter. Yet aside from a handful of others connected with the psychical research movement, Gurney and Myers were the only Englishmen at that time who were doing any extensive psychological inquiry on an experimental basis into these phenomena.<sup>60</sup>

Furthermore, they were starting out with a number of other handicaps: the growing physiological and materialistic preconceptions of all phases of British science, including the psychological sciences, the failure of British psychology to take any but a most rudimentary interest in abnormal psychology or to follow up on the work of Esdaile, Elliotson or Braid,<sup>61</sup> and the association, in the minds of both the public and the scientific community, of automatism and hypnotism with

the fraudulent and pseudo-occult phenomena produced on the platform or in the seance room.<sup>62</sup> Thus in an early essay entitled "On the Problems of Hypnotism," Gurney endeavored to write a critical review and history of the major theoretical vicissitudes which the science of hypnotism had undergone in the last half of the nineteenth century. Among Englishmen interested in his subject, he mentions only Braid and Carpenter. His comments on non-English experimenters and theorists consist only of a few brief remarks on the work of Stanley Hall, Despine, Heidenhain and, in a footnote, Richet.<sup>63</sup>

If one compares Myers' and Gurney's essays of this early period, however, with their contributions to psychical research after 1884, one finds a significant change in the intellectual climate in which they were working. What happened was that Myers and Gurney discovered France and abnormal psychology; and France and abnormal psychology, in turn, discovered Myers and Gurney.

What we have come to call the "new psychology" of the last half of the nineteenth century was really two different movements bound together by their common agreement that psychology was a science involving empirical investigation, scientific inquiry and the collection of evidence. One movement stemmed from the work of Ludwig Fechner and Wundt in psychophysics. This dominant school of psychology was primarily quantitative in character. The measurement of sensation and the mind were its objects; physics, statistics and mathematics were its methods. In France, however, a new and different kind of work was being done, for the French were little interested in psychophysics but greatly interested in psychopathology, abnormality and psychiatrics.<sup>64</sup>

The forerunners of this movement in France were Pinel and Esquirol. They drove the demonic and the supernatural out of the mental hospital and substituted in their place a scientific and humanitarian approach to mental disorders. Disorders of the brain, they argued, were disorders of the personality. With the publication of Taine's De L'Intelligence, psychiatrics was brought into contact with a positivist methodology which led to new areas of inquiry into the distinctions and similarities between the normal and abnormal mind. The science of the normal mind, the ordinary psychology, was compelled to recognize as part of its domain what previously had been either excluded or unknown.<sup>65</sup> Whereas Taine provided a general methodology and a general introduction for the study of personality disorders, Jean Charcot, director of the Paris Hospital for female hysterics, gave the study of psychiatrics a new turn and a specific methodology.<sup>66</sup> Greatly impressed by Charles Richet's claims for the genuineness of hypnotic phenomena, Charcot took an interest in the relationship between the symptoms exhibited by hysterical persons and those observed in the artificially induced trances of hypnotism; he also noted that many of his hysterical patients were extraordinarily amenable to hypnosis and that hypnosis could modify some of their symptoms. He thus introduced hypnosis as the preferred treatment for hysteria. Inverting the results of his experimentation and observations, Charcot concluded that only people who were basically hysterical could be induced into hypnotic sleep.

Not all agreed with Charcot's conclusion, however. In 1882,

for example, the same year that the S.P.R. was founded in England, A. A. Liébeault and Hippolyte Bernheim founded a clinic at Nancy which became the second great center for work in hypnosis and mental disorders. The two schools, Paris and Nancy, were ideological rivals. Charcot thought hypnosis indicative of mental abnormality. Nancy, however, argued that hypnosis was a consequence of suggestion. Thus, they argued, nearly all subjects, sane or insane, could be induced into hypnotic trance. Hypnotism was not a pathological phenomenon but the result of a passive-receptive state brought about by suggestion. Although they had their differences, the two schools introduced hypnotism as an all important technique for isolating and examining all kinds of abnormal mental and physical phenomena.<sup>67</sup> Thus, almost a century after Mesmer, hypnotism took its place as a fruitful and profitable method of psychological and physiological analysis and became a new cause célèbre in the therapeutic treatment of the insane.

These two older schools spawned a whole group of active young investigators. Two who are extremely important for our purposes here were Alfred Binet and Pierre Janet.<sup>68</sup> In the late seventies, Binet became involved in the work of Charcot at the Salpêtrière. He abandoned law for medicine and became an experimenter with those psychological problems which Charcot related to hypnosis. In 1886, he published in collaboration with Féré a series of experiments in hypnosis and animal magnetism. His chief interest in this study was with hypnosis and hyperaesthesia. Binet and Féré successfully separated hypnosis from its clinical surroundings and opened the way for its utilization by the experimental psychologist as well as the physician. In 1892, Binet published his The Alterations

of the Personality, which discussed dissociative and abnormal states of personality in the light of phenomena induced both by artificial means and by spontaneous somnambulism and pathological disease.

Pierre Janet also took an interest in the problems of hypnosis and the dissociation and the splitting of the personality, particularly the problem of the integration and disintegration of the personality. In the normal self, he argued, the integration of ideas and tendencies was relatively stable; in hysterics, however, the unity of the personality was destroyed. This lack of integration resulted in the cleavage of the individual into two or more alternating personalities and conscious control of the faculties failed to take place. Primary personalities were not aware of the thoughts, feelings or experiences of secondary personalities. Hypnosis was Janet's principal means of investigating dissociative disorders.

It was this movement in France and on the Continent that Gurney and Myers discovered in 1884. In 1885, for example, Myers' article on automatic writing refers to the work of Charcot, Taine, Bernard, Ribot, Bernheim and Richet.<sup>69</sup> In the same year Gurney published an essay on hallucinations which took into account the work in this area of Charcot, Esquirol, Binet and Féré.<sup>70</sup> Again in the same year, Myers and Gurney published an essay on the higher aspects of mesmerism.<sup>71</sup> Although drawing primarily on the older mesmerists such as Esdaile, Elliotson and Reichenbach, they also state in a postscript that they believe there does exist corroboration for their theories from the work done at the school of Nancy where, earlier in the year, Myers, his brother, Arthur, and Gurney had paid a visit to experiment with Lié-

beault and Bernheim.<sup>72</sup> In April of 1886, Myers spent a week at Le Havre experimenting with Pierre Janet on sommeil à distance whereby trance was induced in previously hypnotised subjects at a distance beyond the ordinary channels of sensory communication.<sup>73</sup> Myers' essay on "Multiplex Personality" in the Nineteenth Century for 1886 drew extensively on the work of French psychologists with Louis V and Felida X, two famous instances of multiple personality in the annals of French psychology.<sup>74</sup> In his third essay on automatic writing published in January of 1887, Myers refers to Janet's publications in the Revue Philosophique<sup>75</sup> which, he argued, confirmed his earlier speculations that automatic writing demonstrates "an intelligence manifesting itself continuously by written answers, of purport outside the normal subject's conscious mind, while yet that intelligence was but a part, a fraction, an aspect, of the normal subject's own identity."<sup>76</sup>

Myers and Gurney also reviewed the work of these French psychologists. Gurney reviewed Binet and Féré's work on animal magnetism.<sup>77</sup> Myers reviewed Bergson's early work on hypnosis and telepathy,<sup>78</sup> Binet's work on dissociative psychological states,<sup>79</sup> Pierre Janet's work on automatism,<sup>80</sup> and Jules Janet's work on hysteria and hypnosis.<sup>81</sup> Although not the only ones to review these important works, Myers and Gurney were the most important disseminators of developments in abnormal psychology on the Continent to the English-speaking world.

The relationship between psychical research in England and abnormal psychology in France and elsewhere was not all one-sided. There was much cross-pollination involved. In an autobiographical essay,

for example, Janet wrote that his first entrance into the study of nervous disorders began with the study of "mysterious phenomena of doubtful reality." That did not seem entirely regrettable, he wrote, for "these strange investigations have put me in contact with some important people who had the same curiosity at the back of their minds: Charcot, Charles Richet, Frederic Myers, Henry Sidgwick."<sup>82</sup>

In his book on L'Automatisme Psychologique, Janet makes fifty or so references to the work of the S.P.R., in particular, the work of Gurney on hypnotism and Myers on automatic writing and the psychology of mediumship.<sup>83</sup> Albert Moll's authoritative text, The Study of Hypnotism (1889), was one of the first of such studies to treat the work of Gurney and Myers in hypnosis and automatic writing with due appreciation. "The spiritualists," he wrote, "think that automatic writing proves some external force, because a work showing design, and independent of the consciousness of the writer, can only be produced by an external force. . . . But thanks to the investigations of Taine, F. Myers, Gurney, Pierre Janet and Max Dessoir, automatic writing has now received another explanation."<sup>84</sup>

William James' Principles of Psychology (1890) was so full of references to psychical research that James Ward made special reference to them in his review in Mind.<sup>85</sup> The S. P. R., James wrote, meets "one of the greatest needs of psychology." He calls Myers' work on automatisms "highly important" and his theory of hallucinations "the most important thing on the subject from the point of view of theory."<sup>86</sup> Binet, too, in several essays made frequent reference to the work of Myers and Gurney. The work of Janet and Bernheim, the great chapter on the "Consciousness of Self"

in James' Principles of Psychology, and the articles of Myers in the Proceedings of the S.P.R. are, Binet affirms, the best literature on the subject of the alterations of personality.<sup>87</sup>

Although Myers and Gurney were primarily interested in validating the existence of such higher faculties of the mind as telepathy, precognition and clairvoyance while the French experimentalists were involved principally with therapeutics and psychiatrics, the two groups of inquirers used the same basic methodology and similar or identical materials for evidential support of their respective theses. For both, hypnotism was the most valuable means for exploring the basis of human personality. Thus, at the Second International Congress for Experimental Psychology, chaired by Sidgwick with Myers as Secretary, the committee on hypnosis heard papers and discussion on hypnosis and cognate phenomena by Myers, Nora Sidgwick, Janet, Liébeault, Liégeois, Brillouin, Bramwell and Schrenk-Notzing.<sup>88</sup> Myers, Janet and others used automatic phenomena such as crystal gazing and automatic writing to isolate, demonstrate and account for the existence of secondary levels of consciousness and memory below the threshold of the normal everyday conscious self. Liébeault's work on hypnotic therapeutics with small children confirmed, in part, Myers' and Gurney's argument that hypnotic phenomena cannot wholly be accounted for by the suggestion theory or the imitation theory. Janet's work on sommeil à distance, Myers and Gurney believed, confirmed the existence of telepathic impulses between subject and operator.

Aside from a basic methodology and much subject matter in common, the psychical research group and the French experimentalists were



also in common agreement that materialistic and mechanistic theories of the mind and its operations were incommensurate with the facts. The most prominent psychological theories in England during the 1870's and 1880's--Maudsley's physiological psychology, Huxley's epiphenomenalism, Clifford's mind-stuff theory and Carpenter's notion of unconscious cerebration--were all materialistic and mechanistic in character.<sup>89</sup> Drawing upon their own studies of human faculties and human personality, Gurney and Myers waged a continuous war against the materialistic character of these theories in support of a psychological psychology rather than a wholly physiological psychology. In this endeavor, they found frequent and vocal support from Janet<sup>90</sup> and Binet.<sup>91</sup>

#### The Subconscious in the Late Nineteenth Century

The notion of the existence of subconscious states and multiple personality toward which the psychical researchers and the French experimentalists and their followers were working in the last two decades of the nineteenth century has had a long and varied history. Working with ample quotation and illustration, Lancelot Whyte, for example, proves effectively that the idea of the subconscious or unconscious was already a commonplace of advanced European thinking before Freud began his great work on the Interpretation of Dreams.<sup>92</sup> Without denying the truthfulness of this thesis, we can also say, however, that at no time in the past had psychologists and the general public become so interested in the existence of these states and so desirous of knowing about them. Essays on the subconscious and multiple

personality filled the pages of both general and specialized periodical literature, the pages of Mind as well as the pages of W. T. Stead's Review of Reviews.<sup>93</sup>

As Binet wrote in 1891, "Il se produit en ce moment, dans le domaine de la psychologie expérimentale, un fait bien curieux; de nombreux observateurs, qui n'appartiennent ni a la même école, ni au même pays, qui n'expérimentent pas sur le même genre de personnes, qui ne se proposent pas le même objet d'expérience, arrivent, sans le savoir, au même résultat; ils constatent qu'en derrière analyse une grande quantité de phénomènes psychologiques s'expliquent par une maladie de la personnalité, qui consiste dans un dédoublement ou plutôt un morcellement du moi; l'unité normale de la conscience est brisée; il se produit plusieurs consciences distinctes, dont chacune peut avoir ses perceptions, sa mémoire et jusqu'a son caractère moral."<sup>94</sup>

An excellent illustration of the spirit of new discovery which surrounded such terms as the subliminal self, the hidden self, the unconscious self and the subconscious self was an essay on "The Hidden Self" which James contributed to Scribner's for 1890.<sup>95</sup> Drawing on the work of Gurney, Myers, Binet and, in particular, Janet's L'Automatisme Psychologique--note that James refers to all these men as "psychical researchers"--James wrote: "The new light which this book throws on what has long been vaguely talked about as unconscious mental life seems so important that I propose to entertain the readers of Scribner's with some account of its contents as an example of the sort of 'psychical research' which a shrewd man with good opportunities may now achieve."<sup>96</sup>

Even though the idea of the subconscious was rapidly becoming a commonplace there was no consensus of opinion as to what the notion of subconscious phenomena or the subconscious referred to or whether there really was such a thing as the subconscious at all. As one psychologist wrote, "There is at present no consensus of opinion, either among psychologists who deal with the normal, or among the doctors who deal with the abnormal, as to the class of phenomena to which the term 'subconscious' shall be applied, nor to the interpretation of these phenomena."<sup>97</sup> There were those, for example, who argued that the term "subconscious" may refer "not to a demonstrated entity, but to an hypothesis submitted for the explanation and interpretation of certain observed facts."<sup>98</sup> One writer in Mind maintained rather eloquently that "a little more respect for the prejudice of the unity of consciousness would be of value."<sup>99</sup> James, to the contrary, testified not only to the actual existence of an entity called the subconscious, but argued that this entity may have powers indicative of higher faculties of knowledge and insight.

There is no better illustration of the remarkable diversity of opinion surrounding these terms and their use than the "Symposium on the Subconscious" published by the Journal of Abnormal Psychology in 1907.<sup>100</sup> Theodore Ribot,<sup>101</sup> for example, classified the various theories on the subconscious into two general groups. The first, he states, "bears the stamp of a peculiar biological mysticism." In certain men, this theory states, subconscious activity is "invested with almost supernatural power, not only of a trophic and physiologic, but also of a psychologic order, and constitutes in the individual an in-

intermediate link between the human and the divine." The second group draws a far less flattering picture of subconscious activity. The subconscious, they believe, is stupid, uncritical, extremely credulous, without morality, and "its principal mechanism is that of the brute--association by contiguity." Together, Ribot argues, the two theories correspond to the sum total of human nature, its advantages and defects. Thus, they are not irreconcilable.

Hugo Munsterberg found three different kinds of theories.<sup>102</sup> The layman's theory, he states, suggests that the "subconscious is the psychological system of a full real personality below the conscious person" which remembers, thinks, feels, wills on its own and influences our conscious life very much for the better. The second theory is psychological and not mystical in character. Here the subconscious is not dissociated, split-off mental material which only in a secondary way may flow together into a new detached self." The subconscious here is neither regular nor universal but pathological or artificial. The third theory is the theory of the physiologist. The subconscious which underlies abnormality is the same that underlies the ordinary conscious processes of memory or attention. These processes are not psychological at all but simply a consequence of physiological brain processes.

The most elaborate classification of subconscious theories was that of Morton Prince who found six meanings for the term as it was then used.<sup>103</sup> Firstly, the subconscious is any portion of our consciousness which at any given moment is outside the focus of our attention. Secondly, the abnormal psychologist conceives of the uncon-

conscious as dissociated ideas split off from the main personal consciousness. These ideas may be isolated sensations aggregated into groups. In the last, they form a co-existent consciousness. The split off consciousness may display extraordinary activity which becomes dominant, for example, in automatic writing. Thirdly, the subconscious is a broad generalization involving both normal and abnormal life. Subconscious states become personified and are called "the subconscious self" or a similar name. This Self makes up part of all human minds and plays a part in all our mental life. Every mind, therefore, is double, and the two selves are given special domains. Fourthly, the subconscious consists of dissociated states which are active and those which are inactive, i.e., those which are forgotten or out of mind. This theory combines theories one and two.

Fifthly, the subconscious is a metaphysical principle which transcends all facts which can possibly be observed in others or through introspection. Subliminal ideas are not mental states dissociated from the main personality, but the main reservoir of consciousness in which the personal consciousness is a subordinate stream flowing out of this great storage basin. We are conscious only of a small part of this reservoir and its contents. The subliminal is frequently conceived of as part of a transcendental world and is made the source of flights of genius, while, at the same time, it controls the physical processes of the body. Sixthly, the subconscious is purely physiological in character. Automatic writing, automatic speech, the subconscious solution of mathematical problems and hysterical outbursts constitute purely neural processes unaccompanied by any mentation.

Myers' Theory of the Subliminal

As he himself recognized, Myers' work in the 80's was partly responsible for generating a widespread interest in the subconscious. In 1893, Myers wrote that the idea of a subconscious initially grew out of the earlier conceptions of stratified consciousness. The notion "presented itself independently to three observers as the result of three different lines of experiment. Mr. Gurney was led that way by experiments in hypnotic memory; Mr. Janet by experiments on hysteria; and to myself the observation of various automatisms neither hysterical nor hypnotic--as automatic script and the like--brought a still more developed (I did not say more established) conception of the stratified nature of our psychical being, of the higher faculties discernible in the deeper strata, and of the unity which comprehends them all."<sup>104</sup> Myers argued similarly one year before in his review of Binet's Les Altérations de la personnalité.<sup>105</sup> Myers' judgment was echoed by others. Binet himself wrote that "parmi les premiers observateurs qui ont reconnu l'existence de ces phénomènes singuliers de désagrégation mentale, nous citerons deux psychologues anglais, M. Gurney, auquel on doit de bonnes études sur la mémoire des personnes en somnambulisme, et M. Myers, qui a minutieusement analysé l'écriture automatique des spirites et des médiums."<sup>106</sup> And commenting on Herbert, Gardner Murphy argued that "it was over fifty years before a more adequate description of the unconscious in terms of empirical findings was attempted by men like Janet, Myers and Freud."<sup>107</sup>

The "conception" of which Myers spoke in 1893 was his concep-

tion of the Subliminal Self; and it was in explaining, describing and documenting a theory of the subliminal which would conform to his evolutionary notions and to all the "facts" of human personality which psychological research and abnormal psychology had brought to light in the 1880's that engaged almost all of Myers' attentions in the last decade of his life.<sup>108</sup>

Our previous discussion of the varieties of theories of the subconscious enables us to forge a general conception of Myers' theory. The primary issues surrounding all discussion of the subconscious were four-fold. Firstly, does a subconscious exist in reality or is it merely a figurative fancy which is poetic rather than scientific? Secondly, assuming that a subconscious does exist, can it be accounted for psychically or physiologically? Thirdly, assuming that a subconscious does exist and can be accounted for psychically or psychologically, does the subconscious exhibit only pathological states or is there reason to believe the subconscious is also a source of supernormal or paranormal phenomena? And fourthly, assuming a subconscious psychological in character exhibiting both abnormal and paranormal manifestations, can a theory be constructed to substantiate the existence and source of the subconscious in a way which would be acceptable to both the scientific community in general and the psychological community in particular?

Myers' theory of the subliminal endeavored to address itself to each of these issues and problems. His general position can be approximated as follows: There does exist a psychical entity which is the source both of abnormal and supernormal physical and mental ac-

tivity. This entity manifests itself by frequent uprushes or incursions into the domain of the supraliminal or ordinary conscious self which it can both control and dominate, although this control varies considerably from individual to individual. Furthermore, in the same way that psychologists can account for the existence of a supraliminal conscious self by applying the theory of terrestrial evolution to psychology, the existence and activity of the subliminal self can, by analogy, be accounted for by the extension of the theory of terrestrial evolution to a theory of cosmic evolution, that cosmos being a cosmos of spirit and not of ether and atoms, as the "facts" of the higher phenomena of psychical research and experimental psychology indicate. In effect, Myers' theory can be classified under the first definitions of both Ribot and Munsterberg and the fifth definition of Prince.

There have been a number of succinct summaries<sup>109</sup> of Myers' theory which go beyond the bare outline of his conception indicated above. Perhaps the best is that of William McDougall, who explained Myers' conception of the subliminal in the following way:

Myers conceived the soul of man as capable of existing independently of the body in some super-terrestrial or extra-terrene realm. He regarded our normal mental life as only a very partial expression of the capacities of the soul, so much only as can manifest itself through the human brain. He regarded the brain as still at a comparatively early stage of its evolution as an instrument through which the soul operates in the material world. So much of the life of the soul fails to find expression in our conscious and organic life through its interactions with this very inadequate material mechanism remains beneath the threshold of consciousness and is said to constitute the subliminal life. The subliminal as thus conceived would be better described as the subliminal part of the self, a part which surpasses the supraliminal or normal conscious self to an indefinitely greater degree as re-



gards its range of psychical faculties. It was further conceived as being in touch with a realm of psychical forces from which it is able to draw supplies of energy which it infuses into the organism, normally in limited quantities, but in exceptionally favourable circumstances, in great floods, which for the time being raise the mental operations and the powers of the mind over the body to an abnormally high level.

It is a leading feature of this protean conception that many of the abnormal manifestations that have commonly been regarded as symptoms of mental or nervous disease or degeneration are by its aid brought into line with mental processes that are by common consent of an unusually high type, the intuitions of genius, the outbursts of inspiration . . . the enthusiasm that enables the human organism to carry through incredible labours. Myers's hypothesis thus boldly inverts the dominant view, which sees in all departures from the normal symptoms of weakness and degeneracy and which seeks to bring genius and ecstasy down to the level of madness and hysteria; the hypothesis of the subliminal self seeks to level up, rather than to level down, and to display many of these departures from normal mental life as being of the same nature as the operations of genius, as being, in common with these, uprushes of the subliminal self, which temporarily acquires a more complete control of the organism and therefore achieves at such times a more complete expression of its powers. And these rare displays of subliminal capacities are held to foreshadow the further course of mental evolution, to afford us a glimpse of the higher plane on which the mind of man may habitually and normally live, if further evolution of the nervous system shall render it a less inadequate medium for the exercise of the spiritual faculties and for the influx of the psychical energies which at present, owing to its imperfections, are for the most part latent or confined to the subliminal self.<sup>110</sup>

Thus, for Myers there exists within each man a subliminal self, a certain portion of our being which is both conscious and intelligent, which does not enter into our normal waking intelligence nor rise above our supraliminal life, our habitual threshold of consciousness. The subliminal self is capable of exerting supernormal faculties which transcend our known level of evolution. Some of these faculties seem to be extensions of those we already know. Others, however, like telepathy, clairvoyance, retrocognition or precognition, altogether exceed our supraliminal range of powers. These

faculties do not depend for their exercise upon either the world of matter or the world of ether and atoms. Rather, they imply a vital or transcendental environment neither terrestrial nor ethereal. This subliminal knowledge or faculty may manifest itself in part to the supraliminal or ordinary consciousness by means of sensory or motor automatism, which may arise spontaneously or may be induced by crystal gazing, automatic writing, hypnosis or cognate methods. By such means, messages are conveyed from the subliminal to the supraliminal self.

In summary, Myers asserted that man has within himself a real and permanent spiritual entity of which his ordinary self is only a fragment conditioned and differentiated from this permanent self by the struggle for existence in the course of terrestrial evolution. Myers' theory of the subliminal, therefore, pulls together the variety of different kinds of ideas his work was generating in the 80's and which his personal problems had initiated in the 70's--his interest in multiple personality and subconscious phenomena, his interests in the application of evolutionary and cosmical concepts to psychological theory, and his argument that through the patient and careful acquisition of new facts, science could validate the existence of an unseen world, solve the religious crisis of the modern world, demonstrate the possibilities of life after death, and give absolute sanctions to the moral and ethical intuitions of mankind.

The last ten years of Myers' life were devoted almost entirely to arguing the religious, scientific, psychological and philosophical implications of his thesis and to reorganizing and re-evaluating the

materials of experimental psychology and psychical research in the context of his conception of the subliminal self.

His posthumously published magnum opus, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, was his final synthesis of all this material.<sup>111</sup> The book is divided into eight substantial chapters treating of (1) Disintegrations of Personality, (2) Genius, (3) Sleep, (4) Hypnotism, (5) Sensory Automatism, (6) Phantasms of the Dead, (7) Motor Automatism and (8) Trance, Possession and Ecstasy. In each of his chapters, it is Myers' procedure to discuss these various phenomena in terms of their source in the subliminal and their consequences with respect to what they tell us about the nature of human personality:

It will be my object in this book to lead by transitions as varied and as gradual as possible from phenomena held as normal to phenomena held as supernormal, and it may be useful to conclude this introductory chapter by a brief sketch of the main tracts across which our winding road must lie. Our inquiry will naturally begin by discussing the subliminal structure, in disease or health, of those two familiar phases of human personality, ordinary waking and ordinary sleep. I shall go on to consider in what way the disintegration of personality by disease is met by its reintegration and purposive modification by hypnotism and self-suggestion. I shall go on then to sensory automatism which is the basis of hallucination. This includes phenomena claiming an origin outside the automatist's own mind. It will be found that origin is often to be sought in the minds of other living men, and various forms of telepathy will be brought under review. The conception of telepathy is not one that needs be confined to spirits still incarnate; and we shall find evidence that intercourse of similarly direct type can take place between discarnate and incarnate spirits. The remainder of the book will discuss the methods and results of this supernormal intercourse.<sup>112</sup>

To simplify Myers' textbook, we might note that it can roughly be divided into two large sections. In the first four chapters, Myers works primarily with generally accepted psychological phenomena--normal and abnormal--which he reinterprets in the context and vocabulary of

his theory of the subliminal. Hysteria is defined as a diseased or disorderly condition of the hypnotic strata caused by the instability of the thresholds of consciousness. Hysteria does not exhibit the possession of the everyday conscious self by the secondary self but the sinking of significant controlling elements of the ordinary conscious spectrum into the depths "from which it cannot be voluntarily controlled." Of primary importance in his chapter on "Disintegrations of Personality" is the argument that the principal cause of the disintegrations which yield hysteria is identical with that which yields the integrations of genius. The permeability and instability of the psychical diaphragm may manifest itself not in downdraughts of supraliminal faculty but in uprushes of subliminal faculty.<sup>113</sup> Genius, therefore, is described psychologically as an uprush of subliminal faculty, "an emergence into ordinary consciousness of ideas matured below the threshold."

Sleep and hypnosis also have a common denominator for Myers. Just as hysteria and genius have the same cause, sleep and hypnosis have the same effects. Sleep, Myers argues, is a phase of man's personality in which the supraliminal functions are all but abandoned. The subliminal possession of the personality in sleep accounts both for the general vitalization of the organism as a consequence of energy drawn from the metetheric world with which the subliminal is a part and the occasional appearance of faculties superior to those of the ordinary waking state manifesting themselves in dreams. It is through dreams in sleep that telepathy and clairvoyance make their rudimentary appearance. Hypnosis is an artificially induced sleep which

frequently results both in an increase of the subliminal vitalization of the organism as well as in manifestations of such higher phenomena as telepathy. Hypnotic suggestion is defined as "a successful appeal to the subliminal self." As in each of the phenomena which Myers has previously discussed, hypnosis and its consequences are given an evolutionary twist. "Man is in the course of evolution; and the most pregnant hint which these nascent experiments have yet given him is that it may be in his power to hasten his own evolution in ways previously unknown."

If in the first four chapters of his text Myers is largely concerned with the interpretation of generally accepted psychological phenomena from the point of view of the subliminal, indicating how such phenomena carry with them the possibility of supernormal faculty such as telepathy and veridical hallucinations and dreams, the last four chapters, beginning with his discussion of sensory automatism, move on to a higher level of import. Here our starting point is no longer ordinary phenomena indicating the possibility of supernormality but supernormal phenomena indicating the possibility of human survival. In his chapter on sensory automatism, for example, Myers writes:

Considering together, under the heading of sensory and motor automatism the whole range of that subliminal action of which we have as yet discussed fragments only, we shall gradually come to see that its distinctive faculty of telepathy or clairvoyance is in fact an introduction into a realm where the limitations of organic life can no longer be assumed to persist. Considering, again, the evidence which shows that the portion of the personality which exercises these powers during our earthly existence does actually continue to exercise them after our bodily decay, we shall recognize a relation--obscure but indisputable--between the subliminal and the surviving self.<sup>114</sup>

It is at this point in Myers' text that we begin to see the real organizing principle of his work which, most important, also corresponds to his own personal history as a psychologist and a psychical researcher. Without underestimating the real complexity of the structure of his text, we can say that Myers' work is logistic in character. The book begins with the most elemental and basic aspects of the psychology of human personality and from them generates, by addition and accretion, a more and more complex structure which becomes knowable and understandable only with respect to the definition, explication and verification of the various fundamental elements which compose it. We move from the simple to the complex and from the known to the knowable. The substitution of concrete particulars for these generalized abstractions reveals the essential characteristic and organizing principle not only of Myers' book but of the last twenty years of Myers' life. We begin with the essentials of the psychology of human personality and build out and up to a hypothetical construct which is cosmic in scope. In effect, we move from what is known about human "personality and faculties" to what is knowable about the cosmos, from experimental psychology to psychical research to cosmology.<sup>115</sup>

#### Significance of Myers' Theory of the Subliminal Self

Criticism of Myers' psychological theorizing and his notion of the subliminal self was extensive. Spiritualists like Roden Noel and Wallace were hesitant to accept the theory of the subliminal and the concomitant supposition of telepathy because such theories circum-

scribed the spiritistic hypothesis of disembodied spirits.<sup>116</sup> Idealists like Muirhead<sup>117</sup> and Lang<sup>118</sup> rejected the spiritistic implications and survival theory of Myers' work but welcomed his theory of the subliminal on psychological and traditional grounds. Two critiques in the Nineteenth Century, one by Frederic Harrison and the other by W. H. Mallock, subjected Myers to ridicule and satire.<sup>119</sup> Ribot, Munsterberg, Prince, Riley and Stout, all professional psychologists, were involved with the problem of secondary consciousness, but disagreed variously with Myers' conception of that secondary consciousness.<sup>120</sup> In Mind, McDougall found Myers' theory scientifically untenable but his place in the history of the intellectual development of mankind significant.<sup>121</sup> Other important professionals and academics found the theory of the subliminal basically correct as well as significant. The Swiss psychologist Theodore Flournoy thought Myers' notion of the subliminal "extremely remarkable and worthy of the serious attention of even official and university psychologists."<sup>122</sup> Oliver Lodge argued in the Quarterly Review that Myers' theory was "a good working hypothesis" and "a great conception."<sup>123</sup> In an essay on "Frederic Myers' Service to Psychology" James published the most laudatory appraisal of Myers' work. "It is at any rate a possibility, and I am disposed to think it a probability, that Frederic Myers will always be remembered in psychology as the pioneer who staked out a vast tract of mental wilderness and planted the flag of genuine science upon it."<sup>124</sup>

Criticisms of Myers' work in psychical research, pro or con, should not obscure his significance in the history of ideas. Nor

should we fail to recognize the variety of disciplinary interpretations and contexts to which Myers' work is relevant. Theodore Flournoy and William McDougall both remark on Myers' disdain for contemporary philosophy and his naiveté about it. Even so, Myers' work has significant philosophic importance. It touches upon such philosophical problems as the nature of mind, cognition, time and space, ethics and a variety of problems involving the application of evolutionary theory to numerous philosophical issues. Mellone in the Hibbert Journal linked Myers to Hegel.<sup>125</sup> Lodge and others saw possible relationships between Myers, Emerson, Whitman and the "transcendental" tradition.<sup>126</sup> Muirhead saw him in the tradition of idealism. His work was part of the revival of a serious nineteenth century interest in Plato and Neo-Platonism. James thought Myers' theory of the subliminal a "sober metaphysical hypothesis," and placed Myers in the tradition of psychological and philosophical romanticism. Unamuno as a young man saw in Myers the failure of rational empiricism to solve the problem of the tragic sense of life.<sup>127</sup> Alfred Lyall saw his work as part of the wider context of Eastern philosophy and religious thought.<sup>128</sup> Sidgwick, Balfour, James, Schiller and Broad were all philosophers of distinction whose work drew upon psychical investigation and psychical inquiry. Myers may be considered part of the same tradition.<sup>129</sup>

From the history of general psychology and its development, Myers' work also is significant. Writing to Max Muller in 1887, Francis Galton stated that he valued "modern mental literature over ancient psychological literature because contemporary psychologists have 'two



engines of research<sup>3</sup> which the older psychology wanted--inductive inquiry and an adequate notion of the importance of mental pathology."<sup>130</sup>

In the wide context of methodological developments in psychology, Myers' work exhibits these two salient criteria of the new methodology of psychology. From a narrower perspective, E. G. Boring makes specific reference to Myers' work in the context of modern British experimental psychology. "Psychic research has also lain at the periphery of the new psychology in England. F. W. H. Myers was very influential."<sup>131</sup>

Similarly, as we have noted, Myers played a significant role in the development of abnormal psychology. In a chapter entitled "Abnormal Psychology from 1875-1914" in his work A History of British Psychology, 1840-1900, L. S. Hearnshaw devotes considerable space to the work of Myers. "The relation between psychical research and abnormal psychology is a problematical one. Psychical phenomena are abnormal in a statistical sense in that they are comparatively rare occurrences. But, if, as F. W. H. Myers believed, both pathological and psychical phenomena frequently have a common origin in the subliminal mechanisms of the mind, then a more substantial affinity than the statistical may be held to relate them."<sup>132</sup>

The relationship between psychical research and religion is perhaps one of the most important contexts in which to view Myers' work. It was the context which he himself found most valuable and illuminating. The relevance of one discipline to the other has already been touched upon in our examination of Myers' contributions to the Synthetic Society. Several other documents and essays which Myers wrote in the 1890's have a similar theme, notably his auto-

biography. One of the foremost problems of the Victorian age, no matter in what context it was discussed, was the problem of immortality of the soul and the survival of the personality after bodily death. In 1901, William James acknowledged that "religion, in fact, for the great majority of our own race means immortality, and nothing else." Much of Myers' work, literary, scientific and rhetorical, in the 1890's was devoted to shoring up this disintegrating article of faith in the traditional religion. Thus, his final volume of essays published in 1893 takes its title from one of Myers' most successful rhetorical endeavors of this kind, "Science and a Future Life."<sup>133</sup> Characteristically, the essay attempts to demonstrate the survival of the human personality on grounds of psychological fact rather than on grounds of traditional theological belief. In truth, the faith which Myers promulgated in his last researches is part of what Goldwin Smith has called the Victorian "substitutes for religion." With obvious differences, Myers' faith in psychical research is similar in kind to those who held faith with late Victorian positivism, Darwinism, Hermeticism, Theosophy, Cosmic Consciousness, Socialism and Spiritualism.<sup>134</sup>

Myers also contributed significantly to the field of the psychology of religion and the religious experience. Robert Thouless can criticize Myers' conception of the subliminal and its impact on late nineteenth century and early twentieth century religious thought. Yet with all its criticisms of Myers, his Psychology of Religion is a testament to Myers' significance in the history of religious psychology.<sup>135</sup> Unlike Thouless, James, in his Varieties of Religious Experience, takes as his psychological base the work of Myers, a debt

which he acknowledges in his text and his notes. In his important "Conclusion" and his chapter on "Conversion," for example, Myers' influence on James was particularly heavy.<sup>136</sup>

## CHAPTER VI

### PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

#### Introduction

One particular context to which Myers' work in psychical research was relevant will be our principal subject matter in this section—psychical research, subliminal psychology and those subject matters which are primarily "literary" in character.<sup>1</sup> In particular, we will ask ourselves two questions here. How did Myers' work in psychical research and his theory of the subliminal inform his attitudes toward literature in his maturity and what kinds of literary problems and questions was he now concerned with? One of the principal arguments of our preceding chapter, and one of the assumptions of this chapter, is that the psychical research movement was part of another widespread movement in Europe and America--the "new psychology," indicating both new subject matters for psychological analysis and new tools and empirical techniques for organizing and analyzing that subject matter. As one might expect, therefore, Myers' interests in literature at this time were primarily interests in psychological problems as those problems related to literature, art and creativity. And in the same way that Myers differed from professional psychologists because of his interest in the "higher phenomena" of psychology, his interests in literature differed from those of other psychologists

because of his theory of the subliminal and his notions of the super-normal.

It would be inaccurate to say that the last twenty years of the nineteenth century saw a revival of interest in the relationship between psychology, aesthetics, art and literature, for the immediate predecessors of the Victorians by no means neglected this relationship. At the same time, it would not be in error to say that under the stimulus of what was believed to be a new and functionally scientific psychology there was a growing awareness on the part of psychologists that some of the older problems involved in this relationship were ultimately capable of empirical solution. This awareness took two forms. On one hand, psychologists were willing to acknowledge what had already been accomplished by contemporary psychology in solving these problems.<sup>2</sup> On the other, the psychologist was dutifully aware of what still remained to be done.<sup>3</sup>

Optimism or pessimism apart, things were happening. In 1866, for example, Dallas published his Gay Science;<sup>4</sup> although hailed as one of the real forerunners of contemporary psychological approaches to literature and art,<sup>5</sup> Dallas' analysis lacked the tools, the "nomenclature," the experimental and empirical evidence to describe meaningfully and valuably the unconscious and related mental phenomena. The concern for inductive inquiry and the interest in the abnormal which discriminated the new psychology from the old were demonstrably wanting in his work. By the eighteen-eighties and through to the end of the century, however, it was just these deficiencies in psychology which a number of psychologists were endeavoring to correct. As a

consequence, the last twenty years of the century saw psychologists approaching a variety of problems bearing on art, literature and creativity with the tools, hypotheses, vocabularies and experimental and empirical evidence wanting in such earlier attempts. The nature of the creative act, the notions of genius and inspiration, the affective quality of aesthetic objects, among other subjects, were empirically and experimentally analyzed. The psychologist believed he was no longer dependent upon metaphysical and dialectical speculation.

Because experimental psychology was largely the "tradition" in which Myers was now working, we will glance at that "tradition" and some of its most obvious manifestations. Only in doing so can we observe the uniqueness of Myers' place within that "tradition"—a uniqueness which was a consequence of his theory of the subliminal and his involvement with psychical research.

#### Psychology and Literature in the Late Nineteenth Century

In the Victorian world, genius and the problems of its nature, definition and significance took a variety of forms.<sup>6</sup> None, however, captured the public and scientific imagination as did the problem of the relationship of genius to insanity and degeneration. In the 1850's, Moreau de Tours, arguing from a physiological position, suggested that the cause of genius "must be sought in certain neuropathic conditions of the subjects."<sup>7</sup> At the same time, the French physician, B. A. Morel, defined degeneracy as the "atavistic reversion of offspring in consequence of abnormal conditions in the ancestry to types belonging to prior stages in the development of the spe-

cies."<sup>8</sup> The criminal, the insane and the genius, Morel argued, are "degenerative" deviations from the norm. Stimulated by the work of Moreau and Morel, psychologists in England and on the Continent published widely on these relationships. In Germany, Max Nordau published his Entartung (1891), applying the degenerative concept to the domain of nineteenth century art, music, literature and philosophy.<sup>9</sup> In England, Henry Maudsley, Thomas Huxley and James Nisbet<sup>10</sup> helped to popularize the theories of Morel.

More significantly, Lombroso in Italy, like Moreau, worked out relationships between criminality, madness, genius and degeneration.<sup>11</sup> Although Lombroso did not start out to demonstrate that degeneration was the efficient cause of genius, his work An total suggests that this was his general conception. His famous study, The Man of Genius, initially bore the title Genius and Madness. Syllogistically speaking, Lombroso's thesis can be summarized as follows: All forms of neuroses and psychoses are indicative of degeneracy. Genius is a form of psychosis and there exist numerous analogies between genius and neuroses. Thus, genius is a form of degeneracy. Lombroso's work had a real vogue. In the Arena for 1893, for example, Arthur McDonald argued that genius was a pathological conditions of the nervous system. Genius and insanity had identical causes.<sup>12</sup> G. Sergei in the Monist, although disagreeing with Lombroso in some particulars, expressed his conviction that genius is a pathological abnormal divergence having its origins in degeneration.<sup>13</sup>

The theses of Lombroso, Maudsley and Nordau did not find favor in all circles. Morelli, Lombroso's countryman, argued that genius

is a variation from the norm, but is a progressive divergent variation higher in the evolutionary scheme of things and not a degenerate variation.<sup>14</sup> William Hirsch in Germany published a most important refutation of the work of Lombroso and Nordau. "Genius resembles insanity as gold resembles brass. The similarity is merely in the appearance. When we go deeper into the facts we find that the two states are so widely disparate that we are not justified in saying that they are allied; still less, with Moreau, that genius is a morbid condition."<sup>15</sup> Reviewing Lombroso and Nordau in the Psychological Review, James in America expressed his dissatisfaction with their theories. Lombroso's "incapacity for accurate reasoning," James argued, "is apparently incurable; and this book, were it not for the biographic material which it contains, could only be regarded as one of the oddities of scientific literature." Nordau's book, he commented, was a pathological book on a pathological subject.<sup>16</sup> In England, James Sully concluded that it was the consequences of genius, not its nature, which frequently leads the genius into states of poor mental health. In itself, nothing is morbid about the nervous structure or mental characteristics of the genius.<sup>17</sup>

Psychologists were also interested in the uses of psychology in literature. In an article in Mind for 1886, for example, Joseph Jacobs, arguing the case for a society for experimental psychology, commented: "The mention of fiction reminds me of a quite unworked field for psychologists which our society might cultivate. For the last fifty years we have had a large number of persons whose life has been passed by examining and exhibiting the processes of other men's minds.



From their experience the science of human nature ought to be able to learn something. I need only refer to the stores of acute observation contained in the works of George Eliot and George Meredith."<sup>18</sup> Most commonly, psychologists endeavored to trace the use of certain psychological types or states of mind in literature in general. Occasionally they wound their theses around the distinctions between ancients and moderns with respect to the use made of a particular psychological subject matter or the causes of the existence of certain literary treatments of a psychological subject matter. In 1899, for example, Cesare Lombroso published an essay entitled "Insane Characters in Fiction and Drama" in which he pointed out through example and illustration the curious frequency of insane characters in modern theatre and modern fiction.<sup>19</sup> James Sully's essay in the Forum for 1889 on the subject of "Dreams as Related to Literature" was of a similar kind. Among the topics which Sully isolated for study and detailed analysis were the various ways in which the creative writer has invested his composition with a dreamlike appearance, the objective or dramatic uses of dreams in literature, the scope which dream-construction offers for dramatic insight, and a series of detailed studies of dreams as they were used by Hoffman, Dickens, Goethe and Scott.<sup>20</sup>

In some instances psychologists were interested in an individual writer's use of a specific psychological characteristic which the psychologist used as a base illustration for his own theories, much as Freud made use of Oedipus. Thus, for example, Alfred Binet in 1891 published an article on Jekyll and Hyde and modern psycho-

logical science. Binet's essay was an attempt at a scientific explanation of the Jekyll and Hyde phenomenon of double personality. He concluded that Stevenson was correct in his assumption that several moral personalities, each having consciousness of itself, may rise side by side without mixing in the same organism.<sup>21</sup> On occasion, too, one finds that the nineteenth-century psychologist undertook critical studies of a specific author from a psychological perspective. A classic example of this kind of endeavor by a psychologist is Sully's essay, "George Eliot's Art," published in Mind for 1881.<sup>22</sup> Among those aspects of George Eliot's art which he says are particularly interesting to the psychologist are the genesis of her work, which suggests the conditions of the development of the most vivid kind of creative imagination, the deep-lying conditions of the effect of her characters on her readers, and the psychological devices by which she emphasizes and exposes the inconsistencies of character. Sully concludes his remarks with the statement that "what distinguishes the reflection of George Eliot's writings from that of earlier works is, first of all, its penetration, its subtlety and its scientific precision. And it is this fact which renders her even to the trained psychologist a teacher of new truths, truths to which he would never have found his way deductively, though after her large experience and accurate observations have discovered them for him he can easily connect them with familiar principles."<sup>23</sup>

Another area of inquiry explored by psychologists interested in problems of a literary and creative character was the relationship between dreaming and creativity and dreams and poetical expression.

In 1912, F. C. Prescott published his famous monograph, Poetry and Dreams, the first endeavor to relate psychoanalytic theory to the study of poetry.<sup>24</sup> Significantly, Prescott draws in his notes on no dream psychologist other than Freud. Indicative as this is, the widespread movement in the late Victorian period to bring within the domain of psychology materials outside the province of clearly conscious and observable phenomena saw some interested psychologists turning their attention to the subject of dreams and, by way of a by-product, the relationship between dreams and creativity.

James Sully<sup>25</sup> was the most prominent English psychologist interested in this relationship. As early as 1876, Sully published an essay in the Cornhill on "The Laws of Dream Fancy."<sup>26</sup> His principal argument here was that dreams are not necessarily chaotic but frequently coherent and organically unified. To prove his point, he compares the impulse to emotional harmony which organizes dreams with the emotional unity given images of the brain which hold together the many otherwise disconnected ideas of a lyric poem. In an essay on Illusions published somewhat later, Sully reinforces the relationship between dreams and poetry, arguing that dreams have a "certain degree of artistic unity," and that the source of that unity is a plastic force which he correlates with "the mysterious spiritual faculty, under the name of creative fancy. . . . Dreaming has been likened to poetic composition, and certainly many of our dreams are built upon a groundwork of lyrical feeling. They may be marked off, perhaps as our lyrical dreams."<sup>27</sup> In an essay in the Forum for March, 1889, Sully tentatively conjectured that "the dreaming faculty

is akin to the poetic faculty, and that the development of either must tend to react on that of the other."<sup>28</sup> In 1893, after years of collecting evidence on this problem, he argued three theses relevant to problems of dreaming and invention--there is a definite connection between dreaming and fictive production; Lamb was not entirely correct when he asserted that we ought to be able to gauge a man's poetic faculty by means of his dreams; and there is evidence that some dreamers, like Heyse or Stevenson, have the power to fashion a dream, by help of a process of critical reflection, which points "to the existence in a few imaginative men of a rudiment of a higher kind of dream faculty, a power of giving to the dream creation a more elaborate and coherent form and a finer poetic quality."<sup>29</sup>

Psychologists of the late nineteenth century were also interested in what one might call the psychology of literary movements. This was particularly true of French psychologists interested in understanding the psychological concepts underlying both the Symbolist and Parnassian movements in literature. In an essay entitled "L'Imagination créatrice affective," Theodore Ribot, for example, argued that there did exist forms of the imagination which are purely affective.<sup>30</sup> After completing a lengthy psychological examination of this kind of imagination in music and music composition, demonstrating its essential and general character and the principal phases of its development, Ribot goes on to discuss certain literary creations to prove "par des faits qu'il y a un mode de création dont la matière se compose exclusivement d'états affectifs, actuels ou rémemorés, qui par un travail de l'esprit sont associés, groupés, combinés

suisant des rapports nouveaux, développés et organisés en une fiction." It is the literature of the Symbolists that Ribot chooses to illustrate his thesis.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, Dugas, in a study entitled L'Imagination, undertook a psychological analysis of the creative imagination not only of the Symbolists, but of the Parnassians as well.<sup>32</sup> Symbolism, he argued, constitutes a "véritable expérience psychologique, une compulsio ou productio experimenti, comme dirait Bacon ... Cette expérience psychologique est le renversement ou la contre-partie de celle que représente la doctrine parnassienne."<sup>33</sup> Whereas Ribot was chiefly interested in the art product as an expression of a particular kind of imagination, Dugas emphasized the art product's psychological effect upon its audience. William Hirsch, in his book on Genius and Degeneration, undertook a psychological analysis of the development of the schools of realism, naturalism, idealism and romanticism in an effort to refute the degenerative thesis of Nordau, who found degenerative characteristics in the causal developments of these movements. Hirsch argued the "normative" character of the movements, in particular the "rhetorical" character of the arguments for or against these movements. "The inclination, in the pursuit of a new idea, to press it far beyond what was originally intended is a phenomenon grounded in the normal human character, and found not merely in art, but in every department of human production."<sup>34</sup> Lombroso in his The Man of Genius physiologically and psychologically characterized the "decadent" movement in literature. Literary decadence, he argued, was a manifestation of mattoidism in art. The symbolist theory of correspondences, the primitive base of symbolism, its em-

phasis on evocation by sensation, Mallarme's Traité du Verbe and Verlaine's poetry are all, he argued, neuropathic. Verlaine is the high priest of these mattoids.<sup>35</sup> William James, we might note, also attempted a psychological analysis of Romanticism and Classicism.<sup>36</sup>

One of the commonplace concerns of Victorian artistic and literary criticism, and of late nineteenth-century aesthetics and poetics as a whole, was the concern with the affective qualities of works of art and aesthetic objects. For such critics as Arnold and Pater, the problem revolved around the garland of associations suggested by the critical term "charm" which appears with such frequency in their work. Neither Pater nor Arnold sought a positive or scientific explanation for the "charm" phenomenon they so often described. There were those, however, like Darwin, Spencer, Allen and Marshall who approached this problem from the physiological and biological point of view. Others, like Helmholtz, Wundt and Fechner, saw the problem of the affective qualities of art in the context of psychophysics.<sup>37</sup> For Freud, the problem of the affective qualities of works of art was a problem for psychoanalytic theory.<sup>38</sup>

Another group of psychologists, however, drew their inductive principles and procedures from the study of hallucinatory states, dream states and hypnotic states and their causes and effects. Perhaps the most interesting and successful venture in this last line of inquiry was the work of Paul Souriau. Two of Souriau's studies are worth noting here, his La Réverie esthétique; essai sur la psychologie du poète<sup>39</sup> and his La Suggestion dans l'art.<sup>40</sup> The first book he called "un enquete de pure psychologie." What he did was to

define all poetry as aesthetic reverie and all aesthetic reverie as poetry. In the succeeding chapters of his work he distinguishes among a wide variety of stimuli capable of producing the state of mind called aesthetic reverie. Making frequent reference to trance phenomena, hypnosis, suggestion, illusion and hallucinations, Sourian argued that all such states are consequences of aesthetic contemplation and accompany the psychological state characterized as "rêverie." Similar problems occupied Souriau in his Suggestion dans l'art. Here he was concerned with isolating the particular qualities in objects of art which are capable of stimulating hypnotic and suggestive states in their viewers and thus bringing about "l'extase admirative," or the "charm" which men experience in artistic products. The work draws heavily on those French psychologists we referred to in our fifth chapter.

One problem with which Sourian was concerned was the problem of the "dédoublement de la personnalité."<sup>41</sup> Indeed, studies involving the relationship between art, creativity, the subconscious and multiple personality were quite popular in the last ten years of the century. Binet, as we noted earlier, was one of the leading propagandists for the theory of "dédoublement." In 1894 and 1903 he published a lengthy series of articles in L'Année Psychologique on the psychology of dramatic writing, the result of his interviews with such dramatists as Sardou, Dumas, Daudet, Pailleron, Meilhac, Goncourt, Hervieu, Coppée and Francois de Curel.<sup>42</sup> One of Binet's principal interests in these articles was the role that subconscious states or secondary personalities play in the creative act. For example, he

distinguishes three principal ways in which the imaginative factor and the critical faculty, both necessary for successful literary creation, can be related in a single author. With Sardou, he argues, the two "personages" are distinct and independent of each other. With Curel, one finds an extreme type of the doubling of the personality which, if accentuated, takes on all the characteristics of nervous and mental pathology which is particularly prevalent among mediums. The critical personality is suspended and the wholly creative personality, the subconscious, takes over. Hervieu<sup>43</sup> represents a third kind of relationship, as extreme in its own way as is the second. His personality is such that it is completely incapable of "dédoublement" and "métamorphose." He is always completely conscious and rational.

Theodore Ribot, too, brought his interests in subconscious phenomena to bear upon his work on creativity. In his essay on the "L'Imagination créatrice affective" he concluded with the comment that more work needs to be done on the subliminal and unconscious factors involved in imagination.<sup>44</sup> In his essay on the "Psychologie des sentiments" he argued that it is "l'inconscient" which produces what is vulgarly called inspiration.<sup>45</sup> And in his great classic, Essai sur l'imagination créatrice he devoted one whole chapter to the unconscious factor in creativity, writing a history of the notion of "inspiration." Using positivism's three stages, Ribot argued that contemporary psychology and its interest in subconscious phenomena will ultimately, scientifically and empirically define the imagination.<sup>46</sup> Chabaneix, in his work on Le Subconscient chez les artistes, les savants et les écrivains, also argued that the testimony of



artists and writers themselves suggests that the subconscious factor in productive and creative work is significant. The subconscious, he argued, was capable of doing purposeful work and was not an inferior form of mental activity. The German psychologist, Max Dessoir, also discussed the relationship of the secondary self and the creative imagination in his essay on "Das Dóppel-Ich."<sup>47</sup> "It is only when Imagination is comprehended as a function of the secondary self, and Hallucination, Inspiration, Change of Personality are understood as projections from within outwards, manifestations in short of that externalising process which is always at work within us--it is only then, I say, that the creative imagination of the artist is understood and traced to its root."<sup>48</sup>

By the end of the nineteenth century, psychologists working with the psychology of the imagination and creative activity had begun to absorb the wealth of theory and fact which had been handed down to them by the anthropologist who, in turn, had absorbed considerable doses of the evolutionary hypothesis from the biologist and physiologist.<sup>49</sup> Thus, we find a mélange of psychological studies during this period which treat of the psychology of mythmaking, the psychology of the primitive imagination considered in the context of child psychology, and psychological approaches to the problem of the evolution of the creative imagination from its pristine and primitive beginnings to the superior and more recent forms of its manifestation.

In his Studies of Childhood, for example, Sully endeavored to justify his subject matter by equating the child-mind with the

race-mind in the context of the evolutionary hypothesis.<sup>50</sup> One of the many characteristics of childhood which he isolated for explanation and detailed analysis was the imagination and fancy of the child. Thus, by simple analogy, the creative imagination of the child was equated with the creative imagination of primitive man. One significant consequence of this relationship of primitivism, childhood and creativity was a series of psychological speculations on the relationship between art, imagination and play. The evolutionist argued that the pleasure of play is the pleasure of putting to work unoccupied energies which represent earlier instincts for existence inherent in the species.<sup>51</sup> Thus, Herbert Spencer argued that art was a species of refined play which had its origins in the instinct for survival. In contemporary life, art is a kind of superfluous derivative.<sup>52</sup>

In the same vein, psychologists were also interested in studying the mode of operation of the primitive mentality and the mentality of the child and equating the mental operations of the young man and the early man with essentially poetic operations. In the concluding chapter of his Primitive Culture, for example, Tylor argued that the study of the savage intellect opens up new possibilities for the study of imaginative and mythological creation. "In so far as myth, seriously or sportively meant, is the subject of poetry, and in so far as it is couched in language whose characteristic is that wild and rambling metaphor which represents the habitual expression of savage thought, the mental condition of the lower races is the key to poetry-- nor is it a small portion of the poetic realm which these definitions cover."<sup>53</sup> In his Essai sur l'imagination créatrice, Ribot devoted one

chapter to the creative imagination of children and another to primitive man and the creation of myths, both of which, he argued, elucidate all the psychological qualities and mental operations of the pure and primary creative imagination.<sup>54</sup> It was Ribot's belief that the same mental characteristics responsible for the creation of myths<sup>55</sup> ultimately developed into the mental characteristics necessary for the making of modern literature. "La littérature est une mythologie transformée et adaptée aux conditions variables de la civilisation."<sup>56</sup> Ribot thought modern forms of invention were superior to primitive forms of invention because the former were products of individuals while the latter were collective products. Others, however, saw primitive and child-like mental operations surviving in much contemporary poetry, as for example an anonymous contributor to the Cornhill for 1876 who wrote on the subject of "Poetic Imagination and Primitive Conceptions."<sup>57</sup>

Theodore Flournoy once commented that Myers' naiveté toward traditional philosophy was much to his advantage, for he was able to respond with originality to problems of a philosophical character, free from the restrictions and limitations of philosophical tradition and scholasticism.<sup>58</sup> One cannot say the same for his psychology, however. Myers was thoroughly familiar with this tradition and its limitations and restrictions. But this inevitably led to an originality of a different sort, for Myers took the tradition and worked it into a synthesis of his own making and with the stamp of his own uniqueness. Thus, for example, Myers' work on the psychology of creativity, the nature and definition of genius and the mechanics of inspiration is

dotted with references to the work of Lombroso, Nardau, Ribot, Dessoir, and Chabaneix. In one significantly historical instance, he even draws on the work of Breuer and Freud. Yet as a consequence of the uniqueness of his notion of a subliminal self and his concern for the higher faculties of the mind, these authors were refashioned into a context of ideas which was distinctly Myers' own.

If we were to assume, as some have done, that one of the significant rubrics of "modernism" in literature, art and criticism was the marriage of psychology and literature,<sup>59</sup> and if, as well, we were to put our finger on those psychologists who were above all responsible for this marriage, we would have to name James in America, Bergson in France and Freud in Austria and Germany. On the other hand, if we were to ask ourselves what Englishman at the turn of the century was most interested in bringing to bear upon the arts and their creation the most forward theories of the new dynamic psychology, who knew thoroughly the work of James, Bergson and Freud, was very familiar with the most recent theories of abnormal and "subconscious" psychology emerging from the continent, and endeavored to speculate on theories of creativity and symbol based on notions of multiple personality, trance phenomena and secondary or subconscious mental states, we would in all truthfulness have to say that F. W. H. Myers was that Englishman. There is good reason why Myers' work in this respect is not better known than it is. His reputation has suffered considerably as a consequence of the peculiar ulterior aims of his psychology, for his primary interest was not psychology proper but psychology as a means to proving on scientific and empirical grounds the survival of the human per-

sonality after bodily death. This end seriously damaged his historical reputation. This is not to say, however, that men of some importance have not taken an interest in Myers' work on the relationship between psychology and literature and creativity.<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, in no instance has anyone examined with thoroughness or any semblance of completeness the full range of his ideas on these relationships. This will be our task in the remainder of this section.

#### Two Essays on Tennyson

Myers' essays, "Tennyson as Prophet (1889)" and "Modern Poets and the Cosmic Law (1893)," have some obvious similarities to his Essays, Classical and Essays, Modern.<sup>61</sup> They, too, in some measure are concerned with the message of the poet, his belief or disbelief in the existence of a spiritual world, his conception of the cosmos and the universe, his personal equation and his hopes and thoughts on the existence of a life after death.

If this were all Myers were to argue in these essays, they would in effect be little different from his essay on Rossetti or his essay on Hugo. The essays do differ from the earlier essays, however. Myers, for example, is not only interested in the poet's teachings and messages but he is equally interested in the psychological states and mechanisms which the poet uses to characterize his moments of insight into truth and his moments of inspiration. Tennyson's use of trances in "The Two Voices," Myers argues, "has received, I need not say, much reinforcement from the experimental psychology of the present years."<sup>62</sup> Choosing appropriate passages from such poems

as "Sea-Dreams," the "Idylls of the King," "The Two Voices," Myers endeavored to demonstrate the similarity of Tennyson's visionary psychology to that of Plotinus<sup>63</sup> and, more important, distinguishes Tennyson's psychological precepts from the modern schools of epiphenomenalism and unconscious cerebration.<sup>64</sup>

In the later of the two essays, Myers assembles a wide variety of passages from Tennyson's later poems to demonstrate Tennyson's sympathies with, and awareness of, that branch of experimental psychology called psychical research. From the "Ancient Sage" he cites a passage "treating of the possible development of powers as yet unrecognized in man." From "Demeter," he quotes a passage which speaks of a phantasm of the dying telepathically communicated. Commenting on "Happy," he argues that the poet anticipates the full evolution of the faculty of telepathy and direct communication in the spiritual world.<sup>65</sup> And from "The Ring," Myers quotes a lengthy passage not only alluding to spirit communication, but suggesting also the endless progress of this spirit communication.<sup>66</sup>

Myers' most extensive discussion of Tennyson's psychological characterizations in the earlier essay, "Tennyson as Prophet," is his comment on the famous passage in "The Ancient Sage"--"known to be based on the poet's own experience"--in which the poet describes "some such sensation of resumption into the universal following upon a self-induced ecstasy."<sup>67</sup> Myers' discussion of this passage entails three arguments. Firstly, he argues that the content of the passage exemplifies Tennyson's belief in a spiritual universe. Secondly, he points out in detail how Tennyson demonstrates the existence of that

universe through employing various psychological states serving to prove evidentially the existence of that cosmos. And thirdly, Myers evaluates Tennyson's psychological descriptions and principles in the light of present day experimental psychology. The upshot of Myers' arguments here is significant, for what he is really trying to do is to defend the truth of the poet's message by evaluating the psychological state of mind by which the message was "personally" received. Myers' analysis of this passage is thus concerned with two significant questions: What does the poet believe or intuit about the cosmos and does the state of mind by which the poet suggests he received his intuitions indicate in any way the possible validity or truthfulness of these intuitions? Myers is, therefore, arguing the case for the poet as prophet not only on traditional or historical grounds, but tending to argue it on psychological and empirical grounds. In effect, Myers is asking whether man's mental operations and the structure of his personality bear witness to the spirituality of the universe and, if so, whether the creative act in any worthwhile way is a cognitive act.

In his essay on "Tennyson as Prophet," therefore, Myers is working toward an explanation of the mechanism of intuition and inspiration which could be expressed in other than vague terms and poetical metaphor and which would serve to validate on psychological grounds the notion of the poet as prophet. What we have in this particular essay, however, are only valuable intimations of the theory he was to work out more fully in the near future--the theory of the subliminal self and a fuller explanation of the mechanism of inspiration and intuition in the context of that theory. What we find in the

essay on "Tennyson as Prophet," with its defense of ecstasy as a state of possible veridical cognition and not delusion, with its references to a "profounder consciousness" and its discussion of intuition and inspiration in terms of telepathy and telaesthesia is only a first step in that direction.

In his discussion of Tennyson in his essay on "Modern Poets and the Cosmic Law,"<sup>68</sup> published four years later, Myers continues to trace the development of Tennyson's maturing thought through the last two volumes of his published work. At the same time, he once again approaches the problem of the psychology and mechanics of intuition and inspiration. This time, however, he poses that problem and offers a solution for it from the point of view of his recently enunciated theory of the subliminal self.

One of the real difficulties involved in discussing the poet as the revealer of a kind of wisdom or truth not accessible to other men is the difficulty of evaluating the sincerity of the poet, a difficulty which Myers touched upon earlier in his essays on Wordsworth and Hugo. In his essay on Tennyson, he is faced with a similar problem. What must one first ascertain about the poet if one is to accept the teachings, intuitions or messages of his poetry as truthful or veridical? Myers' response to this question now has a second dimension which is a direct consequence of his work in psychical research. The notion of the poet as prophet or revealer of wisdom to mankind is, of course, Myers' old problem of the character of the poet, his sincerity and his ethos. Myers never fully was capable of disengaging himself from the rhetorical aspects of this problem,<sup>69</sup> and here he



first sets up a series of enthymemic propositions serving to suggest what kind of poetical character can be taken seriously.<sup>70</sup> The poet's convictions must not come from tradition or the peculiarities of his temperament. He must demonstrate that his is a true questing after the truth, that he is ready for "stern self-questioning, for the facing of naked truth." The poet who is to be taken seriously as prophet or seer must infuse "the least possible of the special or the transitory into his appeal for eternal things." Clearly, however, Myers now is not so much interested in discussing this problem from the point of view of the rhetorical or the adventitious, but from the point of view of science, especially psychological science as it was able to explain, define and characterize the sources of poetic intuition and inspiration. He wanted to move the question from a proper place to a commonplace, from the particular to the universal.

To understand fully Myers' second argument in this essay, one has to refer back to his work in psychical research in the first few years of the 90's. We will recall that Myers had then turned his attentions to the problem of the subliminal life, the ways in which the subliminal manifested itself and the kinds of messages which it remitted.<sup>71</sup> Thus, for example, he argued that the visual hallucination was a kind of subliminal message which has rendered itself cognizable to the percipient's senses. The bulk of such hallucinations, he argued, are the product of fever, artificial stimulants, or various stages of insanity, degeneration or mental and physical deterioration. For the most part, the content of such a hallucination is likely to be insignificant. Yet a very few hallucinations of the

sense of sight do correspond to objective events at a distance (a phantasm of the living, for example), and in this sense the hallucination is veridical or truth-bearing in character. To account for the veridicality of such an hallucination, Myers and Gurney first postulated the theory of telepathy, the acquisition of information by the mind of a percipient as that information was conveyed by the mind of an absent agent. Myers then asked himself (and here I vastly oversimplify the complexity of his thought and its development) what was the real source of that information. His answer was that it was the subliminal self of the percipient which was somehow in touch with the subliminal self of the agent. Thus, one can argue that the communication of information through subliminal channels indicates that "these centres of psychical perception" are immersed in a larger psychical continuum and that the subliminal has access to information of a truth-bearing or veridical character which the everyday self operating through the normal channels of sense is unaware of until that information manifests itself through the subliminal to the supraliminal through one of the senses. Certain truths, therefore, are attainable by methods other than the methods of science or the ordinary informative instruments of the supraliminal.

To return to the essay we are now discussing, if one is to argue that the poet is one whose messages are in some way veridical in character or that the poet has access to truths which are not (or not yet) accessible to others, he must first demonstrate that the poet has access to the subliminal, that his inspiration is a subliminal manifestation, and that his intuitions and intimations partake

of the "informative" possibilities of the subliminal. Given Myers' basic paradigm, it is only through the working out of these steps that the psychologist can demonstrate, without depending wholly on rhetorical particularizations, that "moments of poetical inspiration are apt to be moments also of some sense of insight or entrance into a supernal world," i.e., that the creative moment has the potentiality of a cognitive moment.

It was from this point of view that Myers approached Tennyson's poetry in the essay on "Modern Poets and the Cosmic Law." The steps of the argument are not wholly worked out in the essay itself, but Myers refers his readers to the series of essays on the subliminal self which he was then publishing in the Proceedings of the S.P.R. These essays provide the evidential support for the theoretical statements Myers assumes as valid in the critical essay. In one specific instance, however, Myers does use some of this material in the essay itself. It is one of the few instances in his work in which his notion of the subliminal directly informed a specific "literary" subject matter in a publication not directly concerned with the psychological research movement. Clearly, it is a most pregnant and significant statement and one whose thesis we will further discuss below.

It is on the ground, then, of their association with this assumed fourth cosmic law of interpenetrating worlds [throughout the essay Myers had argued that Tennyson's real message to his contemporaries was that the spiritual world interacts with the material world] that I would claim both for Wordsworth and for Tennyson a commanding place among the teachers of this century. I do not, of course, claim a scientific eminence for poets. But certain rules, ultimately, provable by science may be in the first instance attained by other than scientific methods. They may rise into consciousness, as I have elsewhere tried to show, in some sense

ready-made, and accompanied with no logical perception of the processes which, deep in our being, may have been used to reach them. The "genius" shown in discovery or in creative art may be defined as an "uprush of subliminal faculty," and the rapt absorption of a Newton, the waking dream of a Raphael, the inward audition of a Mozart, do but represent the same process occurring in different regions of thought and emotion. The mystic claims a like inspiration: but since we have no canons by which to test the validity of the message which he brings us, we do well for the most part to set mystic messages aside altogether. But nevertheless, just as Faraday, by making many probably true divinations in the physical universe secured mankind's attention for certain divinations which he could not prove; so also may a great poet, by manifestly fruitful inspirations in his own special art, claim our attention for alleged inspirations in a field where our critical tests can no longer follow him. The fact that fools have rushed in is not in itself a reason for angels to fear to tread. High art is based upon unprovable intuitions and of all arts it is poetry whose intuitions take the brightest glow, and best illumine the mystery without us from the mystery within.<sup>73</sup>

In a later passage, Myers gives a kind of summary of the upshot of his whole essay. "I have placed Wordsworth and Tennyson together as realizing with extraordinary intuition," he argued, "promulgating with commanding genius, the interpenetration of the spiritual and the material worlds."<sup>74</sup> In effect, what Myers is saying here is that the poet's realization of the intuition (the mechanism by which such intuitions are received) and the promulgation of those messages with commanding genius (the expression of that intuition in poetic and artistic form) together demonstrate the interpenetration of the spiritual and material worlds.

#### Myers, Psychology and Fiction

In his two essays on Tennyson, we noted that Myers, like other psychologists of his day, was interested in the uses of psychology as material in works of literature. There are other significant manifestations of this interest in his published work and in his correspondence.

Myers' correspondence with Robert Louis Stevenson is a case in point. The correspondence began in February of 1886 when Myers wrote to Stevenson to express his great admiration for Stevenson's recently published story about Jekyll and Hyde.<sup>74</sup> Aside from just expressing his admiration for the story, Myers also suggested to Stevenson that if he re-edits the story, he would perhaps alter certain portions of the text involving such points as the handwriting of Hyde, the change in Dr. Lanyon, the metamorphosis of character in Dr. Lanyon's presence, the nature of the metamorphosis in general, and the relationship of the two consciousnesses. Stevenson's curiosity was piqued, and he replied to Myers that although he would perhaps never rewrite the story he would like to hear more from Myers on these subjects and have his views at length.<sup>75</sup> In response to Stevenson's cordiality, Myers sent him several foolscap pages of closely packed commentary of a psychological character on those points he specified as in need of change in his first letter.<sup>76</sup> Stevenson again showed interest,<sup>77</sup> and Myers again wrote to him on foolscap primarily discussing failures in Hyde's characterization from the point of view of recent studies in experimental abnormal psychology.<sup>78</sup> Their correspondence on these and similar matters continued until Stevenson's death. We might comment here, however, on what we can learn from this correspondence.

If Stevenson were our primary consideration, we might note his cordiality toward his critics and his deference to criticism.<sup>79</sup> We might note also that Myers' letters to Stevenson constituted a significant dose of information on contemporary abnormal psychology and

on multiple personality. Myers refers in his notes, for example, to contemporary psychological discussions of handwriting in cases of double personality, to the classic French studies of Felida X and Louis V, and to experiments in France involving a variety of problems pertaining to spontaneous changes of personality and to induced changes brought about by hypnosis. We might surmise on the basis of these notes, therefore, that Stevenson by midyear of 1886 knew something of contemporary psychological inquiries into the nature of double and multiple personality.

Looking at the correspondence with Myers uppermost in our minds, our main concern must be with Myers' reasons for taking such an interest in this particular work. The notes are an overt appeal for realistic verisimilitude in fiction of a psychological character. Stevenson believed that "the novel, which is a work of art, exists, not by its resemblance to life, which are forced and material, as a shoe must still consist of leather, but by its immeasurable differences from life, which is designed and significant, and is both the method and the meaning of the work."<sup>80</sup> Although there is no indication that Stevenson was rankled by Myers' remarks, Myers' attempts to persuade Stevenson to rewrite his story were attempts to have it rewritten not in terms of dramatic or fictive probability but in terms of scientific and psychological probability. He was not so much interested in the story as a work of art but as a realistic document which would "represent" the latest theories of experimental abnormal psychology.

Thus, Myers argued that in cases of double personality, the

handwriting is not and cannot be the same in the two personalities and the effect of shock on Dr. Lanyon seemed unreal--it might induce diabetes if there were previous kidney weakness; the tidiness of the room is surely not a true point nor is the sugar in the cup. He suggested to Stevenson that the potion must surely be a drug, the process of transformation needs more substance and it would probably result in a loss of consciousness. He praises Stevenson for his admirable handling of spontaneous reversions during the somnambulistic state. He comments on the physiological and physical consequences of reversion. He suggests that Jekyll's transformations occur far too rapidly and that Stevenson had better expand his descriptions of the Jekyll and Hyde states and their psychological separation. His final remarks refer Stevenson to Gurney's work on memory. Experimental studies of multiple personality had shown that transformations of personality were progressive. The relationship between the personalities changed over a period of time. Myers suggests that Stevenson should draw upon such recent researches in the area of community of memory which would enable him to solve scientifically the ethical problem of Jekyll's sudden and backward change.

Clearly, Myers did not agree with those like Symonds that Stevenson's story was morally unsuitable. Symonds, for example, was appalled to find that Stevenson had actually published a story which so scrutinized the dregs of human personality. He thought that Stevenson ought "to bring more of distinct belief in the resources of human nature, more sympathy with our frailty."<sup>81</sup> At the same time, Myers was not the first to recognize the psychological significance of

Stevenson's story. In France, we have noted, Binet had argued that Jekyll's transformations were neither magical nor fairy-like, but true to new evidence about alternating personality divulged by contemporary psychology.<sup>82</sup> In truth, Myers' opinions of the story differed from those of Symonds because his interests were not only ethical and moral but scientific. And his opinions differed somewhat from those of Binet because his interests were not wholly scientific but equally ethical and moral.

This seeming paradox is not difficult to account for, particularly when we remember that Myers' interest in psychology at the outset was determined by moral considerations and a particular moral problem. By 1886, he already believed that such psychological analyses of character and personality offered hope for an insight into human nature which was optimistic and not pessimistic. The thesis of his poem "From Brute to Man"<sup>83</sup> written in 1890 was that new insights into human personality generated by scientific research demonstrated the possibility of spiritual and moral evolution and, consequently, the possibility of moral regeneration. A few months prior to his reading of Stevenson's story, Myers published an essay entitled "Human Personality" which pointed out that recent experimentation with multiple personality and hypnosis threw much light on the intimate nature of man. On one level, he argued, the results of such experimentation will seem to most minds a very depressing view of man's dignity and destiny. On another level, he argued, contemporary science's negation of a consistent personality, character, memory or will is not as humiliating as one might expect.



I cannot here enter on the reasons which, as already stated, convince me that this method of experimental psychology, when carried further, will conduct us not to negative but to positive results of the most hopeful kind. It must suffice to say that I believe there is an incandescent solid, but that solid is beneath our line of sight. This fact can only be recognized when the visible flames are examined not only with the telescope, but with the spectroscope, that is to say, when the phenomena of abnormal states are so scrutinized as to discover whether any of them are, in fact, supernormal, transcending the powers of man as hitherto known to us, and pointing to a higher stage of evolution. One such discovery, that of telepathy . . . has, as I hold, been already achieved.<sup>84</sup>

In 1888, Myers published a lengthy essay in the Nineteenth Century entitled "The Disenchantment of France," one of a number of essays by various hands appearing in England at this time endeavoring to examine French culture for the benefit of the Englishman.<sup>85</sup> Because France is always the nation "first to catch and focus the influences which are slowly beginning to tell on neighbouring states, so long will its evolution possess for us the unique interest of a glimpse into stages of development through which our own national mind also may be destined ere long to pass."<sup>86</sup> Ranging over much of French and European thought, drawing illustrations and examples from Zola, Huysmans, Schopenhauer, Renan, Bourget, Brunetière, James, LeMaitre, Sully-Prudhomme, Ackermann, Taine and Ribot, Myers argued that France was passing through a moment of spiritual reaction wherein intellectual problems which she formerly had considered significant now seemed specious and premature, where disillusionment, if not at times decadence, seemed to be the reigning mode. The only positive channel of French thought which he believed constructive at that time and which held out the possibility for a moral regeneration in France was experimental psychology. It was this aspect of French thought which he

continually recommended to his English readers. With an eye perhaps cast at Arnold,<sup>87</sup> Myers argued that there really is no other way in which France can deeply influence again man's general conception of humanity and human fate. She could hardly any longer alter it by emotion or rhetoric. "If modified at all it must be modified by scientific discovery." "Frenchmen will concur with me in accounting the Revue Philosophique, with the Société de Psychologie Physiologique (including MM. Taine, Charcot, Ribot, Richet, Janet, Prudhomme, etc.) as perhaps the most vital, the most distinctive nucleus of modern French thought."<sup>88</sup>

The conclusions we might draw from Myers' analysis of the malaise of modern France which are relevant to our subject here are several. In arguing that experimental psychology opens the possibility for the "reconstruction" of the spiritual life of France--"I have suggested so to say, a nostrum, but without propounding it as a panacea"--Myers also argued that French literature, letters and criticism should partake in that "reconstruction." His use of example, illustration and quotation from poets, dramatists, novelists and critics as means of evaluating the present condition of French thought and disillusionment suggests his belief in the significance of the arts as they reflect a nation's culture and as they are capable of shaping a nation's culture. In drawing attention to the work of psychologists as that work reflects on the thought of the artist and the man of letters he was arguing that literature and the men who make literature have an opportunity to learn from the psychologist and to turn the tide of disillusionment and pessimism then sweeping France. The

novelist can at least endeavor to adopt the tone of pure neutrality of the psychologist and hope that in this "very neutrality there may be a certain element of advantage," at least as that neutrality counteracts the pessimism and decadence of so much French thought at the present time. For Myers, Goncourt and Maupassant represented the "neutral" school of French letters, and they are, through implication, compared to the decadent cynicism and darker currents of pessimism expressed in Huysmans, Ackermann, and Baudelaire. Also implied in Myers' essay is his belief that the moral neutrality of a Goncourt or Maupassant, which at present is essentially detached from any moral interests, could well make use of new developments in experimental psychology which, even though itself neutral also, at least offered the potentiality for discovering deeper elements in human personality which complemented man's sense of his own dignity and value.

In effect, Myers was asking the man of letters to do exactly what he had two years before encouraged Stevenson to do—to become aware of contemporary psychology and to put that awareness to work in such a way as to "propagate" the hope of new possibilities for human understanding and new attitudes toward man and the universe. He believed contemporary work on multiple personality, hypnosis, trance phenomena and "unsuspected lines of cleavage amid the strata of mental operation" possessed these possibilities. Literature as well as science should participate in the exploration of man's personality and inner nature initiated by the psychologist.<sup>89</sup>

William James,<sup>90</sup> without perhaps intending to do so, brought about what Myers thought should be brought about—an awareness on the

part of the man of letters that new and dynamic concepts arising out of recent psychological inquiry were fertile territory for literary subject matter. With Freud, the marriage of literature and psychology was consummated. No matter how elementary Myers' attempts were to bring this marriage about, however, he nevertheless made an attempt to fuse literature and psychology. He perceived that the realism of a Maupassant, the naturalism of a Zola, the decadence of a Huysmans, each in its own way drawing upon contemporary sociological and physiological science, had gone about as far as it could go; the new tide would turn from the realistic and dramatic presentation of outward events to the realistic and dramatic presentation of inward events. If, he argued, the realistic presentation of outward events led to pessimism and disenchantment, perhaps the realistic presentation of inward events would turn the tide in favor of optimism and reinstitute those illusions the nineteenth century had somehow lost. It was with this thought in mind, I believe, that Myers attempted to get Stevenson to rewrite his story and to persuade the British public that new developments in France and on the continent--which several years later were to bring about a distinctive "inner turning" in the realization of the psychological novel--were worthy of their serious attention.

#### Myers on Genius

The key to understanding Myers' interest in the psychology of literature and creativity is his theory of genius, a subject matter which was one of deep controversy among savants of his day. Genius, of course, was one aspect of Myers' theory of the subliminal

and it is a consequence of its position within this larger context that Myers' theory achieves uniqueness. In his publications on subjects primarily psychological or treating of psychical research, Myers frequently speaks of genius. A significant footnote in his essay on "Modern Poets and the Cosmic Law," published in 1893, refers his readers to his essay on "The Mechanism of Genius" published in the Proceedings of the S.P.R. in 1892.<sup>91</sup> Myers reviewed Dessoir's study of genius with approval and augmented Dessoir with some theorizing of his own.<sup>92</sup> In 1897, Myers gave a paper to the S.P.R. on the subject of "Genius and Hysteria."<sup>93</sup> And in an address to the British Medical Association in 1898 on the psychology of hypnosis he devoted quite a few remarks to the subject of genius and hypnosis.<sup>94</sup> In his magnum opus, Human Personality, one of the six principal chapters is devoted to the problem of genius.<sup>95</sup> Since this chapter represents his most mature thinking on the subject, it will serve as the principal source for the discussion to follow.

For Myers, genius is one of a wide variety of ways in which the subliminal manifests itself. Its distinctive characteristics are not so easily identified, however. In one instance he writes that "when the subliminal mentation cooperates with and supplements the supraliminal without changing the apparent phase of personality, we have genius."<sup>96</sup> In another instance, he contrasts genius with hysteria arguing that hysteria signifies the descent of supraliminal faculty into the depths of the subliminal from which it cannot be recalled voluntarily while genius signifies an uprush of subliminal faculty and an emergence into ordinary consciousness of ideas matured

below the threshold.<sup>97</sup> And in a third instance, he argues that "the differentia of genius lies in an increased control over subliminal mentation . . . and I suggest an important inference, namely that the genius is for us the best type of normal man, in so far as he effects a successful cooperation of an unusually large number of elements of his own personality--reaching a stage of integration slightly in advance of our own."<sup>98</sup>

Although somewhat confusing in their diversity and distinctions, these definitions when taken together reveal rather clearly Myers' conception of genius.

Firstly, Myers is not principally concerned about the "rhetorical" character of genius. For him, genius is not so much a matter of judgment of things done as a matter of precise psychological definition. Genius is in no way dependent upon public approbation or approval of the products which are manifestations of genius. Furthermore, he even suggests that a man may be entitled to the name of genius if he is virtually unproductive, for genius characterizes the way in which a mind works and not the products which a mind is capable of producing.<sup>99</sup>

Secondly, genius constitutes a very individualized relationship between the conscious self and the subliminal self. If a subliminal uprush is to be considered an uprush "genial" in nature, it must cooperate and aid the conscious self without altering the basic character of that conscious self. Furthermore, the conscious self must be in the act of consciously endeavoring to do something--paint a picture, make a poem, calculate a series of figures, work out a law

of nature, or contemplate or admire a loved one. The subliminal uprush in genius helps to foster the end of that supraliminal action and activity. Thus it operates in harmony with the purposeful, intellectual, aesthetic, emotional or ethical behavior of the supraliminal and, in conforming to supraliminal behavior, actually enables the conscious self to realize its ends.

Thirdly, as noted above, Myers does not confine genius to any one aspect of human endeavor or activity. Genius is operative in a wide variety of behavioral contexts. "There is no kind of perception," Myers wrote, "which may not emerge from beneath the threshold in an indefinitely heightened form, with just that suddenness of impression which is described by men of genius as characteristic of their highest flights. Even with so simple a range of sensation as that which records the lapse of time there are subliminal uprushes of this type, . . . and a man may have a sudden and accurate inspiration of what o'clock it is, in just the same way as Virgil might have an inspiration of the second half of a difficult hexameter."<sup>100</sup>

The variety of contexts in which Myers observes genius can be illustrated by noting the organization of his chapter in Human Personality. He begins with a general discussion of the relationship between genius and abnormality. Then he proceeds to discuss the variety of ways subliminal uprushes may manifest themselves. At the first level, genius is operative in the motor region and at the organic level. A man, for example, outdoes himself physically in a moment of great emergency. He then takes up the problem of genius as it is operative in lower forms of perception, particularly instances

in which subjective impressions are quantitatively measurable and correspond with objective results. Here he examines the arithmetical prodigy or calculating boy and the subliminal intensification of the sense of the flux of time, of the sense of weight, muscular resistance and smell.

What follows in Myers' essay is a discussion of instances of subliminal mentation and perception primarily sensory in character but involving a more specialized intellectual content as well.<sup>101</sup> He then moves on to a discussion of more complex instances of subliminal mentation and perception involved in the production of the best work of the scientist, the philosopher, the artist and the poet. At this point in his argument he discusses extensively the relationship between the subliminal uprush and the creative act. This discussion of genius as creative and cognitive process concludes with a discussion of subliminal manifestations which are "vaguely supernormal in character." On the intellectual level of apprehension such manifestations are telaeesthetic in character. On the emotional level of apprehension they are telepathic in character. Myers concludes this chapter with a "revived Platonic conception" of love and beauty, psychologically and subliminally considered, an argument illustrating the operations of genius as they exist on the highest religious and ethical level.

The significance of what Myers organizes in his chapter is its demonstration that genius exhibits itself on the organic, the sensorial, the creative, the intellectual, the telaeesthetic, the telepathic and the ethical levels and hence is not confined to any particu-



lar subject matter, mode of apprehension or action. Yet even given the diversity of materials which Myers discusses here, his general conception of genius still underlies all of them.

The fourth significant point of Myers' analysis of genius grows out of the third. Although genius is operative in a wide variety of contexts, the contexts can be arranged and organized into a hierarchy so that one can discriminate between lower levels of genius and higher levels of genius. The kinds of criteria Myers uses to discriminate these levels suggest the variety of ways one can determine the organizing principle of his chapter. One of the most significant criteria is the criterion of complexity and concentration (frequently described in such physical terms as "depth" or "profundity"). Thus, the emotional content of subliminal messages is profounder than the intellectual content. Transcendental activities are more complex than organic activities and involve greater inward concentration. Organic manifestations of genius, however, are more complex and concentrated than similar supraliminal activity. The sensorial manifestations of genius suggest more inward concentration and greater complexity than do the organic, but less than the creative, the intellectual, the tel-aesthetic or the telepathic.

Another set of terms which Myers employs to construct his hierarchy is terms like "general" and "specific." One movement which the chapter presents, therefore, is the movement from general to specific, from the least specialized to the most specialized. Thus, organic manifestations of genius are possible for almost everyone, simple sensorial manifestations less possible, and so on through com-

plex sensorial manifestations, creative manifestations, intellectual manifestations and teleaesthetic and telepathic manifestations. Another movement within the scheme is the movement from definiteness to indefiniteness and vagueness. Here Myers is mainly concerned with the content of subliminal uprushes. In this instance, we move from uprushes whose content is most definite and hence most easily verifiable by ordinary methods of verification (calculation, for example) to subliminal messages teleaesthetic or telepathic in character which indicate vaguely and diffusely the possibilities of a wider spiritual world but are as of now incapable of verification by ordinary supraliminal procedures. Creative and artistic expressions of genius indicate a less definite and hence "wider and vaguer" realm of subliminal work than sensorial subliminal intensification. Within the arts themselves, we shall see, there are similar differences.

A third possible interpretation of the arrangement of his materials is his movement from organic action to sensorial perception to thought and passion. A fourth would be the movement from modes of action to modes of perception to modes of making to modes of cognition terrestrial in character to modes of cognition transcendental in character. The variety of ways one can interpret the organization of this chapter is a consequence of Myers' conception of genius as both a psychological phenomenon involving a particular kind of interaction between the subliminal and supraliminal selves and a communicative activity involving "messages" with specific kinds of content. Myers is never quite capable of separating descriptive terminology from normative considerations.

Myers' Refutation of Lombroso and Nordau

One obvious consequence of Myers' notion of genius was its distinction from the more popular conception of genius which stated that genius was a physiological or psychological aberration indicative of degeneration. Myers was well aware of this difference of opinion and framed his definition in such a way that his chapter could be easily read as a refutation of "Professor Lombroso and those anthropologists who have discussed the characteristics of the man of genius with the result of showing (as they believe) that this apparently highest product of the race is in reality not a culminant but an aberrant manifestation; and that men of genius must be classed with criminals and lunatics, as persons in whom a want of balance or completeness of organization had lead on to an over-development of one side of their nature;--helpful or injurious to other men as accident may decide."<sup>102</sup>

Myers' refutation of Lombroso and Nordau and their followers revolves around his use of two key terms, "normality" and "instability."<sup>103</sup> Instability, of course, was a key phrase in the arguments of the proponents of the genius-degeneracy theory. Nordau, for example, had argued that the present stage of human development indicated an increase in nervous instability. With this, Myers was in complete agreement. But Myers disagreed with Nordau on the causes and consequences of this instability, for he believed that Nordau assumed on wrong and incomplete premises that instability in an advanced organism was indicative of degeneration in that organism and a reversion to its more primitive and unstable past. In response to this argument Myers

very carefully sets up his system so as to be able to distinguish genius from those aspects of the human personality indicative of disintegration and degeneration such as hysteria, morbidity, and debilitating alternations of the personality. The initial ground for this distinction is Myers' argument that careful observation of the ways in which the personality tends to disintegrate also suggests ways in which the personality may tend to more complete integration. One significant cause of personality disintegration is the extreme instability of the diaphragm which separates the conscious threshold from the subconscious. "Instability" is a key term in his description of fixations, hysteria, and morbidity. At the same time, however, he argues that it is this same permeability which makes possible the cure of such disabilities through hypnosis and suggestion.<sup>104</sup> The main point here is that one of the primary causes of abnormality--the permeability of the psychical diaphragm--is also one of the primary ways in which man can better control and coordinate these two phases of his personality.

For Myers, therefore, the instability of the psychical diaphragm was a sufficient condition for both abnormality and genius and thus the common denominator between the two. What he was principally interested in demonstrating, however, were the differing consequences of that instability which made for the necessary conditions of genius--increased control over the complex structure of our psychical being--and the necessary conditions for hysteria and other forms of personality disorder--a loss of control over the psychical organism at both the subliminal and the supraliminal level. Thus, contrary to Nordau

and Lombroso, instability for Myers was not itself indicative of disintegration or degeneration.

Assuming this to be true, Myers then goes on to account for the increase of nervous instability in the modern world, a point on which he agrees with Nordau. His argument here was that the causes of instability at the present time were a consequence of the nervous system undergoing a change, but a change "probably tending in each generation to become more complex and more delicately ramified. As is usual, when any part of an organism is undergoing rapid evolutionary change, this nervous progress is accompanied with some instability."

Those individuals in whom the hereditary or the acquired change is the most rapid are likely also to suffer most from this perturbation which masks evolution--this occasional appearance of what may be termed "nervous sports" of a useless or even injurious type. Such are the fancies and fanaticisms, the bizarre likes and dislikes, the excessive or aberrant sensibilities, which have been observed in some of the eminent men whom Lombroso discusses. Their truest analogue, as we shall presently see more fully, lies in the oddities or morbidities of sentiment or sensation which so often accompany the development of the human organism into its full potencies, or precede the crowning effort by which a fresh organism is introduced into the world.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, Myers argues that a "biological" conception of genius is more probable given certain significant assumptions than is a pathological conception. Without making specific reference to Morselli, he is clearly in the tradition of progressivism which Morselli initiated.<sup>106</sup>

Myers never tired of seeking metaphors or analogies which would clarify his notion of that "perturbation which masks evolution." One of his favorites was that of the image. Another, perhaps more significant, was that of the child or childhood. Thus he argues at one point in his text that the true analogue of the genius is not the criminal nor the lunatic but the child, particularly the adolescent.<sup>107</sup>

Another point of contention between Myers and the genius-abnormality theorists was Myers' argument that genius was characteristic of normality rather than abnormality. Much of Myers' attempted refutation of Lombroso and his followers, therefore, was devoted to defining what he meant by normality and then deducing the "normal" characteristics of genius.<sup>108</sup> This rather complex definition involved three basic assumptions. Firstly, one cannot discuss the normality of a living organism or a changing species as if it were a particular static quality or set of qualities. Secondly, every living organism raises its own particular problems with respect to the evolution of that organism. That man is in the process of evolving, for example, is not readily apparent. "It is possible to argue that the apparent advance in our race is due merely to the improvement which science has effected in its material environment, and not to any real development, during the historical period, in the character or faculties of man himself." And thirdly, Myers draws into his discussion of normality not only an evolutionary scheme but his whole notion of the subliminal self. "In seeking the true normality of man we must remember how much of psychical control goes on below the threshold."

Myers' definition plays on these three assumptions. The first two taken alone together yield a paradox. As a living organism, man must be undergoing change evolutive in character, yet is it "apparent" that the faculties and character of man have shown little real development. Myers' resolution of the paradox is marvelously simple. Once we understand that much of man's psychical operations goes on below the threshold of ordinary consciousness, we can argue that the evolu-

tion of man is contingent upon the evolution of his capacities to make use of these subliminal psychical operations and faculties to help him adjust to and discover his environment. Thus, through the introduction of assumption three, Myers can argue that the real development of man lies along the line of greater concentration in his own will and thought which in turn involves greater complexity in the perceptions which he forms of things without.<sup>109</sup> It is this concentration and complexity which yields the norms by which one must gauge the normality of a man. And since one must gauge the normality of a living species on the grounds of the average of the immediate future, Myers can argue that those who have greater control over their subliminal faculties and greater concentration in their own will and thought than the average of the here and now constitute the norm of the here and now, for they will then be the average of the immediate future.<sup>110</sup> Genius, of course, involves greater control over the subliminal self as well as greater concentration of inward faculty than that exercised by the average. Thus, genius is indicative of normality.

#### Poetry, Evolution and Cosmic Law

Earlier in this chapter, we noted how the significance of poetry and the poet was considerably diminished as a consequence of a number of ideas emerging from evolutionary doctrine, psychology and anthropology. Art was denigrated to a form of play, both in its resemblance to the activity of the child and in its function as a means by which man "works off" his surfeit of nervous energies formerly

necessary for his survival. For Tylor, the primitive poet exercised his imagination with myth and false belief based on erroneous assumptions about man, nature and the universe. Spencer had argued that among the hierarchy of utilities necessary for self preservation, among them the obtainment of sustenance and health and the fashioning of political and social conduct, the pleasure of the arts assumed no significant role.<sup>111</sup>

There were those, of course, who endeavored to rescue the arts from their diminished significance. In France, Guyau endeavored to raise art's self-esteem by refuting Spencer and his followers. So too did Alfred Russell Wallace in England.<sup>112</sup> Myers also engaged in these arguments. In his essay on Rossetti he had argued that human society had reached such a high level of sustenance, prosperity and education that its "preparation" for accepting the arts as a bona fide utility was complete.<sup>113</sup> In his essays on Tennyson he again took up the cudgels for the poet and poetry, this time arguing that the activity of poetic creation was possibly a cognitive activity revealing truths lying outside the scope of rational, conscious thought. In his chapter on genius in Human Personality Myers again defended the cause of the arts, bringing to bear on his subject his work in psychical research, his theory of the subliminal and his peculiar notions of evolution.

The means by which Myers argued his case was to restate his thesis on the distinctions between planetary and cosmic evolution. Thus, he begins with a hypothetical summary of the evolutionary scheme of things as it had been stated by those who conceived of it in the context of the materialistic synthesis. According to this view, Myers



argued, the universe had certain laws presumably antecedent to living matter and to which living matter must inevitably conform. Among those laws was the law which stated that living creatures must eat and propagate if life is to persist. "And the germ from which they sprang must have involved the faculties necessary for thus persisting. That germ developed along various lines into various animals; and the higher animals prove their superiority by outliving and dominating the lower. The main set and tendency of man's faculties points to a more and complete dominion over the material world."<sup>114</sup> Faculties develop largely through unpredictable sports. Among these, most tend to increase man's power over the material world. Others, however, tend only to man's pleasure, apart from his self-adaptation to a known environment. The complexity of the brain is such, and the inter-connections of faculty so subtle, "that the mere development of those useful faculties which lie in the direct track of evolution tend also to the formation of by-products--instincts, appetites and powers which tend to persist and grow."<sup>115</sup> Religion, spiritual love and all the higher gifts of genius--poetry, the plastic arts, music, philosophy and pure mathematics--are such by-products. None has the character whereby it enables man to gain dominion over the material world or aid him in his struggle for existence.

Implied in Myers' restatement of the materialistic synthesis is his subtle confirmation that the traditional evolutionist operates on a teleological basis with an assumed premise of a final cause.<sup>116</sup> The teleological dimensions of this thesis, however, are only planetary in scope. The final cause toward which human development is

advancing is man's adaptation for survival in the planetary world which surrounds him. Many of the by-products of this development are adventitious to this end and, as a consequence, are neither significant nor important in the scheme of things. To counteract this argument, Myers asks two questions. If art and poetry are not fundamental in the planetary scheme of things, was there any other teleological scheme for which they were fundamental? If such a scheme did exist, was it of equal significance to the planetary scheme? To answer these two questions, Myers rewrote the theory of evolution in the light of the consequences of his labors as a psychical researcher and the psychological postulates which these labors originated.

Myers' argument runs principally as follows. He does not disagree with those who argued that the history of the germ of life is a history of its "gradual self-adaptation" to a known environment. He argues, however, that this is only one side of the coin. The other side suggests that the history of the germ of life is a history of the "gradual discovery of an environment always there but unknown"<sup>117</sup> and of faculties having the capacity to make such discoveries. In effect, Myers argued that a significant aspect of the evolutionary history of life on earth has been a gradual evolution of faculties able to discover and reveal the environment of which life is a part. Furthermore, in the same way that one assumes that the history of life's self-adaptation to a known environment is a continuing process, one can also assume that the process of the awakening of nascent faculties and the further discovery of attributes and characteristics of our environment is still continuing.<sup>118</sup>

This supposition raises the question--from whence will emerge these nascent faculties? Myers replies that the nascent faculties which will further the discovery of our environment will emerge from the subliminal. One such unsuspected capacity, the capacity for telepathic percipience, Myers argues, has revealed that we had "long been acted upon by telepathic as well as by sensory stimuli; and that we are living in an inconceivable and limitless environment,--a thought world or spiritual universe charged with infinite life and inter-penetrating and overpassing all human spirits."<sup>119</sup> Genius, of course, is another such nascent faculty capable of discovering aspects of our environment which have always existed but which hitherto have been unknown because undiscovered. And what is true of genius is also true of the ways in which it manifests itself--poetry, the plastic arts, music, philosophy and pure mathematics. "All of these are precisely as much in the central stream of evolution in that they are perceptions of new truths and powers of new actions just as decisively predestined for the race of man as the aboriginal Australian's faculty for throwing a boomerang or for swarming up a tree for grubs."<sup>120</sup>

The suppositions of this argument differ from those of the materialist. Firstly, the products of genius are part of the main stream of evolutionary development. And, secondly, the final cause toward which these products are working, if not the scheme of planetary existence and planetary history, is to be fulfilled by man's cosmic history, a history both qualitatively and quantitatively more significant than man's terrestrial history and whose existence is demonstrated by the

emergence of such nascent faculties as telepathy. Thus, if one assumes the evolution of life to be operative only in a planetary environment, the manifestations of genius, for example, poetry, are products whose ends do not promote the adaptation of man to his known environment. If, however, one assumes that the evolution of life is also an evolution of latent faculties and capacities so potentialized that man discovers, perceives and responds to an environment previously unknown yet always there, an environment both terrestrial and spiritual, the mechanism of genius and its manifestations are extraordinarily significant. Poetry and the arts as well as philosophy and pure mathematics are no longer denigrated to a position of relative insignificance. They are raised to a higher power and given a status commensurate with their potentialities. Poetry is once again permitted to play its significant role on the cosmic stage.

#### Art Language and Symbol

In much the same way that Myers endeavored to cast light on the problem of genius and the importance and significance of poetry in the evolutionary scheme of things from the point of view of the theory of the subliminal, he also undertook to discuss the problem of art, language and symbol within the same psychological context.

His discussion of the relationship of poetry and art and language arose naturally from his argument that poetry and art, aspects of genius, are subliminal manifestations. The theory of the subliminal argued that the supraliminal everyday consciousness was only a fragment of our total self belying the complexities and pro-

fundities of the totality of our thoughts, emotions and perceptions.<sup>121</sup> Speech and language, initially subliminal products, through the process of evolution and development have become more and more under control of the supraliminal and hence less and less capable of expressing the growing complexity of our psychical being.<sup>122</sup> Thus, subliminal thought, emotion and perception transcend the scope of speech and language. Furthermore, evidence provided by an analysis of telepathic messages and automatic writing suggests that speech is not the habitual vehicle for subliminal expression nor is it the most congenial form of subliminal expression.

If then our everyday modes of communication through speech and word are inadequate means for expressing our profounder thoughts and emotions, how can the subliminal manifest itself in such a way that it can circumvent the finite and supraliminal limitations of ordinary instruments of communication? Myers' answer to this question is that the vehicle by which it does so is the vehicle of Art, the means which the subliminal appropriates and invents for the expression and discovery of those thoughts and emotions which lie hidden to our everyday consciousness in the depths of our subliminal. The movement here is from sign to symbol.

The inspiration of Art of all kinds consists in the invention of precisely such a wider symbolism as has been above adumbrated. I am not speaking, of course, of symbolism of a forced and mechanical kind—symbolism designed and elaborated as such—but rather of that pre-existent but hidden concordance between matter and thought, between thought and emotion, which the plastic arts, and music and poetry do each in their own special field discover and manifest for human wisdom and joy.<sup>123</sup>

Thus, it is through Art that man can express more complexly, imitate

more completely, and coordinate more meaningfully those thoughts, emotions and perceptions which extend beyond the range of our everyday vehicle of communication. Art employs finite means to invent means for suggestive representations of our whole psychical being.

There are a number of valuable ideas here which should be given special consideration. Firstly, Myers comes to a definition of art and a suggested explanation of its need and its origin through a discussion of the subliminal self and its means and methods of externalization. Since he believed that the problem of the subliminal was a problem which was the especial subject matter of psychology, one can say that Myers conceives of the problems of the origin of art, the need for art and the definition of art as problems whose especial province is that of psychology. It is through psychological science that these problems can be effectively discussed and understood.

Secondly, Myers very carefully distinguishes his definition of art as symbol from a variety of current definitions of art as symbol. Because he thought his definition of art empirical in character, he distinguishes it, for example, from those definitions of art as symbol which are inherently "mystical" in character. The subliminal for Myers was not a true unknown but a field of psychical experience having the potentiality to be known and understood through empirical and psychological inquiry. The problem of art as symbol, therefore, was not a problem which necessitated any supernatural or occult explanation. At the same time, he distinguished himself from those who evolved a conscious and deliberate literary symbolism, by assigning

a symbolic significance to certain colors, letters of the alphabet or numbers. He indicated that such a symbolism was forced and mechanical in character, indicative of supraliminal design and elaboration approximating the arbitrary symbolisms which have reached their modern fruition in alphabetical script, arithmetic, algebra and telegraphy.

Thirdly, important to Myers' definition of Art is his assertion that Art is not a conscious product but a subliminal invention preformed and preshaped below the conscious threshold. The discovery of wider symbols (as opposed to everyday signs of supraliminal communication) to convey the complex perceptions, thoughts and emotions of our greater psychical being is a subliminal function. This is not a difficult morsel to swallow if we are predisposed to accept purposeful subliminal activity on less significant levels. Fourthly, from Myers' definition of Art we can come to some understanding of what the artist is. Clearly, he is a genius who has the power of reaching downwards "by some self-suggestion which they no more than we can explain," to treasures of latent faculty in the hidden self and can appropriate those treasures to further his supraliminal designs.

We might note here that Myers does come close to the theorizing of the "symbolists" of the late nineteenth century in one significant respect. Not only does he conceive of Art in terms of the notion of symbol, but he conceives of Art as a form of self-expression and self communion. Art is a human mode of "self-expression." "We may ask ourselves in what kind of subliminal uprush this hidden habit of wider symbolism, of self-communion beyond the limits of speech, will be likely to manifest itself above the conscious threshold."

Like such interpreters of symbolism, for example, as Arthur Symons, Myers suggests that art and poetry differ from rhetoric in that their controlling principle is not an audience which is to be addressed, compromised, persuaded or instructed but the invention of symbols from finite means which enables the artist to express and imitate more completely and wholly his private or inward emotions, thoughts and visions.

As early as 1879, Myers used a phrase which represents the distinction between poetry and rhetoric which was to have its echoes down through the end of the century. Adopting the terminology of Mill wherein the philosopher distinguishes poetry from eloquence, Myers argues in his essay on Hugo that the emotions of the poet should be overheard, not adjusted to the expectations of his public.<sup>124</sup> Symons also frequently declaimed against confusing poetry with rhetoric, and he did so with very much the same terminology. In praising the poems of De Nerval, for example, Symons argued that de Nerval "knew that the whole mystery of beauty can never be comprehended by the crowd, and that while clearness is a virtue of style, perfect explicitness is not a necessary virtue. So it was with disdain, as well as with confidence, that he allowed these sonnets to be overheard."<sup>125</sup> And commenting on Verlaine, Symons wrote that

From the moment when his inner life may be said to have begun, he was occupied with the task of an unceasing confession, in which one seems to overhear him talking to himself, in that vague pre-occupied way which he had often had. Here again are words which startle one by their delicate resemblance to thoughts, by their winged flights from so far, by their alighting so close. The verse murmurs with such an ingenious confidence, such intimate secrets. That "setting free" of verse, which is one of the



achievements of Verlaine, was itself mainly an attempt to be more and more sincere, a way of turning poetic artifice to a new account, by getting back to nature itself, hidden away under the eloquent rhetoric of Hugo, Baudelaire, and the Parnassians. In the devotion of rhetoric to either beauty or truth, there is a certain consciousness of an audience, of an external judgment: rhetoric would convince, be admired. It is the very essence of poetry to be unconscious of anything between its own moment of flight and the supreme beauty which it will never attain. Verlaine taught French poetry that wise and subtle unconsciousness.<sup>126</sup>

Even though, however, Myers and Symons both agree that art is symbol and true art is a form of self-expression and self-communion non-rhetorical in character, the context of their arguments differs considerably. Symons, for example, sees the problem of rhetoric and poetic in the context of a mystical philosophy. Myers argues his point from the context of psychological science. Thus, the interaction of the subliminal and the supraliminal is the source of Myers' notions of art as symbol and self-communication. The self-communion overheard by the reader or admirer of a poet, however, is the communion or dialogue of the artist's supraliminal and subliminal states of consciousness or, in other words, the dialogue and communion of the artist's cosmic and terrestrial selves. Furthermore, Myers' argument that the subliminal self is the active agent in artistic creativity and invention, although not the initiating agent, adds a significant dimension to the notion of art as a form of self expression which expresses the complexity and profundity of the artist's own inner thoughts, perceptions, emotions and visions. He believed that the true self ultimately was the cosmological self, the subliminal; thus, he is really commenting not so much on self-expression as he is commenting on Self-expression. Thus, as a consequence of his indi-

vidualistic approach to art and symbol arising out of his work in psychological research, Myers both differs from and approximates the symbolists writing at the end of the century.

Symons argued that symbolism "is a form of expression, at the best but approximate, essentially but arbitrarily, until it has obtained the force of a convention, for an unseen reality apprehended by the consciousness."<sup>127</sup> Myers would agree with Symons that symbolism was a form of expression. He would agree also that it was a form which crystallized the finite and the infinite in such a way that the symbol expressed an unseen reality apprehended by the consciousness. Yet Myers would not agree that true symbolism could ever obtain the force of a convention. He further endeavored to define as specifically as possible what that "consciousness" which apprehends an unseen reality consisted of. Symons frequently refers to psychology in his text. He speaks, for example, of double personality, dreams, madness, an inner self and a subconscious self. Unlike Myers, however, his comments on psychology and internal states never approximate adequate definition and he never demonstrates that his psychological concepts or principles are facts which in some sense are empirically and not mystically and deductively grounded.

#### The Subliminal and Distinctions Among the Arts

In the realm of genius in general, the subliminal can operate through a variety of senses, the sense of the efflux of time, the sense of smell, the sense of weight, of sight, of hearing, or of taste. As in hypnotic trance, different modes of subliminal faculty can in-

tensify the character of that faculty as it operates on the conscious level. When we speak, however, of subliminal intensification of those faculties involved in the making of artistic products, we speak essentially only of two--the visual and the auditory.<sup>128</sup> Thus, Myers divides artists into two primary types. There are those, for example, whose subliminal faculties manifest themselves in internal visualizations, pictures, images, idealizations. The sculptor or painter is one whose complex subliminal thought and emotion crystallizes around idealizations and images and it is through images and idealization that the sculptor's subliminal externalizes itself. There are those also, however, whose subliminal manifests itself auditorily. Inward audition is to the poet or the musician what inward visualization is to the painter or sculptor.<sup>129</sup>

Poetry and music for Myers are therefore both forms of a wider symbolism or art by which the inventive facilities of the subliminal endeavor to transcend ordinary signs of communication and expression and ordinary supraliminal thought and emotion. Both also are externalized products of inward audition and both are symbolic products preformed below the conscious threshold. As in the earlier essay on Virgil, however, Myers also denotes several important distinctions between the two arts. Music is differentiated from poetry and song because music involves primarily the intensity of sound whereas poetry and song involve also the complexity of sounds.<sup>130</sup> Poetry is, at the same time, differentiated from song in that song involves the interrelations of rhythm and articulation while poetry involves these two qualities and also interrelations of pitch, definite time-intervals

and timbre.<sup>131</sup> Myers also formulates a crucial distinction between poetry and music in terms of the relationship of motor and sensory elements by which each manifests itself. In this instance he is getting at an idea which has from time to time been the subject of some controversy--the description of poetry and identification of poetry in terms of distinct physical reactions to it. Housman said at one time, for example, that "Poetry indeed seems to me more physical than intellectual."<sup>132</sup> Myers has little to say about the pit of the stomach or the shivering of the spine, but he did argue that poets and those who have an ear for poetry differ from musicians as a consequence of their physiological responses to verbal rhythms and sounds. "In all definite inward audition, there is, then, probably a motor element as well as a sensory. And I hold that one difference between imagined poetry and imagined music or song lies in the fact that imagined verbal rhythm may be almost wholly motor, while imagined tunes must be largely sensory as well."<sup>133</sup>

The most significant distinction which Myers draws between music and poetry, however, is a consequence of his argument that poetry works in the medium of expressive signs which are least amenable to subliminal control. The material of poetry is speech, and speech is an instrument of communication more definite, more logical and more subjected to the uses and control of the supraliminal than is the material either of music or painting. At one point in his chapter on genius, Myers argued that the subliminal was closer to the spiritual world than the supraliminal and, hence, one step nearer to the primitive source of life.<sup>134</sup> Thus, one can say that the inspirations of

genius spring from a source one step nearer to primitive reality than the specialized consensus of faculties which natural selection has lifted above the conscious threshold for the purposes of everyday existence. In distinguishing poetry from music, Myers takes this argument one step further. Among subliminal products some are nearer to primitive reality than others in that the materials they work with are less amenable to the necessities of terrestrial life. In an essay on genius and hysteria, Myers wrote that "one great art, that of music, in its primitive potency and its indefinite meaning, seems like a symbolism to which we have lost the key." Poetry, on the other hand, uses the material which "she would fain transcend."<sup>135</sup>

From this point of view, Myers gives us an arrangement of the arts in terms of the serviceability of their materials to subliminal control. Those materials least involved with the necessities of life are less definite than those which are so involved and more easily manipulated by the inventive faculties of the subliminal. Those materials which do function for various reasons in our everyday world under the immediate control of the supraliminal are more definite in their character as serviceable modes of communication and less subject to the control of the subliminal. Nevertheless, given the inherent difficulties involved in its medium, poetry is distinguishable from other forms of verbal communication in that it is a subliminal product and a symbolic product. "Her utterance must be subliminal and symbolic if it is to be poetry indeed; it must rise from a realm profounder than deliberate speech; it must come charged, as Tennyson has it, with that 'charm in words, a charm no words can give.'"<sup>136</sup>

In a very real sense, Myers is here taking up the threads of his essays on Virgil and Wordsworth and reworking them in the context of his theory of the subliminal. In defending Virgil's merit as an artist and a poet, for example, Myers began from the same beginning: the range of human thoughts and emotions greatly transcends the range of such ordinary symbols (the gesture, spoken word, written word, etc.) which man has developed naturally or artificially to express his thoughts and emotions.<sup>137</sup> In his essay on genius Myers very neatly translates the vague notions and unproved assumptions of the two earlier essays into the language of his subliminal psychology. In the Virgil essay, poetry of the highest order raised every word to a higher power so that it was both a logical step in the argument and a musical sound and a centre of emotional force. In its new setting, poetry of the highest order is both symbolical and subliminal.

In the Virgil essay and the Wordsworth essay, the source of such poetry was either the "unconscious" or a vague "specialized faculty." Commenting on one of Wordsworth's poems, for example, Myers wrote that "We must not suppose that Wordsworth consciously sought these alliterations, arranged these accents, resolved to introduce an unusual word in the last line, or hunted for a classical allusion. But what the poet's brain does not do consciously it does unconsciously; a selective action is going on in its recesses simultaneously with the overt train of thought, and on the degree of this unconscious suggestiveness the richness and melody of the poetry will depend."<sup>138</sup> In his essay on genius and in the context of his subliminal psychology Myers perhaps would rephrase this statement, but

in essence he would say very much the same thing. The greatness of the poetry of Wordsworth or of Virgil is a consequence of supraliminal control by self-suggestion over the inward unifying forces of the subliminal which is capable of crystallizing thought and emotion into auditory symbols conveying potent and intimate messages expressive of our whole being through mechanisms of the slenderest kind.

The Language of Psychology and the Language  
of Criticism

Myers frequently stated that his remarks on the relationship between psychology and poetry were purely descriptive in character and not meant to serve the function of criticism. "The aesthetic critic asks whether the thought and images which surge up ready made to the artist's or poet's mind--his inspirations--are such as to give delight to other men. Unless they are such, the critic refuses to him the name of genius. To the psychologist, on the other hand, it matters little whether other men find joy in the artist's inspirations or no. The question which interests him is how these inspirations arise? Can we prove they were matured by subliminal mentation beyond the artist's conscious control, and then presented to him as finished products from his subterranean workshops?"<sup>139</sup> Aside from this declamation and similar ones against abusing his thesis, however, Myers' psychological descriptions and definitions do serve as criteria for aesthetic judgment and evaluation. Descriptive terminology frequently emerges as normative terminology and quantitative distinctions frequently become qualitative distinctions.

We might note, for example, that Myers continually compares

works of art. Wiertz's "Vision of the Guillotined Head," Haydon's "Raising of Lazarus," Raphael's "Sistine Madonna," Blake's Prophetic Books, Coleridge's "Kubla Khan" and a disordered opium dream all conspicuously represent "the same inward process,--the same sense of subliminal uprush--that extension, in other words, of mental concentration which draws into immediate cognizance some workings of elements of the hidden self."<sup>140</sup> At the same time, however, as artistic products, some parts of Blake's poetry are superior to others, "Kubla Khan" is superior to a disordered opium dream, and Raphael's "Sistine Madonna" is superior to Wiertz's "Vision of the Guillotined Head" and Haydon's "Raising of Lazarus."

To describe how Myers distinguishes these art products on qualitative grounds we must consider three interrelated assumptions which he makes. The artist is a man of genius who carries the power of inward concentration farther than others, "reaching downwards by some self-suggestion which he no more than we can explain to treasures of latent faculty in the hidden self." The art product is dependent upon the inventive faculties of the subliminal, which crystallizes, preforms and shapes the wider symbolism which is art. And the character or quality of the subliminal as an agent of discovery and invention differs between one man and another and may differ in the same man at different times.

Herbert Spencer had argued in his evolutionary schematism that whether one speaks of politics, art, psychology or philosophy that which involved greater differentiation and integration, coherence, control, complexity and coordination was higher on the evolu-



tionary scale than that which involved less so.<sup>141</sup> Drawing heavily on Spencer's scheme, the neurologist Hughlings-Jackson in turn applied a similar scheme to his hierarchical arrangement of the nervous centers. In its highest stage of development, the higher level nervous centers, involving great complexity, differentiation and coordination of function, controlled the middle and lower level centers in such a way that all centers worked together coordinately and harmoniously.<sup>142</sup>

Influenced by Jackson, as we noted earlier, Myers in turn argued by analogy that a similar arrangement involving similar descriptive terminology was applicable to the description of the subliminal and its operations.<sup>143</sup> It too consisted of higher centers of control, middle centers and lower level centers involving individually and collectively various stages of integration, concentration, coordination, differentiation, complexity and control. The genius differs from the ordinary man in that he more readily coordinates his subliminal and supraliminal selves through greater inward concentration and control. He has greater complexity in the perceptions which he forms of things without and greater concentration in his own will and thought. What is true of genius in relation to other men is also true of man in relation to other animals and modern civilization in relation to other civilizations or no civilization at all. "Of all creatures, man has gone furthest in differentiation and in integration; he has called into activity the greatest number of those faculties which lay potentially in the primary germ, and he has established over those faculties the strongest central control. The process still continues. Civilization adds to the complexity of his faculties; education helps him to their concentration."<sup>144</sup>

The same terminology by which Myers distinguishes the genius from the ordinary man, the centers of subliminal control, and the various stages of evolutionary development function as his norms for evaluation and judgment when he distinguishes art products from each other. The descriptive terminology of biology, neurology and psychology becomes an evaluative terminology when judging and criticizing artistic products. Thus, when the highest level centers of the subliminal control and coordinate the lower level centers, the inspiration of genius and the subliminal uprush crystalize a product of perfect artistic form such as the "Sistine Madonna." When the inventive faculties of the subliminal are under the control only of the middle level and less coordinated and less coherent centers of subliminal control, "we have products which, while containing traces of some faculty beyond our common scope, involve something as random and meaningless as the discharge of the uncontrolled middle-level centers of arms and legs in the epileptic fit. We get, in short, a series of phenomena which the term dream-like seems best to describe."<sup>145</sup> Such would be the disordered opium dream or Wiertz's "Vision"; in the work of Blake, Myers points out, "we see the subliminal self flashing for moments into unity, then smouldering again in a lurid and scattered glow."<sup>146</sup>

Thus, to rewrite in his own terms Myers' comparison of different subliminal artistic products, one can state that both the "Sistine Madonna" and Wiertz's "Vision" are psychologically similar in that both indicate that the agent of their production and source was the artist's integration of complex ideas and emotions "floating in the

subliminal" and the coordination and cooperation of the subliminal faculties of internal visualization with supraliminal process. Yet the two pictures differ aesthetically and artistically in that the "Sistine Madonna" as a symbolic product evinces more sustained and substantial, perhaps wiser and "more profound," control of the inventive faculty of the subliminal so that the preformed product of this invention represents greater complexity and differentiation and yet greater integration, coordination and organization. One is the product of the highest level centers of the subliminal and is a reflection of the quality of those centers whereas the other is not.

Myers' argument that poetry must be subliminal and symbolic if it is to be true poetry can be similarly translated into these descriptive and qualitative terms.<sup>147</sup> True poetry differs from other kinds of linguistic statement in terms of the mechanism or agent of its production and in terms of the peculiar kind of product formed. The mechanism of its coming into being involves greater control of the poet's whole psychical being and greater coordination, cooperation and integration of the subliminal self and the supraliminal self. In this context, the mechanism is more complex than the mechanisms of voluntary thought or supraliminal manipulation, for it involves the capacity to utilize powers which lie too deep for the ordinary man's control. At the same time, the symbolic product which emerges from the integration and cooperation of subliminal and supraliminal faculty differs from products designed and elaborated solely by voluntary thought. A reflection of its source, the subliminal product expresses more of the complexity of our psychical being. In

art products, this complexity manifests itself in the complexity of imagined sounds, and greater control and integration of thought and emotion, matter and thought, the visible and the invisible than supraliminal or voluntary invention operating through instruments adapted to the needs of science, convenience, commerce and technology. Thus the source of poetry and the peculiar kind of product which that source manifests is distinguished from the source and product involved in other modes of discourse.<sup>148</sup>

Not only does the terminology of Myers' psychology, biology and evolutionary theory enable him to distinguish and evaluate products which have their source in either the supraliminal or the subliminal, but it enables him to distinguish and evaluate products whose source is the subliminal only. Thus, to translate the thesis of his Virgil essay into these terms, one can say that Virgil is not only a true poet whose poetry is both subliminal and symbolic, but he is a poet of the highest order as a consequence of the quality of his inventive faculties which are reflected in the quality of the product which that source emits, a product involving only the highest levels of differentiation, integration, coherence, control, complexity and coordination. Thus, Myers' essay on genius enunciates a theory of poetry and art which provides both a description of the knowable processes of invention and creation and a theory of judgment and criticism. The tools and vocabulary of psychological definition are also the tools and vocabulary of critical evaluation.

#### Art and Automatism: the Poet and the Sensitive

Hypnosis, hysteria, trance, sleep, dreams, possession, ec-

stasy, and motor and sensory automatism in Myers' paradigm are all species of the same genus of psychological phenomena, for each is a phase of the process whereby the subliminal or self below the threshold influences, interacts with, or obliterates the self above the threshold. Therefore, even though genius has its own distinctive characteristics as a species of subliminal behavior, as part of this wider genus its relationship to other phases of subliminal behavior is such that genius frequently merges with one or more of these other subliminal activities. The upshot of this relationship is significant because poetry and art and other creative activities are aspects of genius. As one might expect, therefore, Myers' discussion of poetry and art from his own peculiar psychological perspective frequently draws these other subliminal activities so closely aligned to genius into the argument. Thus, in his correspondence, his reviews, his essays and his Human Personality, Myers frequently discusses poetry and creativity from the perspective of these different subliminal activities, among them dreams, motor automatism, possession, hallucination, and crystal gazing.<sup>149</sup> To trace out these various relationships would entail a chapter in itself. Consequently, I shall concentrate my energies on two which are most significant—the relationship of automatism to creativity and the relationship of the genius to the sensitive.

Earlier in this study we noted in some detail Myers' early preoccupation with a theory of literature roughly approximating a theory of improvisation. In the 1860's, the musician was for Myers an analogue of the artist and the poet. The improvisations of Virgil,

Jebb, Tennyson, Swinburne or Morris were products of the inventive faculties of the artist, but from whence they came or how they came was not a significant question for Myers at that time. In his chapter on genius in Human Personality, however, Myers took up the subject of improvisation once again. In this instance, his approach to this subject matter was distinctively psychological in character. In particular, improvisation is discussed as an analogue of genius and as an aspect of automatism.

Automatism for Myers is defined as subliminal mentation forcing itself up through the subliminal without amalgamation with the supraliminal and without working in harmony with the supraliminal at its direction or "suggestion."<sup>150</sup> Fundamentally, the relationship of genius to automatism is one of proportion and magnitude. Just as anger is a brief madness, the flash of genius is a brief automatism. The extension of this momentary flash over a period of time is what Myers calls improvisation.<sup>151</sup>

Working with such material as oratory and musicianship, Myers distinguishes two kinds of improvisation. At the first level he places secondary automatic action,<sup>152</sup> a state in which bodily movements seem to take place independently of the consciousness and the volition of the subject and seem independent of all conscious processes. Myers did not believe such a state existed, but he here uses it for purposes of argument. A musician who plays a known piece without conscious attention or an orator "thinking on his legs" who "trusts himself at first to the automatic repetition of a few stock phrases," are Myers' illustrations of secondary automatic activity.<sup>153</sup>

Such activity Myers characterizes as stereotyped habituations involving transcription from memory roughly parallel on the psychical level to a state of comatose on the physical level.

At another level, however, Myers speaks of improvisation which can be called extemporization. Unlike the first level, extemporization exhibits some invention and adaptability on the part of the nervous functions which are operating. "We thus get beyond the range of stereotyped synergies or habituations of particular groups of nerve-centres to common action. There is some adaptability and invention [rather than pure transcription]; some new paths are traversed; adjustments are made for which no mere recurrence to old precedents will suffice."<sup>154</sup> Myers characteristically reverts to an analogy to describe the activity of extemporization. Extemporization corresponds to the regrowth of physiological material and the reorganization of physiological functions after a severe injury to the brain.<sup>155</sup> Ordinary growth is like the lowest level of oratory and musicianship; it is predetermined through habitual synergies. When some elements of that synergy are damaged, however, those elements which remain must assume functions they never exercised before. Paths of cerebral communication must be rearranged and adjustments and adaptations must be made in order to get the old efficiency out of the damaged material. Translating these physiological terms into psychological terms, one can say that in extemporization the conventional links of memory and association are somehow broken. Consequently, new connectives and associations must be made. Through adaptation and invention, the subliminal, without working in immediate cooperation with the supraliminal, re-

fashions a new synergy of cerebral operants. Thus, the new product is something more than the rapid exercise of ordinary powers exhibited at the first level. Myers' analogy leaves much unanswered. Yet there is much in the analogy of importance. For example, the oratorical or musical product which is the result of extemporization is not new in the sense of original. The material with which the orator or the musician works is material which already has had an existence and was familiar to the supraliminal. But the material now is rearranged and organized by the subliminal into a new shape formed by a new combination of old parts.

One question which Myers' discussion of extemporization and improvisation raises is the question whether Myers is drawing any real distinction between the products of genius--poetry, music, the plastic arts, painting and higher mathematics--and the products of extemporization and improvisation. Clearly, it seems to me, he is. The materials of the two activities differ. In speaking of extemporization, for example, he speaks not of poetry but of rhetoric. Furthermore, he does not discuss music as a creative activity but music as musicianship. Nowhere in his discussion of extemporization or improvisation does Myers refer to his notion of symbolism. In his discussion of Art, Myers' emphasis was on the qualitative distinction of the product from the sum of its parts. Invention here involved something new, raised, as Myers expressed it, "to a higher power." This was particularly true of poetry where the symbols or signs of ordinary supraliminal communication were invested with a new quality by the invention of the subliminal operating in and through auditory symbols to create a higher



symbolism expressive of the infinite potentiality of our subliminal thought and emotion. The consequences of extemporization, however, involves nothing qualitatively different from the sum of its parts. Extemporization merely constructs new patterns out of ready-made materials. The distinction between improvisation, extemporization and art is apparently a fundamental one for Myers. It was fundamental in the same sense that the distinction between the memory, the fancy and the secondary imagination was fundamental for Coleridge, his great predecessor in psychological criticism.

Since genius is a means of subliminal manifestation closely akin to automatism, and since automatism itself is the principal means by which the subliminal manifests knowledge beyond the capacities of the supraliminal, the problem of the relationship of the genius as artist and the automatist as sensitive was one which Myers also discussed. In the two essays on Tennyson which we looked at earlier, Myers endeavored to work out this relationship in rather rough and approximate fashion. In his chapter on genius he takes up the problem again in more detail and from a broader perspective. In this instance, he chooses Wordsworth to illustrate how the poet or the artist approximates the true seer or prophet of supernormal faculty. What primarily distinguished the man of genius from other men was his ability through self-suggestion to gain access to the subliminal, not the peculiar quality of the subliminal itself.<sup>156</sup> "From his subliminal self he can only draw what it already possesses; and we must not assume as a matter of course that the subliminal region of any one of us possesses that peculiar sensitivity—that specific transparency—which

can receive and register definite facts from the unseen."<sup>157</sup> The genius represents normality. The sensitive, however, taps a subliminal of supernormal potentiality. "That may be a gift which stands as much alone--in independence of other faculties--in the subliminal region as, say, a perfect musical ear in the supraliminal."<sup>158</sup> After making this crucial distinction, however, Myers uses the evidence of Socrates and Joan of Arc to argue that certain higher forms of genius bear witness to teleaesthetic and telepathic impressions generating precognitive information and an awareness of the spiritual universe. It is not only the distinctive quality of the subliminal itself which is significant here, but the content of the message manifested by the uprush.

The primary distinction between the higher forms of genius and the sensitive in matters of cognition is the distinction roughly involved in the words "intimation" and "definition" or "awareness" and "knowledge." Speaking of genius in this context, for example, Myers wrote that "the knowledge gained is simply a perception of the invisible world; there is no claim to any more definite revelation."<sup>159</sup> To demonstrate his point, Myers chooses Wordsworth and Plato for purposes of example and illustration, the first an example of genius intuiting and intimating truths teleaesthetically and the second telepathically. What he does in each of these arguments is to neatly translate a number of key passages from The Prelude or the Symposium into the language of his own psychology. Wordsworth's description of the powers of the imagination, for example, becomes for Myers an expression in the language of poetry of the very relationship of the subliminal and the supraliminal which he has been examining.

For our purposes, the most significant aspect of Myers' argument regarding the vague supernormal content occasionally found in moments of inspiration is his ranking of artistic kinds in a hierarchy capable of communicating these intimations. The genius as a seer is a genius of a higher kind than normative genius and also a genius of a certain type. The mathematician, the painter, the musician, the philosopher and the poet—these are the distinctive types of creative genius for Myers. But among them, "those concerned with numbers, forms, and sounds do not seem habitually to tend toward the apprehension of deeper aspects of the cosmic mystery."<sup>160</sup> The mathematician is unlikely to give expression to supernormal intimations and the painter and composer "command arts of expression so subtly and obscurely suggestive that it is hard for the mere onlooker to infer what the artist's own spiritual attitude may in fact have been. Deeply interesting, therefore, as such discussions may be—discussion as to what was the inward experience of a Raphael or a Beethoven—the content of that experience must at present be too uncertain for any psychological analysis such as we wish to make here, of its veritable truth—of its trustworthiness as actual insight into a spiritual world."<sup>161</sup> This leaves, of course, only the philosopher and the poet. But among poets and philosophers Myers must again make distinctions. Philosophers who have utilized uprushes of subliminal faculty to crystallize the products of supraliminal thought are few in number. Among poets, those of the objective type—the epic or dramatic poet—are less likely to be self-expressive than the lyricist.

The significance of Myers' argument here is that it is one of

several arrangements of the arts in his later essays. In this instance, when one compares arts in terms of their messages, poetry is differentiated from painting and music in terms of the capacity of the medium of the art for the expression of intimations of truth. "Moments of inspiration in all artistic endeavor are apt to be moments also of some sense or insight or entrance into a supernal world."<sup>162</sup> Yet only the poet is capable of effectively conveying and translating that moment into a communicative and intelligible form. At the same time, however, and here we return to an earlier arrangement of the arts, the poet is distinct from the painter and the musician because he works with materials which are most recalcitrant to the inventive and symbolic potentialities of the subliminal. The arrangement of the arts here is considerably different from the later arrangement.

Thus, Myers' analysis of the arts in the context of psychological principles growing out of his work in psychical research permits an evaluation and characterization of the arts on two different levels--those more amenable to symbolic statement and subliminal crystallization and those more amenable to the expression of truth or a significant insight in the form of a communicable message. His analysis of the arts from his own distinctive perspective, therefore, takes cognizance of the two broad categories of nineteenth century critics. There were those, for example, who were interested in Art as a form of symbolic expression and for whom the reduction of Art to reasoned articulation, rhetoric, or communicative expression was an anathema. There were also those who looked upon Art as a means of conveying and communicating significant thoughts and messages in an

articulate way not accessible to others. In each instance, the art product, whether symbolical or communicative, is deemed truer and more permanent than other kinds of human products. In each instance also, Myers provides psychological and experimental evidence to illustrate both theories. Art does use a wider symbolism than that afforded by the instruments of conscious and voluntary thought and the artist as poet is capable of revealing certain truths not accessible to supraliminal cognition. That which demonstrates the significance and uniqueness of the artist and the art product in each instance is Myers' notion of the subliminal self. The subliminal both invents the wider symbolism of art and permits the artist access to intuitive truths. Thus, Myers' theory of the subliminal and his conception of genius, both of which are evidential and empirical in character, justify the two notions of the artist as inventor of symbols and the artist as a conveyor of significant truth.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

The kind of study we have been engaged in makes it difficult to state conclusions concretely and specifically. Our purpose in this thesis was to demonstrate the impact of the psychological research movement of the nineteenth century on the literary criticism and theory of F. W. H. Myers. To accomplish our ends, we have done a somewhat truncated history of Myers' critical development, comparing his critical principles of the sixties and early seventies, his criticism of the late seventies and early eighties, and his critical and theoretical assumptions of the late eighties and nineties. In so doing, we indicated in each instance the causal factors which initiated important changes in Myers' thought. In chapter ii, chapter iv and chapter vi we distinguished three distinctive stages in Myers' critical and theoretical development. In chapter iii and chapter v we indicated how the changes in Myers' thought were a direct consequence of his interest in psychological research and his labors as a psychological researcher.

The three crucial changes in Myers' critical and theoretical development can be variously distinguished.

In his first stage, for example, Myers was concerned primarily with distinguishing poetry from other kinds of literary and verbal

discourse. His prize poem of 1863 had been criticized as a plagiarism, for Myers forced into his own poem a number of lines from classical poems and from prize poems written at Oxford. Responding to his critics and justifying his practice, Myers asked what it is which distinguishes poetry as an art form from historical, philosophical and rhetorical discourse. His response to his own question and his defense of his own practices sprang directly from his education as a classicist. He argued persuasively that the distinctive characteristics of a poem have little or nothing to do with its content. Borrowing from the ancient classical notion of literary imitation, Myers asserted that a poem is a structure of words arranged in such a way that its style, its mannerism and its underlying rhythmical support constituted a whole. What makes poetry an art for Myers, and it is distinctively as an art that he discusses poetry in this stage of his development, is the poet's ability to synthesize mannerism, style, metre and rhythm into a concrete whole which is something greater than just the sum of its parts.

In the late seventies and the early eighties, Myers' conception of poetry changed radically. For example, Myers no longer insisted on discussing poetry as a distinctive art form. Rather, he now talked about poetry as if it were a vehicle for the communication of certain truths of a special philosophical character. He now prescribed requisites necessary for the successful communication of truth, requisites not artistic in character but primarily rhetorical in character. In this second stage of his development, poems were no longer ends in themselves but were now means to an end. Thus,

they were means by which one evaluates a given position toward man and his relationship to the universe or means of evaluating what the nineteenth century can learn from poets, poems and poetry in order to effect its intellectual and emotional deliverance. In asking what one can learn from a work of art, Myers does not speak in terms of structuring experience into an artistic whole nor in structuring language to achieve certain special poetic effects, but in terms of what a poem tells us about the artist, the way in which he views the world, his moral character, and his grasp of the deep-seated problems of human life and human destiny. Quite clearly, in his Essays, Classical and Modern, Myers discusses poets, poetry, novels and novelists in much the same way that he discusses historians, scientists, philosophers, literary critics and religious controversialists. Myers does not altogether neglect the function of the artist as the maker of a special kind of product. Thus, he talks about rhythm and rhyme in his essay on Hugo and in his essay on Virgil he speaks of the special province of the poet as using language in such a way as to synthesize the suggested and expressed emotion. On the whole, however, these are secondary subject matters in the essays of this second period.

In his third stage of critical and theoretical development, Myers was mainly concerned with the mechanics of creativity and inspiration. In his first stage his interests were almost wholly poetical. In the second stage, they were primarily rhetorical. Here in the third stage, however, Myers' interests are primarily psychological and cosmological. Myers' problem in the nineties was not the



problem of what can one learn from the work of a given poet but what are the psychological mechanisms at work in the act of creating poetry and how do these mechanisms operate so that the poet can both intuit truths and make products which can successfully suggest or "mime" those truths. This problem is now conceived of as a psychological problem and not as a rhetorical problem.

I do not believe the development of Myers' thinking on poetry, literature and art is contingent upon any necessary internal consistency. The stages of that development are not dialectical in character but spring from those outside influences with which Myers was interacting. The first stage of his critical thought, therefore, reflects Myers' classical education and his abilities to compete successfully for poetry prizes, both as a schoolboy and an undergraduate. It was his skill with classical languages that brought him into contact with Conington and it was his contact with Conington that brought about the synthesis in Myers' thought of classical theories of literary imitation and the aesthetic doctrine of "pure poetry."

Myers' critical assumptions and attitudes from 1877 to 1883 were all reflections of his growing involvement with the psychological research movement as a means of solving what he considered to be his own personal problems and the most significant problems of the Victorian period. The ideas, experiences and considerations which brought Myers to psychological research under the tutelage of Sidgwick and others also brought Myers to the critical principles and attitudes enunciated in his Essays, Classical and his Essays, Modern. In this sense, his criticism of this period was a kind of apologetics, a means for ex-

horting his contemporaries to realize possible solutions to the religious and moral dilemma of the nineteenth century and to persuade them to adopt that solution toward which Myers himself was tending. Thus, poets were held up as examples of differing attitudes toward that religious crisis; their poems constituted successful or unsuccessful attempts to solve that crisis in a meaningful way, and Myers' poetics itself at this time was largely a part of his general criticism of nineteenth century science and the inhibiting attitudes of nineteenth century rationalism.

If Myers' criticism in Essays, Classical and Essays, Modern presupposed the question of what is necessary if the nineteenth century is to realize and initiate its intellectual and emotional deliverance, his critical principles and theoretical assumptions of the nineties presupposed his theory of the subliminal self and the whole system of ideas generated by Myers' work in psychical research and his exploration of human personality and supernormal faculties. Myers was still concerned with the problem of invention and discovery. But in the first stage of his critical thinking, the problem of invention and discovery was closely bound up with the problem of literary imitation and creative translation. In the second stage of his development, the problem of invention and discovery was the larger problem of using literature as a means of inventing and discovering possible solutions to the religious crisis of the Victorian period. In the third and final stage of his development, the problem of invention and discovery was the problem of the successful interaction of the subliminal and the supraliminal self and the

creative possibilities of the subliminal for employing the finite tools of supraliminal communication to invent and discover symbols capable of suggesting and representing truths of a telepathic and teleaesthetic character.

In the sixties and early seventies, Myers endeavored to define poetry in distinctively artistic terms and to limit the vocabulary of poetic and artistic criticism. His involvement with the psychical research movement in the late seventies and early eighties and his enthusiasm for promulgating the cause of psychical research led to a considerable expansion of his notions of the function of poetry and the poet and the tools and critical vocabulary of criticism. In the nineties, the vocabulary of Myers' literary criticism and literary theory lost all particularity. His theory of genius, his notions of creativity and inspiration, his concept of symbol, the distinctions he drew between poetry and automatism, and the interaction which he suggested existed between poetry, evolution and cosmic law were all discussed in the context of the disciplines of biology, anthropology, psychology and psychical research. Poetry was no longer a distinctive discipline requiring its own distinctive critical vocabulary. Myers now conceived of poetry as a function of genius and a sub-function of the activity of the subliminal self. As such, poetry was now part of the cosmological paradigm which Myers' theoretical labors in psychical research ultimately evolved. Because Myers' work in psychical research drew heavily upon a wide variety of different intellectual disciplines and endeavored to integrate and synthesize them in a cosmological structure, his theory of poetry and art was

ultimately a synthesis of these different disciplines. So, too, was the critical vocabulary with which he discussed and talked about poetry and art.

## FOOTNOTES

### Notes to Chapter I

1. Catherine Crowe, Nightside of Nature: or Ghosts and Ghost Seers (3rd ed.; New York, 1904). The first and second editions were printed in 1848.
2. Ibid., p. 1. For a brief summary of Crowe's work and importance, see G. Y. Clapton, "Baudelaire and Catherine Crowe," Modern Language Review, XXV (1930), 286-305 and R. Hughes, "Une Etape de l'Esthetique de Baudelaire: Catherine Crowe," Revue de Litterature Comparee, XVII (1937), 680-699.
3. Herbert Mayo, On the Truths Contained in Popular Superstitions (Edinburgh, 1851).
4. Alfred Russell Wallace, "A Defense of Modern Spiritualism," Fortnightly Review, XXI (1874), 630-657 and 785-807. Reprinted in Miracles and Modern Spiritualism (rev. ed.; London, 1896), pp. 146-230.
5. "Objects of the Society," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, I (1882-1883), 3-6. Hereafter cited as P.S.P.R.
6. A single important exception to this point was Edmund Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, and Frank Podmore, Phantasms of the Living (London, 1886), "A Note on Witchcraft," pp. 172-185.
7. On this point see Frank Podmore, The Newer Spiritualism (London, 1910), pp. 7-30.
8. Andrew Lang, "Psychical Research," Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed.; New York, 1910), Vol. XXII. All succeeding citations will also be to the 11th edition.
9. For a very adequate listing of essays on psychical research in a variety of late Victorian periodicals, see Psychological Index, a Bibliography of the Literature of Psychology and Cognate Subjects, Vol. I (1894-).
10. MS. letter F. W. H. Myers to Charles Richet, dated November 3, 1891 (E. Q. Nicholson) expresses Myers' amazement that Stead's Special Christmas Issue of the Review of Reviews entitled "More Real Ghost Stories" sold over 100,000 copies. This issue and

the one published the preceding year drew heavily on the P.S.P.R. On Stead and psychical research, see Frederick Whyte, Life of W. T. Stead (London, n.d.), II, 35-37; and Estelle Stead, My Father, Personal and Spiritual Reminiscences (London, 1913).

11. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Modern Library Edition), p. 450.
12. Frank Harris, My Life and Loves (Grove Press Edition, 1963), pp. 983-988.
13. See Alfred Russell Wallace, The Wonderful Century (New York, 1898); Andrew Lang, "Psychical Research," The Nineteenth Century, a Review of Progress (New York, 1901); Joseph Charles, Modern Thought and Thinkers (London, 1890), pp. 39-48.
14. Andrew Lang, "Psychical Research," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXII.
15. Sir Walter Scott, Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft (Edinburgh, 1831).
16. Morton Prince, Noted Witnesses to Psychic Occurrences (Boston, 1928), pp. 139-140. Prince quotes from Lady Shelley's Shelley Memorials.
17. Dugald McDougall Monroe, "Coleridge's Theories of Dreams, Hallucinations and Related Phenomena in Relation to His Critical Theories" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1953).
18. See Wordsworth's poem, "The Somnambulist," for example. The Wordsworth circle was also interested in apparitions and mesmerism. See Thomas DeQuincey, Reminiscences of the English Lake Poets (Everyman Edition), pp. 296-298; Henry Crabb Robinson, Correspondence of Crabb Robinson with the Wordsworth Circle (Oxford, 1927), II, 183, 605, 616-617; Later Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth, ed. Ernest De Selincourt (Oxford, 1938), III, 1242-1244.
19. Gordon S. Haight (ed.), The George Eliot Letters (New Haven, 1954-1955), III, 60.
20. William Archer, "Real Conversations: With Thomas Hardy," The Critic, XXXVIII (1901), 314.
21. William Bell Scott, Autobiographical Notes of the Life of William Bell Scott, ed. W. Minto (London, 1892), II, 66; Clyde K. Hyder, "Rossetti's Rose Mary," Victorian Poetry, I (1963), 197-207.

22. John Lewis Bradley (ed.), Letters of John Ruskin to Lord and Lady Mount-Temple (Columbus, 1964) and F. W. H. Myers, "John Ruskin," Fragments of Prose and Poetry (London, 1904), pp. 89-94.
23. For example, see Pater's essay "Dante Gabriel Rossetti," Appreciations (New York, 1906), p. 223. "A sense of power in love, defying distance, and those barriers which are so much more than physical distance, of unutterable desire penetrating into the world of sleep, however 'lead bound,' was one of those anticipative notes obscurely struck in 'The Blessed Damozel,' and, in his later work makes him speak sometimes almost like a believer in mesmerism. 'Dream-land,' as we said, with its 'phantoms of the body,' deftly coming and going on love's service, is to him in no mere fancy or figure of speech, a real country, a veritable expansion of, or addition to, our waking life." Pater also compares Rossetti to Swedenborg and speaks of his interest in "visionary magic crystals."
24. See below, pp. 170-179.
25. On the Victorian interest in mesmeric phenomena, see Arno L. Bader, "Those Mesmeric Victorians," Colophon, N.S., III (1938), 335-353.
26. Katherine H. Porter, Through a Glass Darkly: Spiritualism in the Browning Circle (Lawrence, 1958) and R. K. Kuipers, "Spiritualism as a Social Phenomena," American Review of Reviews, II (1890), 158.
27. Andrew Lang, The Making of Religion (London, 1898) offers an excellent survey of this subject.
28. For some interesting remarks on Victorian science and the legacy of amateurism, see Bernard Cohen and Howard Mumford Jones (eds.), Science before Darwin (London, 1963), pp. 3-12.
29. F. Paulhan, "Le nouveau Mysticisme," Revue Philosophique, XXX (1890), 480-522; E. Rosenbach, "Etude critique sur le Mysticisme moderne," Revue Philosophique, XXXIV (1892), 113-158; Charles Richet, "A propos de Mysticisme moderne," Revue Philosophique, XXXIV (1892), 417-422.
30. Richet's organization had a rather interesting history. See his remarks on this subject in his Thirty Years of Psychical Research (New York, 1923), p. 33.
31. Quoted in F. W. H. Myers, Science and a Future Life (London, 1893), p. 132.
32. On Catholic attitudes toward psychical research in the late nineteenth century, see Thomas Croskell, "Modern Spiritualism,"

- Dublin Review, CVII (1903), 23-45 and 265-282; C. Kegan Paul, Kegan Paul (London, 1899), pp. 353-354; Louise Chandler Moulton, "A Hitherto Unpublished Letter of Elizabeth Barrett Browning," Arena, VI (April, 1892), pp. 296-299.
33. W. T. Stead, "Real Ghost Stories," Review of Reviews, Special Christmas Issue, November, 1890, p. 8.
34. Harvey Goodwin, "Thoughts about Apparitions," Contemporary Review, XLV (1884), 13-24; "Further Thoughts about Apparitions," Contemporary Review, XLVI (1884), 423-435.
35. C. D. Broad, "Phantasms of the Living and the Dead," P.S.P.R., L (1953-56), 51-66 offers an interesting recent evaluation of the work.
36. The history of the S.P.R. has been frequently written. I refer the reader to the following: Gurney, Myers and Podmore, Phantasms of the Living, pp. lx-lxxiv; Edward T. Bennett, The Society for Psychical Research: Its Rise and Progress (London, 1903); Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, The Society for Psychical Research (London, 1932); Frank Hales, "Histoire de la Société des Recherches Psychiques de Londres," Bulletin de l'Institut Psychologique International, I (1900), 41-82; Alan Willard Brown, The Metaphysical Society (New York, 1947), pp. 243-247.
37. Edward Carpenter has some interesting remarks on the significance of the year in which the S.P.R. was officially founded. "I have mentioned 1881 as the year in which Towards Democracy came to me, and insisted on being given form and expression. It is curious that the same year (or 1882) saw the inception of a number of new movements or enterprises tending towards the establishment of mystical ideas and a new social order. Mother Shipton's prophecy with its strange prognostication of mechanically propelled cars and flying machines ended up with the words:  
 And the world to an end shall come  
 In eighteen hundred and eighty-one.  
 The world did not come to an end, but in a certain sense a new one began; and just in those two years quite a number of societies were started with objects of the kind indicated. Hyndman's Democratic Federation, Edmund Gurney's S.P.R., Mme. Blavatsky's Theosophical Society, the Vegetarian Society, the Anti-Vivisection movement, and many other associations of the same kind marked the coming of a great reaction from the smug commercialism and materialism of the mid-Victorian epoch, and a preparation for the new universe of the twentieth century." My Days and Dreams (London, 1916), pp. 240-241.
38. We might note here that Phantasms was listed in Mudie's Catalogue. See Light, VII (1887), 402.



39. Quoted in Edward Clodd, A Brief History and Examination of Modern Spiritualism (London, 1917), p. 35. A more interesting spoof of the volume is to be found in Punch, XCII (1887), 148.
40. Oscar Wilde, "The Decay of Lying," Essays by Oscar Wilde, ed. Hesketh Pearson (London, 1950), p. 67. Originally published in Nineteenth Century, XXV (1889), 35-56.
41. Anon., "Phantasms of the Living," Spectator, LX (1887), 146-148. See also "Mr. Gurney's Psychical Studies," Spectator, LXI (1888), 891-892.
42. C. L. Morgan, "Phantasms of the Living," Mind, XII (1887), 75-82.
43. Leon Marillier, "La Suggestion mentale et les actions mentales à distance," Revue Philosophique, XXIII (1887), 400-422.
44. Josiah Royce, "Phantasms of the Living," American Journal of Psychology, I (1887), 128-146.
45. F. W. H. Myers, "Introduction," Phantasms, pp. xxx-lxxi.
46. An excellent illustration of Myers' point here is a letter from Lord Acton to Myers dated April 5, 1892 (E. Q. Nicholson). "Perhaps you will think that my topic amounts to nothing else, but for a reason arising in the natural and legitimate course of things, it possesses a serious interest for me./ I have to think about certain historians and their methods; and the question arises: how do they deal with miracles when they meet them? I am thinking of Catholic writers who have no a priori difficulty about them; but who cannot help noticing that the evidence is very apt to crumble away, that the marvels increase by distance, and that asiatic history offers some perplexing analogy./ Now the closest analogy is supplied by your system of enquiries, and I wonder whether you would tell me what light your experience tends to throw on mine. For if your scientific conclusion is that, though the world is full of supernatural stories, when you examine all those of which the evidence can be really tested, so and so many break down, and a very small percentage survive, then the value of human testimony is very much impaired, and a variety of consequences enter for the historian--the Roman Catholic historian and hagiologist--which are very obvious to any one who has been busy in your way, and if not, not. Especially if you find that nearly all break down, and if not all, yet so many that an overwhelming presumption arises against the insoluble remainder. Nobody who has not spent his life among our books has any idea of the extent to which vision, dream, prophecies and the like interpose in causation, and without wishing for a theory or dogma, I want a rule for historians who are quite ready, as far as theory goes, to accept or to reject. From which also divers conclusions would arise, touching the credibility of authorities. . . ."

47. Phantasms, p. liv.
48. Congrès International de Psychologie Physiologique, Première Session (Paris, 1890). See also Leon Marillier, "Le Congrès International de Psychologie Physiologique de 1889," Revue Philosophique, XXVIII (1889), 539-546. William James, "The Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris," Mind, XIV (1889), 614-616.
49. International Congress of Experimental Psychology, Second Session (London, 1892). See Anon., "The International Congress of Experimental Psychology," Mind, I, N.S. (1892), 580-588; Leon Marillier, "Le Congrès International de Psychologie de 1892," Revue Philosophique, XXXIV (1892), 501-506.
50. Carl Murchison (ed.), History of Psychology in Autobiography, I (Worcester, 1930), 158. Cf. also Joseph Jastrow, "Psychology in Great Britain and the United States," The Open Court, III (1889-1890), 2006-2008. "Although the present sketch makes no attempt to render a complete account of British psychology, it would be decidedly lacking were no mention made of a movement that at the present time contributes more than any other to the discussion of psychological matters, and is amassing more than any other a vast heterogeneous literature--I mean the 'Psychic Research' movement" (p. 2008).
51. Ernest Jones, The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud (Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 160n. and 243-244.
52. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Mentor Books, 1958), originally published in 1902; R. H. Thouless, The Psychology of Religion (Cambridge, 1922).
53. Andrew Lang, Maid of France (London, 1908), especially "Appendix I--Voices and Visions of Jeanne d'Arc." See Roger L. Green, Andrew Lang (London, 1946), pp. 139-145.
54. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1964). Cf. F. W. H. Myers, "Greek Oracles," Essays, Classical and Modern (London, 1921), pp. 1-105.
55. E. M. Chadwick, Poetry and Prophecy (Cambridge, 1941).
56. Hans Dreisch, Psychical Research (London, 1933); L. S. Hearnshaw, "William McDougall," A Short History of British Psychology (London, 1964), pp. 185-195; Editor, "Henri Bergson and the S.P.R.," Unpopular Review, I (1914), 63-111.
57. Podmore's early "psychical" activities at Oxford have been described by E. J. Dingwall, "Introduction" to Podmore, Mediums of the 19th Century, I (New York, 1963), v-xxiv.

58. On a brief review of "psychical research," Kant and post-Kantian idealism see Andrew Lang, The Making of Religion, pp. 12 and 28-35.
59. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir (London, 1906), p. 94.
60. F. W. Bradley, "Evidences of Spiritualism," Fortnightly Review, XLV (1885), 811-826.
61. J. H. Muirhead, Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends (London, 1935), p. 53 and n. Also, Bernard Bosanquet, What Religion Is (New York, 1920).
62. Andrew Seth, "The New Psychology," Man's Place in the Cosmos (London, 1897), pp. 64-128. Also Andrew Seth, "Are We Conscious Automata?" Philosophical Review, III (1894), 278-288.
63. Mark Pattison, "The Argument for a Future Life," Metaphysical Society Papers, Vol. I, No. 25 (April 9, 1872). (Privately printed for the Bodleian Library.)
64. Josiah Royce, "Phantasms of the Living," American Journal of Psychology, I (1887), 128-146; Josiah Royce, "Memory and Telepathy," Mind, XIII (1888), 244-248.
65. J. H. Muirhead, "The Survival of the Soul," Contemporary Review, LXXXV (1904), 111-121.
66. Ibid., p. 121.
67. F. C. S. Schiller, "Logical Aspects of Psychical Research," in Carl Murchison (ed.), The Case For and Against Psychical Research (Worcester, 1933), pp. 216-217. Cf. also F. C. S. Schiller, "The Progress of Psychical Research," Fortnightly Review, LXXXIII (1905), 60-73.
68. Charles Oman, "The Old Oxford Phasmatological Society," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, XXXIII (1943-1946), 208-209.
69. Phasmatological Society Papers, 1st Series (Oxford, 1882); 2nd Series (Oxford, 1885).
70. Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, I (London, 1897), 43.
71. Jerome Buckley, Tennyson, the Growth of a Poet (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 33.
72. On the Cambridge Ghostlie Guild, see the following: A. C. Benson, The Life of Edward White Benson (London, 1901), Vol. I; G. W. Prothero, A Memoir of Henry Bradshaw (London, 1888); A. F.

Hort, Life and Letters of F. J. A. Hort (London, 1896), Vol. I; Arthur Westcott, Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott (London, 1903), Vol. I; A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir.

73. A. F. Hort, Life and Letters of F. J. A. Hort, I, 211.
74. Arthur Westcott, Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott, I, 118-119.
75. A. F. Hort, Life and Letters of F. J. A. Hort, I, 219. The letter was dated May 11, 1852 and was addressed to C. H. Chambers.
76. G. W. Prothero, A Memoir of Henry Bradshaw, pp. 216-217.
77. For two general studies of Sidgwick's work in psychical research, see F. W. H. Myers, "Henry Sidgwick," Fragments of Prose and Poetry (London, 1904), pp. 95-114; C. D. Broad, Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research (New York, 1953).
78. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, p. 43.
79. Ibid., p. 43.
80. Ibid., p. 124.
81. Ibid., p. 160 and F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (New York, 1954), II, 122-123, for an account of Sidgwick's early experiments with Cowell.
82. Jane Ellen Harrison, Reminiscences of a Student's Life (London, 1925), p. 55. For another account of psychical research at Cambridge in the 1870's see W. E. Heitland, "Cambridge in the Seventies," in Harley Granville-Barker (ed.), The Eighteen-Seventies (New York, 1929), pp. 261-262.
83. The best account of the history of psychical research and science in the nineteenth century is Frank Podmore, Mediums of the 19th Century, 2 vols. (New York, 1963). The original title of this work was Modern Spiritualism (1902).
84. Ibid., II, 9.
85. Ibid., II, 141 and 144. See also Alfred Russell Wallace, Miracles and Modern Spiritualism (rev. ed.; London, 1896), pp. 82-87, for a lengthy extract from De Morgan's "Preface."
86. David Masson, "Swedenborgianism and Spiritualism," Contemporary British Philosophy (London, 1865), pp. 181-190.
87. Report on Spiritualism by the Committee of the London Dialectical Society, together with the evidence oral and written, and a

- selection from the correspondence (Longmans, London, 1871). For an account of this committee's investigations and its problems, see Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life, II (New York, 1905), 293-317.
88. William Crookes, Researches on the Phenomena of Spiritualism (London, 1874); on Crookes, see the controversial study by Trevor Hall, The Spiritualists (London, 1962).
  89. William B. Carpenter, Mesmerism and Spiritualism (London, 1877).
  90. P. G. Tait and Balfour Stewart, The Unseen Universe (London, 1878). For an interesting review of this work, see William Kingdon Clifford, "The Unseen Universe," Lectures and Essays (London, 1879), II, 257-297.
  91. On Huxley, Lewes and Tyndall, see Alfred Wallace, My Life, II, 296-301.
  92. Quoted from Frank Podmore, Mediums of the 19th Century, II, 40.
  93. Henry Sidgwick, "Presidential Address to the Society for Psychological Research," Presidential Addresses to the Society for Psychological Research, 1882-1911 (Glasgow, 1912), pp. 1-7.
  94. Thomas H. Huxley, "On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata," Methods and Results (New York, 1896), pp. 199-251. In his lecture, Huxley devoted ten pages to an analysis and summary of an article by Dr. E. Mesnet which appeared in L'Union Medicale for July 21 and 23, 1874. He also comments that those "who have had occasion to become acquainted with the phenomenon of mesmerism or of somnambulism will be struck with the close parallel which they present to the proceeding of F. in his abnormal state. But the great value of Dr. Mesnet's observations lies in the fact that the abnormal condition is traceable to a definite injury to the brain, and that the circumstances are such as to keep us clear of the cloud of voluntary and involuntary fictions in which the truth is too often smothered in such cases" (p. 234).
  95. See Alfred Binet, Alterations of Personality, trans. Helen Baldwin (New York, 1896), pp. 63-64 for a direct reply to Huxley's interpretation of the soldier's activities. Also see F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 181, 306, 472.
  96. William F. Barrett, "Some Phenomena Associated with Abnormal Conditions of Mind," P.S.P.R., I (1882-83), 238-244. One year later, Barrett delivered another talk involving "psychic" phenomena to the Biological Seminar of the British Association. The text of the talk is reprinted in the Spiritualist, X (1877), 85.
  97. William F. Barrett, P.S.P.R., I, 240.

98. Ibid., p. 243.
99. Ibid., p. 244.
100. Frank Podmore, Mediums of the 19th Century, II, 159-160; the Spiritualist, IX (1876), 127, quotes the indictment against Slade from the Daily Telegraph. W. B. Carpenter states in his "Preface" to Mesmerism and Spiritualism that the lectures which constitute the book were initiated "partly by the discussion which took place in the Anthropological Section of the British Association at its Meeting in Glasgow, and partly by the Slade prosecution which followed" (p. v).
101. The Times (London), Wednesday, September 13, 1876, p. 5, col. 5.
102. William Crookes, "Presidential Address Delivered to the British Association at Bristol, September, 1898," excerpted in P.S.P.R., XII (1898), 2-5.
103. William Crookes, "On Psychical Research," Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1898-1899, pp. 185-205. See Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, p. 450. "For a number of years Langley published in his Smithsonian Reports the revolutionary papers that foretold the overflow of nineteenth century dogma, and among the first was the famous address by Sir William Crookes on psychical research, followed by a series of papers on Roentgen and Curie, which had steadily driven the scientific law giver of Unity into the open."
104. "Editorial," The Times (London), September 7, 1898, p. 7. One might compare these remarks with those printed in The Times, Wednesday, August 3, 1892, p. 7, on the International Congress of Experimental Psychology then meeting in London: "Experimental Psychology is a rather alarming phrase, especially for a holiday week; and the names of the gentlemen who have gathered together from various lands to talk about it in Gower Street are scarcely less so. An International Congress on the subject is there at this moment, holding its second triennial meeting under the Presidency of Professor Henry Sidgwick. From men like these [Bain, Helmholtz, Richet, Liegeois, Gruber] it is not natural to expect anything entertaining; nor should we expect it if we were not possessed with the idea that somehow or other, Experimental Psychology would be brought around to ghosts. Three years ago there was something more than a suggestion of them in the proceedings of the Congress; and Professor Sidgwick's opening address gave a definition of 'experimental' which seemed constituted so as to admit them. It is a great thing in a Congress to make your qualifications strict enough, but not too strict. This is so with regard to the persons entitled to be present, and to the subjects entitled to be discussed. Mr. Sidgwick aimed at this golden mean; and if his rendering of the word was not quite what is understood

by it in most branches of science, it was permissibly near. It comes to this, that the kind of psychology which the Congress professes is the psychology of observation conducted for special purposes, though not always under artificial conditions. The observation is very often self-observation, very often it is observation of abnormal experiences and abnormal minds. Clearly this leaves plenty of room for ghost stories, and ghost stories we shall have. We hope that they will be new ones, very mysterious, very creepy, and very difficult to explain. . . . We expect from a Congress, of which one of the Secretaries is Mr. Frederic Myers, something more impalpable; something that has to do with volition, suggestion, thought transference, psychic force, and similar entities. Whether, when phenomena have been carefully translated into their equivalents in phrases of that nature, science has got much further, is a question on which we shall not hazard an opinion. Probably the Congress would decide in one way and the rude world in another."

105. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, p. 160.
106. F. W. H. Myers, "Introduction," Phantasms of the Living, p. xlv.
107. Unpublished letter, Herbert Spencer to Henry Sidgwick dated October 21, 1891 (Trinity College Library, Cambridge).
108. William James was amused at Frazer's ignorance of mediumistic phenomena which resulted in the anthropologist's belief that the ancient oracles were deliberate frauds. See John C. Wilson, "Preface" to Jane Ellen Harrison, Themis (University Books, New York, 1962), p. xi. Harrison herself, although on intimate terms with members of the S.P.R., did not participate in their activities. Her good friend, Gilbert Murray, however, was an active psychical researcher who held the Presidency of the S.P.R. for 1915-1916.
109. Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life, II, 299.
110. Andrew Lang (ed.), Anthropological Essays Presented to Edward Burnett Tylor (Oxford, 1907), pp. 7-8.
111. Unpublished letter, E. B. Tylor to Henry Sidgwick dated February 2, 1898 (Trinity College Library, Cambridge).
112. A glance at the "Index" of Tylor's Primitive Culture, 2 vols. (Harper Torchbooks, 1958), will make this amply clear. (First edition, 1871.)
113. Quoted from Jan Ehrenwald, Telepathy and Medical Psychology (New York, 1948), p. 14.
114. E. B. Tylor, "Mr. Spencer's Principles of Sociology," Mind, II (1877), 142.

115. On similarities and distinctions see the article on "Animism" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II, and Edward Clodd, Animism, the Seed of Religion (London, 1905).
116. E. B. Tylor, "Mr. Spencer's Principles of Sociology," Mind, II (1877), 141-156.
117. For a bibliographical review of this controversy the reader should consult the bibliography of Tylor's works found at the conclusion to Anthropological Essays Presented to Edward Burnett Tylor (Oxford, 1907).
118. R. Marret, Tylor (New York, 1936), pp. 101-103 and E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, I, 141-155.
119. Quoted from Jan Ehrenwald, Telepathy and Medical Psychology, p. 23.
120. Cf. also James G. Frazer, "The Primitive Ghost and His Relations," Popular Science Monthly, XXVII (1885), 665-685.
121. R. Marret, Tylor, p. 102.
122. F. W. H. Myers, "Introduction," Phantasms of the Living, I, xliv-lxv.
123. Alfred Russell Wallace, "Primitive Culture," The Academy, III (February 15, 1872), 69-71.
124. For Tylor's reply to Wallace see E. B. Tylor, "Ethnology and Spiritualism," Nature, V (1872), 343.
125. Edward Clodd, Memories (London, 1916), pp. 210-211. For Andrew Lang and psychical research, see Lang's own address to the Society for Psychical Research at the time of his Presidency in 1911 in Presidential Addresses to the Society for Psychical Research, pp. 313-325. A good general survey of Lang's work in psychical research is that of M. A. Bayfield, "Andrew Lang and Psychical Research," P.S.P.R., XXVI (1912-1913), 419-430.
126. Andrew Lang, "The Comparative Study of Ghost Stories," Nineteenth Century, XVII (1885), 623-632.
127. Andrew Lang, The Making of Religion (London, 1898). As Lang notes in his "Preface," F. W. H. Myers had a hand in the making of Lang's book.
128. Ibid., p. 3.
129. Cf. also Andrew Lang, "Evolution of the Idea of God," Contemporary Review, LXXII (1897), 768-781.



130. R. Marret, Tylor, p. 113. "Lang's own view being that the mental phenomena loosely classified under this head as more or less pathological may well include contacts with the 'x-region of experience,' that are not merely apparent but profoundly real."
131. On the Metaphysical Society, see Alan Willard Brown, The Metaphysical Society (New York, 1947); on the Synthetic Society, see Maisie Ward, The Wilfred Wards and the Transition (London, 1934) and Brown, pp. 252-260.
132. Ibid., p. 26.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., pp. 11-19.
135. James F. Knowles, "Brain Waves - A Theory," Spectator, XLIII (1869), 135-137.
136. Ibid., p. 135.
137. Ibid., p. 136.
138. Richard Holt Hutton, "The Hypothesis of Brain Waves," Spectator, XLII (1869), 133-134.
139. Ibid., p. 134.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. The following bibliography is basic for anyone working his way through this problem: B. O. Flower, "Inspiration and Psychical Phenomena among Latter Day Poets," Arena, VII (1892-1893), 337-344; Shadworth Hodgson, "Tennyson and the Supernatural," Outcast Essays (London, 1881); W. T. Stead, "A Character Sketch of Tennyson," Review of Reviews, VI (1892), 568-570; J. T. Knowles, "Reminiscence of Tennyson," Nineteenth Century, XXXIII (1893), 164-188; Anon., "Tennyson," Spectator, LXV (1892), 523-525; F. W. H. Myers, "Tennyson as Prophet," Science and a Future Life (London, 1894), pp. 127-165; Henry Sidgwick, "Tennyson," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, V (1891-1892), 315-318; John Tyndall, "A Glimpse of Farringford, 1858; and the Ancient Sage, 1885," in Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II (London, 1897), 469-478; Robert Preyer, "Tennyson as an Oracular Poet," Modern Philology, LV (1957-1958), 239-251; Carl Sonn, "Religious Certainty and Poetic Vision in Tennyson's Earlier Poetry," Modern Philology, LVII (1959), 83-93; Carlisle Moore, "Faith, Doubt and Mystical Experience in In Memoriam," Victorian Studies, VII (1963), 155-169; E. D. H. Johnson, The Alien Vision of Victorian Poetry (Princeton, 1952); Clyde de L.

- Ryals, "Weird Seizures in The Princess," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, IV (1962), 268-275.
143. See Henry Sidgwick, "Tennyson," Journal of the Society for Psychological Research, V (1891-1892), 315-318.
144. Miriam Allott, "James Russell Lowell--A Link between Tennyson and Henry James," Review of English Studies, N.S., VI (1954), 399-401.
145. Jerome Buckley, Tennyson. the Growth of a Poet, p. 247.
146. Sir Charles Tennyson, Tennyson (London, 1950), p. 499; also Charles Tennyson, Six Tennyson Essays (London, 1954), p. 110.
147. Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 365.
148. F. W. H. Myers, "On Recognized Apparitions Occurring More Than a Year After Death," P.S.P.R., VI (1889), 60.
149. Charles Tennyson, Alfred Tennyson, p. 367.
150. Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 55-56.
151. Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life, II, 315-316.
152. Anon., "Review of G. M. Beard on Trance," Mind, II (1877), 568-570, has an interesting application to Tennyson's trances without mentioning the poet by name. See also John Tyndall, "A Glimpse of Farringford, 1858; and the Ancient Sage, 1885" in Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 469-478.
153. Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 21; James T. Knowles, "Brain Waves--A Theory," Spectator, XLII (1869), 136.
154. Hack Tuke, Pritchard and Symonds in Especial Relation to Mental Science (London, 1891).
155. Arno L. Bader, "Those Mesmeric Victorians," Colophon, N.S., III (1938), 335-353; Charles and Francis Brookfield, Mrs. Brookfield and Her Circle (London, 1905), p. 47; Anon., "Lord Houghton," Journal of the Society for Psychological Research, II (1885), 92.
156. This subject would make an essay in itself. The reader should consult James Hughes Bennett, The Mesmeric Mania of 1851: A Lecture (London, 1851) for an excellent statement on the causes of trance, the effects of trance, and the relationship between trance phenomena and monomania written in the same year that the "weird seizures" were added to The Princess. Bennett draws heavily for his definitions and theory on Henry Munro's Remarks on Insanity (London, 1851). Clyde de L. Ryals' essay, "The

- Weird Seizures and The Princess," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, IV (1962), 268-275, does not refer to Bennett's lecture and thesis, but Ryals' own analysis of the theme of the poem approximates Bennett's theory of trance phenomena, their causes and effects.
157. See Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, I, 320 and II, 158; William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 299; the whole letter is quoted in Stainton Moses, "Lord Tennyson as Prophet and Teacher," Light, VI (May 15, 1886), p. 223; "May 7, 1874/ Dear Sir,/ I have to thank you for your essay and your photograph. The face is that of one (it seems to me) born to grapple with difficulties, metaphysical and other, and the essay does not belie the face--a very notable sketch of metaphysics, ending, apparently, yet once more, in the strange history of human thought, with the placid Buddha, as verified by 19th century anaesthetics./ But what need you my praise when you have secured the approval of him who is, by report, our greatest or one of our greatest Hegelians; where as I, though I may have a gleam of Kant, have never turned a page of Hegel, all that I know of him having come to me ab extra and obscurely through the talk of others, nor have I ever vigorously delivered myself to dialectics./ I have never had any revelations through anaesthetics, but a kind of waking trance (this for lack of a better word) I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has come upon me through repeating my own name to myself, silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity or the consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being--and this not a confused state but the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words--whose death was an almost laughable impossibility--the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life./ I am ashamed of my feeble description. Have I not said that the state is beyond words? But in a moment when I come back to my normal condition of "sanity" I am ready to fight for "meines liebes Ich" and hold that it will last for aeons and aeons./ In Lucretius, 'what is duty' was the first reading. It was altered because Lucretius, I think, makes mention of duty in that sense; but it now stands again as at first./ If you come over to England, I shall be glad to welcome you here. Believe me/ Yours very truly,/ A. Tennyson." The essay to which Tennyson refers was entitled Pluriverse--An Essay in the Philosophy of Pluralism: The Anaesthetic Revelation (New York, 1874). On Blood, see William James, "Benjamin Paul Blood," Hibbert Journal, VIII (1910), 739-759.
158. James T. Knowles, "Brain Waves--A Theory," p. 137.
159. Ibid.
160. James T. Knowles, "Personal Reminiscence of Tennyson," Nineteenth Century, XXXIII (1893), 169.

161. For a reprint of the "Prospectus" of the London Dialectical Society, see The Spiritualist, I (1870), 65. On the Dialectical's investigations, consult Frank Podmore, Mediums of the 19th Century, II, 147-148 and the Report on Spiritualism by the Committee of the London Dialectical Society (Longmans, London, 1871).
162. Alan Willard Brown, The Metaphysical Society, p. 217 and Frank Podmore, Mediums of the 19th Century, II, 147.
163. John Tyndall, "Science and Spirits," Fragments of Science (London, 1871), pp. 427-436.
164. Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life, II, 298.
165. On Pattison, see above, pp. 15-16; also William B. Carpenter, "On the Fallacies of Testimony in Relation to the Supernatural," Contemporary Review, XXVII (1876), 279-295, and John Ruskin, "The Nature and Authority of Miracle," Contemporary Review, XXI (1873), 627-634. Both these papers were originally delivered to the Metaphysical.
166. On the Synthetic Society, its purposes, goals, formation and membership, see Maisie Ward, The Wilfred Wards and the Transition (London, 1934) and Papers of the Synthetic Society, 1896-1909, with a Prefatory Note (Privately printed by Arthur Balfour, London, 1910). Hereinafter cited as Papers.
167. Wilfred Ward, Men and Matters (London, 1914), pp. 428-429).
168. Oliver Lodge, "Paper of May 2, 1896," Papers, pp. 35-36.
169. Oliver Lodge, "Paper of June, 1896," Papers, pp. 56-57.
170. Canon Gore, "Paper of Jan. 29, 1897," Papers, pp. 70-74.
171. Oliver Lodge, "Paper of Jan. 29, 1897," Papers, pp. 75-76.
172. Thomas B. Strong, "Paper of Feb. 2, 1897," Papers, p. 79.
173. Oliver Lodge, "Paper of Sept., 1897," Papers, p. 115B.
174. F. W. H. Myers, "On the Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Problems Generally Classed as Religious--Paper of April 29, 1898," Papers, pp. 187-197.
175. Anon., "Paper of April 29, 1898," Papers, pp. 198-199.
176. Henry Sidgwick, "Paper of April 29, 1898," Papers, pp. 200-201.
177. Arthur Balfour, "Paper of April 29, 1898," Papers, p. 201.
178. Wilfred Ward, "Paper of May, 1898," Papers, pp. 202-206.

179. C. Bigg, "That Faith Is Akin to Scepticism--Paper of June 10, 1898," Papers, pp. 207-208.
180. Oliver Lodge, "Is Obscurity of Infinitude the Well Spring of Religion--Paper of June 10, 1898," Papers, pp. 217-221.
181. Henry Sidgwick, "Paper of June 10, 1898," Papers, pp. 222-223.
182. F. W. H. Myers, "One Door Will Open--Paper of June 10, 1898," Papers, pp. 212-216.
183. Bernard Holland (ed.), Baron Von Hugel. Selected Letters (London, 1927), pp. 116-117.
184. F. W. H. Myers, "Epilogue," Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, II, 278-314.
185. The following chapter is composed mainly of notes which Myers had planned to publish as part of an autobiographical fragment in July of 1893. The manuscript was written periodically in 1891. The notes below have never been published. Cf. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Prose and Poetry, ed. Eveleen Myers (London, 1904), pp. 1-54; F. W. H. Myers, Collected Poems, with Autobiographical and Critical Fragments, ed. Eveleen Myers (London, 1921); the authoritative autobiographical fragment is F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life (Privately printed by the Society for Psychical Research, London, 1961). The fragments printed below are from manuscripts in possession of Myers' granddaughter, Mrs. E. Q. Nicholson.
186. Commenting on the popularity of Myers' Human Personality,--"the book has been translated into nearly all European languages"--Douglas Sladen wrote that "this would have surprised Frederic Myers enormously. He wrote to a friend in 1900, 'I am occupied in writing a big book which I don't expect anyone to read, but I do it for the satisfaction of my own conscience.'" Douglas Sladen, Twenty Years of My Life (New York, 1915), p. 105.
187. The Times (London), September 7, 1898, p. 7.
188. "Editorial," Light, VI (1886), 26.

#### Notes to Chapter II

1. In 1861 Myers won the Chancellor's Medal and in 1862 he won the Camden Medal. The Chancellor's Medal is awarded for an English poem and the Camden Medal for a Latin poem.
2. Both poems were printed in Prolusiones Academicæ (The University Press, Cambridge, 1863), pp. 7-12 and 15-18. In 1894, an edition entitled Cambridge Prize Poems. a Complete Collection

of the English Poems Which Have Obtained the Chancellor's Medal in the University of Cambridge (London, 1894) omitted both of Myers' Chancellor poems "by request of the author."

3. See the Cambridge Chronicle and University Journal for June 20, 1863, August 1, 1863, August 15, 1863 and September 9, 1863.
4. For an account of this incident see G. G. Coulton, Fourscore Years: An Autobiography (Cambridge, 1943), pp. 106-108. The incident is also mentioned in the brief biography of Myers in John Venn's Alumni Cantabrigienses (Cambridge, 1922- ).
5. As Poole's Index to Nineteenth Century Periodicals reveals, the problems of literary plagiarism had a peculiar fascination for the Victorians. Among the more significant essays on this subject, see Andrew Lang, "Literary Plagiarism," Contemporary Review, LI (1887), 831-840; James Runciman, "King Plagiarism and His Court," Fortnightly Review, LIII (1890), 421-439; E. F. Benson, "Plagiarism," Nineteenth Century, XLVI (1899), 974-981; Arthur Balfour, "The Works of Handel," Edinburgh Review, CLXV (1887), 214-247; Edward Wright, "The Art of Plagiarism," Contemporary Review, LXXXV (1904), 514-519. On Arnold and charges of plagiarism, see Arnold's notes on "Sohrab and Rustum," published in the Poetical Works, ed. Tinker and Lowry (Oxford, 1950), p. 492. On Tennyson's reply to charges of plagiarism, see John Pettigrew, "Tennyson's Ulysses: A Reconciliation of Opposites," Victorian Poetry, I (1963), 44-45.
6. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to his uncle, probably Arthur Marshall, dated September 26, 1863 (E. Q. Nicholson).
7. Myers' comments, as will be clear later on, should be compared to those of Ben Jonson in Jonson's Discoveries, 1620-1635: "The third requisite in our poet or maker is imitation, imitatio, to be able to convert the substance and riches of another poet to his own use. . . . Not as a creature that swallows what it takes in crude, raw, or undigested; but that feeds with an appetite, and hath a stomach to concoct, divide, and turn all into nourishment. Not to imitate servilely, as Horace saith, and catch at vices for virtue, but to draw forth out of the best and choicest flowers, with the bee, and turn all into honey, work it into one relish and savour, make our imitation sweet; observe how the best writers have imitated, and follow them. . . ." Quoted from R. P. Cowl, Theory of Poetry in England (London, 1914), p. 128. For a late Victorian expression of the "digestive" theory or "assimilative" theory, see E. F. Benson, "Plagiarism."
8. For a somewhat similar argument, see Arthur Balfour's defense of Handel's plagiarisms. Balfour defended Handel's use of the materials of other musicians on the grounds that Handel discovered the possibilities of admittedly inferior work, and out of inferior

- work made superior work. "Out of poor old material he produces work which is of the first order. Out of old material he produced something new." By virtue of discovering and utilizing those possibilities, Handel, Balfour argued, is a creator. Arthur Balfour, "The Work of Handel."
9. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life (London, 1963), p. 9.
  10. See Cambridge Chronicle and University Journal, August 15, 1863, p. 8.
  11. Myers is referring to Conington's The Works of Virgil (4th ed.; London, 1881), II, 23. First edition was published in 1858. The 4th edition is the most readily accessible.
  12. Myers' position on plagiarism has been frequently reiterated. See, for example, Edward Wright, "The Art of Plagiarism." Wright argues that plagiarism is an art, a sign of "communion" between the living and the dead, an act of honor and spiritual interaction between souls. Plagiarism gives an "esoteric relish" in good poetry. "Plagiarism is an art in which the finest critical power is exhibited by means of creation." The poet is a singer. "So long as he sings with sincerity and clearness, with charm or grandeur, it matters nothing to his fame where he finds the subject matter of his song. The importance of this subject matter may no doubt add to the worth of his music, but that is merely the measure of his discriminative power as a critic."
  13. Reuben Brower, Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959), p. viii.
  14. On this point see E. F. Benson, "Plagiarism." "In a word and without paradox, the truth seems to be that unintelligent theft is plagiarism, critical theft is not inconsistent with the truest originality."
  15. Clearly, yet perhaps unconsciously, Myers' theory of plagiarism or imitation closely approximates a number of Renaissance theories of imitation, especially that of Joachim Du Bellay. Cf. Warner Forrest Patterson, Three Centuries of French Poetic Theory (Ann Arbor, 1935), especially pp. 291-355; Harold Ogden White, Plagiarism and Imitation During the English Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass., 1935).
  16. William E. Gladstone, Studies in Homer and the Homeric Age (Oxford, 1858), III, particularly Section V, "Homer and Some of His Successors," 500-554.
  17. Ibid., p. 502.
  18. For Gladstone's remarks on poetry and theology, see pp. 515-516; on poetry and history, see pp. 516-520, and on poetry and attitudes toward human nature, see pp. 524-528.

19. Gladstone also criticizes Virgil's imitations of Homer on other grounds: "for there is scarcely a point of vital moment in which Virgil follows Homer faithfully, or represents him either fairly or completely." Gladstone overlooks that Virgil's imitations were adapted to the exigencies of his own epic. He did not suffer, as Gladstone states, from "torpor of the faculties" or "defect in the habit of mind."
20. Ibid., p. 522. "Still it seems not a little strange, notwithstanding the power of the disabling causes which have been enumerated, that with so vast an amount of material imitation, Virgil should not have acquired, even by accident or by sheer force of use, some traits of nearer resemblance in feeling and in ethical handling to his great original."
21. Ibid., pp. 512-524.
22. Ibid., pp. 506 and 509-512.
23. Ibid., p. 534. "It is but fair to admit that we must not measure the relative rank of Homer and Virgil simply by the comparative merits of their epic works. Homer lived in the general and joyous youth of a poetic nation and a poetic religion, and amid the influences of the soul of freedom: Virgil among a people always matter of fact rather than poetical, in an age and a court where the heart and its emotions were chilled, where liberty was dead, where religion was a mockery, and the whole material of his art had passed from freshness into the sere and yellow leaf."
24. Ibid., p. 533. "An effete and corrupted age could no longer conceive a mind like the mind of Homer."
25. Conington's essays on Virgil's Eclogues and Georgics were published in book form as introductions to Conington's text and commentary on Virgil in 1858. I am using the 4th edition (London, 1881). These essays were first given as lectures at Oxford in 1857. The essay on the Aeneid was first printed in 1863. Myers, a close friend and frequent correspondent of Conington, knew in detail the substance of all the manuscripts before they were printed. Conington's criticism of the Eclogues is found in I, 2-19; on the Georgics, I, 132-156; and the Aeneid, II, 2-28.
26. On Gladstone's analysis of Virgil, Conington wrote: "In the general introduction I have controverted Mr. Gladstone's view of the relation of the Aeneid to the Homeric poems. . . . In my former volume I was thought to believe to have disparaged unduly Virgil's claim to originality: I may now be considered to be taking the opposite side, in vindicating his right to be criticized independently of Homer . . ." (II, xiii).



27. Ibid., II, 8, "We must not judge a poet as we should judge an historian. . . . To be plausible and consistent are a poet's sole historical duties."
28. Ibid., II, 11, "He (Virgil) is an artist, an Italian antiquary, a Roman of the Augustan period, speaking to the average educated intelligence of his own day; he is anything rather what modern admirers of Homer would wish him to be, a hierophant of 'the inner Homeric world,' an expounder of 'primitive history, philosophy, policy, and religion.'"
29. As the Saturday Review exemplified, "Conington's Virgil," Saturday Review, VI (1858), 891-892, many thought the aim of Conington's text and commentary was to illustrate the idea that "there is something almost unexampled in the state of feeling which at Rome, and the Augustan age in particular, allowed palpable and avowed imitation to claim the honors of poetic originality." Conington, the reviewer continued, has examined "all the sources from which Virgil borrowed, and the mode of borrowing, with a fulness and accuracy which have never been brought to bear on the subject before." He has proved beyond a doubt that Virgil's poetry is an "imitation of a wholesale and deliberate kind." Conington's remarks on this review (Miscellaneous Writings, ed. John Addington Symonds [London, 1872], I, iii) more accurately state his intentions: "I fancy it nearly hits the mark in speaking of the class of the edition, though vanity winces a little at being told that it is merely a student's book. But I hope, if I live, to be able to show that I can do something more than 'clear the whole ground for the literary critic.' An examination into Virgil's place in literature, and into the modes which he appeals to our imagination and taste, is quite within the scope of an edition like mine, as I conceive it; and if I have not regularly attempted it as yet, it is because I should be better qualified for it in a later volume." Similarly, in the text itself (Virgil, II, vi) he commented that "Virgil interests me chiefly because he is a Latin poet. As a student of poetry, I take delight in tracing, word by word, his delicate intricacies of expression, which stimulate curiosity while they baffle analysis, as well as endeavoring to appreciate the broader features of his work as a whole and its place in the history of literature." We might conclude by noting that Conington did not believe he was acting only in the person of a scholar listing and cataloging imitations. He thought he was criticizing and evaluating imitation as a means of imaginative and tasteful literary creation.
30. John Conington, Virgil, I, 6.
31. Ibid., I, 5. "Yet we may realize something of the feeling if we go back to the time when the office of translator ranked as high in English estimation as that of an original poet."
32. Ibid., I, 9.

33. Ibid., I, 7. Commenting on Virgil's relationship to Bion, Moschus and Theocritus, Conington wrote: "He had doubtless lived from boyhood in their world; and their world accordingly became a sort of second nature to him--a storehouse of life and truth and beauty, the standard to which he brought conceptions and images as they rose up within him, the suggestive guide that was to awaken his slumbering powers, and lead him to discover further felicities yet possible to the artist."
34. Ibid., I, 10.
35. Conington's conception of language, style and perfection closely approximates that of Pater in his essay "On Style."
36. See Virgil, II, 19. "That which is so remarkable a feature of Virgil's style, his practice of employing combinations of words so constructed as to remind the reader of other and yet other combinations could hardly be better illustrated than by a comparison of the language of Virgil with the language of Sophocles. . . . A poet like Virgil, studious to embody in himself all that was best in previous culture, could not be wholly independent of writers whose conception of their art was so far analogous to his own."
37. Ibid., I, 12-14.
38. Ibid., I, 151.
39. Ibid., I, 147.
40. Ibid., I, 132.
41. Speaking of Virgil and Lucretius, for example, Conington wrote that "both profess to go as deep as life itself, and both seek to impress the mind not only with principles of truth, but with images of beauty" (Virgil, I, 145).
42. Unpublished letter, John Conington to F. W. H. Myers, dated September 24, 1863 (E. Q. Nicholson).
43. Edmund Gosse commenting on Myers' early years states that "we have the impression of him as a sublimated schoolboy, pensive, pious, and precocious, but quite ignorant of the world. He was steeped in Greek and Latin poetry, and in Tennyson as a continuer of the classic tradition." More Books on the Table (New York, 1923), p. 40.
44. On Cheltenham College during these years, see R. E. Francillon, Mid-Victorian Memories (London, 1919), pp. 50-61.
45. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

46. R. St. John Parry, Henry Jackson, a Memoir (Cambridge, 1926), p. 10.
47. R. E. Francillon, Mid-Victorian Memories, p. 54. In 1898, Myers wrote that the "Exemplaria Graeca should still, as in the days of Horace, be the study of night and morn." Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 482.
48. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Prose and Poetry, p. 15.
49. Douglas Sladen, Twenty Years of My Life, pp. 104-105.
50. R. E. Francillon, Mid-Victorian Memories, p. 57.
51. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Prose and Poetry, pp. 15-16.
52. Unpublished letter from John Conington to F. W. H. Myers, dated August 5, 1861 (E. Q. Nicholson).
53. In speaking of Myers' classicism as a manifestation of his experience at Trinity College, we might note the following comment on Trinity's influence on Tennyson. Arguing that Tennyson was more closely associated with the school of Pope than any other English poet of the past, the writer goes on to state that, "There can be little doubt that this care for form was due to his University education on the old classical Trinity lines. Tennyson is of the classical order of poets in a double sense. There are always poets who love to reproduce and recall the best work of their predecessors in their own or in the classical language. Milton and Gray are of this class. There are poets again who preserve in their lines the reserve, the dignity of the great poets of antiquity, even though they not be intimately acquainted with them. Collins and Keats are classical in this sense. Tennyson was classical in both ways; he has antique reserve, he is full of reminiscences." Joseph Jacobs, "Tennyson," Eclectic Review, LVI (1892), 813-814.
54. Although we are not primarily concerned with Myers' poetry here, we should note that allusion, imitation, "rendering" and translation were a distinctive aspect of all Myers' verse making. Gosse, to give only one illustration, commented that the citations from the New Testament in Myers' Saint Paul were so thick and frequent "that in some places the poem is almost a cento." More Books on the Table, p. 41. Also W. L. Courtney, "Poets of Today," Fortnightly Review, XL (1883), 724-726.
55. Rptd. in F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 106-177. The essay was originally printed in the Fortnightly Review, XXXI (1879), 163-196.
56. Ibid., p. 108. "For the impulse of historic science is naturally toward the Origines or source of things; it seeks to track

styles and processes to their fountain-head, and to find them exhibiting themselves without self-consciousness or foreign admixture; it would even wish to eliminate the idiosyncracies of individual artists from its generalized estimate of the genius of a nation. And in highly cultivated societies, there is a somewhat similar craving--a wish to escape from all that speaks of effort or preparation, into the refreshing simplicity of a spontaneous age. This craving was strongly felt under the Roman Empire; it is potent among ourselves, it is wholly natural and innocent so long as it is not allowed to sway us in our estimate of the highest art."

57. Ibid., p. 109. "And there is a sense--and this is a point on which the Germans have especially dwelt--in which the whole Latin literature of the Augustan age, whose outer form at least, is so confessedly derived from Greek models, is of less interest than those models themselves. If we wish to understand the native type, the original essence of lyric or epic poetry, we must go back to Homer and not to Virgil, to Sappho and not to Horace. Yet this text, like all sweeping and a priori methods of estimating works of art, requires in practice so many limitations as to be almost valueless. It is impossible to judge a literature by its originality alone, without condemning much that is best in our modern literature more severely than we condemn the Augustan poets. Imitation is very much a matter of chronology; it may be conscious or unconscious--ostentatious or concealed--but as the world goes on it tends irresistibly to form a larger and larger element in all new productions. And yet each new production may be superior in essentials to its type or forerunner. Its relative merit can be determined by experience alone."
58. R. P. Cowl, English Poetic Theory, pp. 49 and 239-240.
59. F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth (English Men of Letters Series; New York, 1881). See especially chap. ix, pp. 103-122.
60. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
61. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
62. Ibid., p. 109.
63. Ibid., p. 118.
64. Ibid., pp. 118-119.
65. Ibid., p. 119.
66. For a similar argument, see Wilde's comments on Wordsworth in "The Decay of Lying": "One touch of nature may make the whole world akin, but two touches of nature will destroy any work of Art. If, on the other hand, we regard nature as the collection

of phenomena external to man, people only discover in her what they bring to her. She has no suggestions of her own. Wordsworth went to lakes, but he was never a lake poet. He found in stones the sermons he had already hidden there. He went moralising about the district, but his good work was produced when he returned, not to nature but to poetry. Poetry gave him 'Laodamia'; and the fine sonnets and the great ode, such as it is. Nature gave him 'Martha Ray' and 'Peter Bell,' and the address to Mr. Wilkinson's spade." Quoted from W. Wimsatt and C. Brooks, Literary Criticism, a Short History (New York, 1957), p. 361.

67. Hallam Tennyson, "Letter from Frederic W. H. Myers," Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 481-484.
68. Ibid., p. 481. For a somewhat similar argument with respect to Tennyson, see John Churton Collins, "A New Study of Tennyson," Cornhill Magazine, XLI (1880), 36-50. Imitating Conington, whose work on Virgil he found highly suggestive of significant critical theory, Collins did for Tennyson what he though Conington did for Virgil. "It is still interesting and necessary to remember that there have appeared in all literatures, at a certain point in their development, a class of poets who are essentially imitative and reflective. They had usually been men of great natural ability, extensive culture, refined taste, minute and comprehensive acquaintance with the literature which preceded them; they have occasionally been men endowed with the most precious attributes of original genius . . . Torquato Tasso, Gray and Tennyson are perhaps the most striking types in the modern world. . . . Their work has a two-fold virtue; it has--to borrow an expression from the schools--not only an exoteric but an esoteric interest. . . . Nature has indeed made one world, Art another. Mr. Tennyson has now, by general consent, taken his place among English classics; he too will have, like Virgil and Tasso, his critics and his commentators; and unless we are much mistaken, one of the most important and fruitful departments of their labor will be that of tracing his obligations to his predecessors, of illustrating his wonderful, assimilative skill, his taste, his tact, his learning" (pp. 36-37).
69. Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 481.
70. Ibid., p. 482.
71. Ibid.
72. James Hepburn and Russell Goldfarb, "Forum: Decadence and Aestheticism," English Literature in Transition, VI (1962), 16-18.
73. Helmut F. Gerber, "Some Problems in Definitions," English Fiction in Transition, V (1962), 31-32.

74. For my own commonplaces on aestheticism here I have used Dorothy Richardson, "Saintsbury and Art for Art's Sake," PMLA, LIX (1944), 243-260.
75. F. W. H. Myers, "Victor Hugo," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 334-353.
76. See unpublished letter, F. W. H. Myers to Swinburne dated August 13, 1882 (E. Q. Nicholson); unpublished letter, Swinburne to F. W. H. Myers dated October 11, 1891 (E. Q. Nicholson); unpublished letter, Swinburne to F. W. H. Myers dated August 18, 1896 (E. Q. Nicholson); unpublished letter, J. W. Mackail to F. W. H. Myers dated May 2, 1897 (E. Q. Nicholson); unpublished letter, E. Magnusson to F. W. H. Myers dated February 3, 1897 (E. Q. Nicholson).
77. Quoted from Cambridge Review, XVI (1895), 156.
78. See Cambridge Review, XVII (1896), 171.
79. Myers' essay was originally published as an introduction to Poe for Warner's The World's Best Literature. It is reprinted in F. W. H. Myers, Collected Poems, pp. 44-49, from which the following references are taken.
80. Ibid., p. 46.
81. Ibid. and Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson, II, 481. Speaking of the classical poet here, Myers remarks that when he fails to "carry to its utmost height that innate and inexplicable charm in the relations of sound or line or rhythm or color which makes the essential principle of his art," he degenerates into a virtuoso. "When he succeeds, he enters in some sort into the hidden heritage of emotion which maintains the life of Art itself."
82. F. W. H. Myers, "Poe," p. 47.
83. For a general study of Victorian translation, see Richard Emerson Young, "Theories of Translating Poetry in Victorian England" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1964).
84. Some briefer statements by Myers on the art of translation are found in "Professor Conington's Translations of Virgil," Light Blue, XI (1867), 241-246; "Virgil," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 112-113; Wordsworth, pp. 116-119.
85. F. W. H. Myers, "Mr. Jebb's Translations," Fortnightly Review, XX (1873), 645-655.
86. R. C. Jebb, Translations into Greek and Latin Verse (Cambridge, 1873). For Jebb's favorable response to Myers' review, see

unpublished letter from R. C. Jebb to F. W. H. Myers, dated October 21, 1873 (E. Q. Nicholson).

87. Two excellent contemporary accounts of creative translation closely approximate Myers' arguments. Jean Paris, "Translation and Creation," The Craft and Context of Translation, ed. Arrowsmith and Shattuck (Anchor Books, 1964), pp. 77-91; J. P. Sullivan, Ezra Pound and Sextus Propertius, a Study in Creative Translation (Austin, 1964).
88. F. W. H. Myers, "Mr. Jebb's Translations," p. 645.
89. Ibid., p. 655.
90. Ibid. A similar idea with respect to plagiarism (Wright's notion of the art of plagiarism is indistinguishable from Conington's conception of "imitation" or Myers' use of the word "rendering") is found in Edward Wright, "The Art of Plagiarism," p. 514. We might also note that Myers' conception of the translator's "joy" is similar to Anatole France's notion of the "adventure of the soul among masterpieces." See René Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism, IV (New Haven, 1965), 24.
91. Ibid., p. 655.
92. Ibid., p. 654.
93. For a very different opinion of Victorian translation, see Roger Shattuck and William Arrowsmith (eds.), The Craft and Context of Translation, p. xvi.
94. See F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth, p. 118. "Nothing is gained by rendering an ancient poet into verse at all unless that verse be of a quality to give a pleasure independent of the faithfulness of the translation which it conveys"; John Conington, "The Translators of Virgil," Quarterly Review, CX (1861), 73-114: "No one is likely to attain as a poetical translator the excellence which would be denied to him as an original writer. . . . The poetical translator is really an original poet' and the stream cannot rise higher than the source"; Herbert Warren, "The Art of Translation," Quarterly Review, CLXXXII (1895), 324-353. This is an excellent survey of theories of translation with particular emphasis on the 19th century. Warren was struck by the paradox that "great ages of pure literature have always been ages of translation." Speaking of a translation of Cory, Warren wrote: "It certainly justifies the liberal against the literal method. It does not follow the form of the original exactly, it does not exactly follow the words; yet it is not mere imitation--it is a successful translation. It gives the values and soul of the form. It is true and moving poetry, the work of one who was a poet."

95. For a contemporary discussion of this point, see Smith Palmer Bovie, "Translation as a Form of Criticism," The Craft and Context of Translation, pp. 51-75.
96. Walter Pater, "Joachim Du Bellay," The Renaissance (Library ed.; London, 1919), pp. 162-163. For other interesting remarks by Pater on translation, see "The School of Giorgione," The Renaissance, pp. 130-131; "On Style," Appreciations (London, 1906), pp. 10-11; "Charles Lamb," Appreciations, pp. 114-115. For some illuminating notes on Pater as a translator, see Eugene J. Brzenk, "Pater and Apuleius," Comparative Literature, X (1958), 55-60; Paul Turner, "Pater and Apuleius," Victorian Studies, III (1960), 290-296.
97. Walter Pater, "Joachim Du Bellay," p. 163.
98. On Du Bellay, see Harold Ogden White, Plagiarism and Imitation, pp. 31-33 and Warner F. Patterson, Three Centuries of French Poetic Theory, pp. 314-319.
99. Walter Pater, "Joachim Du Bellay," p. 172.
100. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
101. For a very different attitude toward translation, that of Arthur Symons, see Ruth Z. Temple, "The Critic as Translator," The Critic's Alchemy (New Haven, 1955), pp. 135-152. In opposition to Symons and in agreement with Myers, Pater, Warren and Conington was John Addington Symonds, one of the most prolific and best known late Victorian translators. See John Addington Symonds, "A Note on Style," Essays, Speculative and Suggestive (London, 1890), I, 264: "The style of the Aeneid, for example was determined by the nature of Latin as used by Virgil. The style of Dryden's translation is still further qualified by the peculiarities of English as Dryden used it. If the style of the original is a double quality (Latin plus Virgil) the style of a translation is a quadruple quality (Latin plus Virgil plus English plus Dryden)."
102. Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (Laurel Edition, 1960), p. 5.
103. Oscar Wilde, "The Critic as Artist," Essays by Oscar Wilde, ed. Hesketh Pearson (London, 1950), p. 132.
104. Ibid., pp. 143-144.
105. Ibid., pp. 166-167.
106. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
107. See Paul Valéry, The Art of Poetry, translated from the French



by Denise Folliot (Vintage Books, 1958); for an excellent study of Valéry on translation, see Jackson Mathews, "On Translating Poetry," in Reuben Brower (ed.), On Translation (Galaxy Books, 1966), pp. 72-77.

108. Paul Valéry, "Pure Poetry," The Art of Poetry, pp. 185-186.
109. Jackson Mathews, "On Translating Poetry," p. 75.
110. Paul Valéry, "Variations on the Eclogues," The Art of Poetry, p. 299.

#### Notes to Chapter III

1. F. W. H. Myers, "Rhythm and Metrics in English Poetry," quoted in Cambridge Review, XVII (1896), 171.
2. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 10.
3. Robert L. Peters, "Athens and Troy: Notes on John Addington Symonds' Aestheticism," English Fiction in Transition, V (1962), 14-26; also Phyllis Grosskurth, John Addington Symonds (London, 1964), pp. 147-149.
4. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 11.
5. John Addington Symonds, Studies of Greek Poets (London, 1876), I, 291-292.
6. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 10.
7. F. W. H. Myers, Unpublished Manuscript Draft of Autobiography, unpaginated (E. Q. Nicholson).
8. Phyllis Grosskurth, John Addington Symonds, pp. 119-120.
9. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
10. Archie Jarman, Dr. Gauld and Mr. Myers (Privately printed, Herts, Garden City, 1964).
11. Caroline Jebb, Life and Letters of Sir Richard Claverhouse Jebb (Cambridge, 1907), p. 81. Mrs. Jebb had her own opinion of Myers. See Mary R. Bobbitt, With Dearest Love: Life and Letters of Lady Jebb (London, 1960).
12. Frederic Myers, Catholic Thoughts on the Church of Christ and the Church of England and Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology (London, 1883). Originally anonymous and privately printed, 1834-1848. For the history of these volumes see the article "Frederic Myers" in the DNB and F. W. H. Myers' "Intro-

duction" to the 1883 edition. Frederic Myers' other major publication was Lectures on Great Men (3rd ed.; London, 1857).

13. There are five unpublished letters from Benjamin Jowett to Mrs. Frederic Myers pertaining to the publication of the 1874 edition of these texts. The letters are undated and in the possession of Mrs. E. Q. Nicholson.
14. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, pp. 14-15.
15. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to his mother, dated March 15, 1865 (E. Q. Nicholson).
16. See unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Arthur Sidgwick dated May 5, 1865 (E. Q. Nicholson): "My dear Arthur/ I am well aware that in such controversy as we had at Rugby I when defending Christianity was uniformly defeated, and I have no expectation even if I knew all about the arguments on the other side, instead of being as ignorant as I am, that I should find much good result from that sort of reasoning, but I cannot resist writing to say that the moral evidence in favour of Christianity becomes, immediately the will is thoroughly subjected, quite overwhelmingly, strong. I, even I, wretched and half-hearted beginner as I am can almost say already that I know the thing is true. How do I know? How do I know that Virgil is a great poet? I cannot prove it to Jackson and yet how absolutely I see his deficiency. How do you know that Bach was a great musician? You cannot prove it to me and yet how clearly you feel that it is I who have a sense wanting, not you who have subjective fancies on the subject. I tell you that whatever else I know or do not know . . . I know to what extent I can resist them of my own strength of will under every variety of circumstance. The whole mental process is one in which as you well know I have cause to take a desperate interest. And I am beginning to know in an equally unmistakeable manner what it is to have a strength not my own infused into me, as I believe, by the Holy Spirit of God./ You cannot say that your critical analysis disproves Christianity. It merely fails to prove it on external grounds. The Gospel of John, for instance, Renan supposes genuine though untrustworthy. Strauss (if I mistake not) a 2nd century compilation. You cannot say that criticism is conclusive against the Gospel of John, as it is against the letters of Phalaris. If the grand initial difficulties of believing that God became man was proven, I believe the difficulties of detail would be far from invincible. And that grand initial difficulty is to certain persons, to certain states of mind, the greatest argument in favour of the religion. Who is right? Consider that if the thing is true for one person it is true for another, if it is true for Mrs. Butler, it is true for you./ No threats need to be held out as a consequence of disregarding it if true. The more thoroughly you feel that love is everything that matters the more would it agonize you with shame if once you thought that you had possi-

- bly been rejecting such love as the gospels tell of./ Nothing on earth would rejoice me so much as your conversion. Great heavens what a prospect! Leagued on earth with all those whose love is best worth having in a bond closer than any freemasonry, enrolled among the countless species of one genus/ all with foreheads bearing lover/ written above the earnest eyes of them/ and after death - ! and all this as I believe to be had merely for the asking, surely this is God." An edited version of this letter is reprinted in F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Prose and Poetry, pp. 25-27.
17. Unpublished letter, F. W. H. Myers to his mother dated March 15, 1865 (E. Q. Nicholson).
  18. See Browning's "Easter Day," especially stanzas 21, 22, and 26.
  19. Writing to Arthur Sidgwick somewhat later, Myers again returned to the significance of Browning in his conversion. "As to feeling hypocritical one must not mind that but remember that everyone is to be measured by his very noblest and not only that but by the noblest which his noblest hints at as possible for him. As to how to get to the higher stages I believe the possible processes to be infinite and adaptable to every variety of character (see Browning's Easter Day). . . ." Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Arthur Sidgwick, dated June 30, 1865 (E. Q. Nicholson).
  20. F. W. H. Myers, Books to Read: A Lecture, Delivered at the Request of the Afternoon Lectures Committee in the Government Hall of Arts and Sciences, Dublin, on Wednesday, April 22, 1868 (Privately printed, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1868). See also Myers' essays on Stanley, Renan and Trench in his Essays, Classical and Modern.
  21. "Seeley is a great and good man; - a greater and better man even than Dean McNeile, although he does not usually proclaim the fact so loudly as does his co-religionist." Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Arthur Sidgwick, dated September 20, 1868 (E. Q. Nicholson).
  22. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir, p. 144.
  23. F. W. H. Myers, Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 515-537.
  24. J. R. Seeley, Ecce Homo (7th ed.; London, 1900), p. x.
  25. Ibid., p. 133.
  26. Ibid., p. xviii.
  27. Ibid., p. 151.

28. See Millicent Fawcett and E. M. Turner, Josephine Butler. Her Work and Principles (London, 1927); Josephine Butler, Recollections of George Butler (Bristol, 1892); G. W. and L. A. Johnson (eds.), Josephine Butler: An Autobiographical Memoir (Bristol, 1928).
29. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 11.
30. Ibid., p. 12.
31. Phyllis Grosskurth, John Addington Symonds, p. 83.
32. Ibid., p. 84.
33. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, pp. 12-13. Writing to Arthur Sidgwick one year later, Myers stated: "I am I hope a great deal changed from what I was when I last saw you years and years ago, at the beginning of the Easter Vacation. Since then I have lived many lives of mortal men. All feelings of reverence and devotion to the first of created beings which you ever saw in me, the mere shadow and mockery of my present ones." Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Arthur Sidgwick, dated May 16, 1867 (E. Q. Nicholson).
34. The prize was adjudged to Charles Stanwell. Myers dedicated his poem to Josephine Butler. For Myers' own comments on it, see Fragments of Inner Life, p. 13.
35. Edward Cook, Literary Recreations (London, 1918), p. 187.
36. For an edition of the poems which enumerates these changes and the differences among editions, see F. W. H. Myers, Saint Paul, edited with an introduction and notes by E. J. Watson (London, 1916).
37. George Meredith, "Saint Paul," Fortnightly Review, IX (1867), 115-117.
38. Samuel Chew, Swinburne (Boston, 1929), p. 115. Also, Arthur Waugh, Reticence in Literature (London, 1915), p. 78.
39. Edmund Gosse, "Frederic Myers' Poems," More Books on the Table, pp. 37-45.
40. Unpublished letter from Edmund Gosse to F. W. H. Myers, dated 1882 (E. Q. Nicholson).
41. Evan Charteris, Life and Letters of Sir Edmund Gosse (London, 1931), pp. 14-15.
42. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Poetry and Prose, p. 14.

43. F. W. H. Myers, Saint Paul, edited with an introduction and notes by Oliver Smeaton (London, 1914), p. vi.
44. Herbert Warren, "F. W. H. Myers," Spectator, CXXVI (1921), 236-237.
45. Edmund Gosse, More Books on the Table, p. 45.
46. George Meredith, "Saint Paul," Fortnightly Review, IX (1867), 115.
47. A. C. Benson, "F. W. H. Myers," Leaves through the Tree (London, 1911), p. 584.
48. George Saintsbury, An Historical Manual of English Prosody (London, 1910), pp. 128-129. For other valuable interpretations of the meter of the poem see Oliver Edwards, "What Happened to Myers," The Times (London), June 21, 1956, p. 13 and J. S. MacArthur, "A Believer in the Future Life, F. W. H. Myers," Hibbert Journal, XLI (1943), 123.
49. Arthur Sidgwick very adequately sums up this aspect of Myers' character in "Myers' Posthumous Writings," Independent Review, V (1904), 246-250.
50. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 13.
51. F. W. H. Myers, Unpublished Manuscript of Autobiography, unpaginated (E. Q. Nicholson).
52. Ibid. This is not to suggest, however, that Myers abandoned all hope for Theism. The following letter to Henry Sidgwick proves otherwise: "I must tell you of a meeting I was at last Monday, at the Baboo K. C. Sen's. The object was to found a Free Theistic Union. It did not come off. We being unable to settle about Immortality and Prayer, also about the inclusion or exclusion of Church of Englanders. . . . I must say this, that a more charming, a serener, a holier man than the Baboo I think I have never seen; if we are to have theism developed into an organized religion I think he is your man. It is a second oriental wave flowing into the West. . . . The meeting was small and Miss Cobbe and the B mainly communed, Miss Cobbe wanting the B to advertise his religious views in the evening papers, which he said was bad form. . . ." Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated May 22, 1870 (E. Q. Nicholson).
53. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 13.
54. In his publishing diary (MS. in possession of E. Q. Nicholson) these poems are all dated 1870. They were published anonymously in Macmillan's Magazine.

55. F. W. H. Myers, "Ammergau," Collected Poems (London, 1921), pp. 169-183.
56. Ibid., pp. 147-154.
57. Unpublished letters of F. W. H. Myers to his mother dated December 29, 1869, January 4, 1870 and January 3, 1870 (E. Q. Nicholson).
58. R. H. Hutton, "The Modern Poetry of Doubt," Aspects of Religious and Scientific Thought (London, 1901), pp. 377-398.
59. F. W. H. Myers, Collected Poems, pp. 333-336. In his publishing diary, Myers marks this poem specifically with an asterisk.
60. On these movements and Myers' connection with them, see the following: Millicent G. Fawcett, "University Education for Women in England," Addresses and Proceedings of the International Congress of Education (New York, 1904), pp. 853-862; Ethel Sidgwick, Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir (London, 1938); Barbara Stephen, Emily Davies and Girton College (London, 1927); B. A. Clough, Anne J. Clough (London, 1897); A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir (London, 1906); James Stuart, Reminiscences (London, 1911); F. W. H. Myers, Books to Read: A Lecture, pp. 20-25; F. W. H. Myers, "Local Lectures for Women," Macmillan's, XIX (1868), 159; R. G. Moulton, The University Extension Movement (London, 1887).
61. On this malaise, see Kenneth Young, Arthur Balfour (London, 1963), p. 34.
62. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated September 9, 1870 (E. Q. Nicholson); for Myers' friendship with Taylor, see Una Taylor, Guests and Memories (London, 1924).
63. Unpublished letter from Henry Sidgwick to F. W. H. Myers, dated September 19, 1871 (Cambridge, Trinity College Library).
64. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated October 16, 1871 (E. Q. Nicholson).
65. Horatio Brown, John Addington Symonds (London, 1903), pp. 279-280.
66. Unpublished letter from Henry Sidgwick to F. W. H. Myers, dated September 19, 1871 (Trinity College Library, Cambridge).
67. This poem was originally published in Macmillan's for March, 1871. See F. W. H. Myers, Collected Poems, pp. 192-202.
68. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated May 22, 1870 (E. Q. Nicholson): "I have determined to shunt

everything else and go for the Muse: Next month I shall set off for Ammergau and hope to bring forth abundantly there. I shall go on lecturing, etc. when convenient, but have abandoned idea of politics and regular profession in spite of much contempt and opposition from friends at the idea of my being merely a bard." Cf. also an unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick dated September 12, 1870 (E. Q. Nicholson): "I am going to stop lecturing and live in London lodgings in December, reading and writing. I am drawn by the magnetism of three million souls. I should like to write reviews for the Spectator or something of that sort. . . . I have been much plunged in Rossetti - Willowood, The One Hope, The Monochord. This autumn I lecture at Cheltenham and Clifton.

69. Unpublished letter from Henry Sidgwick to F. W. H. Myers, dated February, 1870 (Trinity College Library, Cambridge).
70. Horatio Brown (ed.), Letters and Papers of John Addington Symonds (London, 1923), p. 35.
71. Addresses and Proceedings of the International Congress of Education (New York, 1904), p. 245.
72. Herbert Warren, Essays of Poets and Poetry, Ancient and Modern (London, 1909), p. 61.
73. R. St. John Parry, Henry Jackson, a Memoir, p. 18.
74. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Prose and Poetry, p. 98.
75. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 14.
76. Frank Podmore, Modern Spiritualism, II, 237-243; A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir, p. 289.
77. Robert John Strutt, John William Strutt, Third Baron Rayleigh (London, 1924), p. 65.
78. Ibid. See also Arthur J. Balfour, Retrospect: An Unfinished Autobiography 1848-1886 (Boston, 1930), p. 34.
79. Charlotte M. Leaf, Walter Leaf (London, 1932), pp. 92-93.
80. Ibid., pp. 94-96.
81. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir, p. 288.
82. Gaylord C. LeRoy, "Richard Holt Hutton," PMLA, LVI (1941), 809.
83. J. Holben, Richard Holt Hutton of the Spectator (Edinburgh, 1899), pp. 104-106.
84. See Anon., "Richard Holt Hutton - Obituary Notice," Journal of the Society for Psychological Research, VIII (1897), 132. Also, Richard Holt Hutton, "The Modern Easter Difficulty," Aspects of

Religious and Scientific Thought, pp. 160-162, 164; Richard Holt Hutton, "On the Natural and Supernatural," Aspects of Religious and Scientific Thought, pp. 171-172.

85. On Noel, see A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir; also Roden Noel, Selected Poems, with a Biographical and Critical Essay by P. Addleshaw (London, 1897).
86. Roden Noel, A Philosophy of Immortality (London, 1882), pp. 6-7.
87. Ibid., pp. 77-108. On Hinton, see Mrs. Havelock Ellis, James Hinton (London, 1918).
88. Charlotte Leaf, Walter Leaf, p. 106.
89. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
90. Kenneth Young, Arthur James Balfour, p. 148. Balfour's interests in spiritualism and psychical research were also initially stimulated by Crookes' researches and Sidgwick's influence. Ibid., p. 37.
91. Ibid., p. 149.
92. Ibid. and "Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research," Society for Psychical Research: Presidential Addresses (Glasgow, 1912), pp. 83-85.
93. See, for example, the following: W. H. Salter, "F. W. H. Myers' Posthumous Message," P.S.P.R., LII (1962), 1-32; Alan Gauld, "Frederic Myers and Phyllis," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, XLII (1964), 316-323; Trevor H. Hall, "The Mourning Years of F. W. H. Myers," Tomorrow, XII (1964), 209-212; Robert D. Stein, "In Defense of F. W. H. Myers," Fate Magazine, XVIII (1965), 67-89; Archie Jarman, Dr. Gauld and Mr. Myers (Privately printed, Herts, Garden City, 1964).
94. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated May 26, 1874 (E. Q. Nicholson): "Walter has returned better but far from well. America with Gurney may be considered out of the question. I am therefore at your service for seances. . . . I stay in London most of June and July unless anything about Walter supervenes.
95. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated June 13, 1874 (E. Q. Nicholson).
96. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated May 5, 1875 (E. Q. Nicholson).
97. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated May 23, 1875 (E. Q. Nicholson).



98. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated June 3, 1876 (E. Q. Nicholson): "Jule has seen W. and expresses a very unfavorable opinion. \_\_\_\_\_ tells Mr. Hill he thinks W. will never leave Ticehurst. W. is angry and complaining of plots, etc. which most distress A."
99. In this connection, see Myers' remarks on marriage in his essay on "George Sand," Essays, Classical and Modern, p. 310; also F. W. H. Myers, "Nelson - An Address Delivered at Eton College," ed. Harold H. Myers (unpublished manuscript in possession of E. Q. Nicholson). Myers' comments on Nelson's "intimacy" with Lady Hamilton are particularly relevant to an interpretation of his relationship with Anne Marshall. On this lecture and Myers' abilities as a speaker, see Gilbert Coleridge, Eton in the Eighteen-Seventies (London, 1912), pp. 236-238.
100. See F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 39. Also Virgil's Eclogues, VII, lines 59-63 and Ovid, "Phyllis to Demophon," Heroides II.
101. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 17. **Myers** comments here that his poem "Teneriffe" (Collected Poems, pp. 221-223) "reflects the first intoxication of that opening glory." In an unpublished letter from Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated August 2, 1877 (E. Q. Nicholson) Myers gave an earlier date: "I enclose a few lines on Vevey. It was in February 71 that I saw her there - the beginning of all things." The reference is to Myers' poem "And All Is Over" (Collected Poems, pp. 354-355).
102. F. W. H. Myers, Essays, Classical and Modern, p. 220.
103. Kenneth Young, Arthur Balfour, p. 20.
104. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (New York, 1930), p. 159.
105. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir, p. 260.
106. Alan Willard Brown, The Metaphysical Society, pp. 189-190.
107. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 15.
108. Edmund Gosse, More Books on the Table, p. 41.
109. A. C. Benson, "Frederic Myers," Cornhill Magazine, CIII (1911), 527-541.
110. F. W. H. Myers, Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 506-507.
111. James Martineau, "A Modern Symposium," Nineteenth Century, I (1877), 343-344.

112. See above, pp. 48-56.
113. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 15.
114. Ibid., p. 38.
115. F. W. H. Myers, Collected Poems, pp. 286-287.
116. F. W. H. Myers, Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 495-496. This is the most famous passage of prose Myers ever wrote. On its significance, cf. Richard Holt Hutton, "George Eliot's Life and Letters," Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith (London, 1887), p. 272; John Morley, "Life of George Eliot," Critical Miscellanies (London, 1918), III, 100; Basil Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies (New York, 1949), p. 204.
117. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 37.
118. Ibid., p. 38. Also, F. W. H. Myers' Unpublished Manuscript Draft of Autobiography, unpaginated and undated (E. Q. Nicholson).
119. See, for example, an unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated October 16, 1871 (E. Q. Nicholson): "As for Noel, however, I consider that his opinions or writings are only worth noticing on the score of private friendship, and when he compares himself to the holy head of Swinburne--and matches his own wandering utterances with that inspired and pythian song--friendship must become the friendship of candid friends. I believe I had read his essay on Walt Whitman in Ms and had angered him somewhat by not perceiving that it incidentally extinguished me, but responding warmly that I quite agreed with the whole thing: - as indeed I do, so far as I know: nor do I perceive that anybody is scathed by it: we all know that poets need both sound and sense, and it is all a question of degree. I earnestly hope that Symonds may do great things; he would if he were quite different, and so should I. As it is, I believe that Symonds' character, my character and Noel's want of ear, will prevent any of us from coming to anything." For Noel's attack on Myers' aestheticism, see his "A Study of Walt Whitman," Essays on Poetry and Poets (London, 1886), pp. 307-309.
120. F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 106-176.
121. Ibid., p. 160.
122. Ibid., pp. 167-168.
123. Ibid., p. 169.

124. F. W. H. Myers, "John Ruskin," Fragments of Prose and Poetry, pp. 89-94.
125. Unpublished letter from J. R. Collins to F. W. H. Myers, dated 1884 (E. Q. Nicholson).
126. For a review of Ruskin's interest in spiritualistic phenomena, see John Lewis Bradley (ed.), The Letters of John Ruskin to Lord and Lady Mount-Temple (Columbus, 1964). Ruskin's interest in spiritualism developed after the death of Rose La Touche in 1875. It was also stimulated the year before by Myers and Prince Leopold, the youngest son of Victoria. In an unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to J. R. Collins, dated January 27, 1875 (E. Q. Nicholson), Myers wrote: "My dear Collins/ Thank you for your note received yesterday. I had not expected that you would write to me, knowing how anxious every hour that passes must be; but your letter was most welcome: Till I saw his danger announced in the papers I had never realized how much I cared for the Prince, - how very few people there were in the world, whose loss I should feel more. I was almost startled by the shock that passed through me at the idea of losing him; and when I analyzed the feeling I perceived that since my last visit to Oxford he had become - almost without my knowing it - one of the people whom I feel I live for. The long conversation with him and Ruskin on the next world was the only occasion in my life, when I have found sympathy with my own intense interest in the Existence, which awaits us, and which must in reality so utterly overbalance this mere fragment of life which we have here. And the sight of the Prince's look of grave patience and Ruskin's look of yearning melancholy made me feel as if the two typified to me all that the world contains of dignity, delicacy, sadness; and I felt that to bring to natures like these anything like a certainty of the unseen which should sustain them through their passage through their alien and temporary world would indeed be an object to which one could give one's life. And I was startled to find how much of the interest would go out of mine, if I had not the idea of telling him anything, which I might discover, to look forward to. But then of course I felt how selfish such a reason for desiring his continued stay in this world was, and I tried to bring myself to being resigned to his loss for a time, for that in any case I shall see him again in thirty years or so I have scarcely the slightest doubt. . . . These crises reveal and quicken one's most deeply-lying emotions, and I feel at present that friendship is a weak word to express the passionate sympathy which I feel with his courage, his gentleness and his sufferings. I do not in the least expect or even wish you to care about Spiritualism as I do, till you have seen something like what I have seen--mainly since I was last with you. But I think the Prince's long illness and something in his own nature have brought the spiritual world near. . . ."

127. On Ruskin's conversion at this time, see Charles Eliot Norton (ed.), Letters of John Ruskin to Charles Eliot Norton (Boston, 1903), II, 128-129. In Holman Hunt's The Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, Hunt records a conversation with Ruskin on the subject of immortality: "When we last met," said Hunt to Ruskin, "you declared you had given up all belief in immortality." "I remember well," replied Ruskin, "but what has mainly caused the change in my views is the unanswerable evidence of spiritualism. I know there is much vulgar fraud and stupidity connected with it, but underneath there is, I am sure, enough to convince us that there is personal life independent of the body, but with this once proved, I have no further interest in spiritualism." Holman Hunt, The Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood (London, 1905-06), II, 271.
128. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Prose and Poetry, pp. 90-91: "But chiefliest I think of him in that home of high thoughts where his interest in our inquiry first upgrew. For the introduction to the new hope came to him, as to Edmund Gurney and to myself, through a lady whom each of us held in equal honor; and it was on the stately lawns of Broadlands, and in that air as of Sabbathical repose, that Ruskin enjoyed his one brief season,--since the failure of his youthful Christian confidence,--of blissful trust in the Unseen. To one among that company a vision came, as of a longed-for meeting of souls beloved in heaven,--a vision whose detail and symbolism carried conviction to Ruskin's heart."
129. F. W. H. Myers, "George Eliot," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 477-501. On the genesis of this essay, see H. Ritchie, Letters of Anne Thackeray Ritchie (London, 1924), p. 182.
130. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to George Eliot, dated December 8, 1872 (E. Q. Nicholson): "Dear Mrs. Lewes/ I have often wanted to write to you while Middlemarch was coming out, but have restrained myself hitherto, partly because you must be bored with many letters of the kind from slight acquaintances, like myself, or even strangers, and partly because I felt hindered by the idea that you might think that I expected an answer. But after reading the last volume my impulse to write is so strong that I shall yield to it. I do not expect an answer, and I write to give myself the pleasure and relief of thanking you for an enjoyment which has brightened the whole year./ Each reader of complex books like yours will care most for some particular strain which appeals most directly to his personal tastes and experience. Though I thoroughly enjoy the whole of Middlemarch, I care the most for the scenes between Ladislaw and Dorothea. Noble lovemaking--the surprised and pure contact of lofty souls,--is hardly ever described truly--when it is described truly, to read the description is better than to live through any scenes but such as those. Life has come to such a pass,--and now that there is no longer any

God or any hereafter or anything in particular to aim at,--that it is only by coming into contact with some other person that one can be oneself. There is no longer anything to keep isolated fire burning within one,--all one can do is to feel the sparks fly from one for a moment when one strikes a kindred soul. Such contact in real life can make one feel for a moment immortal; but the necessary circumstances are so unusual! Mere love, delicate or passionate, will not do; to have its best savour love must be set among great possibilities and great self sacrifices, and must demand the full strain of all the forces within one. Unless things can so happen the first moment of love is apt to be the best. And therefore it is that to read of Dorothea's night of struggle and visits to Rosamond is better, though it is only on paper and in a book, than an ordinary passion; for this is what one wants, though it be but a shadow; this is the best conception of life that in this stage of the world we can form. Scenes like these go straight into the only imperishable world,--the world which is peopled by the lovely conceptions which have disengaged themselves in successive generations from the brains of men. The interest of such conceptions is more than artistic; they are landmarks in the history of the race, showing the height to which, at successive periods, man's ideal of his own life has risen./ And you seem now to be the only person who can make life appear potentially noble and interesting without starting from any assumptions. De Stendhal, perhaps, while himself detached from all allusions has painted life in the same grand style. But he remains too much outside his characters, and though in his books nobleness seems possible it seems possibly only as an aberation. And others who have shown more or less of the same power of rising into clear air,--Mme. De Stael in *Corinne*, Mrs. Craven in *Fleurange*, George Sand in *Consuelo*,--have all needed some fixed point to lean against before they could spread wings to soar. But one feels that you know the worst, and one thanks you in that you have not despaired of the republic." This letter also, of course, offers an illuminating gloss on Myers' relationship with his cousin, Anne Marshall. (E. Q. Nicholson.)

131. F. W. H. Myers, "George Eliot," Essays, Classical and Modern, p. 479.
132. Ibid., p. 498.
133. See the letter from Myers to George Eliot printed in Fragments of Prose and Poetry, pp. 34-37. George Eliot's reply is only reprinted in part. The full text of her letter, dated November 16, 1877, is as follows: "I am very grateful for your confidence. Indefinable impressions had convinced me that since we began to know something of each other a blight had passed over your energies and it was painful to me to feel in the dark about one of whom I had from first thought with that hopeful interest which the elder mind, dissatisfied with itself, de-

lights to entertain with regard to the younger whose years and powers hold a larger measure of unspoiled life./ What you have disclosed to me affects me too deeply for me to say more about it just now than that my sympathy nullifies to my mind that difference which we were trying to explain on Sunday. When you write--'My own mournful present and solemn past seem sometimes to show me as it were, for a moment, by direct revelation the whole world's love and woe, and I seem to have drawn close to other lives in that I have lost my own.' --you express that spiritual result which seems to me the font of real betterness for poor mankind. I have no controversy with the faith that cries out and clings from the depths of man's need. I only long, if it were possible to, to help in satisfying the need of those who want a reason for living in the absence of what has been called consolatory belief./ But all the while I gather a sort of strength from the certainty that there must be limits or negatives in my own moral powers and life-experience which may screen from me many possibilities of blessedness for our suffering human nature. The most melancholy thought surely would be that we in our own persons had measured and exhausted the sources of spiritual good. But we know how the poor help the poor./ The poems you have sent me I have read several times already and they will be treasured by me as a sacred memorial of your confidence. I feel as if some foggy obstructions had been cleared away from my mind and I am strangely the more contented because I know of your great sadness--as if I had seen and joined hands with one whom I had missed in the procession of reverential mourners." Clearly, Myers had told George Eliot of his relationship with his cousin, Anne Marshall, who had died one year before. (E. Q. Nicholson.)

134. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated February 5, 1879 (E. Q. Nicholson).
135. Margaret Oliphant, "The Beleaguered City," New Quarterly Magazine, N.S., I (1879), 73-149. In his Fragments of Inner Life, Myers wrote: "And always the consciousness that the hour at last had come, that the world-old secret was opening out to mortal view; that the first carrier pigeon had swooped into this fastness of beleaguered men" (p. 16).
136. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to John Addington Symonds, dated December 15, 1874 (Bristol University Library).

#### Notes to Chapter IV

1. These two volumes were originally published separately in 1883 as Essays, Classical and Essays, Modern. My references are to the one volume edition published with a slightly altered title, Essays, Classical and Modern (London, 1921).

2. F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth (English Men of Letters Series, New York, 1881).
3. T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), pp. 114-115.
4. Matthew Arnold, "On the Modern Element in Literature," The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, ed. R. H. Super (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960), I, 19.
5. Illustrations of this methodology are numerous in Arnold's prose works. In particular, see his "Preface to Poems (1853)" and On the Study of Celtic Literature. In "On the Modern Element in Literature," Arnold describes his method as a "method of inquiry." In his "Preface to Second Edition of Poems (1854)" Arnold writes: "Again, with respect to the study of the classical writers of antiquity: it has been said that we should emulate rather than imitate them. I make no objection; all I say is let us study them. They can help to cure us of what is, it seems to me, the great vice of our intellect. . . . It is impossible to read carefully the great ancients, without losing something of our caprice and eccentricity; and to emulate them we must read them." The Complete Prose Works, I, 17.
6. F. W. H. Myers, "Matthew Arnold," Fortnightly Review, XL (1888), 719-728.
7. For an appreciation of Myers' essay on Arnold, see Henry Ebel, "Matthew Arnold and Marcus Aurelius," Studies in English Literature, III (1963), 555-565. "To F. W. H. Myers must go the credit for firstly amalgamating Arnold to the Stoic tradition. . . . It is in this essay that we find Myers' famous sentence: 'Arnold has been treated as a flippant and illusory Christian instead of a specially devout and conservative Agnostic.' William Robbins, in The Ethical Idealism of Matthew Arnold, quotes this sentence as an 'epigrammatic remark' which was 'one of the shrewdest' tributes paid to Arnold after his death. But the 'remark' is imbedded in a remarkably shrewd essay."
8. For a similar argument, see Myers' essay, "A New Eirenicon," Essays, Classical and Modern, p. 542. "We may be carried beyond ourselves by our teacher's eloquence and enthusiasm, yet we are always dimly conscious that eloquence and enthusiasm will after all leave us where we were, with everything depending on a single point which neither our teacher nor we have the data to determine." This essay was originally published in the Fortnightly Review, XXXVIII (1882), 596-607.
9. "Marcus Aurelius Antonius," Essays, Classical and Modern, p. 206. Originally published in Fortnightly Review, XXXVII (1882), 564-586.

10. F. W. H. Myers, "Giuseppe Mazzini," Essays, pp. 285-286. Originally published in Fortnightly Review, XXIX (1878), 513-528 and 710-728.
11. F. W. H. Myers, "George Sand," Essays, p. 296.
12. Matthew Arnold, "George Sand," Mixed Essays (New York, 1903), p. 252.
13. F. W. H. Myers, "George Sand," Essays, p. 328.
14. Matthew Arnold, "The Modern Element in Literature," p. 36.
15. F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, pp. 106-176. Originally published in Fortnightly Review, XXXI (1879), 163-196.
16. F. W. H. Myers, "Ernest Renan," Essays, p. 434. Originally published in Nineteenth Century, IX (1881), 949-968 and X (1881), 90-106.
17. F. W. H. Myers, "Marcus Aurelius," Essays, p. 178.
18. F. W. H. Myers, "George Eliot," Essays, p. 499. Originally published in The Century Magazine, N.S., XXIII (1881), 57-64.
19. F. W. H. Myers, "Greek Oracles," Essays, pp. 1-105. This essay was reprinted from Hellenica, ed. Evelyn Abbott (London, 1880), pp. 388-499.
20. Evelyn Abbott, "Preface," Hellenica (2d ed.; London, 1898), p. viii: "But if a single generation were able to keep before it an ideal of culture which should blend all the elements of human knowledge 'into an immortal feature of perfection,' if a whole country could unite in one effort to appropriate in any real manner the best that has been thought and written on the great interests of life, we should indeed make a great stride forward, but we should also find that the brightest hope of the future is not far removed from the truest interpretation of the past."
21. F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth, p. 133.
22. F. W. H. Myers, "Marcus Aurelius," Essays, pp. 213-214.
23. F. W. H. Myers, "Giuseppe Mazzini," Essays, p. 287. Myers does not suggest that history is the tool by which the modern man can solve his problems. He conceives of history as a discipline by which man can discover possibilities which can initiate such a solution. In the same essay, therefore, he states that "it may indeed be urged that if in an exact age we are to attain to any conclusive knowledge of an unseen world we must attain it by an increased power of accurately apprehending unseen forces--by experiment rather than by tradition, by scientific rather than historical inquiry." Ibid., p. 288.



24. For an excellent general discussion of kinds and methods of history, see Richard McKeon, Thought, Action and Passion (Chicago, 1954), pp. 54-88.
25. F. W. H. Myers, "Greek Oracles," Essays, p. 5.
26. Ibid., p. 4.
27. There are a number of outside materials which help us reconstruct the intent of this essay. An unpublished letter from Lady Mount-Temple to Myers, dated October 27, 1879 (E. Q. Nicholson) gives us some idea how Spiritualists received the essay: "Dear Mr. M/ I wish you could stay for another day with St. C. Do so if possible, but if your departure is inevitable--goodbye./ It has been a great additional happiness to us all to have you. The Essay on Oracles such a lift into wider vision--and being brought to know something of Porphyry and Plotinus with that beautiful letter--and more beautiful renderings of more lost oracles--a real delight--I wish we might have a volume with your Virgil and this--and another on the great subject of Inspiration together. I don't like them to be lost in books of general Essays and Reviews./ Still I shall look forward to its appearance--in any form or company. It is altogether--on the whole--very confirmatory and hope giving." In a "Prefatory Note" to the essay published in Essays, Classical and Modern (London, 1921), pp. vii-ix, Myers draws his reader's attention to the relationship between the subject matter of this essay and inquiries undertaken and published by the Society for Psychical Research. In an unpublished note to Myers from R. W. Raper, undated (E. Q. Nicholson), Raper comments that "Unless you clearly exhibit the actual power of the oracle at its best, carefully estimate its value, human and divine, and above all, put forth in all its strength the possible human machinery of which the total effects may have been composed--however much you may disapprove the theory of a priestly aristocracy ruling the world through its superstitions --you will not have done what you profess, to have completely suspended your judgment, but . . . will leave your essay a dexterously veiled pamphlet on behalf of modern Spiritualism, to which if intended I don't object."
28. For a similar argument from a very different point of view, see Thomas Huxley, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata and Its History," Method and Results, p. 202.
29. Myers suggests that the Greeks themselves had the proper attitude. In effect, Myers compares the Greek temper with the temper of the enlightenment, holding one up for purposes of emulation and imitation and the other for purposes of reproach. "Suspense and judgment, indeed, in matters of such moment is so irksome an attitude of mind, that we need not wonder if confidence of view on the one side is met by a corresponding confidence on the other; if the trust felt by the mass of mankind in

the adequacy of one or other of the answers to these problems which have been already obtained is rebutted by the decisive assertion that all these answers have been proved futile and that it is idle to look for more./ Yet such was not the temper of those among the Greeks who felt, as profoundly perhaps as we, the darkness and the mystery of human fates. To them it seemed no useless or unworthy thing to ponder on these chief concerns of man with that patient earnestness which has unlocked so many problems whose solution once seemed destined to be forever unknown. . . . And even now, in the face of philosophies of materialism and of negation so far more powerful than any which Sophocles had to meet, there are yet some minds into which, after all, a doubt may steal,--whether we have indeed so fully explained away the beliefs of the world's past, whether we can indeed so assuredly define the beliefs of its future,--or whether it may not still befit us to track with fresh feet the ancient mazes, to renew the world-old desire, and to set no despairing limit to the knowledge or the hopes of man." "Greek Oracles," Essays, pp. 104-105.

30. Frederick Pollock, "Marcus Aurelius and Stoicism," Mind, IV (1879), 47-68. Pollock was principally interested in demonstrating that there is no connection between morality and orthodox religious belief. His essay is best understood as part of the debates at the Metaphysical Society and in the Nineteenth Century on the relationship between morality and orthodoxy.
31. Ernest Renan, "Marc-Aurèle," Nineteenth Century, VII (1880), 742-755. Renan was no so much interested in Aurelius' ethics as he was in his method and approach to the problem of ethics.
32. Matthew Arnold, "Marcus Aurelius," The Complete Works, III, 133-157. Originally published in The Victorian Magazine, II (1863), 1-19.
33. F. W. H. Myers, "Marcus Aurelius," Essays, p. 206.
34. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
35. Ibid., pp. 203-204.
36. Ibid., p. 205.
37. Ibid., p. 209.
38. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
39. Ibid., p. 223.
40. Jerome Buckley, The Victorian Temper (Vintage Books, 1964), p. 203.

41. For two interesting illustrations of this error, see Robert Buchanan, "Lucretius and Modern Materialists," New Quarterly Magazine, VI (1876), 1-30, and Jerome Buckley, The Victorian Temper, p. 190.
42. For a brilliant study of the rhetoric of science and the causes of philosophical and scientific conflict, see Leslie Stephen, "Introduction," English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1962), I, 1-15; also John Stuart Mill, "The Spirit of the Age," Essays on Politics and Culture, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb (New York, 1962), pp. 3-20 and Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962).
43. John Tyndall, "The Belfast Address for 1874," Fragments of Science (New York, 1901) II, 145-213. Tyndall placed no limitations on science's possibilities. "We claim we shall rest from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory." Taking a note from his favorite poet, Lucretius, Tyndall frequently waxed rhapsodic in his speculations on ultimate origins and final causes.
44. Alfred Russell Wallace, "The Scientific Aspect of the Supernatural," Miracles and Modern Spiritualism, pp. 33-144. For an excellent discussion of Wallace, see Loren Eiseley, Darwin's Century (Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 287-324.
45. Leslie Stephen, "An Agnostic's Apology," An Agnostic's Apology and Other Essays (London, 1893). Buckley says of Stephen that he found it impossible to regard the universe with any but a "colorless emotion" (p.190).
46. William Kindon Clifford, "Cosmic Emotion," Lectures and Essays (London, 1879), II, 257-297. On Clifford, Swinburne and Whitman, see Goldwin Smith, "The Proposed Substitutes for Religion," Macmillan's, XXXVII (1878), 257-265. Clifford's cosmos was full of the drama and poetry which mankind could identify with aesthetically and emotionally.
47. For the conflict between Huxley and Harrison and between the "religion of humanity" and agnosticism, see Sydney Eisen, "Huxley and the Positivists," Victorian Studies, VII (1964), 337-358.
48. John Fiske organized 19th century scientific thought somewhat differently. His classification is three-fold: (1) "We may regard the world of phenomena as sufficient unto itself and deny that it needs to be referred to any underlying and all comprehensive unity"; (2) "We may hold that the world of phenomena is utterly unintelligible unless referred to an underlying and all comprehensive unity"; (3) "We may hold that the world of phenomena is intelligible only when regarded as the multiform manifestation of an Omnipresent energy that is in some way anthropomorphic or quasi-personal." John Fiske, The Idea of God (Boston, 1897), pp. v-xxxi.

49. F. W. H. Myers, "Marcus Aurelius," Essays, p. 220. "To be the conqueror in such a contest is the characteristic privilege of a time of transition like our own."
50. Ibid., pp. 213-214.
51. F. W. H. Myers, "George Eliot," Essays, p. 499.
52. F. W. H. Myers, Fragments of Inner Life, p. 37. "Religion, in its most permanent sense, is the adjustment of our emotions to the structure of the Universe; and what we now most need is to discover what that cosmic structure is."
53. F. W. H. Myers, "Ernest Renan," Essays, pp. 439-442.
54. Ibid., pp. 442-443.
55. Ibid., p. 444.
56. Ibid., pp. 447-448.
57. Ibid., p. 450.
58. F. W. H. Myers, "George Sand," Essays, p. 317.
59. Ibid., p. 318.
60. F. W. H. Myers, "George Eliot," Essays, p. 497.
61. F. W. H. Myers, "Archbishop Trench's Poems," Essays, p. 473.
62. Ibid., p. 463.
63. Ibid., p. 467.
64. For some interesting remarks on Myers' essay on Hugo see Kenneth W. Hooker, Fortunes of Victor Hugo in England (Morningside Heights, 1939). Also an unpublished letter from John Morley to F. W. H. Myers, dated January 30, 1877 (E. Q. Nicholson) which supports Myers' position on Hugo over against that of Swinburne.
65. F. W. H. Myers, "Victor Hugo," Essays, p. 332. Originally published in the Nineteenth Century, V (1879), 773-787 and 955-970.
66. Ibid., pp. 344-348.
67. Ibid., p. 335. Myers is here using the terminology of Mill's famous essay, "Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties." Distinguishing poetry from eloquence, Mill wrote: "We should say that eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard. Eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener." Quoted from

- Robert L. Peters (ed.), The Victorians on Literature and Art (New York, 1961), p. 83. Mill's distinction had a wide currency in the last half of the century. See William Butler Yeats, The Autobiography of William Butler Yeats (Collier Books, 1965), p. 65 and Arthur Symons, The Symbolist Movement in Literature (Dutton Books, 1958), pp. 20 and 49. Myers does not so much distinguish poetry from rhetoric as distinguish good rhetoric from bad rhetoric.
68. Ibid., p. 354.
69. Ibid., p. 359.
70. Ibid., pp. 385-386.
71. Walter Leaf in an obituary article on Myers wrote that Myers' "literary sense was abnormally acute; but his criticism always leads up to one great question. What attitudes does the poet, the historian, the statesman take toward the great riddle of life? What sense has he of the interaction of the world unseen in the things of this life?" Quoted from W. H. Salter, "Frederic W. H. Myers," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, XXXIX (1958), 263.
72. F. W. H. Myers, "Victor Hugo," Essays, pp. 383-385. For general discussions of the problem of sincerity and poetry in the 19th century, see Henri Peyre, Literature and Sincerity (New Haven, 1963) and M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (Norton Library, 1958), pp. 317-320.
73. F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth, p. 127.
74. Matthew Arnold, "The Study of Poetry," Essays in Criticism. Second Series (New York, 1924), p. 2.
75. John Seeley, Natural Religion (Boston, 1882).
76. F. W. H. Myers, "A New Eirenicon," Essays, pp. 515-537. For an argument similar to that of Myers, see Edmund Gurney, "Natural Religion," Tertium Quid (London, 1887), I, 49-99.
77. Ibid., p. 528.
78. Ibid., p. 529.
79. Matthew Arnold, "Preface to Poems (1853)," The Collected Works, I, 15.
80. F. W. H. Myers, "A New Eirenicon," Essays, pp. 536-537.
81. F. W. H. Myers, "Tennyson as Prophet," Science and a Future Life (London, 1893), pp. 162-163.

82. F. W. H. Myers, "Rossetti and the Religion of Beauty," Essays, p. 539. "The students of Rossetti's poems, taking their tone from Mr. Swinburne's magnificent eulogy, have for the most part set forth their artistic excellence than endeavored to explain their contents, or to indicate the relation of the poet's habit of thought and feeling to the ideas which Englishmen are accustomed to trust or admire. And consequently many critics, whose ethical point of view demands respect, continue to find in Rossetti's works an enigma not worth the pains of solution, and to decry them as obscure, fantastic, or even as grossly immoral in tendency." Originally published in Cornhill Magazine, XLVII (1883), 213-224.
83. F. W. H. Myers, "Rossetti and the Religion of Beauty," Essays, p. 544. "Rossetti was ignorant of Greek, and it seems doubtful whether he knew Plato even by translations. Yet his idealising spirit has reproduced the myth of the Phaedrus even when she perceives beneath the arch of heaven the pure Idea which is at once her substance and her lord."
84. Ibid., p. 546, where Myers distinguishes Rossetti's love poetry from that of Gautier and Baudelaire. Also p. 558. "And further we observe in him the reaction of Art against Materialism, which becomes more marked as the dominant tone of science grows more severe."
85. Ibid. "The instincts which make other men Catholics, Ritualists, Hegelians, have compelled him, too, to seek 'the meaning of all things that are' elsewhere than in the behaviour of ether and atoms, though we can track this revelation to no sources more explicit than the look in a woman's eyes."
86. Myers is referring to an unpublished letter from Theodore Watts-Dunton to himself, dated October 2, 1882 (E. Q. Nicholson): "Your article in the Cornhill I read with the deepest interest and admiration. To say that it is, by far, the best criticism that has appeared upon Rossetti is to say nothing in its praise. My only regret is that it did not appear during his life: it would have afforded him the greatest comfort. Such worldly goods as I have, I would have freely given for Rossetti to have seen that essay: you cannot imagine the effect it would have had upon him. It touches the very core of his work both in poetry and painting; and I did not suppose that the message of his work had been so clearly enunciated that one who never knew him could read it so clearly. I cannot at the moment remember a single suggestion I can make by way of amendment: but I will again read the essay. . . ." For Watts-Dunton's own appreciation of Rossetti, see "The Truth about Rossetti," Nineteenth Century, XIII (1883), 404-424.
87. Unpublished letter from F. W. H. Myers to John Addington Symonds, dated August 28, 1883 (Bristol University Library).

88. F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, pp. 11-12. For an essay frequently compared to that of Myers by his contemporaries, see Principal Shairp, "The Hades of Virgil," Macmillan's, XLVI (1882), 369-377.
89. F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, p. 113. "The range of human thoughts and emotions greatly transcends the range of such symbols as man has invented to express them."
90. Ibid., p. 113.
91. Ibid., pp. 113-114.
92. Ibid., p. 115.
93. Probably referring to Myers' essay on Virgil and his essay on Hugo, A. E. Housman in "The Name and Nature of Poetry," Selected Prose (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 169-170, commented: "There is indeed one literary subject on which I could discourse with profit, because it is also scientific, so that men of science can handle it without presumption, and indeed is fitter for the task than most men of letters. The Artifice of Versification, which I first thought of taking for my theme today, has underlying it a set of facts which are unknown to most of those who practice it; and their success, when they succeed, is owing to instinctive tact and a natural goodness of ear. This latent base, comprising natural laws by which all versification is conditioned, and the secret springs of the pleasure which good versification can give it, is little explored by critics: a few pages of Coventry Patmore and a few of Frederic Myers contain all, so far as I know, or all of value, which has been written on such matters; and to these pages I could add a few more."
94. In a letter to Sidgwick, dated April 30, 1879, Symonds wrote of this essay: "What you say about Myers' 'Virgil' is quite true. Only I go further, and think it quite remarkable; among the best critical products of this century. It is so mellow in tone, so elevated in emotion. He recited the translations to me at Davos, and they warmed my blood like old wine." Quoted in Horatio F. Brown (ed.), Letters and Papers of John Addington Symonds (London, 1923), p. 96.
95. John Addington Symonds, "Is Music Type or Pleasure of All Art?" Essays, Speculative and Suggestive (London, 1890), II, 185-189. Symonds, of course, misinterprets Pater.
96. F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth, pp. 108-109.
97. See Edmund Gurney, The Power of Sound (London, 1880) and Tertium Quid. Chapters on Various Disputed Questions, 2 vols. (London, 1887); on Gurney, see Georges Geroult, "Edmund Gurney: The Power of Sound," Revue Philosophique, XIII (1882), 433-441; James Sully, "The Power of Sound," Mind, VI (1881), 270-278; George

Saintsbury, "Edmund Gurney," A History of English Criticism (Edinburgh, 1911), pp. 512-514; Williams James, The Principles of Psychology (Dover Publications, 1950), II, 468-470. James acknowledged that Gurney "had exquisite artistic instincts, and his massive volume was, when it appeared, the most important work in aesthetics in the English language." Quoted in Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (eds.), William James on Psychological Research (London, 1961), p. 32. Sully states that Gurney enunciated three principal theses about music. He believed that music was formalistic, not impressionistic. Suggestion was no essential ingredient in music. He believed that music as an art form was different from other art forms such as poetry, painting, sculpture and architecture. He differed from other formalists in denying that the beauty of form can be analyzed on rationally grounded or general principles.

98. Edmund Gurney, The Power of Sound, p. 45.
99. Ibid., pp. 40-61.
100. Ibid., pp. 59-61.
101. Ibid., pp. 423-450. Gurney here devotes a whole chapter to the sound element in verse. See also his "Poets, Critics and Class Lists," Tertium Quid, II, 162-179, particularly those passages quoted in R. M. Alden, English Verse (New York, 1903), pp. 427-429.
102. Saintsbury states that Gurney "was the first, or one of the first, I think, to enunciate the great truth that 'the setting includes a new substance'--meaning not merely the technical music setting of the composer, but that sound accompaniment which in all poetry more or less, and in English poetry of the 19th century, especially, gives a bonus, adds a panache, to the meaning." A History of English Criticism, p. 514. Saintsbury was probably referring to Gurney's explanation of metrical effects in The Power of Sound, p. 444. A close reading of this passage will demonstrate that Gurney quotes from Myers' essay on "Virgil" at the crucial point. The passage is rather long, but I shall quote it in its entirety because it has never before, to my knowledge, been reprinted. "To obtain the more general explanation which we require, we must notice how often in Art the enjoyment must be traced to the perception of one thing in two relations, or if we prefer it, to the harmonious confluence of two different lines of things. In the union of words and music, for instance, we see syllables and notes dominated by one rhythm; in the apprehension of metre, we have sounds in a frequently varied and elastic order recognized as still under the dominance of a strict scheme of stresses; in the complete effect of verse, we see the words dominated at once by the idea they express in their grammatical connection and by their metrical adjustment. It is the application of the simple metrical



form, with its comparatively slight power of independent impressiveness, to material expressing a meaning totally independent of it, it is this function of two disparate elements which is at the root of the effect. What that effect at its best can be it is as impossible for one who has not experienced it to divine, as it would be for an uninstructed person to divine the result of the combination of an acid and an alkali: or we might seek our metaphor in that unique sensation of musical concord whose physical condition is that two different sets of stimulation shall flow on simultaneously, but without mutual interference, in the ear; the result of their joint action being something at which nobody who had only known them in separation could have given the smallest guess. In the subtler mental chemistry, to the subtler poetic perception, the combination brings a totally new intuition of language, a sense of surprising and exquisite correspondence . . . [more than] the delight either alone could give, and fusing it into a kind of triumphant affection. That flow of nervous energy which often gives to ordinary emotional expression an expansive delight unknown to our silent meditations, has its current filled, by means of rhythm, from the deeper and wider sources of our whole nervous organization. For once physical utterance seems adequate to our emotions and cognitions: the ictus of the verse strikes living fire out of the neutral symbols of thought, so that hitherto undreamed-of qualities flash forth from common words. In this glow, the separate verbal units seem able to focus all the scattered suggestiveness of their associations into a single point, so as really to mean more than in other collocations: each word, as it has been well remarked, seems 'raised to a higher power.' And we should notice the bearings on this general explanation of the more special points of the preceding section: for any structure or use of language which seems both new and natural vivifies the sense of the twin domination to which it so willingly lends itself.

This general account of the distinctive effect of verse may seem, after all, to be rather a statement or description than an explanation. But it may not be amiss to point out that psychology presents a larger number than is usually recognised of points where the chemical analogy becomes something more than a metaphor; where the product resulting from the combination of certain known elements of a kind which nothing could have led us a priori to expect; and where the explanation can only consist in clearly recognising the elements and the product, plus the fact that the result does belong to this inscrutable department of chemical transformation, and represents no mere summation of the impressive elements; and that this region is no mere metaphorical conception, convenient in a single instance, but truly embraces a considerable number of mental phenomena, which are as real and as amenable to accurate observation as physical substances."

103. See, for example, Sully's review in Mind, VI (1881), 270-278. Although disagreeing with Gurney on this point, Sully still

maintained that Gurney's work amounted "to a new psychological prolegomena to all future art-theory." For Gurney's response to his critics, see "The Psychology of Music," Tertium Quid, II, 251-302.

104. James Sully, "Aesthetics," Encyclopaedia Britannica, I, 284.
105. Quoted from F. W. H. Myers, "Rhythm and Metrics in English Poetry," Cambridge Review, XVII (1896), 171.
106. See James Sully, "Grant Allen's Physiological Aesthetics," Mind, VII (1882), 387-392.
107. James Sully, "Aesthetics," Encyclopaedia Britannica, I, 284.
108. F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, p. 114.

#### Notes to Chapter V

1. F. W. H. Myers and Edmund Gurney, "Transferred Impressions and Telepathy," Fortnightly Review, XXXIX (1883), 437-452.
2. W. F. Barrett, Edmund Gurney, and F. W. H. Myers, "Thought-Reading," Nineteenth Century, XI (1882), 890-901.
3. E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Mesmerism," Nineteenth Century, XIV (1883), 695-719.
4. E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Phantasms of the Living," Fortnightly Review, XXXIX (1883), 562-577.
5. F. W. H. Myers, "Edmund Gurney," Fragments of Prose and Poetry, p. 65. This essay was originally published in the P.S.P.R., V (1888-1889), 359-373. Myers frequently makes the same point in his Introduction to Phantasms of the Living.
6. For a spirited study of Gurney with a debatable thesis, see Trevor Hall, The Strange Case of Edmund Gurney (London, 1964). (Hall could have saved himself a considerable amount of trouble in proving his thesis if he would have consulted The Diary of Alice James, ed. Leon Edel [New York, 1934], especially p. 52.)
7. See Congrès International de Psychologie Physiologique, Première Session (Paris, 1890), pp. 44-48 and 151-157; also, International Congress of Experimental Psychology, Second Session (London, 1892), 56-60.
8. Edmund Gurney, "Stages of Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 61-72; "Problems of Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 265-292; "Stages of Hypnotic Memory," P.S.P.R., V (1888-1889), 515-531; "The Stages of Hypnotism," Mind, IX (1884), 110-121.

9. Edmund Gurney, "An Account of Some Experiments in Mesmerism," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 201-206; "On Some Higher Aspects of Mesmerism," P.S.P.R., III (1885), 401-423; "Peculiarities of Certain Post Hypnotic States," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 269-323; "Recent Experiments in Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., V (1888-1889), 3-17; "Hypnotism and Telepathy," P.S.P.R., V (1888-1889), 216-259; "Problems of Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 265-292.
10. See E. Gurney, "Stages of Hypnotism," pp. 60-72 and "Stages of Hypnotic Memory," p. 530.
11. E. Gurney, "Peculiarities of Certain Hypnotic States," pp. 289-323.
12. E. Gurney, "Recent Experiments in Hypnotism," pp. 3-9 and the whole of his essay on the "Peculiarities of Certain Hypnotic States."
13. Ibid., p. 318.
14. E. Gurney, "Stages of Hypnotic Memory," pp. 530-531. In this particular instance, Gurney vaguely hints at the possibility that the existence of secondary conscious states may have a bearing on the survival of the self after bodily death.
15. Oliver Lodge, Past Years, an Autobiography (London, 1931), pp. 270-272.
16. E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Phantasms of the Living" offers an excellent illustration of this first phase. See, also, E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Apparitions," Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 791-815.
17. See E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Thought Reading," an excellent illustration of the second phase.
18. See E. Gurney, "An Account of Some Experiments in Mesmerism," and "Hypnotism and Telepathy," for illustrations of the third phase.
19. For Gurney's work on hallucinations, one should first consult Phantasms of the Living. Also, "Hallucinations," P.S.P.R., III (1885), 151-189; "Hallucinations," Mind, X (1885), 161-199 and note, pp. 316-317; "Hallucinations of Memory and Telepathy," Mind, XIII (1888), 415-417; "Third Report of the Literary Committee: A Theory of Apparitions, Part I," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 109-136; "Fourth Report of the Literary Committee: A Theory of Apparitions, Part II," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 157-186. E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Apparitions," Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 791-815; E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Visible Apparitions," Nineteenth Century, XVI (1884), 68-95.

20. E. Gurney, "Hypnotism and Telepathy," p. 243.
21. Ibid., p. 240.
22. E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, "Apparitions," Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 792.
23. F. W. H. Myers, "On a Telepathic Explanation of Some So-called Spiritualistic Phenomena," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 217-238; "Automatic Writing," P.S.P.R., III (1885), 1-64; "Automatic Writing, Physiological and Pathological Analogues," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 209-261; "Automatic Writing, The Demon of Socrates," P.S.P.R., V (1888-1889), 522-548.
24. F. W. H. Myers, "On a Telepathic Explanation of Some So-called Spiritualistic Phenomena," p. 217.
25. Ibid., p. 218. "It is to my mind one of the chief interests in telepathy that it seems sometimes to reveal our unconscious to our conscious selves; that it acts like the strong inwardly directed light which enables the surgeon to see reflected in a mirror some obscure recesses of his own inward structure."
26. Ibid., p. 234.
27. Ibid., p. 237. "Up to the present point we have been aiming at two things. The operation of unconscious cerebration in automatic writing has been illustrated with some fulness; and it has been shown that some of the effects which spiritualists ascribe to spirits are referable to the unconscious action of the writer's own mind."
28. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing: The Demon of Socrates," p. 522. "In the third paper I discussed some cognate forms of automatic action and pushed some cases so far as to suggest the formation of a fresh personality; and I argued that 'the sleep waking state, natural or induced, does not stand alone in its tendency to generate a secondary memory, a secondary manifestation of the self, but that this tendency shows itself wherever there is any habitual shaking-up of those elements,' any habitual alteration of the threshold of consciousness."
29. Ibid., p. 524. Also, p. 525. "Nor can telepathy as we as yet understand it, be invoked to explain all the cases which we shall have to consider. If, therefore, we are to label with a single epithet all automatic messages inexplicable on any ordinary accepted hypothesis, we must use a wider term than telepathic; we must call them supernormal; implying by this term (as often has been explained) that, whatever the precise nature of the powers involved in the production of these messages may be, they seem at least prima facie to transcend human powers, as known to us at the present stage of evolution. The word 'supernormal' is

thus meant to beg as few questions as possible; so far as it connotes any theory as to the source or nature of apparently transcendent power, it implies a disposition to seek the origin of those powers in some continuance of the same evolutionary process by which we explain--so far as explanation is possible--such powers as we do admittedly possess."

30. F. W. H. Myers, "On a Telepathic Explanation of Some So-called Spiritualistic Phenomena," p. 218.
31. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing," p. 24.
32. Ibid., p. 27. "A secondary self--if I may coin the phrase--is thus gradually postulated,--a latent capacity, at any rate, in an appreciable fraction of mankind, of developing or manifesting a second focus of cerebral energy which is apparently neither fugitive nor incidental merely--a delirium or dream--but may possess, for a time at least, a kind of continuous individuality, a purposive activity of its own." In the same article, Myers interprets one of his experimental cases, that of Mr. Newnham, in the following way: "We have the prolonged manifestation of a secondary or inner self, which is, as it would seem, no mere fragment or reflection of the primary self, but an entity thus far, at least, independent that it can acquire knowledge which the primary self has no way of reaching. It is the secondary self, that is to say, which receives or recognizes the telepathic impact which in some way or another knows what questions Mr. Newnham is writing, and in some way or another furnishes an intelligible reply" (p. 28).
33. Ibid., p. 30.
34. F. W. H. Myers, "Human Personality in the Light of Hypnotic Suggestion," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 1-20. See, also, Myers' essay "Human Personality," Fortnightly Review, XLIV (1885), 637-655.
35. F. W. H. Myers, "Human Personality in the Light of Hypnotic Suggestion," p. 20.
36. F. W. H. Myers, "Multiplex Personality," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 496-514. See, also, F. W. H. Myers, "Multiplex Personality," Nineteenth Century, XX (1886), 648-666.
37. F. W. H. Myers, "Multiplex Personality," P.S.P.R., p. 513.
38. Ibid., p. 514. For examples of the kind of argument Myers was combatting, see the Spectator, LVII (1886), 414 and LXIX (1892), 330.
39. F. W. H. Myers, "Multiplex Personality," P.S.P.R., p. 514.

40. On Myers and evolution in general, see F. W. H. Myers, "Charles Darwin and Agnosticism," Science and a Future Life, pp. 51-75. This essay was originally published in the Fortnightly Review, XLIX (1888), 99-108.
41. F. W. H. Myers, "Multiplex Personality," P.S.P.R., p. 509.
42. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing," p. 31. "I ask the reader to anticipate a thesis . . . and to regard all psychical as well as all physiological activities as necessarily either developmental or degenerative, tending to evolution or dissolution. . . . Our question, supernormal or abnormal?--may then be phrased, evolutive or dissolutive?" See also "Automatic Writing: The Demon of Socrates," p. 525.
43. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing," p. 32. "Telepathy is surely a step in evolution. To learn the thoughts of other minds, without the mediation of the special senses, manifestly indicates the possibility of a vast extension of psychical powers. And any knowledge which we come across as to the conditions under which telepathic action takes place, will form a valuable starting point for any inquiry as to the evolutive or dissolutive character of unfamiliar psychical states."
44. Ibid., p. 31.
45. Myers' "Automatic Writing" and "Automatic Writing, Physiological and Pathological Analogues" are devoted to this problem.
46. Myers likes to call such phases of activity "perturbations which mask evolution." See "Automatic Writing." p. 32.
47. For a 19th century survey of the relationship of psychology and evolution, see James Sully, "The Relation of the Evolution Hypothesis to Human Psychology," Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Aesthetics (London, 1874), pp. 1-22.
48. On this point, see L. S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology (London, 1964), p. 41. "For Spencer, as for Darwin, psychology was only a secondary field of interest, but Spencer's work in psychology was far more systematic than Darwin's. It was a serious attempt to found psychology from first principles upon an evolutionary basis, and to conceive mind as being functionally involved in the business of living, which Spencer defined as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.'"
49. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
50. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing," p. 25. "I use the term 'highest centres' as the best authorized expression of the cerebral correlative of conscious (or at least complex) mentation.

See, for instance, Hughlings-Jackson ("Croonian Lectures, 1884," p. 4): 'The triple conclusion we come to is that the highest centres, which are the climax of nervous evolution, and which make up the organ of mind (or physical basis of consciousness), are the least organized, most complex and most voluntary.'" See, also, F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 72-73.

51. L. S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology, pp. 44-46.
52. Ibid., pp. 70-73.
53. For Wallace and Myers generally, see Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life, II, 351-354. "The method of a very slow advance was, no doubt, necessary for the purpose of establishing what is really a new science, and in the establishment of this science a foremost place will always be given to Frederic Myers. He was the first English writer to attempt to educe order out of the vast chaos of psychic phenomena, to connect them with admitted physical and physiological laws, and to formulate certain hypotheses which would serve to connect and explain a considerable portion of them."
54. For an excellent summary of the problem discussed here, see F. W. H. Myers, "The Drift of Psychological Research," National Review, XXIV (1894), 190-209.
55. Alfred Russell Wallace, "Sir Charles Lyell on Geological Climates and the Origin of Species," Quarterly Review, CXXVI (1869), 359-394. Also Loren Eisely, Darwin's Century, pp. 309-312.
56. Alfred Russell Wallace, "The Origin of the Human Races and the Antiquity of Man Deduced from the Theory of Natural Selection," Anthropological Review, II (1864), clviii - clxxxvii. Also Loren Eisely, Darwin's Century, pp. 305-308. For a refutation and explanation of Wallace's views, see Thomas Huxley, "Mr. Darwin's Critics," Darwiniana (New York, 1896), pp. 120-186.
57. F. W. H. Myers, "Science and a Future Life," Science and a Future Life, p. 39.
58. F. W. H. Myers, "The Mechanism of Genius," P.S.P.R., VIII (1892), 528. Myers had argued similarly in his essay on "Multiplex Personality," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 509.
59. This thesis suggests the relationship of Myers to a psychologist far greater than himself, Ludwig Fechner. See Gardner Murphy, "A Brief Interpretation of Fechner," Psyche, VII (1926), 75-80.
60. One should note, for example, the absence of any English psychologists in the important list of psychologists in the "Preface" to Phantasms of the Living, I, vii-ix.

61. In a review of a later edition of Sully's great classic, Outlines of Psychology, a reviewer in Mind, N.S., II (1893), 125, noted that "the concluding chapter contains some reference to abnormal phenomena of mind, which is entirely wanting in the former editions; perhaps the author may hereafter see reason to extend the treatment of this somewhat neglected branch of mental science."
62. See Henry Maudsley, Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings (London, 1886).
63. Edmund Gurney, "Problems of Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 265-292. See, also, Gurney and Myers, "Some Aspects of Mesmerism," National Review, V (1885), 681-703.
64. The key factor in this brief history is the coming together of the mesmeric movement and an interest in hypnosis with new developments in the area of abnormal psychology. For a brief bibliography of the material discussed here and for additional material not mentioned in the text, the reader should consult the following: Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology (rev. ed.; New York, 1949), pp. 127-137; Robert I. Watson, The Great Psychologists: Aristotle to Freud (New York, 1963), pp. 300-317; Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology (2d ed.; New York, 1957), pp. 116-133; G. S. Brett, A History of Psychology (New York, 1921), Vol. III; J. C. Flugel, A Hundred Years of Psychology. 1833-1933 (New York, 1933); Carl Murchison (ed.), History of Psychology in Autobiography (Worcester, Mass., 1933), Vols. I and II; a good brief review of the history of hypnosis is William McDougall's essay on "Hypnotism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XIV.
65. Brett, A History of Psychology, III, 246.
66. An interesting account of Charcot is Sigmund Freud's essay "Charcot," Early Psychoanalytic Writings, ed. Philip Rieff (Collier Books, New York, 1963), pp. 13-26. On the importance of Charcot's demonstrations with hypnosis and hysteria, Freud wrote: "Charcot's application of the phenomena of hypnosis to hysteria enabled a very great advance to be made in this important sphere of hitherto neglected and despised facts, because the weight of his reputation put an end once for all to doubts of the reality of hypnotic phenomena." Although a student of Charcot, Freud supported the suggestion theory of Liebeault and Bernheim.
67. See J. Milne Bramwell, Hypnotism, Its History, Practice and Theory (London, 1903), pp. 29-33.
68. On Binet and Janet, see Watson, The Great Psychologists: Aristotle to Freud, pp. 306-311.
69. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing," P.S.P.R., III (1885), 61-62.



70. Edmund Gurney, "Hallucinations," P.S.P.R., III (1885), 151-189.
71. Gurney and Myers, "On Some Higher Aspects of Mesmerism," P.S.P.R., III (1885), 401-423.
72. F. W. H. Myers, "Human Personality in the Light of Hypnotic Suggestion," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 6.
73. For an account of these experiments, see F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing, Physiological and Pathological Analogues," P.S.P.R., IV (1886-1887), 209-261. Also F. W. H. Myers, "Human Personality," Fortnightly Review, XLIV (1885), 637-655.
74. F. W. H. Myers, "Multiplex Personality," Nineteenth Century, XX (1886), 648-666.
75. F. W. H. Myers, "Automatic Writing, Physiological and Pathological Analogues," p. 245.
76. Ibid., p. 238.
77. Edmund Gurney, "A. Binet and C. Féré, 'Le Magnétisme Animal,'" P.S.P.R., IV (1866-1887), 540-554.
78. F. W. H. Myers, "On a Certain Case of Hypnotic Hyperaesthesia," Mind, XII (1887), 154-156. See, also, two unpublished letters from Henri Bergson to F. W. H. Myers, dated December 1, 1886 and January 20, 1887 (E. Q. Nicholson). In the first letter, Bergson wrote: "Je suis d'autant plus heureux de me mettre a votre disposition que votre nom m'est familier depuis un certain temps déjà, comme il l'est sans doute a la plupart de ceux qui s'occupent d'hypnotisme."
79. F. W. H. Myers, "A. Binet, Les Altérations de la personnalité," Mind, N.S., I (1892), 417-421. Also, F. W. H. Myers, "Binet's Recherches sur les altérations de la conscience chez les hystériques," P.S.P.R., VI (1890), 200-206.
80. F. W. H. Myers, "Janet's L'Automatisme Psychologique," P.S.P.R., VI (1890), 186-199.
81. F. W. H. Myers, "Jules Janet's L'Hystérie et l'hypnotisme," P.S.P.R., VI (1890), 216-222.
82. Carl Murchison (ed.), History of Psychology in Autobiography, I, 126.
83. Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme Psychologique (6th ed.; Paris, 1913), pp. 367-443. The first edition of this text was published in 1889.
84. Albert Moll, Hypnotism (London, 1890), p. 377.

85. See the exchange between James and Ward on psychical research in Mind, N.S., II (1893), 144.
86. William James, The Principles of Psychology (Dover Edition, 1950), I, 400 and II, 133. See, also, Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (eds.), William James on Psychical Research (London, 1960). For Myers' review of James' Principles of Psychology, see "James' The Principles of Psychology," P.S.P.R., VII (1891-1892), 111-133.
87. Alfred Binet, "Les Altérations de la personnalité d'après les travaux récents," Revue Des Deux Mondes, CIII (1891), 839-855; also Alfred Binet, Alterations of the Personality, trans. Helen Baldwin (New York, 1896), pp. 97, 329, 354-356, 369.
88. International Congress of Experimental Psychology, Second Session (London, 1892), pp. 144-173. Judging from the report of an anonymous reviewer in Mind, the work of Gurney and Myers had an important influence on the "Second Section" of this Congress. The reviewer notes that the section took cognizance of the therapeutic advantages of the suggestion theory and the older doctrine of Charcot lost considerable ground. At the same time, the idea of suggestion itself was fast becoming unable to account for various new phenomena associated with hypnotic trance and hypnotic therapeutics. Nora Sidgwick's paper on thought transference and hypnotism, which essentially reproduced the earlier experiments of Gurney and Myers, suggested to the reporter that "the Gulf which seemed impossible" between the higher and lower phenomena of hypnotism "may now perhaps be more reasonably regarded not as impossible, but as profound." "The International Congress of Experimental Psychology," Mind, N.S., I (1892), 580-588.
89. See Gerald Balfour, "Psychical Research and Current Doctrines of Mind and Body," Hibbert Journal, VIII (1910), 543-561.
90. Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme Psychologique, pp. 21-23 and 29-30. Janet's title in itself is indicative of the way in which he interpreted his material.
91. A. Binet, Alterations of Personality, pp. 63-64, 354-356.
92. Lancelot Whyte, The Unconscious before Freud (New York, 1961). Also, Avis M. Dry, The Psychology of Jung (London, 1961) for some excellent material on the notion of the subconscious and intellectual currents in the 19th century.
93. One of the most important summaries of Anglo-French literature on the problem of secondary conscious states, multiple personality and the subconscious was W. T. Stead's Special Christmas Issue of the Review of Reviews (New York and London, 1890), especially pp. 11-21.

94. Alfred Binet, "Les Alterations de la personnalite," Revue Des Deux Mondes, CIII (1891), 839.
95. William James, "The Hidden Self," Scribner's Magazine, VII (1890), 361-373.
96. Ibid., p. 362.
97. Morton Prince, "A Symposium on the Subconscious," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, II (1907), 22.
98. Arthur H. Pierce, "An Appeal from the Prevailing Doctrine of a Detached Subconscious," Studies in Philosophy and Psychology in Honor of Charles Garman (Boston, 1906), pp. 315-351, an excellent survey of late 19th century opinion. Also Arthur H. Pierce, "Subliminal Self or Unconscious Cerebration," P.S.P.R., XI (1895), 317-324.
99. Helen Dendy, "Recent Developments of the Doctrine of Subconscious Processes," Mind, N.S., II (1893), 370-375.
100. "A Symposium on the Subconscious," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, II (1907), 22-45.
101. Ibid., pp. 33-38.
102. Ibid., pp. 25-33.
103. Ibid., pp. 22-25.
104. F. W. H. Myers, "The Mechanism of Hysteria," P.S.P.R., IX (1893-1894), 15.
105. F. W. H. Myers, "A. Binet, Les Alterations de la personnalité," Mind, N.S., I (1892), 417.
106. Alfred Binet, "Les Alterations de la personnalité," Revue Des Deux Mondes, CIII (1891), 839-840.
107. Gardner Murphy, An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, p. 51.
108. See F. W. H. Myers, "The Subliminal Consciousness," P.S.P.R., VI (1890-1891), 327-355; "The Mechanism of Suggestion," P.S.P.R., VII (1891-1892), 327-355; "The Mechanism of Genius and Hyperamnesic Dreams," P.S.P.R., VIII (1892), 333-405; "Sensory Automatism and Induced Hallucinations," P.S.P.R., VIII (1892), 436-535; "The Mechanism of Hysteria," P.S.P.R., IX (1893-1894), 26-128; "The Relation of Supernormal Phenomena to Time: Retrocognition," P.S.P.R., XI (1895), 334-407; "The Relation of Supernormal Phenomena to Time: Precognition," P.S.P.R., XI (1895), 408-593.

109. For one of Myers' own, see "The Drift of Psychical Research," National Review, XXIV (1894), 190-209.
110. William McDougall, "Subliminal Self," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXV.
111. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, 2 vols. (New York, 1954). Originally published posthumously in 1903. For a remarkable comment on this work by Aldous Huxley, see F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, ed. Susy Smith with Foreword by Aldous Huxley (New York, 1961), pp. 15-16. W. F. Barrett, in his Psychical Research (New York, 1911) notes that the first four chapters of Human Personality were then included in the examination for the Fellowship in Mental and Moral Philosophy in Trinity College, Dublin, "the highest prize in that famous university" (p. 32).
112. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 19.
113. T. W. Mitchell, a generation later, wrote that Myers' views on hysteria were "far in advance of the teachings of English clinicians." Quoted from W. H. Salter, "Our Pioneers: F. W. H. Myers," p. 266.
114. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 222.
115. J. S. Macarthur has some interesting comments on this aspect of Myers' methodology. J. S. Macarthur, "F. W. H. Myers, A Believer in a Future Life," p. 126. See also F. W. H. Myers, "Ernest Renan," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 452-453. "It is possible that in all this mankind have begun at the wrong end. The analogy of physical discovery at any rate suggests that the truths which we learn first are not the highest truths, nor the most attractive truths, nor the truths which most concern ourselves. The chemist begins with the production of fetid gases and not of gold; the physiologist must deal with bone and cartilage before he gets to nerve and brain. The more interesting to us anything is, the less, and not the more, we are likely to know about it. We must learn first not what we are most eager to learn, but what fits on best to what we know already. Let us apply this analogy to the spiritual world. Let us consider how along that strange road also we may proceed systematically from the most complex of the things which we have learnt already to the simplest of those which we have yet to learn. . . . It is the continual work of science to render that which is incognisable cognisable, that which is unperceived, perceptible, that which is fitfully seen and uncontrollable habitually manifest and controlled."
116. See F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, I, 15-17.

117. J. H. Muirhead, "The Survival of the Soul," Contemporary Review, LXXXV (1904), 112-121.
118. Andrew Lang, "Mr. Myers' Theory of the Subliminal," Hibbert Journal, II (1903), 514-531.
119. Frederic Harrison, "From This World to the Next," Nineteenth Century, LIII (1903), 645-650; W. H. Mallock, "The Gospel of F. W. H. Myers," Nineteenth Century, LIII (1903), 628-644. For remarks on these essays, see Andrew Lang, "The Nineteenth Century and Mr. Myers," P.S.P.R., XVIII (1903), 53-61.
120. On Ribot, Munsterberg and Prince, see "A Symposium on the Sub-conscious," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, II (1907), 22-45. For Stout's review, see G. F. Stout, "F. W. H. Myers on Human Personality," Hibbert Journal, II (1903), 44-64; for Riley's review, see I. W. Riley, "Human Personality and Its Survival," Psychological Review, X (1903), 556-566.
121. William McDougall, "Myers' Human Personality," Mind, N.S., XII (1903), 513-526.
122. Theodore Flournoy, "F. W. H. Myers and Subliminal Psychology," Spiritism and Psychology (New York, 1911), pp. 48-67.
123. Oliver Lodge, "The Survival of Personality," Quarterly Review, CXCVIII (1903), 211-229.
124. William James, "Frederic Myers' Service to Psychology," in Murphy and Ballou (eds.), James on Psychical Research, pp. 213-224.
125. S. H. Mellone, "Present Aspects of the Problem of Immortality," Hibbert Journal, II (1903), 722-740; for Myers and Kant, see Morton Prince, The Unconscious (New York, 1907), p. 251.
126. See J. Arthur Hill, Letters from Sir Oliver Lodge--Psychical, Religious, Scientific and Personal (London, 1932), pp. 176-177. Lodge compares Myers' notion of the Subliminal Self with Emerson's notion of the Over Soul; also John Addington Symonds, Letters and Papers of John Addington Symonds, ed. Horatio F. Brown (London, 1923), p. 255. "I am fascinated by Myers' treatise on the Subliminal Consciousness. I doubt whether he himself suspects how far the hypothesis involved in his argument carries. Rightly, he confines himself to proof or plausible inference from more or less accredited phenomena./ I could talk more than it seems convenient to write, upon the deductions and corollaries which must ensue from this doctrine, if it is established. It will prove a great prop to Pantheism, the religion of the Cosmic Mind."
127. Miguel de Unamuno, Fragic Sense of Life, trans. J. E. Crawford Fritch (Dover Books, 1954), p. 88.

128. Mortimer Durand, Life of Sir Alfred Lyall (Edinburgh, 1913), p. 399. "I myself am inclined to believe that the deepest thinkers of all ages do not greatly differ in fundamental conclusions, however they may vary as to ways and methods. Just now, however, I have been attentively reading the recently published work of Frederic Myers on Human Personality, which is certainly a new form in Europe of what he calls Transcendentalism, the science of discovering the future of the human soul after death. He is quite sure that the veil can be penetrated, and that experiment and observation will carry us into the Spiritual world, with which we are to open communication by the development of abnormal human faculties. Yet his whole system resembles to a very remarkable degree the methods by which Indian ascetics pretend to attain divinity, to perform marvels, and to raise the soul into higher stages of existence. Hypnotism, telepathy, the liberation of the soul by throwing the body into trance, are processes known and practiced in Asia from ancient times."
129. See C. D. Broad, Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research (New York, 1953) and The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London, 1925).
130. For Galton's letter, see F. Max Muller, "Appendix," The Science of Thought (Chicago, 1888), p. 11.
131. E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 502.
132. L. S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology, p. 157.
133. F. W. H. Myers, "Science and a Future Life," Science and a Future Life (London, 1893), pp. 1-50. First published in the Nineteenth Century, XXIX (1891), 628-641.
134. For an excellent study of Myers in this context, see G. H. Banko, "The Scullery Window," The Cambridge Journal, I (1947-1948), 563-573.
135. Robert H. Thouless, "The Unconscious," The Psychology of Religion (Paperback edition; Cambridge, 1961), pp. 102-116.
136. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 188-189, 354, 386, and 395. Through James, Carl Jung came to know of Myers and his theory of the Subliminal Self. On Jung and Myers, see Avis M. Dry, The Psychology of Jung (London, 1961), pp. 114-115.

#### Notes to Chapter VI

1. There is no bibliography adequately covering the materials discussed in this chapter. The reader can find some interesting material, however, in A. R. Chandler and E. N. Barnhart, A

Bibliography of Psychological and Experimental Aesthetics, 1864-1937 (Berkeley, 1938) and Norman Kiell, Psychoanalysis, Psychology and Literature, a Bibliography (Madison, 1963).

2. James Sully, "Aesthetics," Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I.
3. James Sully, The Human Mind (New York, 1892), II, 360-361. Also, James Sully, "Art and Psychology," Mind, XI (1886), 467-478.
4. Eneas Sweetland Dallas, The Gay Science, 2 vols. (London, 1866).
5. Michael L. Roberts, "The Dream and the Poem," Times Literary Supplement, XXXV (January 18, 1936), 42. Also, Alba Warren, English Poetic Theory (1825-1865) (Princeton, 1950).
6. Arnold and Havelock Ellis, for example, were concerned with problems of genius and ethnology. See Houston Peterson, Havelock Ellis, Philosopher of Love (Boston, 1928), pp. 286-287. Galton, on the other hand, was interested in genius as a statistical and hereditary problem: See Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius (London, 1925). Others, such as Grant Allen, undertook to discriminate genius from talent. See Grant Allen, "Genius and Talent," Fortnightly Review, L (1888), 240-255.
7. Theodore Ribot, Essai sur l'imagination créatrice (4th ed.; Paris, 1914), p. 118.
8. On the importance of Morel and for an excellent discussion of the problem of genius in the late 19th century, see Aline Gorren, "The New Criticism of Genius," Atlantic Monthly, LXXIV (1894), 794-800.
9. On Nordau, see Meir Ben-Horin, Max Nordau (New York, 1956).
10. J. F. Nisbet, Insanity of Genius (London, 1891). For some illuminating comments on Maudsley and Huxley, see Arthur McDonald, "Insanity and Genius," Arena, VIII (1893), 4.
11. Cesare Lombroso, L'Homme de Genie, trans. from the 6th ed. by Fr. Colonna d'Istria (Paris, 1889).
12. Arthur McDonald, "Insanity and Genius," Arena, VIII (1893), 1-17.
13. G. Sergei, "The Man of Genius," Monist, X (1899), 85-115.
14. On Morelli, see G. Sergei, "The Man of Genius," p. 93.
15. William Hirsch, "The Psychology of Genius," Popular Science Monthly, L (1897), 389-395.
16. William James, "Degeneration and Genius," Psychological Review, II (1895), 287-295.

17. James Sully, "Genius and Insanity," Popular Science Monthly, XXVII (1885), 447-468.
18. Joseph Jacobs, "The Need of a Society for Experimental Psychology," Mind, XI (1886), 49-54.
19. Cesare Lombroso, "Insane Characters in Fiction and Drama," Popular Science Monthly, LV (1899), 53-62.
20. James Sully, "Dreams as Related to Literature," Forum, VII (1889), 67-89.
21. Excerpts from Binet's remarks are printed in the Review of Reviews, American Edition, III (1891), 277.
22. James Sully, "George Eliot's Art," Mind, XI (1886), 378-394.
23. Ibid., pp. 389-390.
24. Frederick Clarke Prescott, Poetry and Dreams (Boston, 1912). See, also, Frederick Greenwood, Imagination in Dreams (London, 1894).
25. On Sully, see James Sully, My Life and Friends (London, 1918).
26. James Sully, "On the Laws of Dream Fancy," Cornhill Magazine, XXXIV (1876), 536-555.
27. James Sully, Illusions (New York, 1891), pp. 161-162.
28. James Sully, "Dreams as Related to Literature," Forum, VII (1889), 67-89.
29. James Sully, "Dreaming and Poetic Imagination," Proceedings of the National Education Association, XXXII (1893), 730-737.
30. Theodore Ribot, "L'Imagination créatrice affective," Revue Philosophique, LIII (1902), 598-630.
31. Ibid., p. 618.
32. L. Dugas, "Imagination esthétique," L'Imagination (Paris, 1903), pp. 276-305.
33. Ibid., p. 297.
34. William Hirsch, Genius and Degeneration, Trans. from the 2d edition of the German work (New York, 1896), pp. 207-208.
35. Cesare Lombroso, L'Homme de Génie, pp. 343-349.
36. William James, "The Emotions," Principles of Psychology, II, 469-470.



37. For a good brief review of these theories, see Henry Rutgers Marshall, Aesthetic Principles (New York, 1901).
38. Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," Studies in Parapsychology, ed. Philip Rieff (Collier Books, 1963), pp. 19-62.
39. Paul Souriau, La Réverie esthétique: essai sur la psychologie du poète (Paris, 1906).
40. Paul Souriau, La Suggestion dans l'art (Paris, 1893).
41. Ibid., pp. 324-338.
42. A. Binet and J. Passy, "Etudes de psychologie sur les auteurs dramatiques," L'Année Psychologique, I (1894), 60-118; also A. Binet, "M. Francois de Curel," L'Année Psychologique, I (1894), 119-183.
43. A. Binet, "La Création littéraire: portrait psychologique de M. Paul Hervieu," L'Année Psychologique, X (1903), 1-62.
44. T. Ribot, "L'Imagination affective," p. 630.
45. See Paul Chabaneix, Physiologie cérébrale: La Subconscient chez les artistes, les savants, et les écrivains (Paris, 1897), p. 107.
46. T. Ribot, Essai sur l'imagination créatrice, pp. 42-65 and 283-287.
47. Max Dessoir, "Das Döppel-Ich," Schriften der Gesellschaft für Experimentale Psychologie, I (1890), 1-42.
48. Ibid., pp. 37-38. Translation is that of F. W. H. Myers. See Myers' review of Dessoir, P.S.P.R., VI (1889-1890), 207-215.
49. For an interesting study of the relationship between anthropology and evolution, see Irving Goldman, "Evolution and Anthropology," Victorian Studies, III (1959), 55-75.
50. James Sully, Studies of Childhood (New York, 1914), pp. 8 and 35-51. See, also, Sully, The Human Mind (New York, 1892), II, 283 and Outlines of Psychology (New York, 1886), pp. 533-538.
51. For a discussion and rebuttal of the art-play theory, together with many references to English physiologists and anthropologists, particularly Spencer, see Marie Jean Guyau, Les Problemes de l'esthétique contemporaine (4th ed.; Paris, 1897), pp. 3-28.
52. See James Sully, The Human Mind, II, 134-135.
53. E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, II, 532-533.

54. T. Ribot, Essai sur l'imagination créatrice, pp. 77-85 and 86-98.
55. Ibid., p. 115. In psychological terms, Ribot argues that legend is a consequence of illusion and mythology a consequence of hallucination.
56. Ibid., pp. 100 and 114. "La littérature est une mythologie déchirée et rationalisée."
57. Anon., "Poetic Imagination and Primitive Conception," Cornhill Magazine, XXXIV (1876), 294-306. The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900, ed. Walter Houghton (Toronto, 1966), I, 363 attributes this essay to James Sully.
58. Theodore Flournoy, "F. W. H. Myers et son oeuvre posthume," Archives de Psychologie, II (1903), 269.
59. See William York Tindall, Forces in Modern British Literature (Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 217-243. With respect to William James and modern literature, we might note that Myers and Gurney had spoken of the "stream of consciousness" long before 1892. See, for example, F. W. H. Myers and Edmund Gurney, "Mesmerism," Nineteenth Century, XIV (1883), 715.
60. See J. W. Bright, "Poetry and Dreams," Modern Language Notes, XXXV (1920), 188-192 and F. C. Prescott, The Poetic Mind (New York, 1922).
61. Both essays are reprinted in F. W. H. Myers, Science and a Future Life (London, 1893), pp. 127-210. Our page references will refer to this text. "Tennyson as Prophet" was first published in the Nineteenth Century, XXV (1889), 381-396. "Modern Poets and the Cosmic Law" was originally published as "Modern Poets and the Meaning of Life," Nineteenth Century, XXXIII (1893), 93-111.
62. F. W. H. Myers, Science and a Future Life, p. 134.
63. Ibid., pp. 140-141 and p. 57. Myers quotes principally from the Enneads, VI, 10.
64. F. W. H. Myers, Science and a Future Life, p. 158.
65. Ibid., pp. 203-204.
66. Ibid., p. 205.
67. Ibid., p. 159. "This passage raises in the directest form a question which becomes ever more vitally important as external systems of theology crumble away. Can ecstasy ever be a state higher than normal life, or is it always referable to delusion or disease? Now it is undoubted that the great majority of states of true ecstasy

which are now observed occur in hysterical patients, as one phase of a complex attack. The temptation to rank ecstasy on much the same level with hysterical spasm or mutism is naturally irresistible. And yet, as I have urged elsewhere, this is by no means a safe conclusion. An hysterical fit indicates a lamentable instability of the nervous system. But it is by no means certain, a priori, that every symptom of that instability, without exception, will be of a degenerative kind. The nerve storm, with its unwonted agitations, may possibly lay bare some deep-lying capacity in us which could scarcely otherwise have come to light. Recent experiments on both sensation and memory in certain abnormal states have added plausibility to this view, and justify us in holding that, in spite of its frequent association with hysteria, ecstasy is not necessarily in itself a morbid symptom." For an interesting study of ecstasy and late Victorian literature, see John A. Lester, "The Consolations of Ecstasy," English Literature in Transition, VI (1963), 200-201.

68. The modern poets with whom Myers is concerned here are Morris, Swinburne and Tennyson. Commenting on this essay, C. K. Hyder argued that Myers' treatment of Swinburne was unlike any other. "Conventional criticism was unwilling to accord Swinburne such dignified criticism, unwilling to recognize any intellectual content in his verse." Quoted from C. K. Hyder's Swinburne's Literary Career and Fame (Durham, 1933), p. 219.
69. Ibid., p. 198.
70. Ibid., pp. 196-198.
71. For a brief review of these arguments, see "Third Report of the Literary Committee: A Theory of Apparitions, Part I," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 109-136 and "Fourth Report of the Literary Committee: A Theory of Apparitions, Part II," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 157-186. Also Phantasms of the Living, I, 519-573.
72. F. W. H. Myers, "Modern Poets and the Cosmic Law," Science and a Future Life, pp. 195-196.
73. Ibid., p. 198.
74. A Stevenson Library: Catalogue of a Collection of Writings by and about Robert Louis Stevenson. Formed by Edwin J. Beinecke, comp. George L. McKay (New Haven, 1958), IV, Item 5260, 1514-1515.
75. Unpublished letter from R. L. Stevenson to F. W. H. Myers, dated February, 1886 (E. Q. Nicholson).
76. A Stevenson Library (New Haven, 1961), V, Item 7271 dated February 27, 1886, 2127.

77. Unpublished letter from R. L. Stevenson to F. W. H. Myers, dated March 1, 1886 (E. Q. Nicholson). "My dear Sir,/ I know not how to thank you. This is as handsome as it is clever. With almost every word I agree,--much of it I even knew before--much of it, I must confess, would never have been if I had been able to do what I like and lay the thing by for the matter of a year. But the wheels drive exceedingly swiftly, and Jekyll was conceived, written, rewritten, rewritten, and printed inside 10 weeks. Nothing but this white hot haste would explain the gross error of Hyde's speech at Lanyon's. Your point about the specialized fiend is more subtle, doubtless just; I had not seen it--about the picture. I rather meant that Hyde had bought it himself; and Utterson's hypothesis of the gift (p. 42) is an error. The tidiness of the room, I thought, but I dare say my psychology is here too ingenious to be sound, was due to the dread weariness and havoc of the imprisonment. Something has to be done: he would tidy the room. But I daresay it is false./ I shall keep your paper; and if ever my works come to be collected, I will put my back into these suggestions. In the meanwhile I do truly lack words in which to express my sense of gratitude for the trouble you have taken. The receipt of such a paper is more than a reward for my labors. I have read it with pleasure, and as I say, I hope to use it with profit. Believe me,/ Your most obliged/ Robert Louis Stevenson." In Human Personality, II, 301-303, Myers prints another letter from Stevenson to himself, dated July 14, 1892. The letter illustrates, Myers asserts, and here he is referring to Stevenson's statement that Brownies wrote The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, that the subliminal is capable of great flights of imaginative and inventive power as well as morbid and disintegrating manifestations.
78. A Stevenson Library, V, Item 7272, 2127.
79. Sidney Colvin was to use Myers' letters to Stevenson and Stevenson's replies to demonstrate just this point. At the last moment, however, he decided not to. See unpublished letter from Sidney Colvin to F. W. H. Myers, dated October 14, 1893 (E. Q. Nicholson).
80. Leon Edel, The Psychological Novel, 1900-1950 (rev. ed.; London, 1961), p. 23.
81. J. C. Furnas, Voyage to Windward, the Life of Robert Louis Stevenson (New York, 1951), p. 245.
82. Excerpts from Binet's remarks are printed in the Review of Reviews, American Edition, III (1891), 277.
83. F. W. H. Myers, "From Brute to Man," Collected Poems, p. 384.
84. F. W. H. Myers, "Human Personality," Fortnightly Review, XLIV (1885), 655. We might note here William York Tindall's remark

in Forces in Modern British Literature that "in England, writers of fantasy had discovered multiple personality before their more serious compatriots. Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Beerbohm's happy hypocrite are as divided as Gertrude Stein's Teresa" (p. 189).

85. F. W. H. Myers, "The Disenchantment of France," Science and a Future Life, pp. 76-126. Originally published in the Nineteenth Century, XXIII (1888), 661-681.
86. F. W. H. Myers, "The Disenchantment of France," Science and a Future Life, p. 77.
87. See Arnold's "Numbers," Discourses in America (New York, 1906), pp. 1-72. For Arnold, the agent of France's salvation was the "remnant," that small but significant minority who follow "the path of righteousness and virtue and whose thoughts run on what is true, elevated, just and of good report." Originally published in the Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 669-685.
88. F. W. H. Myers, "The Disenchantment of France," Science and a Future Life, p. 120.
89. Myers carried on a correspondence with a number of French, English and American men of letters on just this point, as the following unpublished letter from Edmund Scherer to Myers, dated September 8, 1888 (E. Q. Nicholson), indicates: "Dear Sir,/ I had indeed read with much interest your paper on the 'Disenchantment of France' and admired the temperate and judicious analysis of the moral condition of my country. Nor had I overlooked the hint let out at the end as to the remedy which psychical research might offer to an apparently hopeless state of things./ I feel no difficulty in frankly stating what is my mental attitude as to the phenomena you allude to. It is one of scepticism, of legitimate scepticism, you will admit,--a person who has never as yet come into contact either with ghostly manifestations, or with well authenticated accounts of such./ At the same time, I may say, I think, that I have no a priori insuperable objections to admit any light on the subject. I am sincerely open to the statement of facts, however lying out of the common trait of observations, and I shall be thankful if you are so kind as to introduce me to a knowledge of them. I need not add that you must expect me rather essigeant in the matter of testimony. My studies, I confess, have hitherto made me both realistic and critical. With thankfulness for your offers and sincere respect." Myers also wrote to Henry James about his The Turn of the Screw, inquiring, probably, whether James meant his ghosts to be "veridical" apparitions. See James' reply, dated December 19, 1898, published in Percy Lubbock (ed.), The Letters of Henry James (London, 1920), I, 307-308. For Henry James, The Turn of the Screw and the Society for Psychical Research, see Francis X. Roellinger, "Psychical Research and The Turn of the Screw," American Literature, XX

- (1948-1949), 400-412. For an interesting reference to Henry James and apparitions which Roellinger overlooks, see "A Third Report of the Literary Committee: A Theory of Apparitions, Part I," P.S.P.R., II (1884), 123. "If further proof be needed that we have not to go to weak or hysterical sources for evidence of these vaguer and more emotional sorts of telepathic impressions, we may add that our collection includes under this head accounts from two different informants who, in very different ways, have obtained the highest reputation as acute and accurate observers --Mr. Henry James and Mr. J. N. Masklyne." For James' interest in subconscious phenomena, see Leo B. Levy, "Henry James, Confidence and the Development of the Idea of the Subconscious," American Literature, XXVIII (1956), 347-358.
90. On James' importance in this respect, see Leon Edel, The Psychological Novel, 1900-1950. pp. 19-20.
  91. F. W. H. Myers, "The Mechanism of Genius," P.S.P.R., VIII (1892), 336-361.
  92. F. W. H. Myers, "Dessoir's Das Doppelt-Ich," P.S.P.R., VI (1890-1891), 207-215.
  93. F. W. H. Myers, "Hysteria and Genius," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, VIII (1897), 50-69.
  94. F. W. H. Myers, "The Psychology of Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., XIV (1898), 100-109.
  95. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, I, 70-120.
  96. Ibid., p. 104.
  97. Ibid., p. 20.
  98. Ibid., p. 70. Two other definitions of significance referred to in the text are the following: "Genius is in truth a subliminal uprush, an emergence into the ordinary consciousness current of ideas which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas which he has not consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his will in profounder regions of his being" (p. 71). "The inspirations of genius represent a cooperant stream of submerged mentation, fully as developed in its own way as the mentations of which we are conscious above the threshold" (p. 105).
  99. Ibid., p. 75. Myers' example here is Hartley Coleridge.
  100. Ibid., p. 78.
  101. Ibid., pp. 87-90. In this section, Myers draws heavily on Sir

- John Herschel's essay on "Sensorial Vision," published in Herschel's Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects (1816). Myers writes about Herschel: "I shall venture to claim him as the first originator of the theory (the theory of the subliminal self) to which the far fuller evidence now accessible had independently led myself."
102. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, p. 71.
  103. For a further statement on this problem, see F. W. H. Myers, "Tennyson as Prophet," Science and a Future Life, pp. 158-160.
  104. On this point, we should note that William James thought Myers' definitions of hysteria was one of Myers' most brilliant contributions to psychology. See Gardner Murphy and Robert Ballou (eds.), William James and Psychological Research, p. 220.
  105. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality, I, 93.
  106. On Morselli, see G. Sergei, "The Man of Genius," p. 93.
  107. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality, I, 21 and 97.
  108. For Myers' discussion of this point, see ibid., pp. 70 and 76-77.
  109. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
  110. Ibid., p. 77.
  111. For an adequate summary of Spencer's views, see Spencer's essay, "Education," reprinted in part in Robert L. Peters (ed.), The Victorians on Art and Literature (New York, 1961), pp. 201-203. Charles Darwin also helped to foster this notion. In his Descent of Man (2d ed.; New York, 1906), p. 581, Darwin argued that musical tones and rhythms used by our half-ancestors during the season of courtship suggest that the pleasure modern man finds in music, cadences and rhythms are like "mental reversions to the thoughts and emotions of a long past age."
  112. Wallace argued that man's musical faculty and mathematical faculty distinguished man from his progenitors. Such faculties, he asserted, could not have developed or evolved from the necessities of existence. See Alfred Russell Wallace, My Life, II, 400-401.
  113. F. W. H. Myers, "Rossetti," Essays, Classical and Modern, pp. 540-543. Also, Myers' defense of the primitive mentality and the poetic mind in "Greek Oracles," Essays, p. 6.
  114. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality, I, 94.

115. Ibid., p. 94.
116. On art, evolution, utility and teleology, see James Sully, The Human Mind, II, 134-135 and 153.
117. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality, I, 95.
118. Ibid., pp. 95-96. "May we not then suppose there are yet other environments, other interpretations, which a further awakening of faculty still subliminal is yet fated by its own nascent response to discover?"
119. Ibid., p. 95.
120. Ibid., p. 96. "There is then about those loftier interests nothing exotic, nothing accidental; they are an intrinsic part of the ever revolving response to our surroundings which forms not only the planetary but the cosmic history of all our race."
121. Ibid., p. 98. "The mind is no walled plot which a diagram will figure; it is a landscape with lines which stretch out of view, and an ever changing horizon."
122. Ibid., p. 99. "There is, however, no a priori ground for supposing that language will have the power to express all the thoughts and emotions of man. It may indeed be maintained that the inevitable course of its development tends to exhibit more and more clearly its inherent limitations. 'Every language,' it has been said, 'begins as poetry and ends as algebra.' To use the terms employed in this work, every language begins as a subliminal uprush and ends as a supraliminal artifice. Organic instincts impel to primitive ejaculation; unconscious laws of mind shape early grammar. But even in our own day--and we are still in the earth's infancy--this naivete of language is fast disappearing. The needs of science and of commerce have become dominant. Science has deliberately created for herself an arbitrary system of signs;--either actual arrangements of letters and numerals, or technical vocabularies, constructed on elaborate plans. Commerce is endeavouring to reach the same algebraical pitch, with bookkeeping, telegraphic codes, pidgin English, Volapuk and the like."
123. Ibid., p. 100.
124. F. W. H. Myers, "Victor Hugo," Essays, p. 335.
125. Arthur Symons, The Symbolist Movement in Literature (Dutton Paperbacks, 1958), p. 20.
126. Ibid., p. 40.
127. Ibid., p. 1.



128. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 101-104.
129. Ibid., p. 103. For a survey of 19th century theories of internal audition and internal visualization, see Horace L. Brittain, "A Study in Imagination," Pedagogical Seminary, XIV (1907), 137-207.
130. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 102.
131. Ibid., p. 102.
132. A. E. Housman, "The Name and Nature of Poetry," Selected Prose (Cambridge, 1961), p. 193.
133. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 102.
134. Ibid., p. 97.
135. F. W. H. Myers, "Hysteria and Genius," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, VIII (1897), 69.
136. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 101.
137. F. W. H. Myers, "Virgil," Essays, Classical and Modern, p. 113.
138. F. W. H. Myers, Wordsworth, p. 108.
139. F. W. H. Myers, "The Psychology of Hypnotism," P.S.P.R., XIV (1898), 103. Also Human Personality, I, 75.
140. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality, I, 73.
141. See L. S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology, pp. 40-46. Spencer defined intelligence as an "adjustment of inner to outer relations that gradually extends in Space and Time, that becomes increasingly special and complex, and that has its elements ever more precisely coordinated and more completely integrated."
142. Ibid., pp. 70-73.
143. F. W. H. Myers, "Genius," Human Personality, I, 73. "Now this series of phenomena--descending in coherence and co-ordination from an active concensus of the whole organism to a mere automatic maintenance of its most stably organized processes--may be pretty closely paralleled by the series of subliminal phenomena also."
144. Ibid., p. 77.
145. Ibid., p. 73.
146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., p. 103. "Translating these phrases of poetry into such terms as we here employ, we may say that we have reached a point where the subliminal uprush is felt by the supraliminal personality to be deeper, truer, more permanent than the products of voluntary thought."
148. Myers' employment of the terminology of the biological and psychological sciences for critical and evaluative purposes was foreshadowed by George Eliot. See Rene Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism (New Haven, 1965), IV, 152.
149. For parallels between genius and hallucinations, see Human Personality, I, 234 and 280; for parallels between genius and crystal gazing, ibid., I, 236; for parallels between genius, dreams and somnambulism; ibid., 90-91, 123-124, 135, 149; for parallels between genius and possession, ibid., II, 193. "The highest genius would thus be the completest self-possession,-- the occupation and dominance of the whole organism by those profoundest elements of the self which act from the fullest knowledge, and in the wisest way." For parallels between genius and prophecy, see ibid., II, 282.
150. Ibid., I, xv.
151. Ibid., p. 104.
152. Ibid., p. xv. Myers is here thinking of that stage of invention discussed by Leon M. Solomon and Gertrude Stein in their article, "Normal Motor Automatism," Psychological Review, III (1896), 492-512. See especially their experiments with "unconscious memory and invention."
153. F. W. H. Myers, Human Personality, I, 105.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
156. Ibid., p. 107. "I have thus far endeavored to show that genius represents not only the crystallization of ideas already existing in floating form in the supraliminal intelligence, but also an independent, although concurrent stream of mentation, spreading often to wider range, although still concerned with matters in themselves cognizable by the normal mind."
157. Ibid., p. 108.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid., pp. 113-120. Also, ibid., II, 282. "This love, then," which (as Sophocles has it) rules 'beasts and men and gods' with equal sway, is no matter of carnal impulse or of emotional caprice. Rather, it is now possible to define Love (as we

have already defined Genius) in terms which convey for us some new meaning in connection with phenomena described in this work. Genius, as has been already said, is a kind of exalted but undeveloped clairvoyance. The subliminal uprush which inspires the poet or musician, presents to him a deep, but vague perception of that world unseen, through which the seer or the sensitive projects a narrower but an exacter gaze. Somewhat similarly, Love is a kind of exalted, but unspecialized telepathy;--the simplest and most universal expression of that mutual gravitation or kinship of spirits which is the foundation of telepathic law."

160. Ibid., I, 108.
161. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
162. Ibid., p. 109.

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(Unless otherwise indicated, the following items are in possession of F. W. H. Myers' granddaughter, Mrs. E. Q. Nicholson)

"Notebook," consisting of dates on which poems were written, places of publication, and handwritten copies of numerous poems arranged chronologically. Dated from 1865-1898.

"Nelson," a lecture delivered at Eton College, 1880. Typewritten manuscript, edited by Harold Myers.

"Autobiography," the first draft of Fragments of Inner Life. Handwritten, on foolscap. Various dates, May-August, 1891. Pages unnumbered.

The most important collection of letters to and from Myers is in the possession of Mrs. E. Q. Nicholson; the following are among the correspondents included in this collection: Lord Acton, Matthew Arnold, Edwin Arnold, Evelyn Abbott, Lord Bute, Henri Bergson, James Bryce, Josephine Butler, John Conington, J. Estlin Carpenter, Frances Cobbe, Dean Church, R. C. Collins, Sidney Colvin, Edmund Gosse, George Eliot, Richard Holt Hutton, Henry James, William James, Benjamin Jowett, R. C. Jebb, James Knowles, Lady Mount-Temple, J. D. Mackail, C. C. Massey, Manton Marble, W. H. Mallock, John Morley, Max-Muller, C. Kegan Paul, R. W. Raper, Ernest Renan, Charles Richet, G. Groom Robertson, John Ruskin, Edmund Scherer, Robert Louis Stevenson, Charles Algernon Swinburne, John Addington Symonds, Upton Sinclair, Arthur Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen, W. T. Stead, Henry Taylor, Hallam Tennyson, Mark Twain, Aubrey de Vere, Herbert Warren. The collection includes approximately one hundred letters from Myers to Henry Sidgwick, dated from February 9, 1869 to June 3, 1900.

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